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arranging objects in simple groups, recognizing these groups when seen without counting, and in memorizing some of the simplest combinations of objects -- not of numbers. In the primary school all teachers of experience will agree that there is no difficulty in teaching the child to perform all the common arithmetical operations, provided the material with which he deals consists of objects which he can sense, and is not numerical symbols of abstract relations. Many schools are now omitting all arithmetic in the first one or two years of school. It would seem that this is a step in the right direction so far as the understanding of figure work is concerned, but there is no necessity for it so far as the calculation in terms of objects is concerned.

Abstract cause and effect are the logical simples of science as such. But scientific cause and effect are relations which do not belong to the sense areas of the brain. They seem to mature late. We need a lowerlevel science for children, which shall take advantage of their crude nature interests, mixed as they doubtless are with bits of myth and nature awe, but always in strong sense-pictures and hereditary impulses. The child has no interest nor power to follow out long logical sequences of causeand-effect relations. Barnes, Lindley, and others have shown that the child's thinking is done in a fragmentary sort of way, hopping and skipping from one strong mental picture to another, leaving out the connections which are contributed by higher-level thinking. There seems no place for the kindergarten classic which begins with the bread, proceeds to the baker and dough, then works back to the miller and flour, thence to the farmer and wheat. We encounter the same difficulty when we insist upon the child following the connection between water and evaporation, thence to clouds, their condensation by cold, and finally to raindrops. The child is delighted with the experiments, but that which we especially want him to get - the logical connections- -is just what he does not take strong hold of. His physical science belongs to the experimental kind, with all the reasons and the connections of abstract relation left out. Similarly in natural history he runs readily to collections, but he wearies when we attempt to add to a collection the abstract organic relations which make of it true science in an adult sense. There is a place in the kindergarten and primary school for a science upon the basis of the collecting instinct, but relational science must be left for a later period.

The development of the child's literary and historical interests shows us another phase of the same principle. The child loves the “Mother Goose" jingle, the fairy story, and the myth. The essential difference between this class of material and history and literature proper is that the latter require the mind to be focused upon the connection and relation between facts, while the jingle or the fairy story gives us merely the fragmentary sense-pictures, disconnected, and with a most cheery disregard of all causal relations. “Mother Goose” has its place with the youngest kindergarten children, giving place gradually to the fable and fairy story, and the historical interest does not make itself at all conspicuous, Mrs. Barnes has told us, until the ninth or tenth year. The child then begins to give his attention to the causal connections between these sensepictures.

Or we may illustrate from the ethical development of the child. The infant and young child confuse "what is right” with “what I want,” because they do not deal with abstract ethical relations. But repeated conflicts generally leave the child of four or five to nine or ten years in a state of conviction that wrong is what mamma forbids and that right is what mamma permits. He learns concretely and specifically what these wrongs and rights are. He has no abstract principles of right and wrong, and he follows the law in the letter, rarely in the spirit. He imitates others' actions, and is ready to justify any of his faults upon the ground that so and so did the same thing. Nevertheless, he clearly recognizes authority, accepting it as an incontrovertible fact of his sense experience. The kindergarten and the primary child need to be told crisply what is right and what is wrong, and to obey promptly. There is no place in philosophy for argument on the basis of ethical relations. In observing the child's story preferences we find that he is intensely interested in the problems of right and wrong, but always in a concrete black-and-white

The type of morality we find in Jack and the Beanstalk appeals to him, and leaves no place for the delicate shadings which the Sundayschool and the kindergarten story are prone to force upon him. In the matter of the education of the æsthetic nature, child study has the saine struggle over again to prevent the forced introduction into the kindergarten of delicate æsthetic relations which ripen normally in adolescence. In drawing, the many studies — those of Barnes, Brown, Lukens, O'Shea, Mrs. Maitland in this country, Sully in England, Ricci in Italy, and Passy in France -- agree conclusively in showing that drawing in the kindergarten and early primary years has little or no foundations in what we call ästhetic appreciation. The child's drawings are picture-writings of the fragmentary mental images which come into his mind, and he cares little or nothing whether they represent accurately some object. Accurate representation does not seem to appear until the child is ten years or more, under ordinary conditions. But there is an immense field for the kindergarten and primary school in developing a curriculum along the line of picture-writing. Such work manifestly strengthens all other fields of activity, especially language ; and after telling a story in pictures the child is better able to tell the story in words. The kindergarten child is not interested, to any appreciable degree, in drawing regular geometric forms, in design, nor in copy work. These interests are just beginning in the latter part of the primary school. Nor has the child the powers of accurate finger movement to do such work.

In the sister-art, music, studies have well demonstrated that young children are very fond of simple folk songs which have been used to express the emotions of religion, patriotism, and sentiments of the home. Music as a training in the appreciation of the masters has a later place, tho it is certainly true that the power to appreciate by ear and to express by voice is farther advanced in children than is any other artistic instinct.





The thoughts which I have to offer in this paper have been suggested to me, primarily, in looking over some returns made in the State Normal School here (Los Angeles) upon the “Spontaneous Play Activities of Children.” My conclusions, however, have been drawn in part by a comparison with studies in the same or related fields, especially those by Sheldon (“Institutional Activities of American Children,” American Journal of Psychology, Vol. IX, p. 425), Burk ("Bullying and Teasing, Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. VI, p. 336), Johnson (“Rudimentary Society among Boys,Johns Hopkins University Studies), Gulick (“ Psychological, Pedagogical, and Religious Aspects of Group Games,” Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. VI, p. 135). These studies and others have served to emphasize the very great educational significance of group activity among children. A great many cases reported to me by my students, as the result of direct and objective field work, so to speak, in the study of children, have served to emphasize the same thought. The query naturally presents itself as to what it is that constitutes the vital force, educationally, in the collective activity of children. It is the


of this paper to suggest a tentative answer to that question-one that may be, perhaps, suggestive of a method of approach and study of the problem in the future, tho it is not essentially original.

In comparing cases that have been brought to my attention, it has occurred to me that Le Bon's law of “the crowd” may be of service in getting at the common actuating principles in group activity among children. According to this author the mind of the crowd is something very different from a mere summation of individual minds. The crowd is characterized by a mental unity, in which each member has surrendered more or less of his individual self; which is, in fact, a new chemical

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compound, as it were. This mental unity is ordinarily not secured by a union of the highest, latest, and most individual traits of men, but by a fusion of their oldest, most instinctive traits. As soon as we become members of the crowd we are thrown back upon the unconscious substratum of action, upon heredity, upon the "genius of race." To put it neurologically, we descend to Hughlings Jackson's lower and middle levels, thus cutting out the higher centers of reflective action. In con sequence, the action of crowds is lacking in those elements which mark individual excellence and are the product of its most recent training, but rich in the fields of simple sensory and instinctive reaction. Keep the crowd in the realms of sense and instinct, appeal to it chiefly thru the law of suggestion, and you can determine its action. Raise it to the higher level, where each of its members is thrown upon resources that distinguish his recent training as an individual, and the crowd dissolves, because you have destroyed that which is the essence of a crowd, the unconscious, instinctive, and common substratum of action. I believe that our ordinary, everyday observation of the crowd will serve to substantiate in general Le Bon's law of its action. In heredity and that sense-life which men have in common we have some light thrown upon the unconsciousness, the irrationality, the impulsiveness and explosiveness, the great suggestibility, the fickleness and irresponsibility of crowds, as well as upon their strength and dangers.

I believe, furthermore, that this same law of the crowd is suggestive in studying and understanding certain features, at least, of the group activity of children. Indeed, Sheldon's study alone has shown that as children advance in years they tend more readily to engage in activity in large groups, and that in the later years of childhood, even well over into adolescence, the tendency is strongest to resort toịprimitive interests and instincts. Yet this is the period in which the child is supposed to be advancing very rapidly toward an individual dominance of reason. Observations in this field show that it is group activity, in fact, which most readily stimulates the older and primitive instincts in children. It is true, for instance, among the juvenile offenders in our large cities. Individually they are cowardly, for personal resources are narrow and limited. Collectively, the “old Adam” is seen to wax to gigantic proporTions. But the law may be illustrated not alone in criminal or degenerate youth. Healthy youth exhibits its workings equally, tho under less dangerous, often under favorable, conditions.

My thought is that the conditions of group activity are such as directly to favor the development of primitive instincts. Each boy of a group, left to himself, would seldom evince the violent outbreak of ancient instincts which often characterizes his group as a whole. If he is morally and physically healthy, he will not alone, for example, ordinarily indulge to the same extent in acts of cruelty, of depredation, and the like. In the group the unconscious substratum of fellowship, the instinctive in human nature, is a bond, powerful because it is deep-seated and old enough in nature to have become unconscious; it is ever ready, upon the favorable suggestion, good or bad, to level the features of individual training and to carry the actions of all in favor of a common feeling or a common impulse. This is the reason, for instance, why a contagion of questionable sport seems unaccountably to spread among boys of exceptionally good environment. The unfavorable suggestion sweeps them away by the strength of its appeal to the lower, racial instincts.

Yet, by no means all this influence in the group is unfavorable. To begin with, Gulick has called our attention to the fact that a large number of the best traditional physical games which appear as soon as boys begin to be active in larger groups, such as tag-games, prisoner's base, black-man, hare and hounds, etc., were evidently the outgrowth of a response to such old racial instincts as hunting, roaming, predatory contest, and the like. Sheldon's report reveals a large number of activities of the group order which are rooted in old instincts. Among the cases which have come under my own observation, among others, are many plays representative of hanging, nagging, terrible animal games, depredation, especially upon a rival party; cave dwelling, spying, robbers, haunting gloomy places, and enacting dismal and uncanny scenes, or telling like stories; charms and fetishism, following my leader, playing Indians, soldiers; initiation tests of courage, wits, spirit, and endurance; severe imaginary punishments; camping, carnivals, hunting, etc.

I am aware that two objections may be raised to my use of all these illustrations in substantiation of my thought. First, it may be said, many of these activities are too highly organized to belong to the law of the crowd. So far as their conscious development goes, this is quite true. Yet all which are not mere imitation of others probably found their origin in a very spontaneous and unorganized form of activity, but moved later toward the organized form in which tradition crystallized them. There are many instances observable of this spontaneous growth of group sports among children today. I have a record of one group of children who were constantly producing games in this way. They started with the simplest, apparently least purposeful, action -- mere outbursts of a sportive crowd spirit --- and developed set games to which naines were given.

In the second place, a great deal is claimed today for the related principles of suggestion and imitation. With a great deal of justice they have been regarded as constituting a well-nigh universal principle of connection between individuals and society. It may be claimed that many of the forms of group activity already cited are the result merely of the single universal instinct of imitation, which is common to all ages of life


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