arise which require the exercise of greater power by a city than is conferred by its existing charter. To confer such power by general legislation is difficult or impracticable by reason of the diverse interests of different cities. This was the precise situation in the State of Minnesota a few years ago under a constitutional amendment like that of Wisconsin, prohibiting special legislation for individual cities. To meet the situation, a further amendment of the constitution was adopted in 1897, followed by the passage of an act in that state in 1899, granting to all cities then existing under special charters, the privilege of framing and adopting their own charters substantially as here proposed. The cities of St. Paul and Duluth have already availed themselves of this privilege and are now governed by home-made charters, framed under a law held valid by the Supreme Court of that

state.

I have touched upon what seem to me the most important features of the plan of municipal reform embodied in the constitutional amendments and the provisions of a general charter proposed and recommended by the National League. Some of them will doubtless appear at first view to be extreme departures from old theories and customs,-even revolutionary in scope, method and effect. Their merit does not lie in their novelty, but in their adaptation to the end sought, which is the correction of the defects and the prevention of the recognized evils, abuses and corruptions of municipal government. It is quite certain that their adoption would tend to free the local interests of our cities from the influence and control of general politics and to secure a more capable and business-like administration of their affairs. The League submits them to the scrutiny and criticism of the intelligent and patriotic citizens of Wisconsin who desire such administration, in the sincere belief that the more they are examined the more will their essential features command their approval.

DOES THE NEW MUNICIPAL PROGRAM CONFER DANGEROUS POWERS ON THE MAYOR..

CHARLES RICHARDSON,

Vice-President, Philadelphia Municipal League.

In discussing the question which I have been requested to answer it may be as well to begin with the admission that the Municipal Program does confer dangerous powers on the mayor. The power to govern and act for others is always dangerous and liable to abuse, but it is a power inherent and essential in every conceivable form of human government, and the Municipal Program is no exception to the rule. In view of this fact it is obvious that instead of asking whether there is a grant of dangerous powers, our inquiry should be as to whether the grant is for more than such powers as are necessary or desirable for the work to be done, whether the powers are given to the proper official or officials, and whether they are accompanied with the best possible restrictions and safeguards against the abuses and dangers which cannot be entirely avoided until, in some far-off millennium officials can be found who will be free from the defects and failings of unperfected humanity.

Taking first the question as to whether the Municipal Program confers more than such powers as are necessary or desirable for the work to be done, we can see that in modern cities the duties and responsibilities of municipal governments have been greatly increased and multiplied since the time when the authorities had little more to do than to keep the peace and it was very generally believed that the best government was the one that did the least. Anything like an adequate statement of the duties of one of our large cities would much exceed the limits of this paper. In its numerous departments a modern municipality requires the services of the ablest financiers, lawyers, engineers, and medical,

sanitary and scientific experts of various kinds. It raises and expends immense sums of money; it has an army of clerks, laborers and other employes; it has the care, management and disposal of public buildings, water-works, streets, sewers, parks, bridges and other property, worth many scores of millions of dollars, and it has in many cases the power to grant or regulate the execution of contracts and franchises which may be of vital importance to its inhabitants for many generations. Upon the proper performance of its manifold duties its citizens must very largely depend for their supplies of water, wholesome food, artificial light and other necessities or conveniences, their facilities for transportation and recreation, the security of their persons and property, the promotion of their health, comfort and business prosperity and their protection against disease, dishonesty and vice. Reasons for believing that the extension of the powers of city governments is desirable as a means for promoting good citizenship will be referred to in the concluding portions of this paper, but whether such a belief is correct or incorrect, it is practically certain that there will be a still greater and more general increase of municipal functions in the near future. Without attempting anything more than these brief statements in regard to the present and prospective duties of city governments we may safely assume that the powers conferred upon them by the Municipal Program are not too great for the proper performance of the duties to be discharged.

The question as to whether the executive as distinguished from the legislative or policy determining portions of these necessary powers, should be vested in the mayor to the extent provided in the Program is a much more difficult one because the correctness of our answer must depend partly upon the accuracy with which we may be able to estimate the strength of forces and tendencies, that have not heretofore been brought into joint or conflicting action under such conditions as will be established by the adoption of the Municipal Program. We know, however, that in all great undertakings, concentration of power is essential for attaining the highest degree of efficiency and economy. As the armies of a nation may have many generals but only one commander-in-chief, and as a great corporation may have many

officers but only one president, so in every field of human enterprise and industry on a large scale, while there may be many employes, the best work, the greatest economy, the largest measure of success, can only be obtained by having one supreme head who can decide all questions, combine and direct all efforts, and secure the loyal service and harmonious co-operation of all subordinates.

It is clear also that the proposed increase of the mayor's powers and duties, his opportunities for rendering greater services to the people, and the certainty that he will receive the credit for all that he may be able to accomplish, will make the position far more honorable and attractive than it has hitherto been. A similar effect will result from the restrictions imposed on the mayor's power to make appointments, etc., as they will tend to protect him from corrupt solicitation, and from the personal antagonism of those who would otherwise demand improper favors. Under such conditions men of the highest character and ability will be much less likely to hesitate or decline to become candidates for the mayoralty.

It may be said further that when the executive powers of a city are concentrated in the hands of its mayor he will know, and he will realize that the people will know, that he and he alone must bear the blame or receive the praise for all that may be done or omitted to be done during his term of office. This knowledge will be a powerful stimulus to his efforts for the achievement of good objects and for the prevention of anything that might expose his administration or his assistants to charges of incompetence, corruption or misconduct.

The extent to which the Municipal Program will facilitate the action and promote the political education or development of the citizens is one of the strongest reasons for its adoption. Instead, of being confused and repelled by the conflicting and mendacious claims of comparatively unknown or unfit candidates for many different offices, the attention of the voters will be concentrated upon the character and abilities of a small number of the most prominent and best known men in the city; and when they realize that all the executive powers and responsibilities of the municipal government will be vested in the man whom they elect to the mayor

alty, they will soon learn to appreciate the importance of protecting and promoting their own interests by exerting themselves to secure the nomination and election of the best possible candidate. If we want to improve municipal government we should certainly try to simplify the duties of the voters and make it easy for them to reach their conclusions and declare their decisions.

The fear has been expressed that the concentration of municipal powers may cause the mayoralty to be more eagerly desired and more easily obtained by unscrupulous men, because they will have more offices and more patronage to promise or distribute. But as previously stated these powers must be granted to some person or persons, and it seems reasonable to believe that the control and use of them by corrupt means and for corrupt purposes, will be more difficult when they are vested in one closely watched and solely responsible mayor, that when they are divided among a number of officials who can assist each other to confuse the people, evade inquiry, deny charges and escape punishment. The weakness and evils inherent in a system which involves numerous candidates and many elected officials, have been so frequently demonstrated in the experience of American cities that the desirbility of a change seems obvious.

It must not be forgotten, moreover, that while the Municipal Program increases the mayor's power for accomplishing good objects, it at the same time takes away his strongest temptations and most of his opportunities for wrongdoing. In order to understand the method by which this can be done, we must remember that the great sources of municipal corruption and misgovernment, are the individuals and corporations which are always striving to obtain offices, contracts, franchises or other special privileges without regard to the interests of the public. So long as the control of a city government will give to those who possess it the unrestricted power to grant such favors, that control will be the supreme object of contention for the leaders of the worst elements, and the actual or promised use of it for corrupt purposes, will continue to be the principal means by which the partisan machines will obtain the workers and the funds and influence which they need for carrying the primaries and elections and for securing officials who will serve and obey those who