which, in coming out of the river of Providence, gave the two frigates that were posted to intercept her each of them so heavy a dose of her 18 and 12 pounders, that they had not the courage, or were not able, to pursue her. It seems to be desired that you will step up to Versailles, (where one will meet you,) in order to such a settlement of matters and plans with those who have the direction as cannot well be done by letter. I wish may be convenient to you to do it immediately.

it

"The project of giving you the command of this ship pleases me the more, as it is a probable opening to the higher preferment you so justly merit."

Jones must have been exceedingly gratified by this information. It was placing him at once at the summit of his wishes. The French Minister of Marine notified the wishes of his Most Christian Majesty to employ the American captain; and the Commissioners as formally signified their acquiescence. They say, "We readily consent that he should be at your Excellency's disposition, and shall be happy if his services may be in

any respect useful to the designs your Excellency has in contemplation."

Though Jones had already some experience of Marine Committees, and of the delays and insolence of office, it was quite impossible that he could have anticipated all the torture and vexation laid up in store for him by a proposal which at first sight appeared so fair and flattering. He made his acknowledgments to the minister in his best style; but probably thought less of the

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dignity of human nature," the slang of that day, long before all official connexion was finished between them. "I have no doubt," he says, "that many projects might be formed from the hints which I had the honour of sending lately for your inspection: had I been intrusted with the chief command, I would have held myself responsible for consequences."

"I am bound in honour to communicate faithfully to Congress the generous offer which the King now makes, of lending the Epervier in the meantime to be employed under my command, under the flag of America. I have now under my command a ship bound to America. On my arrival

there, from the former confidence of Congress, I have reason to expect an immediate removal into one of their best ships. I have reason to expect the chief command of the first squadron destined for an expedition, having in my possession several similar appointments; and when Congress see fit to appoint admirals, I have assurance that my name will not be forgot. These are flattering prospects to a man who has drawn his sword only upon principles of philanthropy, and in support of the dignity of human nature. But as I prefer a solid to a shining reputation, a useful to a splendid command, I hold myself ready, with the approbation of the Commissioners, to be governed

by you in any measures that may tend to distress

and humble the common enemy."

This letter, in several of its hints, shows some address on the part of Jones, who, it must be acknowledged, seldom, unless stirred by indignation or a sense of injury, slipped the opportunity of forwarding his own interests by an opportune hint or leading suggestion of hints and projects of a public nature his brain was at all times sin

gularly fertile. At this moment of excitement it teemed with bold ideas or fancies. To effect the destruction of Whitehaven was, as we have seen, one project. To take the Bank of Ayr, destroy that town, and probably Greenock and Port-Glasgow, with the shipping in the Clyde, was a yet bolder design. "Much," he says,

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might be done in Ireland, where ships worth 150,000 livres, or even 200,000, might be seized, London might be distressed, by cutting off the supply of coals carried from Newcastle,— the fishing at Campbelton might be destroyed, and many towns on the north-east coasts of England and Scotland might be burnt or laid under contribution." A more feasible project was the capture or destruction of the Baltic fleet.

"The

success of any of these, or of like enterprises," says Jones, in a letter to the French Minister of Marine," will depend in surprising well, and on despatch both in the attack and in the retreat; therefore it is necessary the ships should sail fast, and that their forces should be sufficient to repel any of the enemy's cruising frigates, two of which may perhaps be met at a time. It is scarce

ly conceivable how great a panic the success of any one of these projects would occasion in England. It would convince the world that their coasts are vulnerable, and would, consequently, hurt their public credit.

"If alarming the coast of Britain should be thought inexpedient, to intercept the enemy's West India or Baltic fleets, or their Hudson's Bay ships, or to destroy their Greenland fishery, are capital objects."

There is much in these plans that must either have been conceived in ignorance, or suggested by Jones for the purpose of merely amusing, or of quickening the motions of the French marine department. Even when, long afterwards, a force was obtained, not one of them was attempted save the abortive attack on Leith.

It has been noticed, that, after the engagement with the Drake, Captain Jones ordered Lieutenant Simpson under arrest for what appeared very satisfactory reasons. He had afterwards been annoyed by the Commissioners' dishonouring his draft, and he was now enraged by their conduct regarding Simpson, the offending officer. In