cific amount paid for each sale or drink, by whom paid and the name of the person receiving payment in each specific instance, whether each of the alleged sales were made as principal, agent, or employé, and whether drunk on the premises or carried away, if not drunk in the house or on the premises, and still in possession of the purchaser or purchasers, that the same be produced in court, that those present and the names of the witnesses against your mover be given, in order that your mover may have an opportunity to properly meet the issues raised, to summon witnesses and customers who may have been present when said alleged unlawful sales and transactions were made. "That each of the above facts, and the data demanded are important, material, and indispensable, necessary to enable your mover to intelligently and properly plead and prepare his defense in said cause, and to be informed reasonably of the charge or charges he is called upon to defend against, and without which he will be prejudiced and denied his legal rights under the Constitution and law of Louisiana, that the district attorney has such facts and data demanded in his possession, or is in a position to easily obtain same, whereas your mover cannot do so." The judge overruled the motion, assigning as his reasons the following: (Syllabus by the Court.) TAXATION (8 500*)-"ASSESSMENT"-ACTION TO ANNUL. "The bill of information shows the date when each sale was made, not only as to the sales While an action against the State Board upon which the state relies as part of the evi- of Appraisers to reduce an assessment must be dence to show the grog and tippling shop alleged brought at Baton Rouge, the domicile of that in the first count, but also the date of the par-made by it declared a nullity may be brought body, still an action to have an "assessment" ticular sale upon which the state relies to show the unlawful retailing alleged in the second and in the parish where the property sought to be third counts. It likewise gives the exact place exempted is situated. where the alleged grog shop was kept and conducted, and where the alleged sale relied on in the second and third counts was made. It al so gives the quantity and kind sold. The bill also states who made manual delivery of the liquors. Certainly the information given is ample to place defendants on their guard. This is the sole purpose of a bill of particulars. I refuse to order the state to give the name of the purchaser on the authority of State v. Selsor, 53 South. 737,1 recently decided and reported in the advance sheets of January. As relates to the rest asked and refused, it is likewise immaterial. "In overruling the motion for particulars I ruled and gave notice at the time that the particulars given in the information would be given the same effect as a bill of particulars given in reference to an application therefor." These reasons of the learned trial judge appear to us to have been entirely sufficient and conclusive. 1127 La. 513. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. § 500.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 549-555; vol. 8, pp. 7583, 7584.] Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; Thomas M. Burns, Judge. Action by the New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Company against Warren Thomas, Assessor, and the State Board of Appraisers and others. Judgment for de fendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded. Miller & Morphy, for appellant. Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., R. G. Pleasant, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lewis L. Morgan, Dist. Atty., for appellees. It is a distinction to be made between an action in reduction and an action in nullity. BREAUX, C. J. Plaintiff sued Warren | specified. The latter, as it goes to the enThomas, assessor of St. Tammany parish and tire invalidity of the tax, the time to have T. E. Brewster, sheriff, and the State Board it declared null is not limited, as it is in of Assessors, through Paul Capdevielle, State regard to a suit to reduce the assessment. Auditor, and Walter Guion, Attorney General, and the town of Mandeville, through its proper officers, and the town of Abita, through its proper officers, to have a judgment decreeing null the action of the State Board of Appraisers in deciding that in the year 1910 defendant's railroad is subject to taxation for that year. Also to compel these defendants to cancel all taxes on the railroad within the parish of St. Tammany appearing on the assessment roll. Plaintiff claimed that its railroad was completed within the limits of St. Tammany parish and within the town named above during the years 1907 and 1908. Plaintiff claims that the property is exempt for the reason that the road was completed in time to be within the constitutional provision of the amendment adopted in the year 1904. The Attorney General, representing the State Board of Appraisers, the assessor, through his counsel, the sheriff, and the town of Mandeville filed exceptions to plaintiff's suit, averring as the ground of exception that the suit to reduce, change, and set aside an assessment on railroad property ought to be brought against the State Board of Appraisers at Baton Rouge. The former must be brought at the domicile of the board. It is because, doubtless, the matter of assessment and appraisement is within the control of the board and remains within its control. While it is different as to the latter. The tax may be attacked as null and void either because of exemption or for any cause long after it has passed out of the control of the board. The assessment of the Board of Appraisers is final unless reduced by suit for reduction to be brought against the board at the capital. Under article 226 of the Constitution, it is made the duty of the Board of Assessors to assess the property belonging to corporations, associations, individuals employed in railway, telegraph, telephone, sleeping car and express business. The law adopted to carry out this article of the Constitution directs that the board shall assess the property, owned as before indicated, for taxation, and it is given power to obtain information in order to ascertain values of property. Throughout, reference is made to the assessment of property and nothing regarding The exception of the Board of Assessors exemption. The whole duty is confined to was heard. the assessment of property. The court held that it was well founded and dismissed the suit. To assess property is to place a value upon it, while to exempt property presents From the judgment dismissing its demand, other issues. plaintiff prosecutes this suit. The action is not brought to reduce an assessment, but to set aside the tax as null because of the alleged exemption of the property from taxation. If the present action can be classed as an action in reduction, suit should have been brought against the board. We have not found it possible to agree with the view that an action to reduce the The former must be brought within the time assessment is an action in nullity. 129 LA.-5 The Board of Appraisers is not authorized by any special provision of law to pass upon the right of exemption. It has not the exclusive right to pass upon the question whether or not the property is exempt. As the language of the statute does not indicate that it was the intention of the Legislature to compel the taxpayer to sue the board exclusively at its domicile, to the taxpayer the right remains to bring suit at the situs of the property. We infer from the law upon the subject that it is the intention that the authorities in charge of the tax collecting department shall to some extent act together and come to a common understanding in regard to property which is exempt from taxation. This can best be accomplished by making the Board of Appraisers a party to the suit in the parish or at the locality where the suit is brought. In this instance, it is important that the Board of Assessors be made a party, for it has acted upon the question at issue and decided that the property is not exempt. In a suit to test the question whether it is exempt or not, the board is a necessary party. We are of opinion that there is no good reason why in every case it should not be made a party when it was proposed to have property exempted from taxation which is subject to assessment and valuation by the Board of Appraisers. In a number of decisions, the question of the absolute nullity of the tax has been decided contradictorily with the officer who had it in charge to collect the tax. That is a direct and practical remedy. The other is not as direct, and, besides, we do not understand that it is the law. To illustrate: When the Board of Appraisers have made their assessment, they return it to the assessor and other local authorities to collect the taxes. When the board has assessed the property and it has passed out of its hands, as it has been referred to the sheriff to collect the taxes, it then would present inconvenience to sue the board in matter of exemption. If, after the return has been made, the taxpayer whose assessment has been made by this board discovers that his property is to be sold for taxes although exempt from taxation, as this board meets annually once a year, the property might be sold before it would be possible for him to have a hearing before the board. It does look more regular to let the taxpayer proceed against the local authorities and make the Board of Appraisers a party to the suit. In this way the authority of the state is recognized, its interest protected, and the taxpayer is not placed to great inconvenience in order to obtain a hearing. We mention this to add that it is not probable that the legislator sought to include the action of nullity as an action to be brought against the board in Baton Rouge. The ruling should not be toward restricting and contracting the methods whereby parties may reach the courts unless it is evidently the intention of the lawmaking authority to thus contract and limit the jurisdiction and confine it to one court at a distance. That is not the tendency of modern law. It is the duty of the board, we have seen, to see to the proper appraisement of property. We have not found that it is the duty of the Board of Appraisers to compel the taxpayer in actions of nullity to resort for the assertion of his rights to the place at which the Board of Appraisers has its domicile. Although it has its domicile at the capital, its jurisdiction extends over all the state, and when that jurisdiction is questioned, or it is deemed that the board is in error wherever the collection of a tax that is null and void is attempted, the court at the domicile of the taxpayer has, under our construction, the jurisdiction to act, provided the board is made a party. The board makes returns to the different parochial and municipal authorities of the property assessed and its valuations to the respective jurisdiction. See section 6 of Act No. 106 of 1898. It having made return to the local authorities, the action to annul may be brought in the parish in which the property is assessed, and, as it is returnable to the locality where assessed, if there be illegality in the proceedings, it may be brought to the attention of the court at the place where the property was assessed. When an officer is proceeding to collect a state tax illegally on account of an assessment that is null and void, or for other similar reasons, or for some illegality in the method followed in collecting, the proceeding may be arrested by injunction. Budd v. Houston, 36 La. Ann. 959, approvingly referring to Blackwell on Tax Titles, p. 583. In a number of cases the suit was brought against the sheriff alone to enjoin him. For instance, in the case of Hollingsworth v. Tax Collector, 45 La. Ann. 222, 12 South. 1. and in the case of L. & A. Ry. Co. v. Tax Collector, 121 La. 997, 46 South. 994, the police jury, the assessor and the tax collector were made parties. See, also, the late case of the Board of Trustees of Seminary College v. Sheriff, 128 La. 258, 54 South. 790. The tax collector alone stood in judgment to put an end to the exemption of the property. While it is true that the question was not directly presented in these cases, it shows the impression created on a number of minds after having read the law upon the subject. For reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is annulled, avoided, and reversed. It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the case be remanded to the district court; that it be reinstated and tried in accordance with the views above expressed. (55 South. 739.) No. 18,526. WINDISCH-MUHLHAUSER BREWING CO. v. SIMMS. (June 15, 1911.) (Syllabus by the Court.) BANKRUPTCY (§ 431*)—ATTACHMENT-FORTHCOMING BOND-RELEASE OF SURETY. Where the property of the debtor was attached and released on bond less than four months before he was adjudged a bankrupt, and the debtor was subsequently discharged, held, that the surety on the bond was released from all liability. Dec. Dig. § 431.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; John S. Boatner, Judge. Action by the Windisch-Muhlhauser BrewIng Company against A. P. Simms. ment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Judg John Dale and Ratcliff & Truly, for appellant. Ernest E. Brown and John S. Boatner, Jr., for appellee. LAND, J. On June 18, 1909, the plaintiff instituted this suit on an open account for $3.013.64 against the defendant, a resident of the state of Mississippi, and attached his property on the ground of his nonresidence. On the next day the property seized was released on bond for $5,000, with the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company as surety. On November 2, 1909, further proceedings were stayed on the ground that the defendant had been duly adjudged a bankrupt on September 3, 1909, in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis trict of the State of Mississippi. The de- The court said, inter alia, that the surety fendant was duly discharged as a bankrupt on May 14, 1910. bound himself to satisfy such judgment as the plaintiffs might obtain against the defendants in the suit between them, and that the event on which the surety undertook and bound himself to pay never happened. On June 6, 1910, the defendant pleaded his discharge in bar of further proceedings in this suit. On October 3, 1910, the plaintiff filed an answer to the application for discharge asserting its right to proceed with the cause to judgment against defendant, with a perpetual stay of execution as against him, reserving its rights against the surety com-cy pendente lite did not release the surety pany on the release bond. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, sustaining his plea in bar, and dismissing plaintiff's suit, with costs. Plaintiff has appealed. Section 67f of the United States bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (chapter 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450]), reads as follows: "That all levies, judgments, attachments or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a peti tion in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as part of the estate of the bankrupt." Section 16 of the same act provides: The doctrine of this case has never been overruled or modified. In Serra é Hijo v. Hoffman & Co., 30 La. Ann. 67, it was held that the defendant's discharge in bankrupt on their appeal bond. In that case a money judgment had been rendered against the defendants, who thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment. That case was decided on the well-recognized rule that the liability of a surety is not affected by the discharge in bankruptcy of the principal debtor. Section 16 of the bankrupt act of 1898 merely recognizes this general rule of law. Section 67f of the same statute, however, strikes with nullity all levies, attachments, or liens obtained through legal proceedings against an insolvent at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy in case he is adjudged a bankrupt. It is difficult to conceive how attachment proceedings thus pronounced null and void can produce any legal effect. The attachment being dissolved by op "The liability of a person who is a codebtor with, or guarantor, or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the dis-eration of the statute, nothing is left but a charge of such bankrupt." In Keyes v. Shannon, 8 Rob. 172, 41 Am. Dec. 299, our predecessors decided that where property attached was released on the execution of bond with surety, and the debtor, before judgment, made a surrender of his property under the state insolvent laws, the surety will be discharged. The court held that the bond represented the property so far as the attaching creditors were concerned, that the cession of property dissolved the attachment, and that plaintiff, having no privilege on the property, could have no right of action on the bond. In suit in personam which is stayed by the Where an attachment is released on bond, the condition is that the defendant will satisfy such judgment, to the value of the property attached, as may be rendered against him in the pending suit. C. P. art. 259. No proceeding can be had against the surety on such a bond until after the judgment has |