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may fairly imply it. It is usual to begin by shewing that the defendants all know each other, and that a certain degree of intimacy exists between them, so as to shew that their conspiring together is not improbable; and if to this can be added evidence of any consultations or private meetings between them, there is then a strong foundation for the evidence to be subsequently given, namely, of the overt acts of each of the defendants, in furtherance of the common design. But although the proof above mentioned is desirable, because it satisfies the jury as you proceed, and they are better able to apply the evidence of the overt acts when it is afterwards given: yet, it is not essentially necessary, as the jury may imply the conspiracy of all, from the overt acts of each. In R. v. Brisac & Scott, (4 East, 171,) Grose, J. said, "conspiracy is a matter of inference, deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them, and which hardly ever are confined to one place." Evidence must then be given of such acts of the defendants respectively, from which the jury may fairly and reasonably imply that they all have been acting with one common design, and that they designed to effect that which is stated in the indictment to be the object of the conspiracy. If the prosecutor fail in proving this, as against any of the defendants, that defendant must be acquitted. See R. v. Pollman et al. 2 Camp. 231, 229. But where the indictment charged a conspiracy falsely to indict a man, with intent to extort money from him, and the jury found that the defendants conspired to indict him with that intent, but not falsely the Court held that the word 'falsely' might be rejected as surplusage, as it was equally an offence to conspire to indict a man with intent to extort money from him, whether the charge were true or false; and in criminal cases, it is sufficient for the prosecutor to prove so much of the charge, as constitutes an offence punishable by law. R. v. Hollingberry, 4 B. & C. 329.

General evidence of the conspiracy charged, may be received in the first instance, although it cannot affect a defendant until afterwards brought home to him, or to an agent employed by him. The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 302. R. v. Hammond & Webb, 2 Esp. 719. S. P.

3. The overt acts, or so many of them as may be necessary to prove the conspiracy against all the defendants: This subject has been above already alluded to. Every overt act, to be evidence, must have a tendency at least to prove, either the general nature of the conspiracy, or that one or more of the defendants were operating towards effecting that, which is charged in the indictment to have been the object of the conspiracy. Where the defendants were charged with a conspiracy to cause them

selves to be esteemed persons of property and opulent, for the purpose of defrauding one A. B. and other tradesmen ; and after evidence was given of their having hired a house in a fashionable street, and representing themselves to one tradesman, whom they had employed to furnish it, as persons of large fortune, it was proposed to prove that they had made similar representations to another tradesman, which was objected to: but Lord Ellenborough, C.J. held that there was no ground for the objection; he said that this being an indictment for a conspiracy to carry on the business of common cheats, cumulative instances were necessary to prove the offence. R. v. Roberts et al. 1 Camp. 399. In R. v. Hunt and others, (4 B. & Ald. 566,) which was a prosecution for a conspiracy to cause great numbers of people to meet at a certain place in Manchester, for the purpose of disturbing the public peace, and of exciting the King's subjects to discontent, hatred of the Government, &c. the prosecutor at the trial gave in evidence certain resolutions passed at a meeting previously holden in Smithfield, London, for the same avowed purpose as the meeting at Manchester, namely, Parliamentary Reform, at which Hunt presided as chairman; and this being objected to, on a motion for a new trial, on the ground that there was no evidence to shew that it was intended to propose the same resolutions at the Manchester meeting, the Court held that, as against Hunt, who, though a stranger, was invited to act, and acted as chairman also at the Manchester meeting, the evidence was properly received, as shewing his sentiments and views with respect to Parliamentary Reform, and to the assembling of multitudes of persons to hear speeches and resolutions under that pretext. It was also proved at the same trial, that large bodies of persons, who attended the meeting at Manchester, came from a distance, organized, and with a regularity of step and movement resembling that of a military march, and that one of these bodies came from a place called “ White Moss," and evidence was given that a number of persons were previously seen at White Moss before the day break, practising the marching step, and that upon seeing the witnesses, they ill-treated them, called them spies, and extorted from one of them an oath never to be a King's man, or to name the name of a king; and it was also proved that some of the parties, in coming into Manchester on the day of the meeting in military order, as above mentioned, on passing the house of a witness who had been so ill-treated, expressed their disapprobation of him by hissing: this evidence as to what occurred at White Moss being objected to, the Court held that what took place at White Moss, coupled with the conduct of those marching to the meeting, in hissing as they passed the witness's house, was unquestionably competent evidence as to the general character and intention of the meeting, and was therefore properly received. Id. Upon a

trial of some journeymen hatters for a conspiracy to cause another journeyman to be dismissed from his employment, for not paying a fine of a guinea which they had imposed upon him, it was proved that the defendants and other journeymen hatters met at his master's manufactory, in a garret, and the prosecutor being sent for, and appearing before them, they told him he must pay a guinea; it was then proposed to ask him whether he heard any person at the meeting say any thing about the appointment of delegates; this was objected to, on the ground that the declarations of others could not be evidence against the defendants, who could be affected only by their own declarations; to which it was answered, that in conspiracy, wherever you lay a sufficient foundation by evidence of several having met for the purposes of the conspiracy, the declarations of any of the parties, made at any time or place, relating to the object of the conspiracy, was evidence as against all of this opinion was Hotham, B. who tried the case, and the defendants were convicted. R. v. Salter et al. 5 Esp. 125. Perhaps the safer general rule to lay down upon the subject, would be this: wherever the writings or words of any one of the parties charged with or implicated in a conspiracy, can be considered in the nature of an act done in furtherance of the common design, it is admissible in evidence, not only as against the party himself, but as proof of an act, from which (inter alia) the jury may infer the conspiracy itself; wherever the writings or words of such a party amount to an admission merely of his own guilt, and cannot be deemed an act done in furtherance of the common design, in that case they can be received in evidence merely as against the party, and not as evidence of the conspiracy, and in strictness ought not to be offered in evidence until after the conspiracy has been proved aliunde; but wherever the writings or words of such party, not being in the nature of an act done in furtherance of the common design, merely tend to implicate others, and not to accuse himself, they ought not to be received in evidence for any purpose.

If a written instrument form any part of the offence, no objection can be made to its being given in evidence, on the ground of its not being stamped. R. v. Fowle & Elliott, 4 Car. & P. 592.

Witnesses.] A wife cannot be a witness for any other parties indicted with her husband for a conspiracy, even although called, not to disprove the conspiracy, but to prove merely that the others took no part in the transaction in question; for her husband may possibly be benefitted by it. R. v. Locker et al, 5 Esp. 107. and see R. v. Frederick & Tracy, 2 Str. 1095. Nor can a defendant who has pleaded guilty, be called as a witness for those who are tried. See R. v. Lafone et al. 5 Esp.

154. On the other hand, where three were indicted for conspiracy, and defended separately; and after two of them had addressed the jury and closed their cases, the third addressed the jury, throwing the whole guilt upon the other two defendants, and then called a witness whom he examined as to a conversation between himself and one of the other defendants; the counsel for the prosecution then began to cross-examine the witness as to other conversations which had also taken place between the third defendant and the other, which was objected to on the part of the other defendant, on the ground that such a crossexamination might establish quite a new case against him: but, Abbott, C. J. said, that as the third defendant had called the witness, and examined him as to one conversation, the counsel for the prosecution could not be prevented from cross-examining him as to other conversations between the same parties; but it might be a matter for future consideration, whether the other defendant, after such evidence, might not have a right to address the jury upon it. R. v. Kroehl et al. 2 Stark. 343.

Verdict, &c.] After the whole of the evidence is given, the jury have to decide upon three questions, namely, 1st. whether from the whole of the evidence, (if there be no express proof of the conspiracy) they can fairly infer that there was a conspiracy; 2d. whether that conspiracy was to effect the particular object stated in the indictment; and 3d. whether all the defendants or which of them were concerned in it. If they acquit all but one, they must acquit that one also, however criminal they may think him, unless the indictment charge him with having conspired with other persons who are not tried; for one person alone cannot be guilty of a conspiracy. 1 Hawk. c. 72, s. 8. And for the same reason, a husband and wife cannot alone be indicted for a conspiracy, for they are but one person in law. Id. But where two conspire, and one dies, the other may be indicted and tried for the conspiracy. R. v. E. Nicholls, 2 Str. 1227.

Where four were indicted for a conspiracy, and two pleaded not guilty, one pleaded in abatement, to which plea there was a demurrer, and the fourth did not appear; the record as to the two who pleaded not guilty was taken down for trial, and one was acquitted, and the other found guilty of having conspired with the party who pleaded in abatement; the demurrer was then argued, and judgment of respondeas ouster given, and that defendant then pleaded not guilty; the defendant who was found guilty was next brought up for judgment, and upon his part it was objected that no judgment ought to be passed upon him, until after the trial of him who had before pleaded in abatement, for if the latter should be acquitted, it would be a virtual acquittal of the other, and the judgment would be erroneous : but the Court said that they would not be justified in deferring a

judgment, fully warranted by the verdict already given, merely from the possibility of the acquittal of the other party. R. v. J. S. S. Cooke, 5 B. & C. 538.

SECTION 6.-Proceedings and Practice of the Court of Quarter Sessions, as a Criminal Court.

1. The Grand and Petty Juries.

Qualification.] Every man, between the ages of 21 and 60, residing in any county in England, who shall have in his own name or in trust for him, within the same county, 101. by the year above reprises in lands or tenements, whether of freehold, copyhold or customary tenure, or of ancient demesne, or in rents issuing out of any such lands or tenements, or in such lands, tenements and rents, taken together, in fee-simple, fee-tail, or for the life of himself or some other person;-or who shall have within the same county 201. above reprizes in lands or tenements, held by lease for an absolute term of 21 years or more, or for any term of years determinable on any life or lives ;—or who being a householder shall be rated or assessed to the poor rate, in Middlesex, on a value not less than 301., or in any other county on a value not less than 201.;—or who shall occupy a house containing not less than 15 windows:-shall be qualified and liable to serve on grand juries in Courts of Sessions of the Peace, and on petty juries for the trial of all issues joined in such Courts of Sessions of the Peace, and triable in the county, riding, or division in which every man so qualified respectively shall reside. 6 G. 4, c. 50, s. 1. In Wales, the qualification is three-fifths of the qualifications above mentioned. ̄Id.

In all corporations within the late Municipal Corporation Act, to which a separate Quarter Sessions is or shall be granted, every burgess is qualified and liable to serve on grand juries in such borough, and also upon juries for the trial of all issues joined in any Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace, triable within the borough of which such person shall be a burgess. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 121.

If persons serve on a jury, who are not qualified, it is only matter of challenge, and must be objected to, if at all, by way of challenge. Semb. See R. v. Sutton et al. 8 B. & C. 417.

Exemptions.] Peers are exempt from serving on juries; so are the Judges of the Courts of Record at Westminster; Clergymen in holy orders; Priests of the Roman Catholic faith, who have taken and subscribed the oaths and declarations required by law; persons who teach or preach in a congregation of Pro

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