miles, and the voyage would take a propeller, traveling by wind and steam, about thirty-five days. It is too long a voyage for a vessel to make by steam alone, unless she carries so much coal as to swallow up all her profits, so that all steamers traversing the Pacific will be obliged to call at Honolulu, on the westward voyage, to fill up with coal for the longest stretch of her journey. Depôts of coal could be easily formed there by colliers from Vancouver's Island, where there are large beds of excellent quality. No quantity could be obtained at Honolulu at present, very little fuel being required in that equable climate; but much of the wood used for building purposes throughout the group, is brought from Puget's Sound and the Columbia river, a distance almost as great as it would be necessary to transport coal. It is therefore seen that Honolulu would be an important station for any line of steamers traversing the Pacific, and the facilities for obtaining supplies which would soon spring up would contribute materially to the success of the line. The harbor is safe, and easily accessible, the channel through the reef is well buoyed, and the wharfage facilities quite adequate for any trade likely to be found there for ten years to come. Although the Sandwich Islands are 17° south of San Francisco, and 11° south of Shanghai, the great apparent deflection to be made by vessels touching there is, in reality, no deflection at all, for the prevalent winds compel all vessels from California to China to pass within a hundred miles of the group. The winds blowing into the harbor of San Francisco, for nine months of the year, are strong northwest gales, and any vessel going west is compelled to run down as rapidly as possible on the starboard tack, until in the latitude of 30° north. It would be useless to beat or steam against these gales; they blow with greater force in this ocean than in the Atlantic, in the same latitude. From Lat. 30° to about Lat. 27° north, are variable winds and calms, which a steamer would soon dash through, but which sometimes detain the sailing ships four or five days. Passing the variables, a ship finds herself in strong northeast trades, blowing with steady power all the year, and at times stretching as far south as 5° north latitude.* They are strongest about the parallel of 20° north the parallel which cuts Hawaii, varying with the season for two or three degrees in either direction. The northeast trades of the Pacific are steadier than those of the North Atlantic; they are very much like the fine southeast trades, from

*KERHALLET, in his "Considérations générales sur l'Océan Pacifique, 1856," gives the following table, from observations of ninety-two vessels:

the Cape of Good Hope to St. Helena, but they never rise to the power of the grand trades of the Indian Ocean. Still, a ship or steamer, if she, is careful to keep in their center, is sure of fine weather, a fresh breeze, and a quiet sea, for at least 4,500 miles of her voyage. Most of those who suppose that the great breadth of the Pacific has always been the most serious obstacle to steam operations, thinking only of the tempestuous North Atlantic, and the powerful machinery needed for quick passages there, forget that, for so long a portion of the voyage, steam would be only an auxiliary to be used in an emergency, such as a day of light wind. If a propeller was provided with an abundance of studdingsail gear, she could sail more rapidly than she could steam, for at least half the distance from California to China. Keeping in the center of the trades until after she had passed the Marianne Islands, or about 140° east longitude, she could then head directly for. Shanghai, using her machinery from meridian 130° east until in the Middle sea (often confounded with the China sea), where, for six months of the year, she could run into port, with the southwest monsoon blowing, at the rate of nine knots per hour. We say Shanghai, for reasons to be explained hereafter, believing that port to be the best terminus for a line of California steamers. On the return voyage, it would not be expedient to call at the Sandwich Islands, if it could possibly be avoided. If it was deemed advisable, she might touch at one of the ports of Japan-Yokuhama, for instance-and start from thence with a full supply of coal. Sailing from Japan to the eastward, she could use the Great Circle route with advantage, shortening the distance to 4,500 miles, with strong westerly winds. The southwest monsoon would aid her for six months in reaching Japan, and she would at all seasons always have the advantage of the Kuro-Siwo, or Japanese gulf stream, which sweeps past Japan as the gulf stream of the Atlantic sweeps past the coast of the United States, its powerful current having been felt as far east as 140° west longitude, although its limits are not yet well defined. If a steamer could make this distance of 4,500 miles, by sail and steam, in twenty days, and carry coal enough for the trip, no deflection from her direct course would be necessary; but in case of stormy weather, especially in winter, the turbulent sea navigators report in these high latitudes would make it a task for a powerful and well appointed steamer. By stretching more to the southward, milder weather and a smoother sea would be found, in a few days' steaming; but more coal would be burnt in contrary winds and calms. Whether any steamers likely to be used in this trade could make such a stretch, with a succession of heavy gales and a confused sea, without coaling, is a question that can only be answered by experience; but it is not probable that any line of steamers would be able to run, without frequently stopping at Honolulu, although it should be their aim to avoid doing so. Commodore TATNALL, in the Powhatan, with the Japanese Embassy, in 1860, tried to make the trip from Kanagawa to San Francisco, direct, with coal for twenty-four days, but was obliged, on the twentieth day, to put into Honolulu to fill his coal bunkers. Although compelled to turn back, in this case, by which she lost two days, the Powhatan made the trip from Japan to California in thirty days' steaming. In any event, the deflection to Honolulu would not consume more than four days, and in all probability the eastern trip from Shanghai can be made with ease, under favorable circumstances, in thirty days. Sailing vessels sometimes

make it, starting with the fair monsoon, in forty-two days, and some clipper will yet make the voyage in thirty-five. We will allow that small propellers, which are the class at present best adapted for this trade, will be compelled to call at Honolulu for coal, both coming and going.

To recapitulate the advantages possessed by these routes, for vessels with steam as auxiliary :

In either direction, it would be safe to count on ten or fifteen days of strong and fair winds, in which sails alone would be required, and on six or seven in which little aid would be needed from the machinery.

In the tradewind zone the steady action of the winds, and the equatorial heat, make a favorable current, varying from fifteen to forty miles a day. On the return voyage, the Kuro-Siwo or Black Stream, so called from its dark blue water, like that of the Gulf Stream, runs from the Loo Choo Islands, along the coast of Japan, and northeast toward the Aleutian Islands, with a velocity varying from twenty-five to eighty miles a day, the mean from the Loo Choo Islands to 140° west longitude being about thirty-five miles. On the coast of California there is a southerly set of fifteen miles a day. On both trips, the wind being abaft, the swell of the sea is favorable.

Indeed, there is no other long route in the world where the advantages are so uniformly in favor of the ship. The nearest approach to it is that between England and Australia, a very much longer route, but one on which "auxiliary " steam screws ply with success.

Such being the route, it would be well to consider what kind of vessels are best adapted to it. There is a class of propellers on our northern lakes, starting from Cleveland, of about six hundred tons, which seem to combine all the requisites for this trade except that they have the schooner rig, which will not do for vessels intended to spread every inch of canvas in the tradewinds. Give them the bark rig, with iron masts and spars, and plenty of studding sail gear, and they are just the thing. The northeast trades blow from east-northeast and east-by-north nearly aft, and do not shift more than a point for days together. After passing the meridian (180°), at certain seasons, they draw more to the eastward, and again blow as steadily at east and east-by-south. These propellers consume little coal, have good passenger accommodations, and their light draft makes them all the better, for after they become unfit for sea service they would be admirably adapted for the Chinese rivers. Their tonnage would do for a beginning. Let them only make regular and tolerably rapid passages, and very soon such a trade would be built up as would call for the largest and best ocean steamers which money can obtain. Whatever class of steamers may navigate the Pacific Ocean, they must, to be economical, be modified to profit by the strong and steady winds which give an advantage, while they last, to the sailingship over the steamer.

(To be continued.)`

THE AGE OF GREENBACKS-DEBT AND CURRENCY.

ARE WE PROSPEROUS ?*

SECTION 1. Throughout the loyal States the hum of human industry is heard, labor is fully employed, human skill and ingenuity are opening new channels of production, new schemes and enterprises are constantly brought forward and prosecuted with energy, trade is active, and money plenty; and, everywhere, in the marts of trade, in the legislative hall, at the stock exchange, and the political gathering, are heard rejoicings over our prosperity.

Remote from the scene of conflict between contending armies, ignorant of the horrors of war, and experiencing but little inconvenience, and, as we think, large profits from its destructive powers, we are living happily under the impression that we are "prosperous," and are, to an alarmning extent, indifferent respecting its speedy and successful termination.

2. Our so-called "prosperity " has had the effect to draw off our attention, allay our excitement, quiet our fears, and stupefy our sensibilities relative to the great conflict in which we are engaged; and the principal reason why men do not volunteer with alacrity is because of this delusive prosperity which abounds at home. There is no want of able-bodied men, for our streets are filled with them; but it is because neighbors, friends, and companions are supposed to be making their fortunes by speculations, or because labor is completely supplied with steady employment and high wages, that even the heavy bounties provided do not offer sufficient inducements for men to enter the service. Thus it is that this nominal prosperity, which is, to a great extent, the product of the war, is the proximate cause why war languishes for want of men to fill up its armies.

3. It appears to me, however, that this "prosperity is, to a great extent, a popular delusion, that it rests upon a fictitious basis, and although presenting to the public mind a specious and plausible appearance, when clothed in its" glittering generalities," it is nevertheless imaginary rather than real, and illusive rather than actual. Believing thus, and entertaining the conviction that the only way to secure prosperity is by securing

*The prevalence of erroneous impressions relative to our real condition, the tendency of which is to encourage general extravagance, excessive importations, and a prolongation of the war, has induced me to give expression, in the following, to a few thoughts upon the subject, based, as I believe, upon right principles, for the purpose of correcting popular misapprehension, and arousing the public mind to the consideration of the actual condition of our affairs, the right appreciation of which is so essential to our prosperity as a nation.

In speaking of the North, says Mr. COBDEN: "They are mistaken if they think they can carry on a civil war like this, drawing a million of men from productive industry, to be engaged in the processes of destruction, to spend $1,500,000,000, they are deluded if they think they can carry on a war like that without a terrible collapse, sooner or later, and a dreadful prostration in every part of the community."

A. W. S.

the speedy and successful termination of the war, it seems desirable that some effort should be made to check the spread of this popular error, and bring the public mind to a more correct appreciation of our true condition.

4. Apparent prosperity generally precedes disaster. In our own history we have experienced severe monetary disasters, the most, if not all, of which have been preceded by great apparent prosperity, the sequel of which proved conclusively that our nominal prosperity was, to a considerable extent, a phantom, as it resulted in disaster to thousands who were deceived by its pretentious appearance.

5. In attempting to correct a popular error, I am aware I have a difficult task to perform; for popularisms, when they are supported by so many superficial appearances, and harmonize so beautifully with our feelings and desires, are with great difficulty overthrown. I approach the subject, therefore, reluctantly. So general is the belief in "our prosperity," its superficial appearances are so fascinating and bewildering, that it seems almost unkind to disturb the tranquil course of thought by endeavoring to look beneath the surface.

6. In what does true prosperity consist? A short and, I believe, correct answer is, in the productive employment of labor. For it is by the labor of the people that all subsist, and, when that labor is actively and productively employed, when the capital and skill of the nation are united with the industry of the country in acquiring the greatest possible amount of produce, then it is that the nation may be said to be truly prosperous, and to become wealthy to the extent of its surplus products. Conversely, it must be admitted that, when a large proportion of people are non-producers, and another large proportion are engaged in unproductive employments, that people cannot be said to be truly prosperous, as it is by the unproductiveness of labor that nations decay.

In dealing with this question, I wish to abstract it from all political relations and associations, and view it, so far as it relates to the wealth and productive prosperity of the country. It is, therefore, material and not political prosperity which we are to examine.

7. According to common report, we have nearly one million men in the service of the Government. These men, with thousands of office-holders, are non-producers, and the value of their labor is an absolute loss of productive capital to the country. Then, we have nearly a million engaged in unproductive employments, or, in other words, the manufacture of the materials of war, which is like the complete destruction of so much capital, so far as any increase of wealth is concerned.

Says J. S. MILL," By unproductive labor will be understood labor which does not terminate in the creation of material wealth; which, however largely or successfully practiced, does not render the community and the world at large richer in material products, but poorer by all that is consumed by the laborers while so employed."

Our immense armies are, therefore, not only non-producers, but are destroyers and consumers of the capital of the country. And, while other labor produces more than it consumes, these classes produce comparatively nothing, involving a loss to the country, not only of the productive labor of these large classes, but also the losses which arise from waste and destruction of material incident to war.

A vast amount of real capital or wealth is thus withdrawn from pro