tine divisions within the new States will arise, which may lead to the recall of the Spanish power, as the Stuarts were recalled in England, and the Bourbons in France, at the close of their respective revolutions?

We should not deceive ourselves. Amidst all the political changes, of which the new States are destined to bet he theatre, whatever party or power may be uppermost, one spirit will animate them all, and that is, an invincible aversion from all political connexion with Spain, and an unconquerable desire of independence. It could not be otherwise. They have already tasted the fruits of independence. And the contrast between what their condition now is, in the possession of free commerce, liberal institutions, and all the faculties of their country, and its population allowed full physical and moral development, and what it was, under Spain, cramped, debased, and degraded, must be fatal to the chimerical hope of that monarchy, if it be cherished, by any means whatever to re-establish her power. The cord which binds a colony to its parent country, being once broken, is never repaired. A recollection of what was inflicted and what was borne, during the existence of that relation, the pride of the former governing power, and the sacrifices of the interests of the colony to those of the parent, widen, and render the breach between them, whenever it occurs, perpetual. And if, as we may justly suppose, the embittered feelings excited by an experience of that unequal connexion, are in proportion to the severity of the parental rule, they must operate with irresistible force on the rupture which has taken place between Spain and her Colonies, since in no other instance has it been exerted with such unmitigated rigor.

Viewing the war as practically terminated, so far at least as relates to Spanish exertion on the continent, in considering the third branch of the inquiry which I proposed, let us endeavor to anticipate what may be expected to happen, if Spain obstinately perseveres in the refusal to conclude a peace. If the war has only a nominal continuance, the new Republics cannot disband their victorious armies without culpable neglect of all the maxims of prudence and precaution. And the first observation that occurs, is, that this protracted war must totally change its character and its objects. Instead of being a war of offensive operations, in which Spain has been carrying on hostilities in the bosom of the new States, it will become one to her of a defensive nature, in which all her future exertions must be directed to the protection and defence of her remaining insular possessions. And thus the Peninsula, instead of deriving the revenue and the aid so necessary to the revival of its prosperity, from Cuba and Porto Rico, must be further drained to succor those islands. For it cannot be doubted, that the new States will direct their combined and unemployed forces to the reduction of those valuable islands. They will naturally strike their enemy wherever they can reach him. And they will be stimulated to the attack by the double motive arising from the richness of the prize, and from the fact that those islands constitute the rendezvous of Spain, where are concentrated, and

from which issue, all the means of annoying them which remain to her. The success of the enterprize is by no means improbable. Their proximity to the islands, and their armies being perfectly acclimated, will give to the united efforts of the Republics great advantages. And, if with these be taken into the estimate the important and well known fact, that a large portion of the inhabitants of the islands is predisposed to a separation from Spain, and would therefore form a powerful auxiliary to the Republican arms, their success becomes almost certain. But even if they should prove incompetent to the reduction of the islands, there can be but little doubt that the shattered remains of Spanish commerce would be swept from the ocean. The advantages of the positions of Colombia and Mexico for annoying that commerce, in the Gulf of Mexico and the Carribbean Sea, must be evident, from the slightest observation. In fact, Cuba is in the mouth of a sack, which is held by Colombia and the united Mexican States. And if, unhappily for the repose of the world, the war should be continued, the coasts of the Peninsula itself may be expected soon to swarm with the privateers of the Republics. If, on the contrary, Spain should consent to put an end to the war, she might yet preserve what remains of her former American possessions. And surely the retention of such islands as Cuba and Porto Rico is eminently worthy of serious consideration, and should satisfy a reasonable ambition. The possessions of Spain in the West Indies would be still more valuable than those of any other Power. The war ended, her commerce would revive, and there is every reason to anticipate, from the habits, prejudices, and tastes of the new Republics, that she would find, in the consumption of their population, a constantly augmenting demand for the produce of her industry, now excluded from its best markets. And her experience, like that of Great Britain with the United States, would demonstrate that the value of the commercial intercourse would more than indemnify the loss, whilst it is unbur thened with the expense incident to political connexion.

A subordinate consideration, which should not be overlooked, is, that large estates are owned by Spanish subjects, resident in Spain, which may possibly be confiscated, if the war be wantonly continued. If that measure of rigor shall not be adopted, their incomes must be greatly diminished, during a state of war. These incomes, upon the restoration of peace, or the proceeds of the sales of the estates, themselves, might be drawn to Spain, and would greatly contribute towards raising her from her present condition of embarrassment and languishment. If peace should be longer deferred, and the war should take the probable direction which has been supposed, during its further progress, other Powers, not now parties, may be collaterally drawn into it. From much less considerable causes, the peace of the world has been often disturbed. From the vicinity of Cuba to the United States, its valuable commerce, and the nature of its population, their Government cannot be indifferent to any political change to which that island may be destined. Great Britain and France also have deep interests in its fortunes, which must keep them wide awake

to all those changes. In short, what European State has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be it what it may, of that most valuable of all the West India islands? The reflections and the experience of the Emperor, on the vicissitudes of war, must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all Governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges, by every precaution with which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of States.

Such is the view of the war between Spain and the new Republics, which the President desires you most earnestly, but respectfully, to present to his Imperial Majesty. From this view it is evident, that it is not so much for the new States themselves, as for Spain, that peace has become absolutely necessary, Their independence of her, whatever intestine divisions may, if intestine divisions shall yet unhappily await them, is fixed and irrevocable. She may, indeed, by a blind and fatal protraction of the war, yet lose more; gain, for her, is impossible. In becoming the advocate for peace, one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests. there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose, without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States, in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of those Islands, now open to the commerce and enterprise of their citizens. They desire, for themselves, no political change in them. If Cuba were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population render it improbable that it could maintain its independence.

Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring Island was the afflicting theatre. There could be no effectual preventive of those scenes, but in the guaranty, and in a large resident force of foreign Powers. The terms of such a guaranty, and the quotas which each should contribute, of such a force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment, to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation, In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very foreign Powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European Power. And if the new Republics, or either of them, were to conquer them, their maritime force, as it now is, or, for a long time to come, is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. Nor is it believed that the new States desire, or will attempt the acquisition, unless they shall be compelled, in their own defence, to make it, by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Acting on the policy which is here unfolded, the Government of the United States, although they

would have been justified to have seized Cuba and Porto Rico, in the just protection of the lives and the commerce of their citizens, which have been a prey to infamous pirates, finding succor and refuge in Spanish territory, have signally displayed their patience and moderation by a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of Spain, who was herself bound, but has utterly failed, to repress those enormities.

Finally, the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war, the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of an useless waste of human life. No Power has displayed more solicitude for the repose of the world, than Russia, who has recently given the strongest evidence of her unwillingness to disturb it in the East, by unexampled moderation and forbearance. By extending to America the blessings of that peace which, under the auspices of his Imperial Majesty, Europe now enjoys, all parts of this continent will have grateful occasion for regarding him, as the United States ever have done, as their most potent and faithful friend.

This despatch is confided to your discretion, to be communicated, in extenso, or its contents disclosed in such other manner, to the Government of Russia, as shall appear to you most likely to accomplish its object.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect, your obedient and very humble servant.

No. 48.

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Clay.

St. Petersburg, 15th, (27th) July, 1825.

SIR: I had the honor of receiving your despatch, No. 1, on the 28th June: (0. S.) The Emperor was, at that period, absent from this residence, but expected about the 5th of the present month. Count Nesselrode had preceded him by a few days, and had announced, by a circular letter, dated 24th June, that he had resumed the direction of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I conceive it would be best to lose no time in opening the matter committed to my care by your instructions in the despatch above mentioned. After having carefully weighed what would be the best mode of proceeding, I mentioned to the Count the purport of the instructions. He gave me, at first, no great encouragement, adverting to the essential difference in our way of thinking on the question between Spain and her colonies. I begged leave, however, to furnish him with a copy of the despatch, (as you had permitted,) in order that he might lay it before the Emperor. Accordingly, on the second of July, a copy of your instructions, together with a short introductory note, was sent in. (See the accompanying paper.)

I conclude from my knowledge of the modes of proceeding in all matters of general concern, that the proposition is in consideration between the allies; it being a fundamental maxim with them not to take any determination in matters affecting the general policy, without the mutual consent of the parties to this alliance.

I trust that I need not add, that every endeavor shall be made, on my part, to give effect to your proposition.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very faithfully, your obd't. serv't,

HENRY MIDDLETON.

No. 49.

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Clay.

To the Secretary of State, &c. &c. &c.

ST. PETERSBURG, 27th Aug. (8th Sept.) 1825.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the answer of the Russian Secretary of State, to my note of 2d July last, by which I had communicated to this Government, in extenso, the instructions I had received by your despatch No. 1.

I think I am warranted in considering this answer to be, in substance, (when divested of diplomatic garb,) in every respect as favorable to the views developed in your despatch, as could possibly be expected to be given by this Government, standing in the predicament it now does. We are left to infer from it, that the proposal that the Emperor shall lend his aid towards the conclusion of the war between Spain and her Colonies, by interposing his good offices in the form of pacific counsel to the mother country, has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets, and I am fully of opinion, that the majority, if not the whole of them, will agree to it. If such should be the event, the Diplomatic Committee sitting at Paris will be instructed accordingly. The chief difficulty to be overcome will be in the Cabinet of the King of Spain, where it is understood that all parties are opposed to the independenco of the Colonies. The necessity of the case, however, begins to be so crying, that a hope may he entertained that even there the counsels of wisdom may ere long be listened to. For obvious reasons we must not expect to learn, officially, that such advice, as that alluded to above, has been given, unless it should be attended to.

I have the honor to be, Sir, very faithfully, your very obedient ser

vant.

HENRY MIDDLETON.