understand when he takes passage in one of these cars, that the company running it becomes obligated to take him to his point of destination safely, except in so far as the roadworthiness, etc., of its own cars is concerned, or to land him there upon schedule time. But while strictly they are not common carriers of passengers, yet, owing to their peculiar relation to the public and the railway company, they owe certain duties to the public which they cannot evade or shirk. They invite the public to ride in their cars, and by receiving the extra compensation therefor, they impliedly contract that their cars are safe and roadworthy and that they will at least exercise ordinary care to protect both the passenger and his property which he may have in his custody. It is quite true that a passenger upon an ordinary railway car, takes the risk of the loss of any personal baggage or effects which he may take with him into the car; and while he may sleep if he can, yet he does so at his peril; and if while sleeping, thieves rob him of his money or baggage, the loss is his own, because the railway company has not contracted either expressly or impliedly to keep watch over his goods, either while he is asleep or awake; but in sleeping cars a very different condition of things exists, and the very object and purpose of the cars, and the inducement which the company holds out to the public for taking passage in them is, that passengers may sleep." Another text writer lays down the rule that railways are liable for injuries received by passengers in sleeping cars, though the cars are owned and manned by an independent corporation with which passengers 1, Wood's Railway Law, Vol. III., p. 1446; WHERE LIABILITY RESTS. 229 have specifically contracted to ride in such cars.1 There are numerous cases in which this doctrine has received the sanction of judicial tribunals. In Massachusetts it was held that if a person who has made a contract with a railway corporation for his personal transportation from one place to another, takes a seat in a sleeping car and there loses an article of personal baggage through the negligence of a person in charge of the car, and without fault on his part, it is no defence to an action against the railway corporation that the car was not owned by the defendant, but by a third person, who by contract with defendant, provided conductors and servants, in absence of knowledge of plaintiff of such state of facts. A passenger by the train of a railway company, traveling in the coach of a sleeping car company, may properly assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that the whole train is under one management; and in such case, when he sustains his injury by the negligence of one employed by the sleeping car company, he may maintain his action against the railway company. On proof of injury to a passenger by the fall of a sleeping car berth without his fault, in absence of other proof, a presumption arises that the railway company is liable. The court did not determine 2 what the effect of such a notice would be.3 In a New York case it was decided that passengers upon a railroad, taking a drawing-room car, have a right to assume that they are under a contract with the railway corporation, and that the servants in charge of I, Patterson's Railway Accident Law, 244; 2, Kingsley vs. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 125 Mass., 54; 3, the car are its servants, for whose acts in the discharge of their duty it is liable. In this case Ji Judge Andrews, of the Court of Appeals, said: "The business of running drawing-room cars in connection with ordinary passenger cars, has become one of the common incidents of passenger traffic on the leading railroads of the country. These cars are mingled with the other cars of the company, and are open to all who desire to enter them, and who are willing to pay a sum in addition to the ordinary fare, for the special accommodation afforded by them. They are put on presumably in the interest of the road. They form a part of the train, and the manner of conducting the business is an invitation by the company to the public to use them, upon the condition of paying the extra compensation charged. Passengers cannot know what private or special arrangement, if any, exists between the company and third persons, under which this part of the business is conducted, and they have, we think, in taking one of these cars, a right to assume that they are there under a contract with the company, and that the servants in charge of the drawing-room cars are its servants. Otherwise there would be two separate contracts, in the case of each passenger in these cars, one with the company, and one with Wagner. Such a condition of things would involve a confusion of rights and obligations, and divide a responsibility which ought to be single and definite. Take the case of a passenger in a drawingroom car who should be burned by the negligent upsetting or breaking of a lamp by a porter, or the case of a passenger in a sleeping car injured by the por 1, Thorp vs. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y., 402; IMMATERIAL WHAT CAR IS OCCUPIED. 231 ter's negligence. Is the passenger, in these or other similar cases which might be supposed, to be turned over, for his remedy, against Wagner, on the ground that the servant who caused the injury was his servant and not the defendant's? The public interest, the due protection to the rights of passengers, require that the railroad company which is exercising the franchise of operating the road for the carriage of passengers, should be charged with and responsible for the management of the train, and that the persons employed therein should, as to passengers, be deemed the servants of the corporation." This principle is aptly illustrated by a remark of Van Hosen, J., who said: "We know nothing of the arrangements between the defendant and the Wagner Car Company, but as no one without leave of the defendant can run cars upon its track, we must assume that the drawingroom cars are run for the benefit of the defendant." IMMATERIAL WHAT CAR PASSENGER OCCUPIES. If a passenger buy a ticket entitling him to ride in a certain section of a certain car, and he happens to be in another section, or in another car, at the time of an accident, occurring through the negligence of the corporation, his not being in the section or car in which his ticket entitles him to ride is no defence. In a case in the United States Supreme Court it appeared that plaintiff purchased a first-class ticket of the defendant for passage over its line, and at the same time, purchased a sleeping car ticket of the Pullman. Palace Car Company, for the same route, paying an additional sum for such ticket. He took the I, Ulrich vs. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 31 Alb. L. J., 302; train the same day; the next morning, at invitation of a friend, he entered another sleeping car on the same train, to engage in conversation; while so engaged the upper berth of the section in which they were sitting fell down, and was replaced by the porter, who assured them it would not fall again. Shortly afterwards the berth again fell, striking plaintiff on the head, causing cerebral injuries, incapacitating him from labor, and rendering medical attendance necessary. The court held the railway company liable, and also held that the fact that plaintiff was in another car than the one for which he purchased his ticket was immaterial, and made no difference as to the company's liability. Harlan, J., said: "The duty of the railroad company was to convey the passenger over its line. In performing that duty, it could not, considerately with the law and obligations arising out of the nature of its business, use cars or vehicles whose inadequacy or insufficiency for safe conveyance was discoverable upon the most careful and thorough examination. If it choose to make no such examination, or cause it to be made; if it elected to reserve or exercise no such control or right of inspection, from time to time, of the sleeping cars which it used in conveying passengers, as it should exercise over its own cars, it was chargeable with negligence or failure of duty. The law will conclusively presume that the conductor and porter, assigned by the Pullman Palace Car Company to the control of the interior arrangements of the sleeping car in which Roy was riding, when injured, exercised such control with the assent of the railroad company. For the purposes of the contract under which the railroad company under |