for each non-fatal one, 91,769 tons in 1895, while in 1894, the tonnage was 83,156. The number of persons employed for each fatal and non-fatal accident during 1895 was 645 and 118, respectively, as against 586 and 162 during 1894. It is an unpleasant duty to have to report year after year the same old story, that a large number of the accidents (both fatal and nonfatal) were the result of carelessness, either on the part of the injured parties themselves, or of some other person, and yet this is too true. ""Tis true, 'tis pity, and pity 'tis 'tis true." Seven of the thirteen persons who were killed during the year ought to have been alive to-day, if they had exercised even ordinary care to protect their lives, while two of them met their death through the carelessness of others, thus only four of the fatalities can be properly said to have been accidental, the others being the result of contributary negligence either by themselves or others. How to prevent accidents under such circumstances is a problem very difficult to solve. Legislation has failed to solve it, as most of these accidents occur in violation of law. What seems to be needed more than anything else is better discipline in and about the mines; discipline of such a strict character that it will not take anything for granted, but which is almost military in its exactness, and which will not allow disobedience of instruction to go unpunished. That accidents will occur even after every known precaution has been taken, is a fact that cannot be disputed, but there can be no question but that their number can be reduced to a minimum by systematic methods of performing the work, and the enforcement of strict discipline. Two mines were worked out and abandoned during the year. There were no new ones opened, and five were idle during the entire year. There were two voluntary advances of wages during the year which has engendered a better feeling between capital and labor than has ever before existed in this district, and which will tend to prevent the recurrence of strikes with their consequent loss to both operators and workmen. One person was prosecuted for violation of law, the result of which has had such an important effect upon the interpretation of the law, that I have given a special account of it in another part of this report. In addition to the usual statistical tables, a detailed description of the thirteen fatal accidents will be found in another part of this report. All of which is respectfully submitted. CHARLES CONNOR, Number of mines in the district, Number of mines operated during the year, Total number of days worked by all the mines, Number of tons (2,000 pounds) of coal mined during the year.. Number of coke ovens in district, Number of mine locomotives in use, On information received from Mr. Elias Phillips, mine boss of Lemont No. 2 mine belonging to the McClure Coke Company, I instituted proceedings against Charles Matukin by making the following information before Wm. H. Miller, a justice of the peace: "That at Lemont No. 2 mine in the county of Fayette on the 26th day of October, 1895, the said Charles Matukin opened a safety lamp belonging to another miner, and opened his own lamp and lighted it from that of the other miner, in a mine where nothing but locked safety lamps are allowed to be used on account of the generation of gas in said mine." A warrant was issued for his arrest, and at a hearing before the justice of the peace aforesaid, after hearing evidence, $300 bail was demanded, and in default defendant was committed to the county jail to await trial before the court of quarter sessions. The grand jury having found a true bill against him he was placed for trial before Judge Ewing on December 4, 1895, whereupon the counsel for the defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that the indictment was not supported by the information, and that it was no offense against the act of Assembly to open and light a lamp in the mine. Counsel for the prosecution read section 5, of article V, of the act of Assembly, approved May 15, 1893, relating to the bituminous coal mines of Pennsylvania, which says: "All entries, tunnels, airways, traveling ways and other working places of a mine where explosive gas is being generated in such quantities as can be detected by the ordinary safety lamp, and pillar workings and other working places, in any mine where a sudden inflow of said explosive gas is likely to be encountered (by reason of the subsidence of the overlying strata or from any other cause) shall be worked exclusively with locked safety lamps. The use of open lights is also prohibited in all working places, roadways or other parts of the mine through which fire damp might be carried in the air current in dangerous quantities." He then argued that in as much as Lemont No. 2 mine generated explosive gas, and was worked exclusively with locked safety lamps, and that the use of open lights was prohibited therein, that the defendant had by opening his lamp in the manner described in the information, violated the section quoted. The court in reply said, that he did not construe the law in that manner, but that the use of open lights was prohibited for the purpose of working with only, and as the defendant was charged with opening a safety lamp, and not with using an open light for the purpose of working with it, that therefore, there was nothing in the section of the law that prohibited him from so opening his safety lamp. He sustained the motion of the defendant's counsel and made the following order: "Now December 4, 1895, on motion of counsel for defendant, the indictment in this case is quashed for the reason that it is not sustained by the information made in the case." The grand jury being still in session, on advice of counsel, I made another information against the defendant and had him rearrested, when he waived a hearing, and the case came before the grand jury a second time on the following information: "That at Lemont No. 2 mine of the McClure Coke Company, in the county of Fayette on the 26th day of October, 1895, the said Charles Matukin being a miner at work in said mine at a place therein, where by the order of the mine boss, none but locked safety lamps were allowed to be used, said Charles Matukin did intentionally and carelessly open his lamp which had gone out, and did open the lamp of another miner there working, which lamp was burning at the time, and did then and there light his lamp from said miners lamp, said Matukin having both lamps open and burning, and so using them at that time, thereby endangering the lives, safety and health of persons working in said mine, and the security of the mines and machinery. Said Charles Matukin did also intentionally and carelessly injure said safety lamp and disobey the order of the mine boss by lighting said lamp at a place not permitted, as special places were designated for lighting lamps." The grand jury again found a true bill against the defendant and the case went the second time before the court for trial. Judge Mestrezat was on the bench. The indictment was made in accordance with article XXI, sections 1 and 2, as follows: "Section 1. Any person or persons whomsoever, who shall intentionally or carelessly injure any shaft, safety lamp, instrument, air course or brattice, or disobey any order given in carrying out the provisions of this act, or do any other act whatsoever, whereby the lives or the health of persons, or the security of the mines or machinery is endangered, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, etc." "Section 2. The neglect or refusal to perform the duties required to be performed by any section of this act by the parties therein required to perform them, or the violation of any of the provisions or requirements hereof, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, etc." At the trial, evidence was given by witnesses proving that the defendant had opened a safety lamp and lighted his own therefrom; that he had disobeyed orders in opening said safety lamp beyond the regular lighting station, and that he had injured such safety lamp by opening it, as by so doing he had destroyed it as a safety lamp by removing the wire gauze from around the flame, and had made it simply an open light and it was no longer a safety lamp while such gauze was removed from around the flame, and that he had done an act which endangered the security of the mine and the lives of the persons employed therein. The defendant himself (when put on the witness. stand), admitted that he had opened the safety lamp and lighted his own from it, but claimed that he did not know that he was disobeying any orders or violating any law, because of his imperfect knowledge of the English language, he being a Polander. Judge Mestrezat in charging the jury, took substantially the same position as Judge Ewing with reference to use of safety lamps in mines, viz: That locked safety lamps had to be used to work with, in mines where explosive gases were generated, but that they could be opened and used to light another safety lamp with. With reference to the other courts he charged that if the evidence had shown that the defendant had been guilty of any act which injured any safety lamp or endangered the lives of the persons in the mine, or had disobeyed any order whereby the safety of life or property had been jeopardized, then it was their duty to convict him under article 21, sections 1 and 2, of the mining law. The jury retired and in about an hour returned a verdict of "not guilty, but the defendant to pay the costs," which virtually means "not guilty, but don't do it again." That the verdict was a surprise to those who had heard both the evidence and the judge's charge, goes without saying. But what to me is more surprising was, that the judge in view of the evidence, and the defendant's own admissions in his testimony, and his own charge to the jury, should have accepted a verdict so directly at variance with the facts in the case. The effect of such a verdict as was rendered in this case is demoralizing and disastrous beyond conception. It breaks down all discipline in mines. It virtually gives permission to persons employed in mines where locked safety lamps are used, to open them at any time, and in any place, and thereby makes disastrous explosions not only possible but probable, with the consequent loss of life and property. I have not put the case too strongly by any means, for if the interpretation of the law with reference to the use of safety lamps is correct as given by those judges, it simply removes all the protection that these lamps were intended to afford to life and property, in mines where explosive gases are evolved, and with these safeguards removed, disaster and death will inevitably follow. One of two things must be done to prevent such direful consequences. If the law is not specific enough on this point, then it ought to be changed or additions made thereto of such a character that sufficient protection will be afforded; or if on the other hand the construction of the law by these judges is wrong, then they ought simply to alter their interpretation of it. One thing is very apparent, and that is, that the mining law as a whole was created for the very purpose of "providing for the lives, health, safety and welfare of persons employed in mines," and any interpretation of its words or clauses must harmonize with the objects, intentions and purposes for which the law was enacted, and where any doubt exists as to the meaning of any part of it, the benefit of the doubt should be given in favor of protection to life and health. This proposition will no doubt be admitted without question. With this idea clearly understood, when any part of the law is being considered, its interpretation must be harmony with this principle. Therefore when the words found in article 5, section 5, are to be construed, it would be well to consider what was intended by them. the words, "the use of open lights is also prohibited in all working places, roadways or other parts of the mine through which fire-damp |