§ 298 (134). Special Charter Provision construed. A municipal charter provided that it should not be lawful for the city council to make, or authorize to be made, "any contract for the payment of money beyond the current fiscal year," declaring every such prohibited contract "illegal and void." In construing this language the court says: "By this section of the charter, the legislature have, in the most explicit manner, prohibited the city council from contracting any debt beyond the fiscal year. If the city council had, at the time the contract was made in 1845, passed an ordinance that the expense of lighting the streets of the city for that year should be paid in 1848, by a tax then assessed for that purpose, it would have come within the letter of the prohibition. It is none the less a violation of its spirit that the council did not pass the ordinance providing for its payment until 1848." 1 § 299 (139). Rewards for Apprehension of Offenders. The governing body of a municipal corporation (which has express power to protect the property and promote the welfare of its inhabitants) may, it has been held, offer a reward for the detection of offenders against the general safety of its people, as, for example, those guilty of the crime of arson within the corporate limits. The contrary 1 Per Caldwell, J., Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, 318, 322; distinguished, Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192, 197. Construction of_similar_provision in other charters. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279; Philadelphia v. Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 21; Johnson v. Philadelphia, Ib. 382; Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464, construing an act applying to the city, to the effect that no debt shall be binding unless authorized by law or ordinance, and a sufficient appropriation therefor be made. Where a charter forbade a city to contract a debt exceeding in any one year the revenue for that year, a contract for a term of thirty years for the use of water was held to create a liability to the full extent of the term, and that as the aggregate liability was in excess of the revenue of any one year the contract was void. Niles Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311. See ante, § 196, on the question whether contracts calling for future periodical payments constitute "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional limitations, and § 210, as to constitutional limitations of indebtedness based upon income and revenue. 2 Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray (Mass.), 324, 374; York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391; Shaub v. Lancaster, 156 Pa. St. 336, 362; Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 404. In Freeman v. Boston, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 56, where it was held that the person claiming the reward had not brought himself within the terms of the offer, a doubt was suggested whether the board of aldermen by their general powers or otherwise had authority to bind the city by such an offer of a reward for the detection of incendiaries; but the court had no occasion to consider the point. In Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, where selectmen of a town were held personally liable for a reward offered by them as selectmen for the detection of the offender in a shooting case, the court, Holmes, J., said: "No doubt the instrument would bind the town if made with authority and intent to bind it." Shaub v. Lancaster, 156 Pa. St. 366, held that a resolution of a city council authorizing the mayor to offer a reward for the arrest and conviction of incendiaries is only binding on the city for a reasonable time, and that seventeen years was not a reasonable time. In doctrine has also been held.' If the reward be offered by the mayor of a city which has such power, it may be ratified by the city council subsequently, and is binding upon the city, though not so ratified until after the performance of the service for which the reward is Loring v. Boston, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 409, the court, while apparently treating an offer of a reward for the detection of incendiaries as a valid one, regarded the offer as lapsed after three years, eight months. An offer of a reward is revocable at any time before its terms have been complied with, and may be revoked in the same manner in which it was made; it is immaterial that the claimant of the reward was ignorant of its withdrawal. Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73. Such an offer is not void for ambiguity, and entitles a person to the reward who gives information to the police officers of the city upon which the incendiary is arrested, he being afterwards convicted. In People v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637, quoting the text, where an offer of a reward by a village for the conviction of persons committing arson within the village limits was sustained, the court held that the "general welfare clause" in a charter was sufficiently broad to confer authority upon the municipality to offer rewards for the conviction of offenders committing crimes which affected the general safety and welfare of the municipality or its inhabitants. The power of towns in Maine to offer rewards denied. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174 (reward for the detection of a murderer). See Lee v. Fleminsburg, 7 Dana (Ky.), 59 (apprehension of felon), and Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367. In Iowa, it is held that "in the absence of express statutory authority a city has no power to offer a reward for the apprehension of criminals, such power not being included in the general authority given to the city council to pass ordinances for the preservation of peace and good order in the city." Hawk v. Marion Co., 48 Iowa, 472 (conviction of thieves); Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193 (reward for the detection of a murderer). So in Kentucky. Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush (Ky.), 324 (detection of embezzler), where the court says: "The power to pass all needful by-laws and ordinances for the due and effectual administration of justice in said city," and to "legislate upon all subjects which the good government of said city shall require," does not authorize an appropriation of money to enforce laws of the Commonwealth, wherein every other community thereof has the same interest. In New Hampshire, the power to offer rewards for offenders is conferred upon towns by statute. It is there held that, under the statute, a reward cannot be claimed for services rendered before it is offered. Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 357; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83. The Constitution of Florida authorizes the imposition of taxes for "corporation purposes and for no other purpose," and the courts there hold that cities are not liable to pay rewards offered for the detection and punishment of criminals. Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318. A county in Indiana has no such power. Grant County Commissioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455. The power of towns to offer rewards for the detection of offenders is also denied in Virginia. Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711; in Connecticut, Crofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn. 294 (an arson case); and in the District of Columbia, Baker v. Washington, 7 D. C. 134, holding that the city had no authority to offer a reward for the capture of the slayer of President Lincoln. In People v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637, where the power of a municipality to offer rewards for the conviction of offenders was sustained in a case of arson, it was pointed out that in the cases above cited where the existence of such authority was denied, the offences were against the general criminal law of the State, and affected the public of the State rather than the property and inhabitants of the municipality, and the distinction seems to have been recognized that while a municipality may offer rewards for the detection and conviction of offenders whose offences were of such a nature as to affect the general welfare of the municipality, yet where the offences were directed against the general public, the power of the municipality under the general-welfare clause to offer a reward does not exist. claimed.' A promise to reward an officer for doing that which, without such reward, it was his duty to do, is void. Such a promise is, on general principles, without consideration, if, indeed, it be not illegal.2 Therefore a watchman of a city who, while in the discharge of his duty as such, discovers a person in the act of committing a crime, cannot recover from the city a reward offered by it.3 $300 (140). Public Buildings. Power to the officers, or to one of the departments of a municipal corporation, to provide for repairs to public buildings, does not give authority to erect a new building, and certainly not a large and expensive edifice. But power to a municipal corporation to build or repair carries with it the right to determine plan and mode. 1 Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray (Mass.) 374. Under a statute authorizing the mayor and city council of any city, or the selectmen of any town, to offer and pay from the treasury of such city or town a suitable reward, not exceeding $300, for apprehending and securing a person charged with a capital or other high crime, any city or town may be bound by an offer of a reward in such cases; and any person who performs the service, relying upon such offer, may, in action of assumpsit, recover the amount offered of such city or town. Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83. If two persons jointly perform the service, they must be joined as plaintiffs. Ib. Requisites of declaration where reward is offered by a town, see Codding v. Mansfield, 7 Gray, 272. In order to recover the reward the plaintiff must in general prove performance according to the terms of the advertisement. See Neville v. Kelly, 12 C. B. N. S. 740; Smith v. Moore, 1 C. B. 438; Thatcher v. England, 3 C. B. 254; England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856; Lancaster v. Walsh, 4 M. & W. 16; Fallick v. Barber, 1 M. & S. 108; Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621; Turner v. Walker, L. R. 1 Q. B. 641; s. c. L. R. 2 Q. B. 301; Lockhart v. Barnard, 14 M. & W. 674; Bent v. Wakefield, &c. Bank, C. R. 4 C. P. Div. 1; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 484. As to rewards, discovery or conviction of criminals in Canada, see Biggar's Municipal Manual, (1900) p. 803. 2 Stotesbury v. Smith, 2 Burr. 921, 924; Harris v. Watson, Peake, 72; 3 Kent Com. 185; Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Campb. 317; Bridge v. Cage, Cro. Jac. 103. See chapter on Corporate Officers, post, §§ 426, 427. 3 Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281; Means v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa, 78; chap. xi., post. Peterson v. Mayor of New York, &c., 17 N. Y. 449, 455, per Denio, J. Contract between city and county in respect to public buildings. Bergen v. Clarkson, 6 N. J. L. 352; De Witt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 289. Minnesota Act "to provide additional means for completing and furnishing the court house and city hall building now in process of erection in the city of Minneapolis," &c., though special in form, was held to be (under the circumstances) general in fact within the meaning of the Constitution prohibiting special legislation. State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540. See ante, §§ 142, 163, where this case is fully discussed in relation to its bearing on the constitutional prohibitions of special legislation. In Georgia, it has been held that the power to build a school house is within the scope of the general power of a municipal corporation in that State, without express authority, unless the charter forbids. Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. 686. 5 Ely v. Rochester, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 133; Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139. An unrestricted power to purchase real estate for the erection of public buildings held to give, by implication, the exclusive right to the city council to determine the expediency of purchasing, the power to purchase on credit and to issue bonds for the purchase § 301 (141). Police Powers and Regulations. Many of the powers exercised by municipalities fall within what is known as money. Richmond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192; ante, § 280. As to power to build town house. French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9. Power to erect buildings necessary for the city's use authorizes the erection of a city hall. Wright v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. 406. Incidental power to provide suitable accommodations for the transaction of the business of the corporation. People v. Harris, 4 Cal. 9. See Vanover v. Davis, Jus. of Terrell Co., 27 Ga. 354; chapter on Corporate Property, post. pose, but how much it can raise without violating principle. It seems to us that if the door can be opened at all, this is not a matter for the courts to decide. The legislature cannot compel a city to be generous to the State or county; but we do not think the Constitution forbids a city, if authorized by statute, from determining for itself whether such an investment of city money for purposes in which the city is directly concerned in part, will not be wise and profitable. If it may put up handsome instead of mean buildings for its own uses, and may accommodate the county in those buildings upon as easy terms as it chooses, we do not see that what is now proposed involves substantially any very different principle." The action of the court below in dismissing the bill was, however, reversed on other grounds. Under the Constitution of Tennessee (art. ii. § 29), city or "municipal purposes and county purposes are separate and distinct things, and taxes levied as county revenues cannot be paid over to a city for city purposes." Knoxville v. Lewis, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 180. In Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7, a taxpayer filed a bill for an injunction to restrain the issue of bonds of the city of Saginaw to pay for the erection of a court house for the county at the sole expense of a city, under an act authorizing such action. The court, Campbell, J., said: "It is claimed, and is true, that the legislature cannot compel a city to bear the whole expense of county buildings (see ante, §§ 119, 120). The question therefore arises whether a city can be authorized to raise by corporate funds and taxes the entire money required for a court house for the county. No precedents have been found precisely analogous. The power is rested by the defence on the Council have power to fit up and validity of city expenditures for pur- furnish the room in which they meet, poses of a public character which make and ine court refused to enjoin them a city more desirable as a residence, from furnishing the council chamber promote its improvement and the in- with portraits of the governors of the crease of its taxable property, and add State. Reynolds v. Mayor of Albany, to the comforts or prosperity of its in- 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 597; People v. Harris, habitants. . . . There is no lack of 4 Cal. 9; but see Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 authority for allowing municipal cor- Denio, 110; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 porations to aid, or in some cases to Mass. 272, per Parker, C. J. Proper establish, improvements which are not uses of public buildings. Scofield v. purely for municipal purposes. It 8th School District, 27 Conn. 499; is also very common, both in this coun- French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9. Market try and in England, from which we houses, post, §§ 699–704, 976. Equity have drawn the principles of our com- will not interfere to prevent the erecmon law, for cities, in building their tion of suitable public buildings unmunicipal buildings, to furnish accom- less the provisions of the charter formodations, gratuitously or otherwise, bid. Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. for public officers and bodies which do not represent the city. . . . The question In organizing a county the legislawhether the city of Saginaw, which ture may delegate the authority to must, at the present ratio of taxation, locate the county seat to the county bear about one-fifth of the expense of commissioners. Rice v. Shay, 43 Mich. a court house, may be authorized to 380. But the county seat cannot raise money enough to build the whole be changed at the will of the county of it, does not therefore seem to be so board after they have canvassed the much whether it can raise anything vote and located it in accordance with more than its ratable proportion for the result. People v. Benzie Co., 41 what is not strictly a municipal pur- Mich. 6; Attorney-General v. Lake Co., 115. the police power of the State,' and are delegated to them to be exercised for the public good. Of this nature is the authority to suppress 33 Mich. 289; Attorney-General v. Benzie, 34 Mich. 211. 1 Ante, chap. iv. The power of a corporation to exercise police jurisdiction is a power delegated by the State. Cranston v. Augusta, 61 Ga. 572. The police power of a State is not impaired by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. Guthrie, Fourteenth Am., chap. iii., collects and states the cases on this point. Ordinance of San Francisco prohibiting washing and ironing in public laundries within a specified district, from ten o'clock at night to six in the morning held valid under the police power. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703. See full discussion in New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 661; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 111 U. S. 746 (slaughter-house case); Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. 17 (prohibiting sale of fresh meats at retail, outside of the city markets); Index, Fourteenth Amendment; infra, § 302. An act prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine or keeping the same with intent to sell, is valid as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, and is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 265. Affirmed by Supreme Court of the United States, 127 U. S. 678; s. P. State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110. Contra: People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377. See also Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (prohibiting manufacture of cigars in tenement houses); and the views of Mr. Justice Field in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 313, 442, and in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 687. More fully see ante, chap. iv. on Constitutional Limitations, and chapter on Public Utilities, post; Index, Police Power and Regulations; Guthrie, Fourteenth Am., 87, 88. "The regulation of municipal corporations is within the almost unlimited power of the legislatures" of the States. Ib. 116. We cannot refrain from expressing our full concurrence in the views and conclusions of the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377. It will not escape observation that the Court of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached opposite conclusions on a question relating so vitally to the natural, inalienable, and primordial rights of the citizen. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustaining the Act of 1885 was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States; and on like grounds, if the New York statute (which was in judgment in the case of People v. Marx) had been before the Supreme Court of the United States, its validity would have been upheld, unless the Supreme Court had followed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We have, at all events, that which is regarded as a fundamental right in New York considered not to be such in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Act of 1885, under which Powell was convicted, makes the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, though open and unconcealed, a crime. We cannot but express our regret that the Constitution of any of the States, or that of the United States, admits of a construction that it is competent for a State legislature to suppress (instead of regulating) under fine and imprisonment the business of manufacturing and selling a harmless and even wholesome article, if the legislature chooses to affirm, contrary to the fact, that the public health or public policy requires such suppression. The record of the conviction of Powell for selling without any deception a healthful and nutritious article of food makes one's blood tingle. A State may, in the exercise of its police powers, protect the public against the deception and fraud that would be involved in the sale within its limits for purposes of food of a compound (oleomargarine) that had been so prepared as to make it appear to be what it was not. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, reviewing the cases. Where the owner of property devotes it to a use in which the public have an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such use, and must, to the extent of that interest, submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, so long as he maintains the use. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, where it was held that |