where the question is left entirely open by statute, is, that, on principle, a municipal corporation is exempt from liability of this char Co., 80 Miss. 343; Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 50, 59; Fortune v. St. Louis, 23 Mo. 239, 240; State v. Eberly, 12 Neb. 616; Erie v. Knapp, 29 Pa. St. 173; Bulkley v. Eckert, 3 Barr (Pa.), 368; Memphis v. Laski, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 511; Chamberlain v. Watters, 10 Utah, 298; Van Cott v. Pratt, 11 Utah, 209; Bradley v. Richmond, 6 Vt. 121; State v. Tyler, 14 Wash. 495; Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131; Burnham v. Fond du Lac, 15 Wis. 193; Paine, J., forcibly points out the inconvenience of the opposite doctrine. Merrell v. Campbell, 49 Wis. 535. In Colorado, although municipal corporations are not subject to garnishment on grounds of public policy in the absence of any express statutory provision (Las Anamas County v. Bond, 3 Colo. 411), they are, by statute, liable to garnishment on judgments obtained in district courts. Denver v. Brown, 11 Colo. 337. Counties are quasi and not municipal corporations and are not subject to garnishment. Stermer v. La Plata County, 5 Colo. App. 379. In this State municipal corporations are now by statute expressly declared to be subject to garnishment. See infra, note, where the statute is referred to. In Illinois, it is held that a disbursing officer or agent of a municipality, e. g., the treasurer of a city, is not liable to the process of garnishment in respect to any money held by him by virtue of his office. The city and not the officer is the debtor, and if the city is exempt, as held in this State, it follows as a consequence, that its treasurer, a mere agent of the corporation, is also exempt. Triebel v. Colburn, 64 Ill. 376. See also Badenoch v. Chicago, 222 Ill. 71. A municipal corporation cannot waive its exemption from garnishment, and, by answering the writ of garnishment without objection, confer jurisdiction upon the court to proceed against it as a garnishee to judgment. Porter, &c. Hardware Co. v. Perdue, 105 Ala. 293. See also School Dist. v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484. Contra: Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315; Tone v. Shankland, 110 Iowa, 525. Nor can it waive it by an ordinance which declares that wages and salaries of officers and employees in its hands may be garnished. Van Cott v. Pratt, 11 Utah, 209. In Washington, it has been held that a judgment against a county as garnishee defendant is void on collateral attack, when the statutes do not expressly make a county subject to garnishment. State v. Tyler, 14 Wash. 495; but quare if the court rendering the judgment is a court of general jurisdiction. In Minnesota, a judgment debtor may, in proceedings supplementary to execution, be required, by order, to assign a debt due him by a municipal corporation. The rule that the debt is not subject to garnishment has no application to an order of this character. Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452. In Pendleton v. Perkins, 49 Mo. 565, it was held that in Missouri, where the main debtor has absconded so that judgment cannot be obtained against him, and he has no property in the State subject to attachment, but has money in the city treasury belonging or due to him, it may in such case be reached by bill in equity in the first instance without a previous judgment at law, and without showing fraud or other ground of equitable jurisdiction. It was so decided notwithstanding the garnishment act in terms exempts municipal corporations from its operation. To the same effect, Furlong v. Thomssen, 19 Mo. App. 364; Beal v. McVicker, 3 Mo. App. 592; Lyell v. St. Clair County, 3 McLean (U. S.), 580. In Iowa, an action against a municipal corporation to subject an equitable interest to execution may have the effect of a garnishment proceeding, but is not affected by the statutory exemption of municipal corporations. Tone v. Shankland, 110 Iowa, 525. But in Illinois, it has been held that a judgment creditor cannot maintain a creditor's bill against a city to reach a debt owing by the city to the judgment debtor. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. Chicago, 170 Ill. 580. The court regarded the creditor's bill as a substitute for garnishment, and held that the right to maintain it must be denied on the same principles on which the courts denied the right to garnishee a municipal corporation. In Alabama, where the private, as distinguished from the public, property of a city is subject to execution under a judgment against the city, the funds of the city devoted to acter with respect to its revenues, the salaries of its officers, and perhaps also the wages of its employees, or payments to be made under pending contracts for public works and the like, but that where it owes an ordinary debt to a third person not in its service, the mere inconvenience of having to answer as garnishee furnishes no sufficient reason for withdrawing it from the reach of the remedies which the law gives to creditors of natural persons and of private corporations. The rule that a municipal corporation is subject to garnishment is supported by a respectable body of authority.1 private purposes are subject to garnishment in the hands of a third party at the instance of a creditor of the city. Murphree v. Mobile, 108 Ala. 663. In Iowa, it was held that the words "debtor or person holding property" in the attachment act included municipal corporations, and that they were subject to garnishment with respect to ordinary debts which they owed the principal debtor. Wales v. Muscatine, 4 Iowa, 302. But by statute, it is now expressly provided that "a municipal or politic corporation shall not be garnished." Iowa Code, 1897, § 3936. See also Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315; Jenks v. Osceola Township, 45 Iowa, 554; Des Moines v. Hinkley, 62 Iowa, 637. This exemption is not limited to cases where garnishment would interfere with the discharge of the corporate duties, but is universal in its application. Jenks v. Osceola Township, 45 Iowa, 554. But a municipal corporation may waive its statutory privilege of exemption from garnishment. Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315. Its exemption from garnishment can be pleaded only by the municipality. Tone v. Shankland, 110 Iowa, 525. As to time when exemption must be claimed, see Jenks v. Osceola Township, 45 Iowa, 554. Independently of the rule which excepts a municipal corporation from garnishment, the salaries of a municipal officer cannot, according to the weight of authority, be attached by garnishment proceedings on grounds of public policy, founded upon a supposed necessity of enabling the officer to use his salary for support and maintenance. See post, § 428. In Connecticut, public officers having money in their hands, to which an individual is entitled, are not subject to garnishment at the suit of the creditors of such individual. Stillman v. Isham, 11 Conn. 123, and cases cited; Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404, 408. or And in that State a county, not having power to contract a debt for which an action will lie against it, is not subject to garnishment in such a case. Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404. But under a statute enabling towns and cities to contract debts, and which provides that debts due from "any person' to a debtor may be attached, these corporations may be factorized garnished. Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416. A debt owing by a school district may be attached. Seymour v. Over-River School Dist., 53 Conn. 502, 509. In Kentucky, a city or town, being a municipal corporation, is as subject to suit for what it owes as is a private individual, and any fund due from it to a debtor is a subject to attachment or garnishment while in its hands as if it were a private individual. Rodman v. Musselman, 12 Bush (Ky.), 354. See also Speed v. Brown, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 109. In Massachusetts, all personal actions may, with certain exceptions, be commenced by trustee process, and any person or corporation may be summoned as trustee of the defendant therein. Under this statute, cities, towns, and counties are liable to be summoned as trustees. Adams v. Tyler, 121 Mass. 380. But only contract debts may be attached by this process. Fees payable to a juror are not for services rendered on a contract, express or implied, but for compulsory attendance, and cannot be attached. Williams v. Boardman, 9 Allen (Mass.), 570. See also Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 577; Hadley v. Peabody, 13 Gray (Mass.) 200. Payment by the disbursing officer to the principal defendant after service on the city, but before notice to the disbursing officer, held to discharge the city in the absence of evidence of delay in giving actual notice to the disbursing officer. Williams v. Kenney. 98 Mass. 142. The soundness or justice of our view that there is no reason why a municipal corporation should by implication be exempt from garnishment for an ordinary debt owing by it to third persons is, we think, supported by the various statutory enactments which have been enacted especially in recent years, giving to contractors, materialmen, and laborers on public improvements a lien or claim on moneys owing by the city to the principal contractor, or requiring the city to exact, and the contractor to give, a bond to secure the payment of work done for, or material furnished to, the latter, as well as by provisions permitting a portion at least of the salaries of officers and employees to be made available for the payment of the debts and liabilities of the latter,' and statutes are to be found which expressly declare that municipal corporations are subject to garnishment.2 In Montana, the term "person" in the garnishment statute is construed to include bodies politic and corporate, and a county is subject to garnishment for a debt due to one of its officers. Waterbury v. Deer Lodge County, 10 Mont. 515. In New Hampshire, under a statute making "any corporation possessed of any money" of the debtor subject to garnishment, a township was held to be included. Whidden v. Drake, 5 N. H. 13. The fees of a juror due him from a county are attachable on trustee process in this State. Wardwell v. Jones, 58 N. H. 305. In New Jersey, a debt which a municipal corporation owes to a third person, not its officer or agent, is subject to garnishment. Jersey City v. Horton, 38 Ñ. J. L. 88. In Ohio, under a statute which provides that "any claims or choses in action due or to become due" to the judgment debtor, or "money which he may have in the hands of any person, body politic or corporate, are subject to execution, salaries of officers of incorporated cities, due and unpaid, may be subjected, by the judgment creditors of such officers, to the payment of their judgments by the garnishment of municipal corporation. Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio St. 462. In Rhode Island, a municipal corporation is not exempt from trustee process. Wilson v. Lewis, 10 R. I. 285. In Texas, it is held that in the absence of any specific statutory exemption, a city is subject to the process of garnishment for any ordinary debt it may owe a third person. Laredo v. Malle, 65 Tex. 159,359, quoting text. In Virginia, a municipal, corporation may be garnished or at tached for a debt due to one of its creditors just as a natural person may be. Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124. It is also held in this State that a writ of fieri facias against a contractor is a lien upon the amount due him by the city for work done. Hicks v. Roanoke Brick Co., 94 Va. 741. 1 For statutory enactments permitting salaries and compensation of officers and employees to be attached for their debts, see post, § 428. In Colorado, by statute all municipal corporations are subject to garnishment. Session Laws, 1891, p. 234: Mills Anno Stat. Supp. § 2707a. But this statute does not extend to and include the salaries of the public officers of a city. Lewis v. Denver, 9 Colo. App. 328; Troy Laundry, &c. Co. v. Denver, 11 Colo. App. 368. In Badenoch Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, it was held that a statute purporting to authorize the court to render judgment against the treasurer of a city in favor of a creditor of the city for the use of a third person, in an attachment or garnishment proceeding, and to compel the city treasurer, by contempt proceedings against him, to deposit in court the amount found due to an officer or employee as salary or wages, was unconstitutional, as subjecting the city treasurer to liability for a debt of the city for which he was not individually responsi able. The statute was also held to be unconstitutional as a special law within a prohibition of the Constitution against enacting special laws for certain specified purposes. Section Express Power Essential 322 Power to issue Bonds absolutely Conditions Precedent to its Estoppel in Favor of bona fide Section 323 324 $260 (102). Outline of Subject. While municipal corporations are everywhere instituted for the same general purposes, heretofore explained,' and while there is a striking resemblance in the authority with which they are clothed, yet, except when organized under general acts, the powers given to them in their single and separate charters are various, both in character and extent. True policy, indeed, requires, as before suggested, that the powers of these bodies should, in general, be confined to subjects connected with civil government and local administration; but legislatures are often liberal in grants of this character, and there is no limit to the faculties and capacities with which municipal creations may be endowed, except as that limit is contained in the State or Federal Constitution. The leading powers ordinarily granted to municipalities, such as those relating to contracts, eminent domain, streets, taxation, ordinances, corporate officers, actions, and the like, will be hereafter separately treated. But it will be convenient to notice in this place certain special powers usually or often conferred upon municipalities, and some special limitations upon ordinary municipal powers, and the construction which such provisions have judicially received. § 261 (103). Wharves and Wharfage. Among the special powers often conferred by the legislature upon municipal corporations bordering upon the high seas or navigable waters is the authority to erect wharves, and charge wharfage as a compensation for making and keeping the same and their approaches in a proper and safe condition for the landing, loading, and unloading of vessels. The 2 Dillon C. C. 70; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; distinguished, Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 688; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; aff'g s. c. below, 4 Dillon C. C. 593; Weber v. Cal. Harbor Com'rs, 18 Wall. 57; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U. S. 430; N. O., M. & T. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; note to 18 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 511; Mayor of St. Martinsville v. Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293; The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers v. Aiken, 9 Fed. Rep. 679; Chester v. Hagan, 116 Fed. |