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question of incurring the debt, the amount proposed to be incurred must be definitely stated.1

In determining whether the requirements of the Constitution or statute have been complied with, the courts cannot inquire into the motives prompting persons to vote on questions submitted where the voter freely and voluntarily exercised his right. Inducements in the way of statements and representations made to influence a voter, although false and fraudulent, will not invalidate the election if it does not appear that by force and fraud the voter was compelled to vote in a way he did not desire to vote. When the Constitution requires that the assent of the voters shall be obtained "at an election for that purpose to be held as may be prescribed by law," a legislative enactment prescribing the manner of holding the election is essential to enable the municipality to submit the question to the voters.3

quires a vote on the question of incurring debt "for the purpose of providing water," submission of the question of incurring debt for the purpose of constructing or purchasing water works is not the submission of separate and distinct propositions, and complies with the constitutional requirement. The Constitution does not limit the discretion of the city as to the means to be adopted. Sioux Falls v. Farmers Loan & Tr. Co., 136 Fed. Rep. 721, rev'g 131 Fed. Rep. 890. See also State v. Allen, 178 Mo. 555; State v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 97. Wilkins v. Waynesboro, 116 Ga. 359. A proposition to issue $460,000 of bonds or such lesser sum as may be sufficient is not objectionable on the ground of indefiniteness, although the only authority given the city officers is to issue bonds to an amount sufficient to take up warrants for $370,979 with legal interest thereon. Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 576. Sufficiency of submission of question of method of payment, see Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393. There is no warrant in the Constitution of Georgia for submitting a proposition to create debt to a stated amount, with the qualification or provision that if the entire amount be not used the surplus shall become a part of the sinking fund provided for the redemption of the bonds. The question to be submitted is the incurring of the debt, and no question of any surplus should enter into the submission. Wilkins v. Waynesboro, 116 Ga. 359; but quære?

2 Epping v. Columbus, 117 Ga. 263. An offer in the proposition submitted to employ only bona fide residents upon the

2

work is not an offer of an unlawful inducement and will not invalidate the bonds. Perkins County v. Graff, 114 Fed. Rep. 441.

3 Dawson v. Dawson Water Works Co., 106 Ga. 696; Hudson v. Marietta, 64 Ga. 286; Elliott v. Gammon, 76 Ga. 766. The general rule is that elections cannot be held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority, but where authority was given by statute to contract debt, borrow money, and issue bonds "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution," it was held that authority to hold an election on the question as required by the Constitution would be implied. O'Bryan v. Owensboro, 113 Ky. 680. Under a constitutional provision requiring the assent of the voters "at an election to be provided by law," the vote may be had on a ballot voted at a general election, when the manner prescribed by statute for holding elections on the question of indebtedness is the same as that prescribed for general elections. Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont. 426. Under the Kentucky Constitution the submission must be at a regular election. Ashland v. Culbertson, 103 Ky. 161; Belknap v. Louisville, 99 Ky. 474. Under the requirement of the Constitution of Washington, that the question shall be submitted "at an election to be held for that purpose," the fact that, for the sake of economy, the election was held on the same day that a general city election was held, and that the same ballots were used, does not render the vote invalid, or prevent compliance with the Constitution. Fox v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 74.

When the Constitution requires the assent of a specified majority of the voters "voting at an election" to be held for the purpose, the question whether the requisite majority has voted in favor of incurring the debt is determined upon the number of the votes cast at the election upon the proposition, and not upon the entire number of voters within the municipality.'

Where there has been a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law regulating the manner in which elections to pass upon the question of incurring debt shall be held, and it is clear that there has been a fair election thereunder, the election will not be affected by technical irregularities, and this rule has been held to apply

Howland v. Supervisors of San Joaquin County, 109 Cal. 152; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373; Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 384, 395; Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629; Winchester Board of Education v. Winchester, 120 Ky. 591; 87 S. W. Rep. 768; Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont. 426; Metcalfe v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 297, 301; State v. Snodgrass, 1 Wash. 305; Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308; Strain v. Young, 25 Wash. 578; Fox v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 74; 86 Pac. Rep. 379. See, more fully, 383, post; Index, Elections Majority.

If the proposition be submitted at a general election, it is not necessary in such case that two-thirds of all the electors who voted at the general election should vote for it. It is sufficient, under the requirement mentioned in the text, if the proposition has the assent of two-thirds of such electors as vote upon it. Howland v. Supervisors of San Joaquin County, 109 Cal. 152. See also Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont. 426; Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629; overruling Belknap v. Louisville, 99 Ky. 474. It has in some cases been held to be different when the Constitution provides for a vote "by a majority of the electors of the city.' In that case the concurrence of a majority of the qualified electors of the city by an affirmative vote in favor of the proposition has been held to be necessary, and a majority of those voting on the proposition is insufficient. Williamson v. Aldrich, 21 S. Dak. 13; 108 N. W. Rep. 1063. See also Santa Rosa v, Bower, 142 Cal. 299; Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 384, 395.

In some States the decisions of the courts are influenced by the character

of the registration provisions of the respective States. În Georgia, under requirements that the assent of a prescribed majority of the qualified voters of the municipality shall be given, the prescribed majority of all the voters of the municipality as ascertained by required registration lists or tally sheets or other reasonable test must vote in favor of incurring the debt. McKnight v. Senoia, 115 Ga. 915. Thus, where there is a law authorizing or requiring the registration of voters at an election to be held on the question of the issuance of bonds, the result of the election is to be determined by a reference to the list of voters registered for the election. Gavin v. Atlanta, 86 Ga. 132; Madison v. Wade, 88 Ga. 699; Decatur v. Wilson, 96 Ga. 251; Floyd County v. State, 112 Ga. 794; McKnight v. Senoia, 115 Ga. 915. Where there is no other test, the question whether the necessary majority of the qualified voters have given their assent is to be determined by reference to the tally sheets of the last general election. Kaigler v. Roberts, 89 Ga. 476; Howell v. Athens, 91 Ga. 139; Heilbron v. Cuthbert, 96 Ga. 312; Carver v. Dawson, 99 Ga. 7; Brand v. Lawrenceville, 104 Ga. 486; Slate v. Blue Ridge, 113 Ga. 646; McKnight v. Senoia, 115 Ga. 915. If, however, the total number of votes cast at an election to determine whether bonds shall be issued exceeds the total number of votes shown by the tally sheets of the last general election, then the question whether the necessary majority has been obtained is to be determined by the actual number of votes cast at the special election on the question of issuing the bonds. McKnight v. Senoia, 115 Ga. 915.

to the time and manner of the publication of the notice.' And this is especially true where the election is attacked or questioned in a collateral proceeding or action. A constitutional requirement that indebtedness shall only be incurred upon the sanction of a popular vote in itself does not create any insurmountable obstacle to the incurring of indebtedness in any amount. If the municipality has otherwise the power to incur the debt, the requirement of a vote affects the method in which the debt shall be incurred rather than the power itself. Hence, if a municipality has incurred debt without a compliance with the constitutional requirement that it be sanctioned by a vote of the electors, such indebtedness comes within the principle that where a municipal corporation has done an act beyond its statutory powers, but within the powers which it was competent for the legislature to have conferred upon it, the act may subsequently be validated or ratified in competent form, and it has been held that where such a debt has been incurred the municipality may ratify or validate the debt by a subsequent election, if power to hold such election is expressly conferred upon the municipality by statute.2

1 State v. Smith, 4 Wash. 661; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427; Williams v. Shoudy, 12 Wash. 362; Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509; State v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 97.

2 Bell v. Waynesboro, 195 Pa. St. 299; Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 576; Rehmke v. Goodwin, 2 Wash. 676; McBryde v. Montesano, 7 Wash. 69; Hunt v. Fawcett, 8 Wash. 396; La France Fire Engine Co. v. Davis, 9 Wash. 600; Williams v. Shoudy, 12 Wash. 362; West v. Chehalis, 12 Wash. 369. See ante, § 129, Curative Acts. In Bell v. Waynesboro, 195 Pa. St. 299, the court held that where a floating debt has been contracted in excess of the two per cent limit of the Pennsylvania Constitution without a vote of the electors, a subsequent vote under statute authority therefor, authorizing the municipal authorities to create an indebtedness for the express purpose of liquidating the floating debt is such a recognition and ratification of the debt as makes it enforceable against the borough. The court said: "It follows that this floating debt, which then existed, being in excess of the two per cent limit, was illegally created and, therefore, invalid. But it was not irremediably so. It was invalid only because it lacked the assent of the electors of the borough. It is not a case of total want of power. . . . It is not the

consent of the electors that creates the
debt. It is the act of the borough au-
thorities, and after consent given, it
still rests with them to say whether it
shall be contracted. And it is not a
regulation that calls for any compliance
on the part of the electors. It is not
imposed on them, but for their protec-
tion it is imposed on their agents. The
invalidity of any action taken in disre-
gard of such regulation is full protec-
tion to the electors; but it is a protec-
tion that they need not avail them-
selves of unless they are so minded. As
they could have authorized the debt in
the first instance by giving their agents
power to contract it, they unquestion-
ably have the right to affirm and ratify
it when contracted without their pre-
vious assent, by like action on their
part as was required to give the power
originally." In Grady v. Pruitt, 111
Ky. 100, where a debt was contracted
without a previous vote as required by
the Constitution, the court says that the
municipality could not voluntarily as-
sume or ratify it, but it does not appear
that any ratifying or validating election
was had.
It is to be observed, too,
that the Kentucky Constitution con-
tains a provision that a municipality
shall not be authorized to assume any
debt created in violation of its provi-
sions. Ky. Const., 1899, § 157.

§ 214. Special Limitations on Indebtedness for Water Works, &c. -The urgent necessity of permitting municipalities, even when indebted to the general constitutional limit, to furnish themselves with water works necessary to sanitation and the public health and welfare of the community, has impelled the people of certain States to except debts for the purpose of constructing water works and, in some cases, other public utilities, such as gas and electric light plants, sewers, &c., from the operation of the general limitation upon the power to incur debt. This has been effected in various ways. Sometimes debt incurred for these purposes is entirely excepted from the operation of the constitutional limitation, and sometimes provision is specially made that municipalities may incur an additional debt within a prescribed limit for the purpose of purchasing or constructing water works and other public utilities to be owned by the people.1 When the language of the constitutional provision is that the

amount of debt created shall not at any time exceed three per centum of the value of taxable property; but "debts contracted for supplying water to such city or town are excepted from the operation of this section."

Missouri. The general limitation upon municipalities is five per cent of the value of taxable property, but any city containing not more than 30,000 or less than 2,000 inhabitants may, with the assent of the voters, “be allowed to become indebted in a larger amount

1 In Alabama, cities, towns, and municipal corporations having a population of less than 6,000 other than counties, are subject to a limitation of five per cent of the assessed value, "except for the construction or purchase of water works, gas and electric light plants, sewerage, or for the improvement of streets, for which purposes an additional indebtedness not exceeding three per centum may be created." All towns and cities having a population of 6,000 and more, and also certain enumerated cities are subject to a limitation of seven per cent of the assessed valuation, provided that there shall not be included in this limitation "bonds or other obligations already issued, or which may hereafter be issued, for the purpose of acquiring, providing, or constructing school houses, water works, and sewers; and obligations incurred and bonds issued for street or sidewalk improvements, where the cost of the same in whole or in part is to be assessed against the property abut- Montana. Municipalities shall not ting said improvements." Obligations be allowed to become indebted in exissued under this provision in excess cess of three per cent of the value of seven per cent of the valuation of taxable property, "provided, howshall not be used for any purpose other than that for which they are issued (Const., 1901, § 225).

Colorado. Const., 1876, art. xi, § 8, prohibits the contracting of debt by loan, except by ordinance specifying the purposes and providing for the levy of a tax, and requiring the submission of the question to the people at an election, and declares that the aggregate

not exceeding an additional five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein for the purpose of purchasing or constructing water works, electric or other light plants, to be owned exclusively by the city so purchasing or constructing the same." But provision must be made for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and also to constitute a sinking fund (Const., 1875, art. x, § 12 a, adopted in 1902).

ever, that the legislative assembly may extend the limit mentioned in this section by authorizing municipal corporations to submit the question to a vote of the taxpayers affected thereby, when such increase is necessary to construct a sewerage system or to procure a supply of water for such municipality, which shall own and control said water supply and devote

municipality may incur "an additional indebtedness" not exceeding a certain percentage of the assessed valuation of the taxable

the revenues derived therefrom to the payment of the debt (Const., 1889, art. xiii. § 6).

New York. Cities shall not become indebted in excess of ten per cent of the assessed valuation of real estate, but this provision shall not "be construed to prevent the issue of bonds to provide for the supply of water; but the term of the bonds to provide the supply of water shall not exceed twenty years, and a sinking fund shall be created on the issuing of the said bonds for their redemption by raising annually a sum which will produce an amount equal to the sum of the principal and interest of said bonds at their maturity" (Const., 1895, art. viii. § 10, as amended in 1899).

North Dakota. The debts of municipalities shall never exceed five per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property, "provided that any incorporated city may become in debted in any amount not exceeding four per cent on such assessed value without regard to the existing indebtedness of such city for the purpose of constructing or purchasing water works for furnishing a supply of water to the inhabitants of such city or town, or for the purpose of constructing sewers, and for no other purpose whatever (Const., 1889, § 183).

is submitted to the freeholders and qualified voters of such municipality, as provided in the Constitution, upon the question of other bonded indebtedness (Const., 1895, art. viii. § 7). As to amendment of Constitution as to water works, see cases cited in note, infra.

South Dakota. Municipal debt shall not exceed five per cent upon the assessed valuation of taxable property, "provided that any county, municipal corporation, civil township, district, or other subdivision may incur an additional indebtedness not exceeding ten per centum upon the assessed valuation of the taxable property therein for the year preceding that in which said indebtedness is incurred, for the purpose of providing water and sewerage for irrigation, domestic sewerage, and other purposes; provided, further, that in a city where the population is 8,000 or more, such city may incur an indebtedness not exceeding eight per centum upon the assessed valuation of the taxable property therein for the year next preceding that in which said indebtedness is incurred for the purpose of constructing street railways, electric lights, or other lighting plants" (Const., 1889, art. xiii. § 4, as amended in 1902).

uses,

and

light, and sewers shall be owned and controlled by the municipality" (Const., 1895, art. xiv, § 4).

Utah. No city or town shall become South Carolina. Cities and towns indebted in excess of four per cent of shall not incur any bonded debt ex- the value of taxable property, provided, ceeding eight per cent of the assessed however, that when authorized by a value of taxable property, and no vote of the electors it "may be albonded debt shall be created without lowed to incur a larger indebtedness, the sanction of a vote; but this limita- not exceeding four per cent additional, tion "shall not apply to bonded in- for supplying such city or town with debtedness incurred by the cities of water, artificial lights, or sewers, when Columbia, Rock Hill, Charleston, and the works for supplying such water, Florence, where the proceeds of said bonds are applied solely for the purchase, establishment, maintenance, or increase of water works plants, [or] sewerage system; and by the city of Georgetown, when the proceeds of said bonds are applied solely for the purchase, establishment, maintenance, or increase of water-works plant or sewerage system, gas and electric light plants, where the entire revenue arising from the operation of such plants or systems shall be devoted solely and exclusively to the maintenance and operation of the same, and where the question of incurring such indebtedness

Virginia. No city or town shall become indebted in excess of 18 per cent of the assessed valuation, but în determining the limitation upon the power of a city or town to incur debt there shall not be included bonds authorized by ordinance and vote "for a supply of water or other specific undertaking from which the city or town may derive a revenue; but from and after a period to be determined by the council, not exceeding five years from the date of such election, whenever and

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