that the revenue so anticipated and pledged to the payment of these obligations is wrongfully diverted to other uses does not bring the debts thereby created within the constitutional provision.' But the rule that current revenues may be anticipated must not be so far relaxed as to impair the force of the constitutional provision, or nullify its spirit. The only revenues which can be anticipated in this manner are those accruing from the collection of taxes already levied or at least leviable for the current year. Any anticipation of the revenues in excess of the amount covered by the annual levy is illegal. Hence a statute which authorizes the municipality to levy a specified tax yearly for a period of ten years and empowers the local authorities to make the levy for the whole period, and to draw anticipation warrants against the aggregate amount to be produced by the tax based on the assessment of the previous year, is an attempt to authorize the municipality to become indebted beyond the constitutional limit and is invalid. But these anticipations are to be carefully distinguished from the anticipation and pledge of revenues to be created under a special assessment to pay for the particular improvement out of which the debt arises. The qualifications upon the anticipation of revenues apply only to revenues to be raised by taxation for the general purposes of the municipality, and not to special assessments, the proceeds of which are specifically devoted to the improvement in connection with which the indebtedness is created." As shown elsewhere,' obligations charged and chargeable solely under legislative authority upon and payable exclusively from a special fund to be created by the levy of a special assessment or other special fund do not come within the constitutional prohibition.

§ 195. Current Expenses.

It is obvious the current expenses of

a municipality for salaries of public officers, court expenses, and other

522, 531; Johnson v. Pawnee County, 7 Okla. 686; Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. Dak. 356; Earles v. Welles, 94 Wis. 285; post, § 295. But under statutes providing that warrants shall be paid in the order of their issue, those for any particular year are not a first charge on the revenues of the year, and the local authorities cannot assign a portion of the delinquent taxes of any year in payment of a claim. State v. Hopkins, 14 Wash. 59.

1 Phillips v. Reed, 107 Iowa, 331; Cedar Rapids v. Bechtel, 110 Iowa, 196. French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614. What are current expenses and current revenues, see post, § 195.

People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 404; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Coles County v. Goehring, 209 Ill. 142.

People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 412. 5 Hodges v. Crowley, 186 Ill. 305. See also Voss v. Waterloo Water Co., 163 Ind. 69; Windsor v. Des Moines, 110 Iowa, 175; Helena Water Works Co. v. Helena, 27 Mont. 205.

Com'rs of Highways v. Jackson, 165 Ill. 17, aff'g 61 Ill. App. 381; Windsor v. Des Moines, 110 Iowa, 175; State v. Superior Court of Whatcom County, 42 Wash. 521.

7 Post, § 198.

obligations arising from the conduct of municipal affairs create what is technically a debt until paid. These expenses are, in universal practice, intended to be paid from cash in the treasury or from the current revenues; and unless they can be provided for in some way, the conduct of local affairs becomes difficult in the extreme, if not impracticable. The fact that these expenses result in indebtedness has caused some courts to hold that they are within the operation of the constitutional limitation, and, if the city is already indebted to the prescribed limit, they cannot be recovered.' But the great weight of authority adopts a contrary view, and it has been declared that there is no restriction on municipal expenditure, provided it is paid as it goes; what is prohibited is the incurring of debt, and if the city has money on hand, or provides at the time a present means of raising it otherwise than by loan, it may within these limits and conditions contract for expenditure without other restriction. Hence, if the contracts of municipal corporations do not overreach their current revenues, no objections can lawfully be made to them, however great the indebtedness of such municipalities may be; for, in such case, their engagements do not extend beyond their present means, and so no debt in the sense of the Constitution is created.3 A city has a right to apply its current revenues to the payment of the ordi

1 Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 Ill. 282; Prince v. Quincy, 105 Ill. 138; Prince v. Quincy, 128 Ill. 443; Chicago v. McDonald, 176 Ill. 404; Beard v. Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 239: but quære? Certificates issued by a city to the effect that a person has advanced a sum of money for current expenses, for which an appropriation has been made, and that such sum will be paid to him and charged to such fund on a specified day, are invalid, when the city is already indebted to the constitutional limit. Fuller v. Chicago, 89 Ill. 282. If an indebtedness of a city for current expenses is illegal as exceeding the constitutional limit, the contract creating the debt is void, though in itself executory and creating only a contingent liability. Prince v. Quincy, 128 Ill. 443.

that if the broadest construction of the term "debt" be adopted no officer of any public corporation can purchase for the public any article, no matter how small and trifling, unless payment for the same is made in cash at the time the article is delivered, and that the general law had been that ordinary current or annual expenses should be incurred and paid from the taxes as they were collected, the court says: "Debt as used in the Constitution is to be understood as a liability which is undertaken and which must be discharged at some time in the future, but which is not to be discharged by a tax levied within the year in which the liability is undertaken." It added: "A liability for a current expense can be incurred by a municipal corporation for any one year, provided there is at the time of incurring the liability a sufficient sum in the treasury of the city which may lawfully be appropriated to the payment of the Appeal of Erie, 91 Pa. St. 398. In liability incurred, or if a sufficient sum Dawson v. Dawson Water Works Co., to discharge the liability can be raised 106 Ga. 696, the court discusses the by taxation during the current year; question whether current expenses pay- and such a transaction would not create able from a levy of taxes for the current a debt within the meaning of that word year constitute debt within the meaning as it is used in the Constitution." of the Constitution. After pointing out

2 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. Corry, 197 Pa. St. 41, 48.

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nary and current expenses even as against a judgment creditor; and if an obligation of the municipality pertains to its ordinary expenses, and is, with other like expenses, within the limit of its current revenues for the year, such obligation does not create indebtedness within the meaning of the Constitution.' These general views are adopted by the courts of many States.2

Although the constitutional limit has been reached, warrants may be issued for the ordinary current expenses of the fiscal year to the full amount levied for that year, without incurring indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit. So long as the amounts of such warrants do not in the aggregate exceed the current revenues, no additional indebtedness has been incurred thereby, and usually warrants thus drawn are payable in the order of presentment for registration. Being legal warrants when issued, no subsequent act or misappropriation of funds by the municipal authorities can operate to render them invalid.3 The current expenses which may be lawfully incurred without violating the Constitution have been held to include salaries to the sheriff, register, and clerk of a county; salary due an alderman; services for jurors in the superior court, witness fees in criminal proceedings, sheriff's expenses in serving criminal

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1 Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396. 2 Lewis v. Widber, 99 Cal. 412; Dawson v. Dawson Water Works Co., 106 Ga. 696, 713; Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; Brashear v. Madison, 142 Ind. 685; Foland v. Frankton, 142 Ind. 546; Perry County v. Gardner, 155 Ind. 165; French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614; Tuttle v. Polk, 92 Iowa, 433; Creston Water Works Co. v. Creston, 101 Iowa, 687; Cedar Rapids v. Bechtel, 110 Iowa, 196; Laycock v. Baton Rouge, 35 La. An. 475; Adams v. Waterville, 95 Me. 242; Alpena v. Kelly, 97 Mich. 550; McGrath v. Grout, 171 N. Y. 7; Darling v. Taylor, 7 N. Dak. 538; Grant County v. Lake County, 17 Oreg. 453; Reuting v. Titusville, 175 Pa. 512; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. Corry, 197 Pa. 41; Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. Ďak. 356; In re State Warrants, 6 S. Dak. 518; Western Town Lots Co. v. Lane, 7 S. Dak. 1; Terrell v. Dessaint, 71 Tex. 770; Biddle v. Terrell, 82 Tex. 335; McNeall v. Waco, 89 Tex. 83; Tyler v. Jester (Tex. Civ. App.), 74 S. W. Rep. 359; aff'd 97 Tex. 344; Fenton v. Blair, 11 Utah, 78; Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568; Hull v. Ames, 26 Wash. 272; Gladwin v. Ames, 30 Wash. 608;

Herman v. Oconto, 110 Wis. 660. The cognate constitutional provision requiring provision to be made for the payment of the principal and interest of a debt does not apply to ordinary current expenses. See post, § 211, Requirement_that_Provision for Payment be made. In California, when the revenue of a city for the current year has been collected and expended, it cannot, even for its necessities during the remainder of the year, incur obligations to be met from the revenues of the following year. Bradford v. San Francisco, 112 Cal. 537.

3 Cedar Rapids v. Bechtel, 110 Iowa, 196; Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. Dak. 356; In re State Warrants, 6 S. Dak. 518; Western Town Lot Co. v. Lane, 7 S. Dak. 1. The validity of a contract for school furnishings, which does not exceed the constitutional limit when made, is not affected by the fact that the board of education subsequently incurs debt for other purposes in excess of the constitutional limit. Peck-Williamson Heating, &c. Co. v. Board of Education, 6 Okla. 279.

McGrath v. Grout, 171 N. Y. 7. Tyler v. Jester (Tex. Civ. App.), 74 S. W. Rep. 359; aff'd 97 Tex. 344.

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process, and expenses incurred at the general State election, as being necessary expenses made mandatory in the Constitution, and provided for by the legislature of the State, and imposed upon the county; salaries of policemen, marshal, and city treasurer; the rent of suitable offices for the officers of a city; labor and material furnished in the building of a city jail; services in guarding quarantine patients, publishing notices and printing ballots of election, feeding impounded stock, boarding city prisoners; insurance on city buildings; services in making assessment rolls; postage and stationery for officers, city printing, the necessary expenses of the city clerk,* the fee of an architect employed by the city to prepare plans and specifications of a city hall and market house, the expense of an investigation of county books, the expense of light, water, labor, and the like; but the building of a sewer system is not to be regarded as a current expense, nor is the building of a garbage crematory and the purchase of a site therefor; and the erection of a city hall, or a building for the use of the city officers, is an extraordinary expense, and not an ordinary and necessary expense such as is properly payable from current revenues.' 10 But if the indebtedness of the city already equals or exceeds the constitutional limit, and the current revenues are not sufficient to pay a contract indebtedness for an usual and necessary expense, such indebtedness, although for a current expense, when it comes into existence by the rendition of services or the delivery of property, is debt within the meaning of the Constitution." The municipality has the power to provide for the payment of current necessary expenses out of the current general revenues, even though the effect be to postpone judgment or other creditors. 12 When the statute defines the necessary current expenses for which provision may be made before satisfying a judgment, only

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not a current expense within a statute regulating the application of the funds of the municipalities which have reached the constitutional limit of indebtedness.

8 Herman v. Oconto, 110 Wis. 660. • Mander v. Coleman, 109 N. Y. App. Div. 454.

10 South Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70.

"Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; Laporte v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co., 146 Ind. 466; Brockway v. Roseburg, 46 Oreg. 77.

12 Foland v. Frankton, 142 Ind. 546. See also Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; post, § 210.

those current expenses can be allowed which come within the terms of the statute, and the city cannot claim the benefit of money which it has expended for other purposes, however necessary.1

§ 196. Contracts calling for Future Periodical Payments. In the case of contracts by municipalities whereby the body corporate agrees to pay for work or services to be rendered, or for water, light, or materials to be supplied periodically over a term of years, a divergence in the views of the courts has arisen similar to that in the case of current expenses. In a few States the rule has been adopted that, as soon as such a contract is entered into, indebtedness to the amount of the aggregate future payments is deemed to be incurred, irrespective of any condition connected with the rendition of the services or the furnishing of water, light, or supplies. Where this view prevails, the city is deemed to be absolutely bound and to have no control over its liability or means of escaping it other than by the act of the person with whom it contracts. The contract contemplates that the services will be rendered, or water, light, or supplies furnished, irrespective of any action which the city may take, and inasmuch as failure to render the services or to furnish the water, light, or supplies will proceed from some cause beyond the control of the municipality, an indebtedness to the aggregate amount of the future payments agreed to be made arises immediately upon the execution of the contract. If, however, at the time of making a contract extend

1 A statute of Missouri provided that an execution against a city may be enforced by mandamus compelling a levy for the satisfaction of the judgment, and that the whole amount within the constitutional limit may be applied to the satisfaction of such debt, "except such amount as may be necessary to pay reasonable salaries allowed by law to the mayor, council, marshal, constable, attorney, and a reasonable police force." Under this statute, the only deductions which can be made from current revenues, as against a judgment creditor, are the salaries specified in the statute. Crebs v. Lebanon, 98 Fed. Rep. 549; Webb City, &c. Water Works v. Carterville, 142 Mo. 101; Lebanon Light, &c. Co. v. Lebanon, 163 Mo. 246. When the statute provides that after the city has reached the constitutional limit of indebtedness, it may pay reasonable and necessary current expenses from its cash assets, while it is for the courts to determine what is meant by the ex

pression a "current expense," the determination of the city council as to the reasonableness and necessity of a particular current expense will not be reviewed by the courts in the absence of fraud or abuse of discretion. Helena Water Works Co. v. Helena, 31 Mont. 243.

2 Prince v. Quincy, 128 Ill. 443; Chicago v. McDonald, 176 Ill. 404; Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v. People, 200 Ill. 541; Beard v. Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 239; Covington v. McKenna, 99 Ky. 508; Ramsey v. Shelbyville, 119 Ky. 180; Niles Water Works Co. v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; State v. Helena, 24 Mont. 521; Read v. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L. 558; Humphreys v. Bayonne, 55 N. J. L. 241; Salem Water Co. v. Salem, 5 Oreg. 29; Duncan v. Charleston, 60 S. Car. 532; Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605. A contract by a city to pay a yearly sum for a number of years for water and electric light creates indebtedness within the