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§ 159. Arbitrary and Unreasonable Classifications. It is frequently said that a classification must be just and reasonable and not arbitrary and illusory. This is usually assigned as an additional reason when the court holds a statute to be unconstitutional because it is not founded upon some reasonable necessity, or because the provisions of the statute are not germane to the classification adopted, and when so used the language of the court is apparently intended to emphasize an invalidity founded principally upon these reasons. But instances are also to be found where the courts have held a statute to be invalid because the classification is arbitrary and unjust, without assigning any other reason therefor."

serve as therein provided, although tion of cities by population for the there was at the time of the enactment only one city in the State which held an election at the specified date, the other terms and provisions of the statute disclosing that notwithstanding this direction the statute was intended to operate similarly in all cities coming within its

conditions.

Darcy v. San Jose, 104 Cal. 194, 642; Longview v. Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117; Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796; 87 S. W. Rep. 1085; Murray v. Board of Com'rs of Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 359; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41

Ohio St. 476.

purpose of regulating consents of property owners to local improvements to be paid for by special assessment is arbitrary and void when it places in one class very large cities and very small ones, and in the other cities of intermediate size, for which different regulations are made. L'Hote v. Milford, 212 Ill. 418. A statute requiring the examination and licensing of journeymen plumbers when employed in cities having a population of 10,000 and a system of sewers or water-works, held unconstitutional, as special legislation. State v. Justus, 90 Minn. 474. In the three last cases may not the legislature have had grounds for its enactments? Ante, § 146 and notes.

2 A statute authorizing the issue of bonds to construct a court house where counties have at the time expended $7,000 for the erection of a court house, A statute which prohibits municipal held to be founded upon an arbitrary corporations from contracting for printand improper basis. Hetland v. Board ing stationery or books from any person of Com❜rs of Norman County, 89 Minn. or firm whose paper or business has not 492; but quære? A statute authoriz- been established in the municipality ing cities which have owned a system for one year or more is founded upon of water-works and sold or disposed of an arbitrary and unreasonable disthe same, but have reserved a right to tinction. The length of the time during repurchase the same, to issue bonds which a business has been established for repurchase, held to be based on is not a proper basis for discrimination. an arbitrary classification, particularly Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53. when the additional qualification was A statute which directs that in all cities added that such city should have a in which a newspaper printed in a population of 10,000 inhabitants. German language shall have been Thomas v. St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 477, but published for three years prior to its quare? No particular reason exists passage, such newspaper shall be why different principles should be designated as an official newspaper in applied to different delinquent taxes. which shall be published municipal Consequently a statute providing for proceedings, is not conditioned upon the manner of collection of taxes which a proper basis of classification, and became delinquent before the first is void as special legislation. Stahl v. Monday of June, 1897, and leaving out Trenton, 54 N. J. L. 444. A statute of its operation taxes which became regulating the enforcement of liabildelinquent subsequent thereto, is based ity of dissolved municipalities which on an arbitrary classification and is is applicable only (1) to dissolved invalid. Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, municipalities which were organized 81 Minn. 486. A legislative classifica- or created under a charter or special

§ 160. Statutes resulting in the Specific Designation of Municipalities. It is held that the classification adopted must bear evidence on its face that it has been selected in good faith and for the purpose of furnishing a general rule of conduct for the future government of municipalities, and that where the intent is to legislate for a particular locality the resulting legislation contravenes the constitutional prohibition, no matter how carefully that intent may be disguised.1 Consequently a system of classification which will merely individualize or designate the different municipalities or the different political districts of the State to which the statute shall be applied, is insufficient. Something more is required than mere designation by such characteristics as serve to identify. Although an act be drawn in general terms, if its provisions are such in number and character as unduly, with reference to the constitutional purpose, to restrict its operation and, to all intents, to confine it to a specific locality, then it comes as much under condemnation as though it designated the locality by name. While an act might be general, if it affects all towns of a class, and that class is based on population, or some other condition which might be recognized as possibly

law, (2) when the dissolution occurred Pennsylvania, into seven classes was through the direct legislative repeal of held to be unconstitutional. The first the charter or special law, (3) the classification of cities adopted in that indebtedness consists of outstanding State divided them into three classes, bonds or other written obligation, and the third class having a population of (4) the effect of the repeal was to attach less than 100,000 and more than 10,000 the territory of the municipality so inhabitants. An examination of the dissolved to one or more municipalities legislation dividing the cities into seven existing at the time, is based upon classes showed that, with very few and arbitrary distinctions, and is special quite unimportant exceptions, the legislation, there being no reason why charter powers of the fourth to the the statute should not be applicable to seventh class inclusive were precisely all dissolved municipalities, to dissolu- similar, and there was nothing in the tions effected in any manner, and to all points of difference that could possibly indebtedness, whether evidenced by be regarded as essential. Aside from bonds or written obligations or not. the important consideration that five Pepin Township v. Sage, 129 Fed. Rep. classes furnished greater facilities for 657. A statute providing for the issue special legislation than one class would of bonds by school trustees of a school do, there was nothing to prevent the corporation having a population of not last four classes from being included more than 4,550 nor less than 4,545, in the third class as originally estabheld to be special legislation, the requirements of the statute serving no other purpose than to identify the particular city to which it should apply. Rushville School City v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 193.

1 Bell v. Allegheny County, 149 Pa. 381; Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554; Scranton School Dist.'s Appeal, 113 Pa. 176. See ante, §§ 146, 147, 151 and notes. In Ayar's Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, a statute dividing the cities of

lished. Their needs were all so similar that no charter power required for either of them would be unnecessary or detrimental to any of the others. It was held that this division of cities was clearly intended as an evasion of the constitutional provision, and that the statute was void. Ante, §§ 146, 147, 151 and notes.

common to a class, or which might permit of classification, yet if it contains such added limitations as to restrict its operation to what must always be, in the nature of the case, a very limited number of specified localities, if not, in fact, one, it is local and special within the constitutional sense.1

Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, aff'g 25 App. Div. 164; Lewis v. Jersey City, 66 N. J. L. 582; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258; Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75. Obviously, where a statute is general in its terms the principle laid down in these cases must be very cautiously applied where the effect is to invalidate the statute.

tangle, and uncertainty which have been judicially brought about in New Jersey, California, Ohio, and some other States. In New York an act in general language has not been held to be necessarily "local" within the meaning of the Constitution, although it describes a city in such a way as to make it certain that the act only applies to that An act providing for the widening one city. The New York Constitution and improving of highways in towns provides (art. iii. § 18): "The legislahaving a total population of 8,000 or ture shall not pass a private or local bill more inhabitants and containing an in any of the following cases: ... incorporated village having a total Granting any corporation, association, population of not less than 8,000 and or individual the right to lay down railnot more than 15,000 inhabitants road tracks." Section 36 of the Rail"except in the County of Madison," road Act of 1875, commonly known as and which authorizes the improvement the Rapid Transit Act, made certain of such highway or a certain specified portion thereof not less than two miles and a half in length, such portion being wholly without the limits of such incorporated village, held to be local and special. Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, aff'g 25 App. Div. 164. In this case Cullen, J., who delivered the opinion in the Appellate Division, said: "It is beyond dispute that in this character of statutes there must come a point when an enumeration of the various limitations of the application of the statute ceases to constitute classification, and becomes mere identification, for almost any object, whether it be a political division of the State, a geographical section of its territory, or even an individual citizen, can be identified by certain qualities that neither it nor he possesses in common with others of a class, as well as by name. Where the special attributes prescribed by the statute, as exclusive conditions for the application of the So also in Matter of New York & statute can afford no fair or reasonable Long Island Bridge Company, 148 grounds for limiting the statute to one N. Y. 540, notwithstanding the proviclass and excluding its application to sions of art. iii. § 18, of the Constiothers outside of that class, I think it tution, prohibiting local legislation should be held that such limitations granting to any corporation the right constitute mere identification, and to lay down railroad tracks, the court make the statute local within the held the following act valid: "Any inhibition of the Constitution."

The course of judicial decisions in New York as to what is "local" legislation has been such, wisely, we think, as to have prevented the confusion,

provisions with reference to "any elevated steam railway or railways now in actual operation," permitting the company owning such railway to lay down certain additional tracks. There was only one railway which answered this description, and the legislation applied, and was intended to apply, only to this railway. The Court of Appeals held that the law was general. Matter of New York Elevated R. Co., 70 N. Y. 327, 350. In the Matter of Church, 92 N. Y. 1, the Court of Appeals held that an act giving the board of supervisors in any county containing an incorporated city of over 100,000 inhabitants, where contiguous territory in the county has been mapped out into streets and avenues, power to lay out and open the same, is not a local law within the meaning of the State Constitution, art. iii. § 18, prohibiting the passage of a local or private law for laying out or opening highways.

company incorporated for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a bridge or bridges over any river. bay, arm of the sea, or other body of water, connecting any city in the State

§ 161. Geographical Distinctions. Soon after the adoption of the prohibition of special legislation by the State of Pennsylvania,

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the Supreme Court of that State declared that there can be no proper classification of cities except by population. The moment resort is had to geographical distinctions the domain of special legislation is entered, for the reason that such classification operates upon certain cities to the perpetual exclusion of all others. The absolute terms of this declaration were not called for by the case which was before the court. That case involved the validity of a statute affecting counties of a specified population in which there was a city of a specified population situate at a specified distance from the county seat. The geographical features were plainly used in this act as a means of identity, and were in the nature of a reference to the latitude and longitude of the particular place to which the statute was to apply.

It is apparent that an absolute rule excluding geographical distinctions cannot be applied. Some municipalities are so situated geographically that legislation peculiar to their needs is called for by the geographical situation alone. For example, a statute which authorizes cities on the ocean to lay out streets, drives, and walks on the beach or ocean front relates to peculiar features which distinguish these cities from other cities, and which furnish a proper and legitimate basis for classification. Legislation for the construction of bridges may be classified on the fact that they are over a river

held to be a special law and uncon- more than twenty-seven miles by the stitutional, because by a Constitution usually travelled public road." This adopted in August, 1872, special laws act was held to be special, and thereon the subject were prohibited, and the fore unconstitutional, Paxson, J., react therefore applied to Grant County, marking: "This is classification run the only county seat relocated by spe mad. Why not say all counties named cial act between January and August, Crawford, with a population exceed1872. Groves v. County Court, 42 W. ing sixty thousand, that contain a city Va. 587. A statute authorizing the called Titusville, with a population issue of bonds by the board of school of over eight thousand and situated trustees of any school corporation hav- twenty-seven miles from the county ing a population of not more than seat? Or all counties with a popula4,545, and not less than 4,540, was tion of over sixty thousand watered by held to be unconstitutional as special a certain river or bounded by a certain legislation. The court said: "The re- mountain? There can be no proper quirements of the statute serve no classification of cities or counties except other purpose than to identify the par- by population." ticular city to which the statute shall apply." Rushville School City v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 193.

In Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258, the statute applied to "all" counties "where there is a population of more than sixty thousand inhabitants, in which there shall be any city incorporated at the time of the passage of this act with a population exceeding eight thousand inhabitants, situate at a distance from the county seat of

2 Bowker v. Wright, 54 N. J. L. 130. Atlantic City and other prosperous summer and seaside resorts in New Jersey have needed and received legislation applicable to their special wants; such, for example, as the power to construct board walks and issue bonds to pay therefor, and the reasonableness of erecting such cities into a class is obvious, and is no longer controverted in that State, and perhaps not elsewhere.