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pality tends to differences in local result and renders a law special in its nature, the inherent purpose and tendency of the act may result in a reversal of the rule. If the statute tends to bring about uniformity in the government of the municipality, it is general, notwithstanding the condition of acceptance attached to it. Hence a statute dividing municipalities into classes and providing for the regulation and government of each class is not special merely because it contains a provision that municipalities previously incorporated may become subject to its provisions by accepting the benefit of the act. Such a statute is to be deemed an enabling, and in no sense disabling, enactment, and when its requirements are complied with in any given case of a pre-existing city such city enters into the appropriate class of cities whose future incorporation has been provided for and becomes a constituent part thereof. No city is prevented from doing this, and all have the opportunity of doing it. There is no possibility of any exercise of the powers or privileges conferred by such a statute working affirmatively a local or special result, because whatever is done by virtue of it simply converts that which was or might be local or special into that which is general.1

$156. Classifications based on Existing Circumstances. The purpose of the constitutional prohibition is to induce uniformity and avoid the confusion resulting from independent enactments affecting different municipalities similarly situated. This purpose will not be furthered if a system of classification be adopted which is based on the perpetuation of existing differences. Such a classification will individualize the different localities. If legislation can be based upon powers or the peculiar form of government created by special charters granted prior to the constitutional prohibition, the legislature may amplify, restrict, amend, change, or modify such powers by legislation applicable exclusively to each locality. And the diversity of enactment instead of being terminated would be continued and perpetuated. It would also be impossible to make provision for municipalities subsequently incorporated, for, in the nature of things, such municipalities must come into existence under general laws. Hence existing circumstances consisting in mere differences in local administration or in the fact that certain municipalities have at some time in the past or by certain statutes obtained power and authority dif

'Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. 328, overruling Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. 198. See also Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. 1; Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 203 Pa. 209; Commonwealth v. Mid

dleton, 210 Pa. 582; Guild v. Chicago, 82 Ill. 472; People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 70; Cummings v. Chicago, 144 Ill. 563.

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fering from that possessed by other municipalities, cannot form the basis of a classification which will make a statute operating only where such peculiarities exist general in its operation and valid under the constitutional prohibition. For these reasons, a statute is special and unconstitutional when its applicability is dependent upon the fact that the municipality is divided into a certain number of wards and has a certain number of councilmen ; or upon the fact that the municipality is governed by a commission or commissioners; or upon the fact that liquor licenses are granted by a particular body, e.g., the council or board of aldermen, on the one hand, or a court, on

1 Pepin Tp. v. Sage, 129 Fed. 657; missioners, 59 N. J. L. 146. A statute State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540; Tiger which by its terms is confined to seav. Morris Common Pleas, 42 N. J. L. side resorts, governed by boards of 631; Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, 47 N. commissioners, and deals with the exJ. L. 442; Loucks v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. penditures on the streets of a borough L. 1; Goldberg v. Dorland, 56 N. J. L. of the road tax raised therein, is special 364; Parker v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 83; legislation and unconstitutional. Ross Johnson v. Hoover, 58 N. J. L. 334, v. Winsor, 48 N. J. L. 95. The court 339; People v. Board of Trustees, 170 says: "The whole statute by its terms Ill. 468; State v. Messerly, 198 Mo. 351; is confined to seaside resorts governed Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363; John- by boards of commissioners. The inson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383; Boyd dividuals thus grouped into a class by v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 456; Bloomer legislative enactment are distinguished v. Bloomer, 128 Wis. 297. A statute from other municipalities by two featregulating the construction of railroad ures only, their being seaside resorts tracks in cities is unconstitutional as and their being governed by boards of a special law if its operation is con- commissioners, and consequently no fined to cities in which railroad tracks legislation touching this class alone is have already been constructed. Bur- constitutional, unless it properly relington v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 56 lates to these peculiarities. We cannot N. J. Eq. 259. A classification which is see how the section under review is so merely based upon the fact that certain related. That the power to expend the territory had previously constituted road tax of a municipality on its streets part of an incorporated town is void. should be vested in its own governing The mere fact of previous location body rather than the committee of the forms no basis for classification, within township of which it territorially forms the rule that a classification cannot be a part, is a proposition which seems to adopted arbitrarily upon a ground have no natural connection with the which has no foundation in difference facts that the municipality is a seaside of situation or circumstances of the resort and that its governing body is municipalities placed in the different styled a board of commissioners." A classes. People v. Martin. 178 Ill. statute relating to villages governed by a board of trustees is a special law and unconstitutional. Burnet v. Dean, 63 N. J. Eq. 253. A statute for the appointment of boards for the assessment and revision of taxes which spplies to any city where a board of assessment and revision now exists is unconstitutional because based upon existing circumstances, and because it cannot be made applicable to any cities answering to the same conditions in the future. State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435; s. c. sub nom. Hammer v. State, 44 N. J. L. 667.

611.

* In Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L. 85, a statute provided for the election of a common councilman by the electors at large in cities of not less than 10,000 inhabitants, divided into not less than two or more than three wards, and which now by law have twelve councilmen, was held to be special, being conditioned upon three incidents too unimportant and restrictive to form the basis of classification for a general law. See also Bennett v. Trenton, 55 N. J. L. 72.

Dobbins v. Long Branch Com

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the other hand; or upon the fact that the term of office of certain officers is by law or by charter indefinite; or upon the fact that an officer is compensated by salary; or upon a difference in the method of filling vacancies in the governing body of municipalities, e. g., the board of aldermen; or upon the method in which the streets of the municipality are lighted pursuant to legislative authority. But in Minnesota, the rule that a classification cannot be based on existing circumstances is not applied when the purpose of the law is temporary only and the statute is intended to remedy existing conditions; a temporary and remedial law does not lose its generality because it is based on existing circumstances only, or those of a limited duration. But all existing conditions are not a proper basis of classifi

1 Johnson v. Hoover, 58 N. J. L. 334; Loucks v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. L. 1; Berry v. Cramer, 58 N. J. L. 278.

Tetrault v. Orange, 55 N. J. L. 99; Uffert v. Vogt, 65 N. J. L. 377, aff'd

65 N. J. L. 621.

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Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq. 126. • Parker v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 83, holding that a statute authorizing the mayor to fill vacancies in the board of aldermen in all cities which have a charter providing for a special election to fill such vacancies, is special legislation.

Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, 47 N. J. L. 442, where it is held that a statute applicable to all cases where the streets have been or are lighted by gas or oil, pursuant to legislative authority, is conditioned upon an improper classification, and is a special law. In Freeholders of Hudson v. Buck, 51 N. J. L. 155, it was held that a statute which applied whenever any county certificates had been issued to construct or improve a road, or, if running through or in such county, for the payment of which certificate the county was by law authorized to become obligated, was a special law, the basis for classification being in reality mere specification. A statute authorizing and regulating the construction of sidewalks in any village in any county containing a city of the first class in which no sidewalks had been constructed was held to be local and special, principally because it was conditioned on the fact that no sidewalks had been constructed. Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St. 202.

Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479; State . Cooley, 56 Minn. 540; Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445; State v. Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15; State v.

Ames, 87 Minn. 23. A statute dealing with the present floating indebtedness of all cities having a population of 50,000 and over, and providing for the funding thereof, is only temporary and remedial, and may properly be based on the existing conditions and limited thereto. Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445. A curative act intended to provide for the legalizing of a certain class of village ordinances and contracts is temporary and remedial in its nature, and is valid as a general law, although the classification is founded on existing circumstances. Flynn v. Little Falls Electric & Water Co., 74 Minn. 180. See also Leavenworth v. Leavenworth City, &c. Water Co., 69 Kan. 82; Index, Curative Acts.

A statute legalizing the incorporation of all cities theretofore organized or attempted to be organized under a general law is remedial in its nature, and is not invalid as a special law, although based on existing circumstances. State v. Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15; ante, §§ 68, 129. A statute authorizing any village to issue bonds when it is indebted, at the time of the passage of the act, in excess of $3,000, besides bonded indebtedness, is intended to remedy a temporary existing condition and is a general law. Kaiser v. Campbell, 90 Minn. 375. These decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota seem to be founded upon the authority of Iowa Railroad Land Company v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112, where a statute legalizing judgment taxes previously levied by counties and other municipal corporations and authorizing their collection, which by its terms applied to all municipal corporations which had levied taxes in excess of the maximum

cation, although the purpose of the legislation may be temporary. They must be such as to suggest the practical (not absolute) necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to the subjects placed in different classes.'

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§ 157. Municipalities existing under Special Charters. — When the Constitution by its terms recognizes cities and other municipalities existing under special charters as a special class by providing that the legislature shall make provision by general laws whereby any city, town, or village organized under a special or local law may become subject to the general laws relating to such corporation, such corporations form a separate and independent class recognized by the Constitution. Even where the Constitution does not expressly recognize municipalities having special charters, such corporations have in some jurisdictions been regarded as constituting, ex necessitate, a separate class by themselves, because the prohibition of future special legislation on municipal affairs made it necessary to legislate specially and separately for their needs. But in New Jersey and possibly some other States these corporations are not considered to form a proper and legitimate class by themselves, and a statute the application of which is limited to corporations which have a special charter or are governed by a special act of incorporation, is unconstitutional as special legislation.*

allowed by law to pay judgments, was 116 Wis. 363; Johnson v. Milwaukee, held to be a general law and not within 88 Wis. 383; Ulbrecht v. Keokuk, 124 the constitutional prohibition. The Iowa, 1. But a statute applicable to Minnesota decisions seem to the author only one or more of a number of muto be sound, and not to contravene the nicipal corporations operating under true purpose and intent of the consti- special charters is unconstitutional, as tutional provisions in respect of general a special law. See Groves v. County and local legislation. Court, 42 W. Va. 587, where a statute authorizing the relocation of countyseats which had, since January 1, 1872, been relocated by special act of legislature, was held to be unconstitutional, being applicable to only one county.

' Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 272.

2 Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543; Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189; Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237. In Arey v. Lindsey, 103 Va. 250, it was held that an act amending a town charter and extending its corporate limits was not affected by the constitutional provision that no special act for the extension of the corporate limits of cities and towns should be valid, the act having been passed prior to the adoption of the Constitution, although it had not been given effect at that date by an election for the approval of the act as therein provided for.

Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363; Appleton Water Works Co. v. Appleton,

Goldberg v. Dorland, 56 N. J. L. 364; Sneath v. Mager, 64 N. J. L. 94; Grey v. Town of Union, 67 N. J. L. 363. An act which attempts to put certain special charter municipalities into a class by themselves, basing such classification, not upon any rule for classifying municipalities, or any circumstances affecting them differently from other municipalities in the State, but merely upon a different provision in their charters from those of other municipalities, and a preference of the electors for such provision, is unconstitutional. People v. Board of Trustees, 170 Ill. 468. A

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Limitations founded on Time. We have seen that when a law is made applicable only to a class, it is necessary to its constitutional validity that the class should include all objects similarly situated, and the law must also apply to and include within its operation all objects coming within the conditions during the future operation of the act. We have also seen that, as a general rule, the legislature cannot make a valid classification which is based upon existing circumstances. Attempts have been made to obviate these rules by the enactment of statutes which, whilst conferring power upon all municipalities within a proper class, limit the time within which such municipalities may exercise the powers so conferred. These limitations have the effect of restricting the operation of statutes to such municipalities as are in the class during the time limited, and are obnoxious to the prohibition of special legislation.' But if the provision of the statute requiring corporate action within a specified time is only directory in its nature, and therefore does not prevent the required action from being taken by the municipality subsequently thereto, such provision does not limit and restrict the operation of the statute in such a manner as to render it special within the constitutional prohibition.2

statute authorizing the cost of improving streets to be assessed against adjoining property, and to be levied and collected "in the same manner and at the time now provided by law or the charter of said cities," indicates an intent that it shall only apply to charters existing at the time of its enactment, and conflicts with the constitutional prohibition of special legislation. Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479.

five days after its passage to redistrict such cities, held to be special and unconstitutional. State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98. A statute general in its terms applicable to all cities having a population of 40,000 or over, is a special law when there is only one such city, and the act can only operate by compliance with special provisions which can have no application to any other city, e. g., requirements as to the time and method of conducting an election. State v. Downs, 60 Kan. 788. Statutes limiting the time within which municipal corporations may accept their provisions are unconstitutional. See ante, § 155, Statutes conditioned on Acceptance by Municipality.

1A statute authorizing any city of the first class "during the year 1897" to issue bonds for specified purposes, held special legislation, there being but one city of the first class, and there being no possibility of any other coming into existence during the year 1897. Burnham v. Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128. 2 Ross v. Freeholders of Essex, 69 But quære, §§ 141, 146, 152 and notes. N. J. L. 291; aff'g 69 N. J. L. 143; A statute for pensioning school teachers Albright v. Sussex County Lake & applicable to cities of the third grade Park Commission, 68 N. J. L. 322, of the first class, which required action 523. In Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 by the board of education within thirty Ind. 186, a statute providing for school days after the law went into effect, and commissioners in cities having a popumade no provision for cities that might lation of 100,000 was held not to be thereafter come into the class, held rendered special and unconstitutional to be special and unconstitutional. because it contained a provision that Hibbard v. State, 65 Ohio St. 574. "at the city election occurring on the Quare? A statute directing local second Tuesday of October, 1899," authorities of cities of the first grade five members of the board of school of the first class to proceed within commissioners should be elected to

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