of a statute is not destroyed by the fact that it is applicable only to bridges used exclusively for vehicles and foot purposes. The condition is meant to prevent interference with railroad bridges, and the classification is obviously proper.1 A distinction is to be made between substantial conditions and those conditions which are so general in their nature that they can hardly be called distinctions. For example, practically all bridges are built on the line of a public highway or on a site deemed necessary to the travelling public. The insertion of conditions such as these will not be regarded as limiting the application of a statute so as to make it a special or local law.2

§ 155. Statutes conditioned on Acceptance by Municipality. Where a statute provides that it shall not operate within a municipality until its provisions shall have been accepted by the local authorities, a diversity of opinion has arisen whether it is a special or general law. The more sound view seems to be that such a statute is general and not special. In support of this view it is said that the prohibition simply is that the legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating municipalities. Prior to the adoption of this prohibition it was a fundamental principle of legislation in many States that a grant of municipal or police powers might be conditioned upon acceptance, and that a municipal corporation might be created or an additional grant of franchises be made subject to acceptance or rejection by the people for whose government the municipality was created or additional franchises were proposed. Legislation of this character was a constitutional exercise of the sovereign power of legislation before the constitutional prohibition was adopted, and a purpose to withdraw from the legislature its prerogative in its discretion to submit such legislation to be accepted or rejected by the people to be affected will not be implied in the absence of a clear expression of such a purpose. The legislative prerogative may stand, and full effect still be given to the constitutional prohibition. If a law be a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, the power of the legislature has been exercised within the constitutional limitations; and it is self-evident that if the legislature may submit a law for acceptance, a law based upon a valid classification and submitted to all of the class that may accept it, is a general law, and its generality is not detracted from, because some may not choose to accept it. Every law conferring discretion

1 Seabolt v. Com'rs of Northumberland County, 187 Pa. 318.

3

3 Ante, § 69 and notes; Index, Local Option Laws.

2 lb.

ary powers may occasion diversities. The infirmity is not in the law. Diversity arises from the execution of it. But the right to accept or reject, must not be so limited as to prevent the adoption of the statute by all the members of the class. Hence a statute which requires the locality to adopt its provisions within a prescribed period, or which is expressly limited to such a class of municipalities as adopt its provisions at the next general election, or which requires that proceedings for its adoption shall be initiated on or before a specified time, unduly restricts and limits the right to accept or reject and renders the law special and local in its application.2 If, however, the provision of the statute simply is that the question of acceptance shall be submitted to the voters at the "next general election," that provision is directory only, and does not prevent acceptance at subsequent elections. Such a provision, therefore, does not limit the right of acceptance or rejection and does not render the statute local or special.3 When the statute merely confers powers upon the municipality and leaves it to the local authorities in their discretion to follow alternative courses, the act is merely an enabling act, and the fact that local action may induce difference of result does not render the statute special. If the powers are conferred upon all the municipalities belonging to the class, the fact that the statute permits the adoption of different methods of doing the same thing, and one method may be adopted in one locality whilst other methods will prevail in others, does not exclude any of the munici

1 Maysville & L. T. R. Co. v. Wig- adoption of part of the general law gins, 104 Ky. 540; People v. Hoffman, was made optional with the city coun116 Ill. 587; West Chicago Park cil rendered it local and special, and Com'rs v. McMullen, 134 Ill. 170; Peo- held that such provision did not have ple v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 72; People that effect. The grounds upon which v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165; Warner v. it arrived at this decision are not very Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62; Noonan v. fully stated, but were to the general Freeholders of Hudson, 51 N. J. L. effect that if the statute is complete 454; Allison v. Corker, 67 N. J. L. 596; in itself and of general operation Albright v. Sussex County Lake & throughout the State, the mere fact Park Commission, 68 N. J. L. 523; that the municipality must take some Ross v. Freeholders of Essex, 69 N. J. step to put the act in force does not L. 291, aff'g 69 N. J. L. 143; Pictou v. detract from the generality of the law. Cass County, 13 N. Dak. 242; Adams Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363. v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363; ante, § 69. In Wisconsin, the legislature passed a general act for the classification and organization of municipal corporations. It thereafter amended the act by providing that any corporation formed under a special charter might adopt any integral part of the general corporation act by ordinance duly passed 3 Ross v. Freeholders of Essex, 69 by the common council. The court N. J. L. 291, aff'g 69 N. J. L. 143; Alcarefully considered and examined the bright v. Sussex County Lake & Park question whether the fact that the Commission, 68 N. J. L. 523.

2 DeHart v. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. L. 223, reversing 52 N. J. L. 319; Ross v. Passaic City, 64 N. J. L. 488; Christie v. Bayonne, 64 N. J. L. 191; Renner v. Holmes, 68 N. J. L. 192. In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319, is overruled in DeHart v. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. L. 223. Post, § 158 and notes.

palities from the operation of the law. That taxpayers will differ in opinion as to the benefits of the different methods, and in consequence some municipalities will adopt one method whilst others will adhere to other methods, is not a local result, but merely an exhibition of that tendency of the human mind to reach different conclusions from the same facts. The municipalities are organized and operated under a general law, with that liberty of selection of ways and means to reach the end of good government which is entirely consistent with the fundamental law.1

In opposition to the view that a statute dependent for its operation upon acceptance by the municipality is a general law, it has been said by those courts which have held such statutes to be special laws, that one of the evils against which the constitutional prohibition is directed is the great diversity of laws applicable to municipalities similarly situated. The intent and object of the constitutional prohibition is to induce uniformity, and legislation which will produce local differences is contrary to that result. A consideration of this fact, therefore, has led to the conclusion that when a statute provides that it shall operate only in such cities of a certain class as accept it by ordinance the result will be local differences, and what may be the law in one city of the same class may not be the law in another city similarly situated, and, therefore, such a statute is special legislation and invalid under the constitutional prohibition. This is peculiarly the case, it is urged, when the Constitution, in addition to prohibiting special laws, requires legislation in relation to municipal affairs to be of uniform operation throughout the State, or specifies the number of classes into which municipalities shall be divided, and declares that each class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions, or enjoins the legislature to establish a uniform system of municipal government. Under these provisions a statute must not only be general, but must have uniform operation; and a law which goes into effect in one city and does not go into effect in another city of the class does not have a uniform operation throughout the State. The mere possibility that all the cities of the

1 Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Appeal, 164 Pa. 44; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136.

acts cannot be organic municipal law at the same time, and to permit such legislation would be to permit the 2 Scranton School Dist. Appeal, mere multiplication of enactments, or 113 Pa. 176; Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa for that matter the simple multiplica226; Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417. A tion of sections in a single act, for as city cannot be vested with discretion- many different, dissimilar, and disary power to collect taxes as provided cordant systems of municipal governby either of two laws which provide ment as there are cities, towns, and different officers and prescribe differ- villages in the State. People v. Cooper, ent methods for that purpose. Both 83 Ill. 585.

class may adopt the law and thereby give it uniform operation, will not save it. It must appear, at the time the law is passed, that it will have a uniform operation throughout the State, i. e., that it will take effect in all cities of the class, and that the class is a proper one. The uniform operation of the law cannot be left to any future contingency.' It has also been held that in providing for the reorganization

of municipal corporations under a general law, the legislature cannot perpetuate a dissimilarity in character and powers by permitting corporations to declare by popular vote that they wish to continue special provisions of the special charters under which they have hitherto acted. To do so is an attempt to put them in a class by themselves, not based upon any rule for classifying municipalities, or on any circumstance affecting them differently from other cities.1 Similarly, since the adoption of the constitutional prohibition a municipal corporation coming within its terms cannot adopt a local or special law, and thus make it a part of its charter, although such law may have been enacted by the legislature prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision, but has not, prior to that time, been adopted by the municipality. Such laws are, by implication, repealed by the constitutional provision." Even in those jurisdictions which adopt the principle that the condition of acceptance by the munici

named therein to cause two different and distinct classes of municipalities to come into existence, both applicable to cities having a bonded debt past due for which payment has not been provided, and infringes the requirement of a uniform system. State v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255.

remain a city under the pre-existing it within the power of the persons statutes. The class created by the act of 1879 was to have powers and privileges different from the powers and privileges conferred upon the other classes. It was held that the statute was void, under the provision of the Constitution requiring the legislature to establish a uniform system of municipal government and prohibiting the enactment of any special or local law regulating municipal business. The principal ground of this decision is that the local option feature made it a matter of discretion with all cities containing 1600 registered voters to determine to what class it should belong, and if uniformity of operation resulted, it would be the result of chance, and not the operation of a fixed rule prescribed by the legislature, and the Constitution contemplated no such contingency. McConihe v. State, 17 Fla. 238.

A statute which vests discretion in the owners of one-half of the bonds of a city and twenty of its residents by which they can dissolve the existing corporation having an elective system of government and organized under an act creating a uniform system of municipal government, and reincorporate the municipality with another and different form of government under which the principal officers are appointed by the governor, is unconstitutional when the Constitution requires the legislature to establish a uniform system of municipal government. Such a statute puts

It has been said that, on the question whether a statute operating on adoption by the locality is general and of uniform operation, those subjects which are usually provided for by a charter or statute and those which are usually provided for by ordinance must be distinguished. While the legislature may delegate to a city the power to adopt ordinances regulating matters which the legislature cannot deal with practically and efficiently, it cannot delegate authority to adopt a charter or law, which will necessarily have the effect of special legislation. State v. Copeland, 66 Minn. 315.

People v. Board of Trustees, 170 Ill. 468. In this case a statute was enacted permitting municipalities existing under special charters to reorganize under the general law, but retaining as a part of their charters any special prohibitory liquor license clause contained in their special charters. It was held that this act violated the constitutional provision requiring amendments of charters to be by general laws.

2 Hinze v. People, 92 III. 406. But see Appleton W. W. Co. v. Appleton, 116 Wis. 363.