poses peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise of a common right, upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.1 2 § 143. Uniformity of Operation under Prohibition of Special Laws. In those States in which the Constitutions simply prohibit the enactment of local or special legislation upon specified subjects without any specific requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, it has sometimes been said that among the evils which led to the adoption of the constitutional prohibition of special legislation was the dissimilarity in the provisions of the charters of different cities when no substantial reason existed therefor, and that the prohibition was intended to bring to uniformity the charters of municipalities. But a simple prohibition of special legislation is not a requirement that the laws shall be uniform or have a uniform operation. Uniformity of provision or result is merely one of the distinctions judicially applied to determine the local or special or general character of the statute challenged, and is not an essential condition to the validity of the act. The term "general law" does not import universality in the subjects or operation of such law. The constitutional prohibition calls for the enactment in this particular field of legislation of general acts, but such so-called general acts are, for the most part, special and local in their effect and applicability, provided the widest possible signification be placed on the terms special and local. A law settling the methods by which all railroads should become incorporated would be special in the Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise. The act was held to be special, and therefore invalid, because it gave the bounty to only one person in each county, the court remarking: "It would not have been more special if it had conferred the privilege to dig an artesian well on some designated person." But quære? 2 People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585, 590; Cummings v. Chicago, 144 Ill. 563. See also People v. Board of Trustees, 170 Ill. 468. 1 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238; Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 620; Welsh v. Branlet, 98 Cal. 218, 219; Darcy v. San Jose, 104 Cal. 642; Bloss v. Lewis, 109 Cal. 493; Escondido High School Dist. v. Escondido Seminary, 130 Cal. 128; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1; Woodruff v. Freeholders of Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 533. In McRae v. County of Cochise, 5 Ariz. 26, a statute authorizing the various counties to offer a reward to be paid to the person first obtaining an artesian well, was held to be in conflict with the • Commonwealth v. Middleton, 210 provisions of the Act of Congress of Pa. 582; Stegmaier v. Jones, 203 Pa. 1886, § 1, prohibiting the legislatures 47; Commonwealth v. Brown, 210 Pa. of territories from passing local or 29. special laws granting to any corporation, 3 Warner v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62, 72; Cummings v. Chicago, 144 Ill. 563. sense that it would be confined in its operation to but a single kind of corporations, and so a law would be local by the same test that provides for the organization under one system of all the municipal governments in the State, as such a law would manifestly have a restricted effect with respect to locality. But, under the usage touching the terms, such statutes have always been regarded as general laws. The prohibition is not against the enactment of a general law which may by possibility produce local results. If the effect resulting from a statute is the test of its constitutionality, it will be impracticable to offer privileges to municipalities, and every law to affect them would, of necessity, have to be a mandatory regulation. In every statute conferring franchises upon these public bodies, to be used or not used at will, there is a potentiality that the result will vary in different localities. Therefore the uniformity resulting from the constitutional mandate that special laws shall not be enacted, must be sought for, not in the result which flows from the free unhampered exercise of the created power of local government, but in the fact that every locality is afforded a like right to adopt and exercise in its own way the same powers which are bestowed upon every other like political body. To the one no privilege must be offered for acceptance which is not extended to the other. The authority given must be the same, although it may be executed in a different way or in the same way at the option of the recipient.3 2 § 144. Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity of Operation. — In some of the States a requirement is to be found that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. It is the generally accepted doctrine that judicious classification and discrimination between classes does not violate this provision of the Constitution. A statute is uniform in its operation if it applies alike to all persons or subjects within the class to which it relates. This provision has been held to be mandatory upon 1 Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1, 8; s. c. 40 N. J. L. 123. In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319, aff'd 52 N. J. L. 188. be repealed before the general law becomes operative therein, does not render a law which is general in its terms, and is in good faith so framed that all parts of the State may come within the circle of its operation, any the less a general law. State v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98. In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. L. 188, aff'g 51 N. J. L. 319; Zumstein v. Mullen, 67 Ohio St. 382. The fact that at the time of its passage there may be in the State certain localities where Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 there are no objects for its present U. S. 155; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. operation, or where there are special 436; People v. Central Pac. R. Co., 105 laws already in existence which must Cal. 576; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 the legislature.1 When, however, a statute is required to operate uniformly, the constitutional requirement is not met if one or more cities or counties is expressly excepted from its operation,' Richardson v. Board of Education, 72 Kan. 629; Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54, 63; Ex parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638; State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St. 90; State v. Bargus, 53 Ohio St. 94. Cal. 136, 147; Vail v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. 35; Sanchez v. Fordyce, 141 Cal. 427; Johnson v. Gunn, 148 Cal. 745; Crovatt v. Mason, 101 Ga. 246; McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 343; Haskel v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232; Iowa Rail- Construing the provision in the Conroad Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112, stitution of Kansas that "All laws of a 116; Primghar State Bank v. Rerick, general nature shall have a uniform 96 Iowa, 238; Rambo v. Larrabee, 67 operation throughout the State; and Kan. 634; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. in all cases where a general law can be 54; Cincinnati St. R. Co. v. Horstman, made applicable, no special law shall 72 Ohio St. 93; Gentsch v. State, 71 be enacted," the court, in Rambo v. Ohio St. 151; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Larrabee, 67 Kan. 634, pointed out the Oreg. 167; State v. Farmers & Mer- distinction made between "laws of a chants Irrig. Co., 59 Neb. 1, 4; Green v. general nature" and "general laws." State, 49 Tex: Crim. Rep. 380; 92 S. W. "If the nature of the law is general, Rep. 847; Ex parte Massey (Tex. which is a question for the courts, the Crim. Rep.). 92 S. W. Rep. 1083; law in its form and operation must be Bloomer v. Bloomer, 128 Wis. 297. general. If the nature of the law is In Ohio, it was long recognized as special, its form and operation may be the general rule that judicious classifi- either general or special, as the legislacation and discrimination between ture may decide. This interpretation classes does not destroy the uniformity we think to be clearly required by all of required by the Constitution. State v. the terms of this section. While it may Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54. But in State not be in conformity with some assumpv. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, decided tions in a few cases decided by this very shortly after the Supreme Court court, we think it not against any, and of that State held the system of classi- that it is consonant with most of them." fication of municipalities which had This construction was adhered to in long existed and been recognized by Richardson v. Board of Education, the courts to be unconstitutional as 72 Kan. 629; 84 Pac. Rep. 538, where special legislation on a prohibited Greene, J., said: "With reference to subject, the court declared that, under this section, subjects of legislation the requirement of the Ohio Constitution, that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State," the operation must be uniform throughout the State, i. e., as to territory it must operate universally, as to persons and things it must operate on all persons and things in the same condition and category; and that when a law is available in every part of the State as to all persons and things in the same condition or category throughout the State, it is of uniform operation. This decision seems to limit or qualify the principle of classi- 2 State v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St. 273; fication, but in the subsequent case of State v. Bargus, 53 Ohio St. 94; DarlGentsch v. State, 71 Ohio St. 151, ing v. Rodgers, 7 Kan. 592; Robinson the principle of classification was fully v. Perry, 17 Kan. 248. Under a conrecognized and re-established. See stitutional requirement that the sysalso State v. Hickman, 5 Ohio C. C. N. S. 175; see supra, § 140 of this chapter, and infra, § 145 of this chapter. Rambo v. Larrabee, 67 Kan. 634; may be divided into three classes: First, those which the Constitution specifically points out as subjects of general laws only, such as conferring corporate powers, &c.; second, subjects of a general nature which are as clearly within the inhibition of special legislation as those specifically excluded therefrom; and third, subjects which are not of a general nature, and which may, therefore, be controlled by general or special laws within the discretion of the legislature." See also post, § 175. tem of county government shall be uniform, the legislature cannot, in a scheme of general county government, create a class composed of a single member, and confer upon the district or if a particular person or persons are excepted from its operation.' 2 $145. Requirement of Uniformity of Operation in Ohio Constitution. The Constitution of the State of Ohio requires that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State." As construed by the courts, this provision is not merely directory, but is mandatory, and a statute which violates it is void.2 The only prohibition of special laws to be found in the Ohio Constitution is that the legislature "shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers," 3 which, as we have seen, has been held to include within its operation acts conferring corporate powers upon municipalities. The requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State has been brought many times to the attention of the courts and has received special consideration from it. It might seem, indeed, that undue weight has been given to this provision, and that it has been applied in cases where there was no substantial reason for its application. The attention of the courts seems to have been directed to an effort to determine what laws are of a "general nature," and the decisions of the court upon the construction of these words seem to have led to considerable confusion. Under this constitutional provision the courts hold that laws of a general nature must have a uniform operation throughout the State, but if the subject matter be of a local nature the legislature may provide therefor by laws either general or local in form. The difficulty is in determining whether the subject matter of a statute be of a general nature or not. In some cases it has been attorney of that class alone the power to appoint deputies, such power being in other counties exercised in a different way. Welsh v. Bramlet, 98 Cal. 219. 1 Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142; Omnibus Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 57 Cal. 160; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 545. Under the constitutional requirement of uniformity a statute must not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges which upon the same terms and under the same circumstances shall not equally belong to all citizens. Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 710; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436. Ohio Const., 1851, art. ii. § 26; supra, §§ 140, 141 of this chapter. It has been said that the provision of the Ohio Constitution on this subject was taken from the Constitution of Cali fornia, and that this provision first Ohio Const., 1851, art. xiii. § 1. State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54; Pump v. Com'rs of Lucas County, 69 Ohio St. 448. said that a law is not necessarily of a general nature merely because it is upon a general subject or because the same result might have been reached by a general law, and special legislation upon a subject matter in its nature local is not prohibited by this requirement.' But the contrary view has also been taken, and it has been declared that under a provision of this nature all laws of a general nature must have a uniform operation throughout the State, and a subject matter which is general must be legislated upon by laws so operating. A subject matter which can reasonably be covered and provided for by a general law can have no special or local legislation as to it or any of its parts. If the general law should be found too broad or too narrow, the remedy lies in an amendment of the general law so as to remedy the defect throughout the whole State, and not in passing a special or local law as to some subject matter to be carved out of and separated from the general subject. It has also been said that the best evidence that a subject matter can be covered and provided for by a general law having a uniform operation throughout the State is the fact that such a general law has been passed upon that subject matter. When such is the case, no local or special law can be constitutionally enacted on that subject. But if the subject matter of a statute has not been covered by a general law operating uniformly, the legislature must form its own judgment as to whether or not such subject matter is of a general nature and capable of being covered by a general law operating uniformly, the final decision as to the constitutionality of the statute resting with the court. But even with these restrictions it seems to have been finally determined that this provision of the Constitution does not prohibit judicious classification and discrimination between classes. It is not possible within the scope of the present work to make an exhaustive examination of the decisions of this court defining what are laws of a general nature, but within that category have been held to be included such laws as the jurisdiction and punishment of minor offences, the right to trial by jury,' elections, taxation for county purposes, the 8 1 State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St. 275. See also State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54; State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455. 2 State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77. 3 Ib. ▲ Ib. 5 Gentsch v. State, 71 Ohio St. 151; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54. But see State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77. Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; 9 State v. Winch, 45 Ohio St. 663; Falk, 7 Silberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio St. 582. But a statute regulating the selection of jurors in a county is not a subject of a general nature within the requirement of uniformity of operation. McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 228. 8 State v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St. 273. Pump v. Com'rs of Lucas County, 69 Ohio St. 448. The refunding of taxes erroneously paid is a matter |