But courts of great ability have adopted a contrary view. It has been most emphatically declared that a municipal officer directing a local improvement is not the agent of the State; he is the agent of the city, and the city alone is responsible for his acts. The legislature cannot authorize or compel the city to give any of its money or property or to loan its credit for any private purpose, nor to expend any of its money directly or indirectly for any other than city purposes. If the legislature should by statute require a city to enter into contracts which directly or indirectly secure benefits to private individuals or particular classes of citizens, and not for purely city purposes, the statute would be void, as in conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution. Therefore a statute which tends to divert the money or property of the city or of the local property owners from strictly city purposes, and devotes it directly or indirectly to private interests, or to interests of some class of persons as distinguished from the whole body, whether the transaction is made to assume the form of the payment of wages or something else, is in conflict with the spirit and policy of the Constitution. Accordingly, many decisions hold that a statute which prohibits a contractor with a city or other municipal corporation from requiring or permitting his laborers to work more than eight hours in one day is unconstitutional.3 For similar reasons, stat 2 "Eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other persons now employed, or who may hereafter be employed, by or on behalf of the State of Kansas, or by or on behalf of any county, city, township, or any other municipality of said State"; required the payment of the current rate of per diem wages in the locality; and declared that all laborers, &c., employed by contractors or sub-contractors of the State or municipality should be deemed to be employed by the State or the municipality. The court did not enter upon any extended discussion of the cases decided other than those decided in Kansas. It placed its decision "upon the broad ground that the work being of a public character, absolutely under the control of the State and its municipal agents acting by its authority, it is for the State to prescribe the conditions under which it will permit work of that kind to be done. Its action touching such a matter is final so long as it does not by its regulations infringe the personal rights of others; and that has not been done." It is to be ob served that the opinion makes no mention of the fact that the obligations undertaken by the city under its contract must ultimately be met by taxation; that the natural tendency of a statute such as that under consideration is to impose a greater burden on the city and its taxpayers; and that the statute might be regarded as arbitrarily imposing obligations upon the city for the benefit of certain individuals or class, viz., laborers upon local improvements. 1 People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 10. 2 People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 10. What is a "city purpose"? People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475; Index, City Purpose. 3 People v. Orange Co. Road Const. Co., 175 N. Y. 84; People v. Grout, 179 N. Y. 417; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197. City ordinances and provisions in specifications to the same effect have been held invalid and illegal for similar reasons. Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 200, 206; McChesney v. People, 200 Ill. 146; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327. - utes which prescribe the rate of wages to be paid to the employees of contractors for the public works of a municipality -whether by fixing a minimum wage or by requiring the rate of wages prevailing in the locality to be paid have been held to be unconstitutional. But one of the courts, which declared that the legislature could not compel contractors for a municipality to pay the prevailing rate of wages, held that it may require a municipality to pay its own employees the prevailing rate of wages.2 For reasons similar to those under which statutes regulating the rates of wages are unconstitutional, a statute which requires the use of stone cut and dressed within the city upon any local improvement, is invalid. This statute is also in conflict with the provision of the Federal Constitution conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce between the States. Laws and ordinances which require the employment of union labor only upon public improvements tend to create a monopoly, are an unjust discrimination in favor of a class of citizens, improperly restrict competition, and impose an additional and unwarranted burden upon taxpayers by increasing the cost of the work, and are therefore unconstitutional. It must be confessed that the decisions do not People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1; Street v. Varney El. Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338; 66 N. E. Rep. 894. In the latter case the court declared that the Indiana Wage Law, which required unskilled laborers upon the public works of the State and municipalities to receive not less than twenty cents per hour, and which made it a misdemeanor for any contractor to violate the provisions of the statute, was unconstitutional, because its effect was to confiscate the property of the taxpayers by forcing them to pay an arbitrary price for labor on public works, and also because the statute deprived the individual of property without due process of law. See also Knowles v. New York, 37 N. Y. Misc. 195; Meyers v. Pa. Steel Co., 77 N. Y. App. Div. 307; People v. Featherstonhaugh, 172 N. Y. 112. of the city for a period of six years 2 Ryan v. New York, 177 N. Y. 271. In this case the plaintiff had been employed by the city as a street laborer; after his employment began the legislature passed a statute requiring that the wages to be paid for a legal day's 3 People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 144; work to all laborers upon public works contra, Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692. shall be, "not less than the prevailing See also St. Louis Quarry & Const. Co. rate for a day's work in the same trade v. Von Versen, 81 Mo. App. 519. or occupation in the locality." The Inge v. Board of Public Works, plaintiff remained in the employment 135 Ala. 187; Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga disclose any generally acknowledged or uniform ground upon which these laws may be either upheld or overthrown. The power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications, hours of attendance, and the compensation of municipal officers is undoubted. It would not seriously be contended that the legislature could not fix the compensation of the mayor, commissioners of police, city treasurer, or comptroller, nor can there be any doubt but that the legislature may prescribe the compensation to be paid to minor officers of the city, engaged in the performance of functions relating to police, health, and public safety. But when officers of this class have been eliminated, there remain a great number of persons employed by a city and drawing compensation from its treasury, whose only claim to payment is that they are mechanics or laborers rendering services as such to the city. It is with reference to this latter class that the difficulty arises. It is difficult at times to tell where the one class begins and the other class ends, and from this difficulty appears to have arisen the unwillingness of the courts to adopt any uniform rule. Yet the duty of the courts would appear to be imperative, for if the only claim which the person has to compensation is, not that he is an officer and entrusted with some public function, however humble, but merely that he is a simple mechanic or laborer rendering services which any mechanic or laborer having the requisite skill or intelligence may render, any statute which results in paying to him more than others pay for the same or like services imposes an increased burden upon the taxpayers, and diverts to the use of a private individual money raised by taxation, which, by rights, can only be applied to a municipal and public purpose. the It would seem that statutes which attempt to regulate the rate of wages or the hours of labor of employees of cities or of contractors for municipal improvements in such manner as to give municipal employees more pay than other employees receive for like services, violate the principles of constitutional law, notwithstanding the high judicial authority which has sustained them. If the legislature can authorize a city to let a contract to the lowest or other bidder, it is a confession that in the performance of that contract the contractor is not exercising any governmental duty. In other words, during the period of construction the only rights and interests which are af 789; Adams v. Brennan, 177 Ill. 194; Holden v. Alton, 179 Ill. 318; Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206; Lewis v. Detroit Board of Education, 139 Mich. 306; State v. Toole, 26 Mont. 22; Paterson Chronicle Co. v. Paterson, 66 N. J. L. 129; Davenport v. Walker, 57 N. Y. App. Div. 221; People v. Edgcomb, 112 N. Y. App. Div. 604; Marshall & Bruce Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495. See also Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs, 71 N. J. L. 183; s. c. 71 N. J. L. 574. fected are the private property rights of the municipality and of the contractor. It may be that public duties attach, when the construction is completed, if the improvement is one which has an essential relation to some governmental function, but, except for the power or duty to make the improvement, that relation does not arise until completion. In making a contract for a local improvement, a municipality uses its own means and credit and the resources of its taxpayers, and buys from some person so much labor and material as may be necessary to effect the improvement. The contractor is merely selling that labor and material. Hence it is apparent that the contractor cannot possibly exercise any governmental function on behalf of the city or the State. The fact that the improvement is made for a governmental purpose under a power given or a duty imposed upon the municipality by its charter, should not place the city in any different position. The duty to use the improvement for a public purpose does not ordinarily arise until completion, and until that time the power or duty to furnish the improvement should not be made an excuse for placing an increased burden on the city and its taxpayers. Therefore the rights and relations of the parties in the construction of such improvement should be placed upon the same basis as if the contract were between individuals. If any other principle be applied, the result is increased taxation, and the diversion of money raised or ultimately to be raised by taxation to the benefit of the contractor, or those whom he is compelled to employ in fulfilling his contract. The proper application to public uses of money raised by taxation seems to be the controlling principle, and if strictly and logically applied, it would seem to result that the legislature should pass only such laws as assure to mechanics and laborers employed by the municipality, and by contractors contracting with it, freedom from restraint, hardship, and oppression in contracting with the municipality or its contractors to furnish their labor and services, and should not pass laws discriminating in favor of municipal employees as respects the rate of wages or measure of compensation for services rendered or materials sold to the municipality.' § 119 (72). Compulsory Contracts; Detroit Park Case. - The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a case arising under a statute relating to a public park for the city of Detroit, which created a board of park commissioners for the city, the act naming the commissioners and investing them with power to acquire by purchase the necessary lands, at a cost not exceeding $300,000, and imperatively 1 See chapter on Public Utilities, post. requiring the city council, without its assent to the appointment of the commissioners or to the purchase of the lands by them selected, to provide the money to pay therefor by the issue and sale of the bonds of the city, held that the city could not be compelled against the will of the council to issue its bonds; and the decision was placed on the ground that a park was purely a matter of local, as distinguished from State, concern, and that it was beyond legislative competency to coerce a municipal corporation to contract a debt for local purposes without its consent.1 People v. Common Council of De- called upon to confer larger powers and troit (mandamus to compel the council to make the locality a subordinate comto raise money to pay for lands for the monwealth. It is a fundamental park), 28 Mich. 228. The ground upon principle in this State, recognized and which the judgment in the Detroit Park perpetuated by express provision of the Case, just mentioned, rests, as appears Constitution, that the people of every by the opinion of the court delivered hamlet, town, and city of the State are by Cooley, J., is that a municipal corpo- entitled to the benefits of local self-governration like that of Detroit will be found ment. But authority in the legislature to be in part a mere public agency of to determine what shall be the extent the State, and in part possessed of pe- of the capacity in a city to acquire and culiar and local franchises and rights hold property is not equivalent to, and which appertain to it as legal personal- does not contain within itself, authority ity for its private (as distinguished from to deprive the city of property actually the public) advantage. It is admitted acquired by legislative permission. As that "in all matters of general concern to property it thus holds for its own prithere is no local right to act independ- vate purposes, a city is to be regarded ently of the State, . . . and the State as a constituent in State government, may exercise compulsory authority, and is entitled to the like protection and enforce the performance of local in its property rights as any natural duties, either by employing local of- person who is also a constituent. The ficers for the purpose, or through agents right of the State is a right of regulation, or officers of its own appointment. not of appropriation. It cannot be The proposition which asserts the am- deprived of such property without due plitude of legislative control over mu- process of law. And when a local connicipal corporations, when confined, as venience or need is to be supplied in it should be, to such corporations as which the people of the State at large, agencies of the State in its government, or any portion thereof outside the city is entirely sound. They are not created limits, are not concerned, the State can exclusively for that purpose, but have no more by process of taxation take other objects and purposes peculiarly from the individual citizens the money local, and in which the State at large, to purchase it, than they could, if it except in conferring the power and had been procured, appropriate it to regulating its exercise, is legally no the State use. From the very more concerned than it is in the individ- dawn of our liberties the principle most ual and private concerns of its several unquestionable of all has been this: citizens. Indeed it would be easy to that the people shall vote the taxes show that it is not from the standpoint they are to pay, or be permitted to of State interest, but from that of local choose representatives for the purpose." interest, that the necessity of incorpo- See rating cities and villages most distinctly appears. State duties of a local nature can for the most part be very well performed through the usual township and county organizations. It is because, where an urban population is collected, many things are necessary for their comfort and protection which are not needed in the country, that the State is then §§ 97-102, as to home rule. In Helena Consolidated Water Co. C Steele, 20 Mont. 1, a statute provided that no city or town having a water supply furnished by private parties under contract or franchise entered into or granted by the city or town, should proceed to the erection or construction of a water plant to be operated for it, but in case it desired to own and operate |