When legislation of this character has been limited in its application to certain occupations or classes of employees, e. g., to employees in mines, it has been also held, in many cases, to be discriminative and class legislation, and unconstitutional on that ground. A detailed examination of the decisions is unnecessary, but the principal cases involving the rights of individual employers and their employees will be found in the notes.' only of freedom from actual servitude, A statute providing that no female imprisonment, or restraint, but the shall be employed in any factory before right of one to use his faculties in all six o'clock in the morning or after nine lawful ways, to live and work where he o'clock in the evening is unconstituwill, to earn his livelihood in any lawful tional. People v. Williams, 116 N. Y. calling, and to pursue any lawful trade App. Div. 379. or avocation. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights, which limit one in his choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work in a specified locality, or exclude him from his own house, or restrain his otherwise lawful movements (except as such laws may be passed in the exercise of the police power. . .), are infringements upon his fundamental rights of liberty, which are under constitutional protection." See also Butchers' Union Cor. 1. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746; Live Stock, &c. Assoc. v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 1 Abb. (U. S.) 388, 398; Bertholf v. Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 515. An act making it a misdemeanor to permit labor for more than eight hours per day in mines, smelters, &c., held unconstitutional, as infringing the right to contract and as class legislation. In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; In re Eight Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29; but see, contra, State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 96; Short v. Bullion-Beck, &c. Min. Co., 20 Utah, 20; 57 Pac. Rep. 720; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. A statute providing that no female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours on any day, or forty-eight hours in any one week, held unconstitutional on similar grounds. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; but see, contra, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602. An act providing that for all classes of mechanics, servants, and laborers except those engaged in farm or domestic labor, a day shall not exceed eight hours, held unconstitutional, because the discrimination against farm and domestic laborers makes it special legislation, and because it interferes with the constitutional right of parties to contract. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127. A statute which requires private corporations to pay the wages of employees weekly violates the right of the individual to contract and is unconstitutional. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66. But see contra, In re Weekly Wage Act, 163 Mass. 589. An act which provides that if any railroad company shall, under certain circumstances, refuse to pay the amount due to its employees, it shall be liable to pay twenty per cent in addition, is unconstitutional. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Wilson, 4 Tex. App. 570. Statutes prohibiting persons and corporations engaged in mining or manufacturing from paying wages by orders on stores kept by themselves or others, held unconstitutional as class legislation and as interfering with the property rights and liberty of the individual. State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 147; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179. But see State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co., 55 Md. 74. An act prohibiting persons and corporations engaged in mining and manufacturing, and interested in selling merchandise and supplies, from selling to their own employees at a greater profit than to others, is unconstitutional, as class legislation and an unjust interference with private contracts and business. State v. Fire Creek C. & C. Co., 33 W. Va. 188. An act prohibiting persons engaged in mining or manufacturing from keeping truck stores held unconstitutional, as class_legislation. Frerer v. People, 141 Ill. 171. An act which prohibits employers from imposing a fine upon employees engaged at weaving, or from withholding wages in whole or in part for im In opposition to these views, it has been declared that the liberty to contract is not absolute and universal. Every one may, by statute, be denied the right to make certain contracts, whilst some individuals may be restrained from all contracts. The limitations in this respect are shown by the disability of infants, and of married women at the common law; the invalidity of marriage brokerage contracts, post obit bonds, and covenants in restraint of trade; the regulation of the form in which contracts may be made by statutes of frauds; the supervision of the contracts of seamen; the exemption of wages from attachment; usury laws, and the like. The legislation on the subject of contracts between individuals relates to a great variety of contracts, and has been passed, some of it to promote the public health, morals, or convenience; some of it for the protection of individuals against fraud, and some of it for the protection of classes of individuals against unfair or unconscionable dealing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, upon the request by the legislature that it - perfections that may arise during the for the exclusive employment of memprocess of weaving, is unconstitutional, bers of the labor union is void, as as interfering with the right of acquir- against public policy. Jacobs v. Cohen, ing, possessing, and protecting prop- 99 N. Y. App. Div. 48; see also Mills erty. Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 N. Y. App. Mass. 117. An act providing for the Div. 605. weighing of coal at the mines, and requiring owners of mines to furnish and place upon the railroad track adjacent thereto a track scale of the standard measure, to employ a weigher and to keep a record of the weights of the coal mined by the different employees, is unconstitutional, as class legislation, and because it prohibits persons sui juris from making their own contracts. Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294. A law which requires the owners of coal mines to weigh coal before screening, and to pay their employees upon the weights so ascertained, deprives the persons subject to its provisions of liberty and property and of the right to contract, and is unconstitutional. Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380; In re House Bill, 21 Colo. 27. A law which makes it unlawful for an employer to prohibit an employee from joining, or to require an employee to withdraw from, a trade or labor union, or other lawful organization, is invalid, as special legislation, and because it deprives the employer of property without due process of law. State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163. A contract be tween an employer and a labor union In Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, the constitutionality of a statute making it a misdemeanor for an attorney to receive more than ten dollars for prosecuting a claim for a pension was sustained. The court said: "While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and universal. It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. It may deny to all the right to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets; to the minor the right to assume any obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to the common carrier the power to make any contract releasing himself from negligence; and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any employment which is against public policy. The possession of this power by government in no manner conflicts with the proposition that, generally speaking, every citizen has a right freely to contract for the price of his labor, services, or property." give its opinion as to the constitutionality of a statute requiring all employers engaged in any manufacturing business and having more than twenty-five employees to pay the wages of the employees weekly, declared that it could not say that such a statute was not within the legislative power, if the legislature deemed it expedient to enact it.' In some cases statutes applicable to private corporations have been sustained upon the ground that such corporations owe their existence to the pleasure of the legislature; their charters are subject to amendment and repeal; and the legislature may prescribe the conditions upon which they may engage in business. In some instances statutes limiting the hours of daily labor of employees have been sustained as health or police regulations," 1 In re Weekly Wage Act, 163 Mass. 589. In this case the court remarked: "The legislative power granted to the general court by the Constitution of Massachusetts is perhaps more comprehensive than I have found in the Constitution of some of the other States." This remark has been the ground for distinguishing it in cases in which the opposite conclusion has been reached in other States. See Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 58; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415. In International TextBook Co. v. Weissinger, 160 Ind. 349, a statute prohibiting the assignment of future wages, and declaring invalid any agreement whereby the employer is relieved from paying wages weekly, was sustained as a lawful exercise of the police power, in view of the importance to the State of the well-being of wage-earners and the temptation to sacrifice future earnings. 2 In Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, a statute which required the wages of employees of railroads and of railroad contractors to be paid immediately upon discharge, and which continued the employment until the wages were paid, was sustained on this ground as to corporations, although the court declared it to be clearly unconstitutional if applied to individuals. So construed, this statute does not violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404. In State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, a statute which prohibited corporations, &c. from paying the wages of employees otherwise than in money or by scrip redeemable in money, and which required owners of coal mines to weigh and to pay for the coal before screening, and which made a violation of the statute a misdemeanor, was sustained, because the defendant was a corporation which, under the laws of the State, enjoyed unusual and extraordinary privileges, which enabled it to surround itself with a great retinue of laborers who needed to be protected against all fraudulent and suspicious devices in the weighing of coal and the payment of labor; and also on the ground that the defendant was a licensee of the State, and was pursuing a vocation which the State has taken under its general supervision for the purpose of securing the safety of the employees by ventilation, inspection, and governmental report, and the defendant therefore must submit to such regulations as the sovereign deems conducive to the public health, morals, and public security. In Shaffer v. Union Mining Co., 55 Md. 74, an act which prohibited the payment of employees of corporations engaged in mining or manufacturing otherwise than in legal money of the United States, was sustained, upon the ground that the defendant was a corporation whose charter was subject to alteration or amendment at pleasure. In Massachusetts this ground of distinction seems to have been rejected; and a statute which required corporations to pay wages weekly was declared not to have been passed necessarily in amendment of their charters, nor for the purpose of restricting the power of the corporations. Weekly Wage Act, 163 Mass. 589, 596. In re 3 In Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, a statute prohibiting the employment of infants under eighteen and women in any manufacturing establishment for more than and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that an act of the legislature of a State which limits the daily hours of employment, if sustained by the Constitution or courts of the State under the police power, does not violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution by abridging the privileges or immunities of its citizens, or ! by depriving them of their property without due process of law, or by denying to them the equal protection of the laws. It has also been held that a statute which prohibits coal miners from stipulating in advance that they waive their right to receive their wages for mining coal in legal tender money of the United States is within the legislative power, and a statute which requires the redemption strictions which had formerly been laid upon the conduct of individuals or classes of individuals had proved detrimental to their interest; while, on the other hand, certain other classes of persons, particularly those engaged ten hours in any one day, and limiting the hours of labor to sixty per week, was sustained, as a health or police regulation. In State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, a statute limiting employment of females in manufacturing and mercantile establishments to ten hours in dangerous or unhealthy employin any one day was sustained, as a ments, have been found to be in need proper exercise by the police power. of additional protection. The court The Constitution of Utah contains a also expresses the opinion that the provision that "The legislature shall people of each State may adopt such provide for the health and safety of systems of law as best conform to their employees in factories, smelters, and own traditions and customs, subject mines." Under this provision a stat- always to the restrictions and limitaute making it a misdemeanor to re- tions of the Federal Constitution. It quire or permit an employee to labor further declared that it had no dispomore than eight hours in any one day sition to criticise the many authorities in the mines or smelters was sustained. which hold that State statutes restrictState v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 96; ing the hours of labor are unconstituShort v. Bullion-Beck, &c. Mining Co., tional; that it was not called upon to 20 Utah, 20; 57 Pac. Rep. 720. In express an opinion upon that subject; People v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 145, a that they have no application to cases statute regulating and limiting the where the legislature had adjudged that hours of employment in bakeries was a limitation was necessary for the pressustained, as an exercise of the police ervation of the health of employees, and power of the legislature in the inter- there are reasonable grounds for believests of the public health. But, on writ ing that such determination is supported of error, this decision was reversed by by the facts. It said: "The question in the United States Supreme Court, on each case is whether the legislature has the ground that it denied to employer adopted a statute in the exercise of a and employed the right to freely con- reasonable discretion; or whether its tract without reason. Lochner v. New action be a mere excuse for an unjust York, 198 U. S. 45. discrimination or the oppression or spoliation of a particular class." The Supreme Court of Colorado has refused to follow this decision. See In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, is distinguished in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 54. 1 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. The grounds upon which the court reached this conclusion are stated at large in the opinion. The court seems to have given great weight to the fact that law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in some States the methods of procedure which at the time the Constitution was adopted were deemed necessary to the safety and protection of the people or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary; that re 2 Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366. This decision appears to be placed upon the unsatisfactory ground that the statute may be sustained as tending to protect and maintain the lawful money of the nation. The court declined to in cash of store orders, and other evidences of indebtedness issued by employers in payment of wages, and gives a cause of action for refusal so to redeem, does not conflict with any provision of the Federal Constitution.' It is, of course, apparent that in those States where the validity of any of the statutes referred to above has been sustained, a statute in similar terms operating upon municipal corporations is valid; but, as has already been said, municipal corporations have a twofold character, and some decisions have insisted upon treating them as merely agencies adopted by the State for the purposes of local government. Being creatures of the State, their charters can be revoked or amended at pleasure, and the same power which can create and destroy may regulate all the internal affairs of the corporations. Accordingly it has been held that a statute which declares the number of hours that shall constitute a day's work on the works of the State or government is in the nature of a direction to the agents of the State or government. And under the principles which make a municipal corporation merely an agent of a State for governmental purposes, it has been similarly held that the legislature may prescribe the number of hours which shall constitute a day's labor upon municipal improvements, and may require municipal officers and contractors to observe the provisions of the statute, under penalty of being convicted of a misdemeanor. Such a law, in its application to a person who has contracted with a city subsequent to its enactment, does not deprive the contractor of his liberty or his property without due process of law, even though it appears that the current rate of wages is based on private work where a greater number of hours constitutes a day's work, and that work in excess of the prescribed number of hours is not dangerous to the health of the laborer." express any opinion whether the legis- comparatively helpless condition of the lature might absolutely prohibit the employee, to protect, by legislation of payment of wages in anything other this character, the employee against than money, saying, "Whether the fraud, hardship, and oppression, or legislature may absolutely declare his own improvidence. that nothing shall be payment but money, we need not inquire; for all that is important here is to decide that it may prohibit a contract being made in advance, waiving the right to payment in what the law says shall be the medium for payment." Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13. The true ground on which the validity of such legislation as that mentioned in the text rests, is, we think, that the legislature has deemed it necessary or expedient, in view of the practice of employers, and the 2 United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400. See also Clark v. State, 142 N. Y. 101. • In re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257; State v. Atkin, 64 Kan. 164, 175; s. c. 191 U. S. 207; State v. Wilson, 65 Kan. 237. A city ordinance making eight hours a day's work on all municipal construction, and declaring a violation of this provision by a municipal contractor to be a misdemeanor, has been sustained. In re Broad, 36 Wash. 449. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207. The statute in this case provided that |