England may go on undisturbed. Whether the nations of India will, in time, grow ripe for self-government through this civilising work, I will not now investigate; but England is certainly bound, from the standpoint of consistency and humanity, to indefatigably persevere in this work, and, regardless of party politics, to make every effort to keep off the disturber of peace from the north-western frontier of her Indian Empire. Too much stress cannot be laid, at this point, on the periculum in mora, and it is, as a matter of course, high time that all the experiments that have been made during half a century and more in attempting to discover the right kind of defensive should be dropped, and that that policy which corresponds with the actual state of things should be pursued, a policy the appropriateness of which is now established beyond all doubt.

All parties conceding that the close vicinity of Russia to India is both unadvisable and dangerous, and the system of mountain ranges in the north and north-west being looked upon as the final boundary and rampart, all endeavours should be directed to supplying this rampart with appropriate outworks, and to providing the object of defence with the necessary outposts. The extent of the outworks must correspond with the dimensions and extent of the fortification itself, and therefore no reasoning can avail against the fact that Afghanistan, especially the western and northern portion of that country, is the fittest ground where these outworks can be most easily and effectively established. The regulation of the boundary-line between Russia and Afghanistan which is now being carried out is but an illusory enterprise, and will, at best, furnish the former Power with means for secret preparations. In order to insure full success in this direction, there is nothing left for England but to take the advice given by General Sir E. Hamley in his discourse on Russia's Approaches to India' delivered by him last May, and erect a fortified triangle, at the same time abandoning all schemes for gaining Afghan sympathies. Dreamers, and such politicians only as do not know the character of the Asiatics, may persuade themselves that rude and fanatic Moslems and Afghans will, forgetful of their former hostility and bloodthirstiness for revenge, enter into an alliance with unbelievers whom they hate from the bottom of their hearts, and co-operate with them for the promotion of a common object.

That is sheer nonsense! The Afghans will never anticipate the future in their politics, and if ever the choice of a foreign ruler is left to them we are taught by the present--and I have directed attention to this before-that they will be sure to give preference to a Russian ruler.

It is possible, but not very probable, that Abdurrahman Khan will prove an exception and pursue a sounder policy; but Afghan princes are not by any means the Afghan people, and threefold of

even fivefold subsidies will not suffice to insure respect to the supreme will of the Sirdars and Khans in this anarchical country, and in the midst of a society founded on robbery and pillage. It would take but one single move across the Oxus on the part of Russia, but one step near the present Afghan governor, to bring about an open rebellion against the ruler at Kabul. In order to avoid the expensive annexation of the whole of Afghanistan, England might leave her present protégé in the absolute possession of a suitable territory in the north and west; but the districts bordering on the Oxus and the Russian territory would have to be transformed into vassal states to be used for the purpose of establishing the triangle of fortifications I have previously mentioned.

The triangle would have to be located in Belkh, Herat, and Kandahar: Belkh, which had been throughout all antiquity a considerable fort, and had always proved a protecting wall against Kabul and India; Herat, known since ages as the Gate of India; and, finally, Kandahar, lying on the main road to the south, which has always served as a starting-point for former invasions. We are well aware of the difficulties involved in the maintaining of the communication between these outposts and the Indian Empire for some time to come. The sacrifices exacted by this measure are by no means inconsiderable, but their extent is justified by the imminent danger of a close approach by Russia; and in the same way as the British succeeded, in a comparatively short time, in getting a firm foothold in Quettah, they will also succeed in accomplishing the same thing in Kandahar, and afterwards, as experience has shown, in Herat and Belkh too. Where the question of the consolidation of the Indian possessions and the position of England as a great power in the world is involved, there certainly the sons of Albion neither will nor can be lacking in the necessary energy and in readiness to make sacrifices. Not until England shall have secured her frontiers in this way, will she be able to continue undisturbed the civilising work carried on by her so zealously in the interior of India; and the scattered seeds of a better culture having once taken root, the ideas of Western civilisation having once spread, and the peoples of India having once become thoroughly convinced of the superiority of free England over despotic Russia, the designs of Muscovite cupidity will come to naught of themselves, and India will be secured to England for a long long time.

A. VAMBÉRY.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:
OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS.

THIS article is designed to exhibit, in a summary manner, the principal objections which have been made to Proportional Representation, and especially to the form of it known as the single transferable vote, with the answers to them. Many of the arguments in favour of the system will appear incidentally, but others, which have been often urged, and with which our readers are probably familiar, will find no place here, our scope on the present occasion being strictly defensive. We think ourselves entitled, after all that has been lately written and said on the subject, to assume that the machinery of quotas and transfers needs no fresh explanation.

Objection. The principle of parliamentary representation is that we should recognise each constituency as being itself an integer, because the community is in the spirit and sense of the constitution recognised as being in itself an integral quantity.'-Mr. Gladstone, on Mr. Hardcastle's Bill of 1870 for repealing the minority clause of 1867.

Answer. What we recognise is generally outside ourselves, and it might be supposed from Mr. Gladstone's language that constituencies came by nature; but now that it is proposed to cut up one community into 3, 4... 9 constituencies, is it the whole or the part that we must recognise as the integer of nature? Whichever we take, if two such contain 6,000 electors each, and in one 4,000 electors are Liberals and 2,000 Conservatives, while in the other 2,900 are Liberals and 3,100 Conservatives, is it constitutional principle which obliges us to put an equal value on their corporate opinions, or only convenience, and a mistaken convenience? The only corporate opinion of which proportional representationists recognise the claim in principle is that of the nation.

Objection. What is wanted in the House of Commons is to have the sense of the majority.

Answer. Precisely, if you mean the majority of the nation; but proportional representation is the only system which comes near being a security for obtaining this. In 1862 the State of Ohio comprised 19 districts of fairly equal population, each returning one member to

the Lower House of Congress, and 225,000 Democratic votes carried 14 of those districts, while nearly 250,000 Republican votes carried only 5. In Switzerland, last October, 170,000 electors gave their party a very strong majority in the National Council, although the opposition, which is in a minority, had 174,000 votes. (Journal de Genève, December 12, 1884.) A similar result is very likely to happen in England, where Liberal majorities are more concentrated in particular parts of the country, and in particular parts of the large cities, than Conservative ones. The concentrated majorities will be out-voted on the single-member plan, and you will not get the sense of the majority of the nation.

Objection. But the majorities which have a wider geographical range ought to have a larger proportional representation than the concentrated ones.

Answer. This has been said, but we are not aware that a reason has been given for it. For ourselves, we cannot compare the proper voting weight of Manchester and a deer forest otherwise than by comparing the populations of the two.

Objection. The majority of the nation ought to be represented beyond its numerical proportion, in order to give a sufficient impetus to the legislative machine.

Answer. First, no system based on local majorities secures that the majority of the nation shall be represented beyond its numerical proportion. On the contrary, it would frequently happen that the minority of voters would actually secure a majority of representatives, as in the cases of Ohio and Switzerland, cited above.

Secondly, there will be less fluctuation under a system of proportional representation, because the people who fluctuate will affect only their own quotas, instead of affecting the representation of those also who are staunch, by turning the majorities in a large number of districts. Now a steady pressure is not less potent for progressive legislation, and is more likely to be wisely applied, than an occasional rush. The majorities obtained by large turnovers are in truth too insecure in themselves to afford steady support to a Minister.

Objection. The majority of the nation ought to be represented beyond its numerical proportion, in order to make the executive government strong. For instance, Mr. Bright has said that the United States could not have been carried successfully through the war of secession, if proportional representation had been in force there.

Answer. The two answers to the last objection may be repeated here, mutatis mutandis in the second one. And a committee of the United States Senate has asserted that with proportional representation there would have been no secession. 'The leaders of the revolt with much difficulty carried their States with them,' and only succeeded because the union men, dispersed, unorganised, unrepresented, without due voice and power, could interpose no effectual resistance to VOL. XVII.-No. 96.

Y

secession and to civil war.' The violent physic was made necessary by the irrational habits of political life previously maintained.

Objection. The majority of the nation ought to be represented beyond its numerical proportion, in order to avoid the balance of power in the house being held by a third party, with which in that case both the great parties would be tempted to intrigue.

Answer. The first answer to the last objection but one again. applies. No system based on local majorities does secure the end desired. Further, the intrigue which is deprecated in the house is almost forced, out of the house, on the managers of elections, by the necessity of obtaining the local majority. Was Parliament never known to ratify promises that were only made in order to catch votes? When this happens, the intrigue, though not less real, may be less apparent, because, in order to catch the votes, it was necessary to simulate the corresponding opinions. If each of two great parties returned its members on its own unsophisticated principles, any subsequent intrigue with a third party would have to be carried on in the face of day, and it may therefore be hoped that it would seldom be carried on at all. Its place might be taken, as too often it now is not, by a union of those parties in opposition to what they both disapproved. When members obtain their seats by coquetting with a third party, the mischief, if not consummated at the general election, is easily carried further in Parliament. When members are elected independently of such manoeuvres they will be found disinclined to support them and even resisting them, although promoted by their own party managers, in the House of Commons.

Objection. Under each of the last three objections there often lurks the idea that Parliament ought to be so constituted as to give a big majority, no matter whether on the side of the majority of the

nation or not.

Answer. There are no means of so constituting Parliament as to secure that result, even were it desirable. Local majorities operate by mere chance, and that chance may be in favour of the equality of the representation of parties, as easily as in favour of its inequality. Objection. Political feeling would be deadened for want of local

contests.

Answer. What is the present state of feeling in a constituency where one party possesses an undisputed majority? The answer may be found in many county divisions and in some big towns. In such constituencies under proportional representation, the minority will at least be kept alive by the representation they would probably get, and they would without risk try for another quota if they thought they had the chance. In other constituencies, where the balance of parties is doubtful, there would be the same stimulus urging each to strive for the predominance of seats as there is now for striving after the majority. The late Mr. Henley objected to proportional