Why Think?: Evolution and the Rational MindIn a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? In this short but wide-ranging book, philosopher Ronald de Sousa looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. In short, this sophisticated and entertaining book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. Ranging over a wide array of evidence, it explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world. |
Contents
3 | |
2 Function and Destiny | 29 |
3 Whats the Good of Thinking? | 56 |
4 Rationality Individual and Collective | 87 |
5 Irrationality | 120 |
Notes | 155 |
169 | |
181 | |
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Common terms and phrases
actually admit of degrees aetiological agents altruistic ancestors Andrea Yates animals Aristotle aVect aVorded behavior beneWciaries beneWt biological capacity causal cell cellular automata chance chapter choice claim cognitive computation contrast conXicts decision theory defect Descartes deWned deWnition distinction diVerent diVerential diYculties domain emotions epistemic eVects evolution example existence explain eYcient fact faculty favor frame problem function genes G goal group selection human hypothesis idea individual inference intelligent intentional intentionality inXuence irrational irrationality kin selection language laws logic machine mathematics mechanism modular modules natural selection norm notion object organisms particular Pascal’s phenotypes point of view preference principle probability problem question rationality reason reciprocal altruism representation reproduction result reXective risk seems selWsh sense sexual reproduction signiWcant singular possibility Sober solution sort species speciWc strategy success suYce suYciently teleology theory thought tion transitivity tropisms truth vestigial teleology Wgures Wrst Wtness Xavor