Opinion. a fact, but a mere expression of opinion. It was not a representation that Dr. Browning had stated that it was to be in full of her share of his estate, but that such was the effect of his deed. If, however, it had been represented as a fact, it is supported by the testimony of both Wynn and his wife, who testify that Dr. Browning had repeatedly so stated to them. This testimony is opposed only by the testimony of Lillie C. that Dr. Browning had told her that he intended that she should have the mill, which is a part of the home tract and was not given to her by the will. The will itself is a contradiction of the claim. As to the representation that Dr. Browning had by his will given all of his real and personal estate to Mrs. Wynn and her children, it is manifest that this was their interpretation of the language of the will, and that the representation was made in perfect good faith, both orally and in writing. It was an expression of opinion on the legal effect of a document that was open to the inspection of the said Lillie C. Moreover, if it be construed to be a representation of a fact, the representation was not relied on. The father of Lillie C., testifying in her behalf, states that he consulted a lawyer of distinction as to the will, and that he said the will "was not worth the paper it was written on;" that he so advised his daughter, and that he called upon Mr. Wynn to turn over a part of the estate to his daughter. Lillie C., testifying in her own behalf, also says: "My father came in one evening and told me my uncle wanted a settlement with me and said he would give me $300, and the other things mentioned, and I cried and said I would not do anything about it and he said he would not have anything more to do with it. He said Mr. Wynn would have a settlement at my expense. I did not have any money and I did not know what else to do." Opinion. [6] It was after these events that the deed of November 17, 1896, was executed. Not only does this deed recite that Lillie C. was setting up claims against the estate of her grandfather, Dr. Browning, but the fact that Wynn and his wife were paying a valuable consideration for a release and conveyance from her is evidence of that fact. The deed of November 17, 1896, on its face appears to be a compromise and adjustment of a disputed claim. It is said that compromise agreements are favored in equity, and this is especially true of family settlements of disputed claims, and that they will not be set aside for fraud unless the fraud be proved "by clear and convincing testimony." Cary v. Harris, 120 Va. 252, 255, 91 S. E. 166, 167; 12 Corpus Juris 351. [7, 8] Mrs. Hicks (Lillie C.) testified that when she executed the deed of November 17, 1896, she had never read the deed from her grandfather to her mother, nor the will of her grandfather, but her failure to do so cannot be charged to any act of commission or omission on the part of Mrs. Wynn or her husband. She also testified that she executed the deed of November 17, 1896, without reading it, or hearing it read. In this she is contradicted by both Wynn and his wife. Neither the attorney who drew the deed, nor the clerk who took the acknowledgment, both of whom were said by John C. Wynn to have read the deed to Lillie C. was examined as a witness in the case. Why, it does not appear. But the mere failure of a grantor to read a deed is not of itself a badge of fraud on the part of the grantee, when there is no impediment to such reading, and no inducement offered by the grantee to prevent the reading. In Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 50, 23 L. Ed. 203, it is said: "It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obliga Opinion. tions, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. If this were per mitted, contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written. But such is not the law. A contractor must stand by the words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible for his omission. Jackson v. Croy, 12 Johns, 427; Leis v. Stubbs, 6 Watts 48; Farly v. Bryant, 32 Me. 474; Coffing v. Taylor, 16 Ill. 457; Stapylton v. Scott, 13 Ves. 427; Alvanly v. Kinnaid, 2 Mac. & G. 7, 29 Beav. 490. [9] "That a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the law will not vitiate a contract, where there is no misunderstanding of the facts, is well settled. "In Fish v. Clelland, 33 Ill. 243, the principle is expressed in these words: 'A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely; and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. The truth or falsehood of such a representation can be decided by ordinary vigilance and attention. It is an opinion in regard to the law, and is always understood as such.' See Star v. Bennett, 5 Hill 303; Lewis v. Jones, 4 B. C. 506; Rashall v. Ford, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 750. "The law is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all parties." [10] We concur with the trial court that the allegation of false representation and fraud on the part of Mrs. Wynn and her husband has not been sustained, even if it would be considered after the lapse of twentyfour years without a reasonable suggestion of any cause to prevent an earlier discovery. Cf. Hagan v. Taylor, 110 Va. 9, 65 S. E. 487. [11] The language of the deed of November 17, Opinion. 1896, leaves no room for doubt that Lillie C. Vandeventer (now Mrs. Hicks) intended to convey and release to Mrs. Wynn and her heirs every kind of interest in or claim upon the estate, real and personal, of James C. Browning "either in Lee county, Virginia, or in Harlan county, Kentucky." There is no evidence of any intention to give any warranty of the title conveyed, or to measure the quantity or quality of the estate conveyed, but plainly she intended to transfer to the grantee whatever estate she had and to do so effectually, so that neither she nor anyone claiming through her could ever thereafter assert title to the interest or estate conveyed. That she intended that the title should be shown of record is manifest from the fact that she acknowledged the deed in such manner as to render it admissible to record in Virginia. That was the purpose of the acknowledgment. To say that she acknowledged so that it could be recorded in Virginia but not in Kentucky would not only impute to her bad faith and fraud, but also a knowledge of the recording acts of Kentucky hardly attributable to a country girl who had only passed the seventh grade of the public schools of the county. The defect in the acknowledgment is attributable to the form adopted by the officer taking it rather than to the character of the act of the grantor. The record discloses nothing to indicate that the grantor did not intend that the deed should be recorded in Kentucky as well as in Virginia. Upon the facts of the case, we are of opinion that there was an implied covenant on the part of the grantor to acknowledge the deed in such manner as would make it recordable in Kentucky as well as in Virginia. But she has refused to do so, and the trial court entered a decree requiring her to execute, acknowledge and file in the papers in the cause a proper deed of conveyance of the Kentucky lands to the com Opinion. plainant, H. Retta Wynn, and providing that, if she failed to do so for thirty days, a commissioner appointed by the court should execute the deed on her behalf. The trial court had jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Hicks, but none over the lands in Kentucky. It could compel her to execute a conveyance, but could not confer any extra-territorial power on its commissioner to make such conveyance. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924; 17 Ann. Cas. 853; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464, 19 L. Ed. 976; Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163; Poindexter v. Burwell, 82 Va. 507; Gibson v. Burgess, 82 Va. 650; Wimer v. Wimer, 82 Va. 890, 901, 5 S. E. 536, 3 Am. St. Rep. 126; Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 549, 32 S. E. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806; Vaught v. Meador, 99 Va. 569, 574, 39 S. E. 225, 86 Am. St. Rep. 908. So much of the decree, therefore, as appoints a commissioner and directs him to execute the deed is erroneous. Whether or not the decree of the trial court, affirmed by this court, settling the rights of the parties over the matter in controversy, is entitled to, and will receive, full faith and credit in the courts of Kentucky, we are not called upon to decide. See Williams v. Williams, 83 r. 59, 162 Pac. 834, 836; Vaught v. Neador, supra; Burnley v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621; Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182; 17 Mich. Law Rev. 527; Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561; 30 Atl. 676, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528; Fall v. Fall, 72 Neb. 104, 106 N. W. 412, 113 N. W. 175, 121 Am. St. Rep. 767; Fall v. Eastin, supra; 33 Har. L. Rev. 423. There was no defect or imperfection in the deed from Miss Vandeventer (now Mrs. Hicks) to Mrs. Wynn bearing date November 17, 1896, but the acknowledgment was insufficient to authorize its recordation in Kentucky. As there was an implied covenant to give |