leon at Avesnes. This he did early on the 14th, and at a later period he forwarded information that confirmed his views. Wellington also learned, probably from the Prussians, that the French troops on the frontier had been increased, and that Napoleon was with them; but while Blucher on the night of the 14th directed Bulow to march upon Hannut,—Pirch I. to occupy Sombref, Thielemann to concentrate upon Namur, and Ziethen to retreat, if attacked, slowly, and fighting every inch of the way, upon Fleurus, Wellington " did not deem it expedient to make any movement, excepting for the assembly of the troops at their several alarm posts, till he should hear of the decided movement of the enemy."

1

At this time, that is, on the evening of the 14th, neither Blucher nor Wellington could know, what we know, that Napoleon's object was Sombref and Quatre Bras. He had it still in his power to take other courses instead of that course he had resolved to take, and he was eminently a general who did not fear to adopt bold and unexpected tactics. Wellington, therefore, who made no move except on accurate and ample information, could not be expected to concentrate his army upon receiving the meagre reports supplied by his own and the Prussian outposts; the more especially because the devices adopted by Napoleon on the frontier between Valenciennes and Dunquerque helped to confirm his view that some attack would be made from the side of the Scheldt. The information in the hands of both generals on the eve of the 14th would not enable any one to say whether the main attack would be made from Beaumont or from Lille; and it is quite impossible to understand the situation of the allied generals on the night of the 14th, unless we exclude from our minds the knowledge

1 Wellington's Commentary on General Clausewitz.

we have of Napoleon's fixed intentions. The French were in force, Napoleon was among them; what was he about to do? That is a question we can answer, but it is not a question which could have been answered either by Blucher or Wellington on the evening of the 14th. The Duke of Wellington himself tells us that he did not "at first give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and Meuse." And he has given his reasons: “The enemy had destroyed the roads leading through these valleys," and the Duke "considered that Buonaparte might have made his attack upon the allied armies in the Netherlands and upon the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, by other lines, with more advantage." The scanty information he had received did not shake his general views, and thus it befell that, on the night of the 14th, he did not act upon the report that the French were conjectured to have appeared that day, in force, near Solre sur Sambre and Beaumont.

The night of the 14th of June, 1815, passed quickly away. Before a single French soldier had moved, the whole of the Prussian army, the corps of Ziethen excepted, was in motion; the soldiers of Bulow were collecting at Liége, those of Pirch I. at Namur, those of Thielemann at Ciney. Napoleon is made to say, in the "Memoirs of St. Helena," that he calculated on the hussar-like promptitude of Blucher, inferring from this characteristic that he would be the first to concentrate, and more eager to succour Wellington if the latter were attacked, than Wellington would be to succour Blucher. If this be not, like so many reasons given in those "Memoirs,” a reason formed after the fact, it is manifest that Napoleon's expectations were fulfilled, and more than fulfilled. What Napoleon did not expect was that the active and venturesome Blucher would be able to concentrate any force at

Sombref before Napoleon himself had concentrated at Fleurus a force more than sufficient to drive away whatever might be before them. He was also right in characterizing Wellington as "circumspect" in his movements, but he was in error when he judged that the marches of the Duke would be slow. Assuming that the "Memoirs" correctly represent the views of Napoleon at the outset of the campaign, it is in them that the root of his greatest error is to be found. That error consisted in the undervaluing of his adversaries. Having inferred from his imperfect estimate of their characters what they would do, he proceeded throughout upon that fatal principle, without ascertaining, by actual and close observation, whether their actions corresponded with his hypothesis. As the story is unfolded we shall have ample evidence of the correctness of this view.

§ 3. Opening of the Campaign.

The French army, massed in three columns, was under arms at the appointed hour on the morning of the 15th. The general order of movement directed the two corps of Reille and D'Erlon to march at three o'clock, following the right bank of the Sambre. Reille was to cross at the bridge of Marchienne, a little above Charleroi; D'Erlon was first directed upon Charleroi, but subsequently ordered to cross at Marchienne, or the bridge of Alnes, between Marchienne and Thuin. The bulk of the army in the central position of Beaumont was to move in succession upon Charleroi by Ham-sur-Eure. Pajol's light cavalry was to lead the way, mounting in the saddle and starting at half-past two. Vandamme was to follow at three; Lobau at four; the different divisions of the Guard between four and six, but the cavalry of the Guard not

until eight. The three corps of cavalry remaining with Grouchy were to move at intervals of half-an-hour, beginning at half-past five. All these troops were to make for Charleroi. On the right Gérard was to march at three o'clock; the original direction of this column was altered from Charleroi to Chatelet, below Charleroi, and Gérard was instructed to keep a good look-out on his right flank towards Namur. In rear of all went the baggage, rigorously reduced to a stinted regulation allowance.

This order of movement was executed as designed, with two exceptions. Reille carried his corps steadily along the right bank of the Sambre, driving before him the Prussians, who, nevertheless, contested every village, but who were pushed on by the torrent of Frenchmen pouring down the valley. By ten o'clock Reille had obtained possession of the right bank of the Sambre as far as Marchienne, had seized the bridge connecting the two sections of that village, and had begun to defile his column through its crooked streets and over the river. D'Erlon followed, but slowly. The bad country roads had been made worse by the march of Reille's troops; hence D'Erlon made but little progress. His flanking parties crossed the river at Lobbes, and patrolled towards Mons and Binche, a movement which caused General Chassé to collect his division on the river Haine. Gérard did not march from Philippeville until five o'clock. His brigades were in motion, when the soldiers were startled by a report that Lieutenant-General Bourmont, the commander of the division in advance, had deserted to the enemy. The report proved to be true. Bourmont and his staff had quitted the head of the column at Florenne, whence he had the audacity to write a letter to Gérard, setting forth very lame reasons for this act of treason.1 It has been asserted that Napoleon

1 Bourmont, according to Sir Francis Head, rode into Charleroi

altered the direction of Gérard's column in consequence of Bourmont's desertion; and it seems probable, for Gérard was moving upon Charleroi, according to Colonel Charras, when he received Bourmont's letter. Later in the morning the fourth corps was directed to cross the Sambre at Chatelet, and the desertion of Bourmont, reported at head-quarters, may have induced Napoleon to make that alteration in his original plan. Gérard, marching through a deep, broken, and roadless country, did not reach Chatelet with the head of his column until three in the afternoon. He found the bridge unbroken and the village unoccupied; for the Prussians, Charleroi being then captured, had fallen back towards Fleurus.

The desertion of Bourmont was not the only or principal mishap. The officer sent by Soult to the third corps with the order of march fell from his horse and broke a thigh, so that at six o'clock Vandamme's troops were still on the ground where they had passed the night! The sixth corps, coming up in rear through a thick morning mist, found the road blocked, and it is from Janin, an officer in Lobau's staff, that we learn the true cause of the delay. When Vandamme got his orders he was soon on the move, and passed the defile in his front with quickness and precision. Informed of the error, and anxious to provide a support for the cavalry, Napoleon put the Young Guard in motion by cross roads upon Charleroi. Pajol

Sir Francis says

about mid-day on the 16th, a misprint for 15th. he was close to General Ziethen when Bourmont gave up the famous order of movement for the day, and declared that he had executed a cherished intention of betraying Napoleon. The "Memoirs" says that Bourmont deserted on the 14th. It was not so. He deserted on the 15th, reaching the Prussians when the French were within sight of Charleroi; a fact which deprives the act of desertion of any military importance.