and provide against the chance of being cut off from the rest." This passage fully explains the sound principle on which he acted, and shows at the same time how much he relied on his own genius, and on the talents of his lieutenants. Full of confidence, he urged offensive operations as speedily as possible. There was not a moment to lose. "I say nothing about our defensive operations," he writes on the 8th of May, “because I am inclined to believe that Blucher and I are so well united and so strong, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole; the greatest part of the enemy's force is in my front; and if I am satisfied, others need be under no apprehensions." A rumour that Napoleon had left Paris brought the Prussian head-quarters to Hannut, and soon afterwards they were carried to Namur. Wellington obtained a pretty good account of the general state, strength, and disposition of the disposable force in France, and forwarded his information to the commanders of the allied armies on the Rhine, as well as to Blucher. He heard that Soult and Mortier were employed, and that measures had been taken to move the Guard from Paris to Maubeuge in forty-eight hours. These statements, so nearly true, were not of a nature to lull an officer like Wellington, and they did not. He was incessantly active, and ever prepared.

The Allies occupied a front almost co-extensive with the frontier of France. Wellington and Blucher commanded the forces nearest to Paris; the other armies were morè distant; the whole being in echelon, from the Scheldt to the Swiss frontier. The plan of campaign suggested by Wellington, and approved, was this:-The left was to move first, because it was the most distant from Paris, and opposed by the smallest force, and because the fortresses interposed serious obstacles to a movement on the right. When the left had reached Langres, the centre would cross

the Meuse, occupy Sedan, and watch Metz and Thionville; then the right would enter France, and get possession of Givet and Maubeuge. Three grand masses, 150,000 strong, would thus successively invade France, and, connecting their operations, press forward towards Paris, supported by the reserves, principally composed of Russians. On this plan it is needless to dwell, since its execution was anticipated by Napoleon.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

WE

WE have seen that Napoleon, by the beginning of June, had raised the effective force of the French regular army to 276,982 men, of whom 198,130 were disposable for war. But, threatened on all sides by implacable enemies, he could not bring all his cannon, bayonets, and sabres to bear upon one point. The largest mass of his adversaries had gathered close on his northern frontier, and therefore he kept four corps and a mass of cavalry between the Meuse and the Lys, one on the Moselle, and the Imperial Guard at Paris. These, combined, were destined to form the fighting, or, in the inflated language of the Empire, the Grande Armée. The larger part of the remainder of the disposable effective of the troops of the line, some 52,000 men, together with 38,000 National Guards d'élite, were divided into six small bodies, whereof two were styled corps d'armée, the 5th and 7th, and four were called corps of observation. They were scattered between Strasbourg and Antibes, thus:—

The 5th corps, 19,000 troops of the line, and 3,000 National Guards, under Count Rapp, held the famous lines of the Lauter, between Hagenau and Landau, having its head-quarters in Strasbourg. Napoleon had promised

Rapp 40,000 troops of the line when he sent him to command on the Upper Rhine. At the opening of the campaign he had not half that number under arms—a feeble force wherewith to face the masses collecting in Baden and Wurtemburg and in the provinces on the left bank of the great German river. On the right of Rapp, but at a considerable distance, General Le Courbe, with a force of 4,446 regulars and 10,000 National Guards, watched Basle and the passes of the Jura range; while a weak division of National Guards hardly kept up the communication with Rapp. On the right of Le Courbe, Marshal Suchet, with the 7th corps, a mixed force like the others, 8,814 of the line and 12,000 National Guards, held Chambery and Grenoble. His corps was styled the Army of the Alps, and its contingent of National Guards was half armed, barely equipped, and poorly clad. A much weaker body, 4,081 men, under Marshal Brune, was scattered between Toulon and the Var. On the Spanish frontier, Decaen was. at Toulouse, in front of the Eastern, and Clauzel at Bordeaux, watching the Western Pyrenees; the aggregate of their troops, National Guards included, did not exceed 14,000 men. The forces available for the defence of Napoleon from his external enemies was further diminished by 8,500 troops of the Line and 6,000 National Guards, who, under General Lamarque, contended with enemies within; for the royalists were up in the West, and they occupied the attention of Lamarque until the end of June in the old battle-ground of La Vendée. Behind all these troops were the depôts, but almost drained of men and in the fortresses were distributed some 150,000 National Guards, sailors, and local troops.

Thus the forces in the hands of Napoleon were 276,982 regulars and about 200,000 other troops, for the most part inferior; giving a total of 476,982 men.

The energy and resolution of the Allies are conspicuously shown in the general enumeration of the immense forces they had directed upon France. Austria, beside the Army engaged in the overthrow of Murat in Italy, had collected nearly 100,000 men on the Rhine between Manheim and Basle. About 80,000 Bavarians, Wurtemburgers, Hessians, and Badeners, under Prince Wrede, were in the Palatinate and on the Upper Rhine. Some 26,000 men, under General Kleist, were in Luxembourg and Rhenish Prussia. Throughout the months of April and May three strong Russian columns were marching across Germany from Poland, Silesia, and Bohemia, upon Mayence, Oppenheim, and Manheim; and their leading divisions arrived in time to take part in the opening movements of the campaign upon the Rhine. In addition to these forces an AustroSardinian army was collected for the invasion of the southeastern departments. It was arranged that the forces on both banks of the Rhine should simultaneously invade France from Mayence to Basle, supported by the Russians, and directing their steps towards Chalons sur Marne, St. Diziers, and Rheims, while the corps of Kleist advanced, and watched, and controlled the garrisons on the Meuse between Meziers and Verdun. At the same time the Austro-Sardinian army was to cross the Alps and march on Lyons. The forces on the right flank-Blucher's and Wellington's-were to regulate their progress by that of the centre and left. The object of the whole, upwards of 700,000 strong, was Paris. But Napoleon would not wait to be attacked, and hence the brunt as well as the glory of the short war fell upon the British and Prussian armies.

It has been seen that the first thought of Napoleon when he found himself once more in the Tuileries was of war. An instinct told him that he would attract towards himself the whole force of Europe. How could he best