General von Gneisenau had taken the command of the Prussian army. He resolved to hold Bry until midnight; to maintain the whole of Thielemann's corps at Sombref and Point du Jour; and to withdraw the remainder of the army at one o'clock to Tilly and Gentinnes, on the road to Wavre. The execution of these measures was not hindered by any movements of the wearied French; who, after posting their pickets, sought repose upon the field, while Napoleon at once betook himself to his head-quarters at Fleurus.

1

The loss of the Prussians in this battle is estimated by themselves at 12,000, and by a careful French authority at 18,000, including a few hundred prisoners taken in the retreat. They also lost twenty-one guns. The French loss is also the subject of controversy; the estimates of the best writers varying the figures from 7,000 to 11,000, the latter number being probably the correct one. In addition to their loss upon the field, the Prussians were deprived of the services of some 8,000 soldiers who separated and fled towards Namur. Thus Napoleon, at a cost of 11,000 men, had diminished the strength of the Allies by at least 25,000, and had compelled Blucher to cede the battle-field. But he had not gained the object for which he fought the battle -he had not separated Blucher from Wellington. When he retired to Fleurus he did not probably know that fact, and he certainly took no pains to ascertain it. For all night long the Prussians were filing away, and, as we shall see, none of his outposts knew whither, although they were within gunshot of the bivouacs of Von Jagow and Thielemann.

§ 2. The Battle of Quatre Bras.

From the sombre and blood-bedewed field of Ligny we

1 Charras.

must return to narrate the fortunes of the French left wing under Marshal Ney. The events of the morning which immediately preceded the battle of Quatre Bras have been already described, and the story must be resumed at the point where Foy coming into Frasne enabled the marshal to begin the fray.

But first, we must describe in more detail, and from the British side, the scene of this conflict. It will be remembered that the road from Charleroi to Brussels ran through the position in a straight line. Viewed from the farm at Quatre Bras, this road was lost to sight in the direction of Frasne. The Namur road branched off at an acute angle, and disappeared in the direction of Thyle, beyond which the hills about Marbais, and farther to the south-east the plain of Fleurus, were visible to the spectator. On the right of the Charleroi road stood the wood of Bossu. Its straggling border fringed the road to Nivelles about 200 yards from Quatre Bras, and stretching southward at the same distance from the Charleroi road, it bent abruptly inwards, and expanding in width, extended upwards of half a mile, where it terminated in a square clump of trees, at its south-western angle, near the farm of Pierpont. Thus, between the road and the wood there was an open space, some 500 yards broad at its southern base, and narrowed to 200 yards at Quatre Bras. On the left, or eastern, side of the road lay a wider plain, bounded by the Namur road and a rivulet, rising in the wood of Bossu, and running, first to the eastward, as far as the Namur road, where it turned to the north-east. A few yards beyond this rivulet, above its right bank, and close to the Charleroi road, stood and stands the strong farmhouse of Gemioncourt, with enclosed fields stretching to the eastward along the valley, and beyond the farm the ground rises, forming a slight elevation overlooking the plain towards Quatre Bras. The village of Péraumont lies

on the left, and the wood of Delhutte bounds the view to the south-east.

The Prince of Orange, with a weak force of less than 7,000 men and sixteen guns, but no cavalry, occupied the front of the position we have described, facing towards Frasne, and extending from the wood of Delhutte on his left, across the road, to the wood of Bossu, with his guns on the high road, and his reserves at Quatre Bras. In this position he had remained for several hours, but the moment of action was fast approaching; for the arrival of Foy, about half-past one, increased Ney's force to 9,000 infantry, 1,865 cavalry, and twenty-two guns. These he arrayed, at once, in order of battle, and gave them the word to advance. He risked nothing in so doing; because, already superior in every arm, he knew that Prince Jerome was not far off; that his division would increase the total strength of the attacking force by nearly 8,000 men; and that Jerome would be followed by Kellerman and D'Erlon.

The first indication of the coming action was given by the French skirmishers, who expelled the Dutch from the wood of Delhutte, and drove back their advanced posts along the whole front. About two o'clock Ney made a vigorous forward movement. Bachelu carried Péraumont on the right, Piré charged and overthrew a battalion, Foy drove the Dutch back upon Gemioncourt, and Ney established his batteries on the ridge above that farm. But here the Prince of Orange halted, holding the farm and enclosures, thus barring the road to Quatre Bras, and filling the wood of Bossu with troops. Nor, although Prince Jerome had come into line, and his leading columns were breaking into the farm and wood of Pierpont, was the Prince of Orange without hope. Sometimes wanting in judgment, never wanting in courage, and inspired by the spectacle of red regiments moving out from Quatre Bras,

he became too audacious, and led the battalion defending Gemioncourt against the veterans of Foy. The result might have been foreseen. Broken by cannon-shot, this battalion fell back in confusion, and Foy, seizing the opportunity, charged and carried the farm and enclosures, thus bringing the French front on to the verge of the open country south of Quatre Bras, which it seemed so easy to reach. But the moment when conquest was possible had passed away.

The red masses which cheered the heart of the Prince of Orange as he looked across the rich cornfields were the regiments of Picton's division, which had marched that morning from Brussels across the Field of Waterloo to Quatre Bras. With them came two batteries of artillery, and on the Nivelles road the head of Van Merle's column of Dutch-Belgian cavalry was seen wheeling to its right and forming on the east of the wood of Bossu. Picton's division drew up speedily along the Namur road, and the 1st battalion of the 95th Rifles, under Sir Andrew Barnard, rapidly engaged the French skirmishers on the extreme left, and compelled them to retire towards Péraumont. Van Merle, hastily called up by the Prince of Orange to support the infantry retiring from Gemioncourt, was charged by Piré, who overthrew both foot and horse, and disabled half a battery of guns, but did not venture to dash against the British infantry about Quatre Bras. This was the first crisis in the engagement; the arrival of Picton had saved the position. Close behind him came a portion of the Duke of Brunswick's corps, 4,000 infantry and 900 horsemen, but without guns. Part of the cavalry were sent to watch the open country and field roads on the right of the wood of Bossu; one battalion was sent to the left, and took post in rear of the 95th Rifles; two battalions were posted immediately on the right of the hamlet, and the remainder were arrayed in advance of Quatre Bras between

the wood and the main road. Although Ney had received no reinforcements, he was still superior to his adversary, for his less numerous troops were all good, and he mustered five batteries to Wellington's four.

At this moment Ney occupied a front stretching nearly east and west. On his right, the eastern flank, the French skirmishers were on the Namur road, in action with the 95th, and their line extended from that point westward on the British side of Gemioncourt into and across the southern base of the wood of Bossu. Bachelu's columns were in rear on the right, Foy in the centre, and Prince Jerome on the left. The guns of the whole of Reille's corps were disposed along the ridge in heavy batteries at intervals from right to left. Wellington's line was not parallel to that of the French, but followed the direction of the Namur road, which, taking a south-easterly course, touched the French right. The British right was in the wood of Bossu, defended by Perponcher's division, protected on their left by the Brunswick regiments in the open. Thus the British left and centre were exposed to an incessant cannonade from Reille's guns, inadequately answered by the inferior artillery of the Allies; and the Dutch Belgians and Nassauers in the wood were giving ground before the onsets of Jerome.

Ney was about to issue from his position and assault the British left and centre. The French light troops dashed forward from the valley of Gemioncourt, and Bachelu on the right, and Foy partly on the road and partly between the road and the wood, led forward their heavy columns, protected by the guns and followed by Piré's horsemen. The signs of the coming storm did not escape the watchfulness of the British commander. He resolved not to wait, but to meet it. Picton's skirmishers were already deeply engaged, and before the French columns had crossed the little ravine and broken through the hedges, Picton's two