4. The general rule that express trusts are not within the statute of limi-
tations does not apply to a trust openly disavowed by the trustee with
the knowledge of the cestui que trust. Speidel v. Henrici, 377.
5. Implied trusts are barred by lapse of time.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 3;
1. Unless exempted by treaty, a foreign merchant vessel, entering a port
of the United States for purposes of trade, is subject to the local law,
and the local courts may punish for crimes committed upon the vessel,
within the port, by one foreigner upon another foreigner. Wildenhus's
Case, 1.
2. The statute of Missouri of March 4, 1869, gives no validity to a transfer,
without indorsement in writing, of a bill of lading or warehouse
receipt. Allen v. St. Louis Bank, 20.
3. The statute of Missouri of March 28, 1874, making the pledge of goods
by a factor, without the written authority of the owner, a criminal
offence, does not render such a pledge valid as between the owner and
the pledgee. Ib.
4. In Illinois when a declaration in an action at law alleges a joint liability
of two defendants, a plea in bar which does not traverse this allegation
admits it, and makes the declarations of one defendant not served with
process evidence against the other who has appeared and answered.
Forsyth v. Doolittle, 73.
5. According to the law and practice of Louisiana, the Supreme Court of
that state, in cases brought before it by appeal from inferior courts,
determines the matter in controversy, as presented by the record, both
as to fact and law, without regard to the particular rulings of the
courts below, and its opinion, showing the grounds of its judgment,
constitutes part of the record to be reviewed in this court, upon writ
of error, when the question for determination is whether the Supreme
Court of the state decided a Federal question, necessary to the decision
of the case, without respect to the rulings of the inferior state court.
Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union Co., 141.
6. It appearing by the record in this court that the verdict at the trial of
an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court of the United States sitting
in Florida did not state the quantity of the estate or describe the land,
the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Pensacola Ice Co. v. Perry, 318.
7. Following the decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, this court
holds that the justices of the peace of Muhlenburg County, in that
state, do not form a necessary part of the county court when levying a
tax to satisfy a judgment against the county, under § 9 of the Act of
the Legislature of Kentucky, of February 24, 1868, amending the
charter of the Elizabethtown and Paducah Railroad Company. Meri-
wether v. Muhlenburg County Court, 354.
8. The State of Missouri having loaned its credit to the Hannibal and St.
Joseph Railroad Company for $3,000,000, upon a first lien of the road
and property of the company, the legislature on the 20th February,
1865, authorized that company to mortgage its road and property to
trustees to secure an issue of bonds to that amount, and further en-
acted that whenever those trustees should "pay into the treasury of
the state a sum of money equal in amount to all indebtedness due or
owing by said company to the state, and all liabilities incurred by the
state by reason of having issued her bonds and loaned the same to
said company as a loan of the credit of the state, together with all in-
terest that has and may at the time when such payment shall be
made have accrued and remain unpaid by said company, and such fact
shall have been certified to the governor of the state by the treasurer,"
the governor should "make over, assign, and convey to the trustees
aforesaid all the first liens and mortgages now held by the state." The
act further required the state treasurer to receive of the trustees in
payment of the $3,000,000 any outstanding bonds of the state, bearing
not less than six per cent. interest, or any of the unpaid coupons
thereof at their par value. Held, that this meant that if payment was
made in money, and not in state bonds or coupons, it must be of an
amount equal to the face value of the bonds issued to the company and
the accrued interest thereon to the time of payment, together with such
further sum,
if any, as would be necessary to enable the state to cancel
then, or within a reasonable time thereafter, $3,000,000 of its outstand-
ing liabilities, bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum.
Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 390.
9. The act of the General Assembly of Missouri of March 26, 1881, to pro-
vide for the transfer to the sinking fund of surplus money in the
treasury, recognized the act of February 20, 1865, providing for the
reduction of the state indebtedness, and constituted an agreement, on
the part of the state, that all moneys paid into the treasury by the
railroad company should be put into the state debt sinking fund, and
that all option bonds should be called in and paid as soon as it could
lawfully be done; and the use of the money so paid in taking up six
per cent. bonds of the state operated to discharge the company from
liability for the payment of either the principal or interest of an equal
amount of the bonds which had been issued for its benefit. Ib.
10. The provisions of the Constitution of the State of Missouri which went
into effect November 30, 1865, relating to the lien held by the state
upon any railroad, or to the release of the indebtedness of any corpo-
ration to the state, do not prevent the state authorities from comply-
ing with the requirements of the acts of February 20, 1865, and March
25, 1881, respecting the lien upon the Hannibal and St. Joseph Rail-
road and the debt of that company to the state, when the company
has
performed the acts required by the statutes to be done upon its part.
Ib.
11. In Pennsylvania a warrant and survey, and payment of the purchase
money, confer a legal estate as against all but the Commonwealth, to-
gether with a legal right of entry which will support ejectment; and
this action of ejectment may be maintained by the owner who paid
the purchase money, without any conveyance from the person in whose
name the application was made and the warrant issued. Herron v.
Dates, 464.
12. The plaintiff in an action of ejectment in Pennsylvania, to prove
title, offered in evidence certified copies of (1) an application num-
bered 12,969, in the names of six separate persons for six separate
tracts of four hundred acres each, adjoining lands of A; (2) of old
purchase voucher, dated November 26, 1793, also numbered 12,969, in
the same names, with like quantities of land also adjoining lands of
A; (3) of old purchase blotter dated June 14, 1794, also numbered
12,969, at the side of which were written the words: "A gen'l rec't
wrote," and in the body of which, after the number and date and the
name of A, were the words "6 W'r'ts of 400 a's Am't, 2400 a's 50s p.
c't p'd specie ch. £60==. Fees 60s. p'd, rem'r charge of 168 D's.
Rec't d'd." Held, (1) That these documents were competent evidence
to prove the payment of the money and by whom it was paid; (2) that
the money for the six tracts was all paid in full by A; (3) that he was
the owner of the warrant by virtue thereof; (4) that notwithstanding
the differences between the date of the application and warrant
(November 16, 1793), and the date of the receipt of the purchase
money (June 14, 1794), the issue of the warrant was, in view of the
settled practice in Pennsylvania, evidence of the payment of the pur-
chase money sufficient to establish prima facie a legal title in A, which
was not liable to be overcome by a subsequent patent from the Com-
monwealth, purporting on its face, but not otherwise proved, to be
connected with the warrant and survey, and under which no claim of
title had been asserted for more than seventy-five years. Ib.
13. When the Orphan's Court in Pennsylvania has jurisdiction of a sub-
ject matter, its orders, judgments, and decrees therein cannot be im-
peached collaterally. Ib.
14. The plaintiff in ejectment in Pennsylvania having proved title to the
premises by establishing a warrant and survey and payment of the
purchase money perfected by return of the deputy surveyor into
the land office, evidence on the part of the defendant of a subsequent
patent from the Commonwealth, with no proof of its connection with
the warrant and survey except recitals to that effect in it, is inadmissi-
ble. Ib.
15. The act of the legislature of Kentucky of January 30, 1878, respecting
the compromise and settlement of the county of Carter with its cred-
itors is not in conflict with the provision in the constitution of the
State that "no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Car-
ter County v. Senton, 517.
16. Carter County in Kentucky under legislative authority subscribed to
the capital stock of a railroad company, and issued its negotiable cou-
pon bonds in payment of the subscription. Subsequently Boyd and
Elliott counties were created, in each of which were included town-
ships which formed part of Carter County when the subscription was
made and the bonds issued, and in each case legislative provision was
made for the continuation of the liability of the persons and property
set off to the new counties on the subscription. Default being made
in the payment of interest, an act was passed in 1878 authorizing the
County Court of Carter County to compromise and settle with the
holders of the bonds on behalf of Carter County, and on behalf of
the parts of the other counties taken from Carter County, and a com-
promise was made under which new bonds of Carter County and of
those parts of each of the other counties taken from Carter County
were issued. Default being made in the payment of interest due on
these latter bonds, a holder of the coupons brought suit against Carter
County to recover on them. Held: (1) That the legislature had au-
thority under the constitution of Kentucky to authorize the County
Court of Carter County to bind those parts of the counties of Boyd
and Elliott taken from Carter County; (2) that under the act of 1878
the County Court of Carter County was authorized to contract for the
issue of negotiable bonds of the county and of the parts of the county
in order to retire the old negotiable bonds of the county; (3) that in
the suit to recover upon the coupons of the new bonds, it was not
necessary to make the parts of Boyd and Elliott counties, which had
been parts of Carter County, parties to the suit. Ib.
17. The restriction upon the right of a congregation, formed for religious
purposes, to receive "land not exceeding in quantity . . . ten
acres," which is imposed by § 42 of the act of the legislature of Illinois
of April 18, 1872, applies to congregations incorporated for the object
named in § 35 of that act, viz.: "the purpose of religious worship;"
and does not affect foreign benevolent or mission societies incorpo-
rated either with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States,
or with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board of Home
Missions of that church, although both organizations are important
agencies in the general religious work of that church. Gilmer v. Stone,
586.
18. A statute of Washington Territory enacts that "a part of several co-
parties may appeal or prosecute a writ of error; but in such case they
must serve notice thereof upon all the other parties." One of two de-
fendants in a cause served upon the other written notice, entitled in
the cause, that he would, on a day therein named, "file a notice of ap-
peal and stay bond and appeal said cause," and added, "You are here-
with requested to join in said appeal." The other defendant answered
in writing, "I hereby accept service of the above notice," "and decline
to join in an appeal in said cause." Held, that this was an exact and
effectual compliance with the provision of the statute. Ex parte Par-
ker, 737.
19. A statute of Washington Territory relating to appeals provides that
"in an action by equitable proceedings, tried upon written testimony,
the depositions and all papers which were used as evidence are to be
certified up to the Supreme Court, and shall be so certified, not by
transcript, but in the original form: but a transcript of a motion, affi-
davit, or other paper, when it relates to a collateral matter, shall not
be certified unless by direction of the appellant. In an appeal in
equity the appellant requested the clerk to "transmit to the Supreme
Court all the papers filed in this cause except subpoenas as by law pro-
vided." The cause had been referred to a referee, who had returned
with his report and finding, five packages, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
with a certificate that it was "the evidence written down before me
and taken in said action, and that the same, with the documentary
evidence returned herewith by me into court, constitutes the evidence
submitted to and taken by me in said action." The clerk of the court
transmitted these packages to the Supreme Court with a certificate
that "the letters, papers, and exhibits herewith transmitted and num-
bered ... are all the papers, letters, and evidence introduced in
said cause before said referee, and by him deposited with the clerk of
said court," and further certified that the transcript on appeal was a
"full, true, and correct transcript of so much of the record . . . as
I am by statute and directions of attorneys in said cause required to
transmit to the Supreme Court." Held, that the certificates showed
that the transcript contained all the evidence introduced by the parties
on the trial below, and that the appeal had been duly taken and per-
fected.
20. In Louisiana a holder of a first mortgage on real estate, duly executed
before a notary with pact de non alienando, is not bound to give notice
to subsequent mortgagees, or to any person but the debtor in posses-
sion, when he proceeds by executory process to obtain seizure and sale
of the mortgaged property to satisfy the mortgage debt. New Orleans
Banking Association v. Le Breton, 765.
21. In Louisiana a mortgage given to secure a future balance on an open
unliquidated account is valid; and the acknowledgment of the amount
of the balance by the debtor, before a notary, is all that is necessary to
be done under the code, in order to ascertain it for the purposes of
executory process. Ib.
22. In Louisiana informalities connected with or growing out of any pub-
lic sale, made by any person authorized to sell by public auction, are
prescribed against by those claiming under the sale after the lapse of
five years from the time of making it, whether against minors, married
women, or interdicted persons. Ib.
23. W, owning a plantation in Louisiana, and being embarrassed, agreed
with several of his creditors and with K, that W should remain in
possession and work the plantation; that K should make annual ad-
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