would have to be in his hands, to be deliv- according to custom, was accompanied by ered to plaintiff. The goods not having been sold to Moss, he could transfer no title to ther. Nemo plus in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet. 5 Cyc. 207; 24 A. & E. E. 1163. The learned counsel for the defendant Fink contend that the transaction was of the kind known at common law as "sale and return," and the Court of Appeal took that view. We repeat, the nature of a transaction is what the parties agree that it should be; and the distinct agreement in this case was that the goods were not sold, or agreed to be sold, on a credit to Moss, but that the only way he could become the owner of them was by paying cash for them. For the distinction between such an agreement and what is commonly known as "sale and return," see Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 323, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L. Ed. 1099, and note; Sturtevant v. Dugan, 106 Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351, 14 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 679. Before passing to the consideration of how far plaintiff may be estopped, we will note that the law of agency can play no part in this case. Moss had no mandate to sell the goods at less than the price set upon them, and still less had he any mandate to give them in payment of his debts. And Fink did not deal with him as the agent of the plaintiff firm, but as the owner of the goods. Coming to a consideration to the estoppel, it is a plain proposition that the mere possession of movable property is not such indicium of ownership as will enable the possessor to convey a good title as against the true owner. If it did, the borrower or hirer of a horse could validly sell it. The owner must have done something more than merely confide the possession of his property to the possessor before the latter can sell it or create a lien upon it. He must have to some extent accredited the title of the possessor— clothed him with more pronounced indicium of ownership than mere possession. This may be done in various ways, and one way would be what the plaintiff firm did in this case, namely, consent that a vender of jewelry exhibit the jewels as part of his stock of goods, or as belonging to him. "If a wine merchant be left in possession of wine, the fair inference is that it is his own, and a person may be justified in advancing money upon the security of it." Per Bramwell, L. J., in Meggy v. Imperial, 3 Q. B. D., 717. The decision in Conner v. Hill, 6 La. Ann. 7, is founded upon estoppel, agency, and ratification. From the facts as stated, the grounds of estoppel do not appear; but the writer of the present opinion knows that the flatboats coming down the Mississippi river before the War loaded with western produce were for sale, and that usually, if not always, those in charge of them had authority to sell; so that Anderson, who was in charge of the flatboat in that case, had more than the power to sell. True, the owner had not consented to his being thus clothed with apparent authority to sell, but his son and agent had done so for him. It was upon this the court must have founded the estoppel, in so far as the decision is based on estoppel. True, Moss was more of an artisan than merchant; but it was in his character of merchant that both plaintiff and Fink dealt with him. Plaintiff consented that he should exhibit the earrings to his customers as belonging to him, and that he should do so in his quality of a trader in jewelry. Fink, knowing him to be a trader in jewels, was justified in buying from him. It follows from this that Fink acquired a good title to the first pair of earrings. Although, we must say, that the great disparity in price gives some room for suspicion even as to that pair of earrings. With respect to the second pair, Fink is not in a position to invoke equitable estoppel. For him to be in a position to do so, it would be necessary that he should "not only have been destitute of knowledge of the real facts, but should also have been without convenient or ready means of acquiring such knowledge." 16 Cyc. 739. And he must have been led to change his position for the worse. 16 Cyc. 722. and, if the buyer has notice of facts which would "Notice is to be distinguished from knowledge, put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry which would have resulted in the ascertainment of the adverse interest sought to be enforced against him, he will be deemed to have taken with notice, and cannot assert the rights of a bona fide purchaser." 26 A. & E. E. 1175. In so far as the earrings were taken in reimbursement of the $500 which Fink had to pay to Keil for redeeming his pin, his position was not changed for the worse, since that amount would have had to be paid to Keil even if Moss had never had possession of the earrings, and since it is not pretended that he was deprived of any recourse which he would otherwise have had against Moss. As to the circumstances under which one who has received property in payment of an antecedent debt may be considered to have parted with value, see 26 A. & E. E. 1171, 1173. By the time Fink came to deal with Moss for this second pair of earrings, Moss had become utterly discredited. He was a confessed embezzler. He was no longer a merchant or trader having valuable goods for sale, but was a diamond setter who had pledged the goods of his employer and stood under the necessity of confessing his crime because of his inability to redeem the pledge. He was not a merchant offering to sell goods out of his stock, but at best an ex-merchant who was proposing to the person whose property he had embezzled that the latter should tain piece of property and pay himself out | cuit court of Santa Rosa county; the mortof the margin between value of the thing gage being given to secure the payment of and the amount for which it stood pledged. a note for $1,687.50, payable 12 months after Fink testifies that he had lost confidence in date, to bear interest after maturity at the Moss and would not trust him out of his rate of 121⁄2 per cent. per annum. The desight with the $465 for redeeming the ear- fendants answered the bill, alleging that the rings from Koritzky. The fact itself, well said note was usurious in this: That the known to Fink, that Moss was a diamond amount really due by them to the original setter, to whom valuable jewelry was likely payee in said note was the sum of $1,500, to be intrusted by third persons, was in it- and that the excess of $187.50 over said sum self sufficient to put Fink upon inquiry. We of $1,500 was added to said note as interest cannot help thinking that Fink was a will- thereon from the date of said note for one ing victim, and that, if it had not been for year thence next ensuing, which they aver the chance of getting back his $500, he would was at the rate of 121⁄2 per cent. per annum, have dealt with Moss with a good deal less and was usurious. Testimony was taken, of confidence. and upon the testimony the court below rendered a decree for the principal sum of $1,687.50, without any interest after maturity of said note, and for attorney's fees for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and for costs. From this decree the defendants below have taken their appeal, and assign the said de As to this $465, we put our decision distinctly on the fact that the earrings were not acquired from a merchant having them for sale to the public generally, but were re deemed from a pawnbroker's shop at the request of an embezzler as a means of settle ment for the embezzlement. It is therfore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that our former decree be reinstated and made the judgment of this court. (59 Fla. 476) DAVIDSON et al. v. DAVIS. (Supreme Court of Florida, Division B. 2, 1910.) (Syllabus by the Court.) USURY (§ 32*) — WHAT CONSTITUTES CASH cree as error. The evidence in the case shows that there was no loan of money by the mortgagee to the mortgagors, and that no indebtedness between them existed at the time of the giving of said note and mortgage, but that, the original mortgagee being the owner of a April tract of land in Santa Rosa county that the mortgagor desired to purchase, the said vendor was willing to sell the same for cash at the sum of $1,500; but the vendee not being able to pay said sum of $1,500 in cash, and desiring 12 months' time within which to make payment for said land, the vendor agreed to give him such extension of time, provided he would at the end of said 12 months pay him $1,687.50, instead of $1,500 (the cash price asked)—the said excess in the price agreed to be paid over the cash price asked being equivalent to interest on the cash price asked at the rate of 12% per cent. per annum. Usury can only attach to a loan of money or to the forbearance of a debt. On a contract to secure the price or value of work and labor done, or to be done, or of property sold, the contracting parties may agree upon one price if cash be paid, and upon as large an addition to the cash price as may suit themselves if credit be given; and it is wholly immaterial whether the enhanced price be ascertained by the simple addition of a lumping sum to the cash price, or by a percentage thereon. In neither case is the transaction usurious. It is neither a loan nor the forbearance of a debt, but simply the contract price of work and labor done, or of property sold; and the difference between cash and credit in such cases, whether 6, 10, or 20 per cent., must be left exclusively to the contract of the parties, and no amount of difference, fairly agreed upon, can be considered illegal.' The difference between the cash and the credit price on a sale of property may be put into the form of interest on a note given for the purchase price without violating the usury law, although the per cent. agreed is greater than the lawful rate of interest. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Usury, Cent. Dig. 88 75-77; Dec. Dig. § 32.*] The law is well settled that usury can only attach to a loan of money, or to the forbearance of a debt, and that on a contract to secure the price or value of work and labor done, or to be done, or of property sold, the contracting parties may agree upon one price if cash be paid, and upon as large an addition to the cash price as may suit themselves if credit be given; and it is wholly immaterial whether the enhanced price be ascertained by the simple addition of a lumping sum to the cash price, or by a percentage Appeal from Circuit Court, Santa Rosa thereon. In neither case is the transaction County; J. E. Wolfe, Judge. usurious. It is neither a loan nor the for Bill by J. W. Davis against W. M. David-bearance of a debt, but simply the contract son and Ida Davidson. Decree for complain- price of work and labor done and property ant, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. sold; and the difference between cash and T. F. West, for appellants. Daniel Camp-credit in such cases, whether 6, 10, or 20 per bell & Son, for appellee. TAYLOR, J. The appellee filed his bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage in the cir cent., must be left exclusively to the contract of the parties, and no amount of difference fairly agreed upon can be considered illegal. Webb on Usury, par. 72; West v. Belches, 5 Mumf. (Va.) 187; Garrity v. Cripp, 4 Baxt. [ filed another bill in the circuit court of De (Tenn.) 86; Brown v. Gardner, 4 Lea (Tenn.) Soto county against the same defendants, 145; Ruffner v. Hogg, 1 Black (U. S.) 115, C. C. Morgan and Hilton S. Hampton, for 17 L. Ed. 38. Or as the rule is stated in identically the same cause of action, and First Nat. Bank of Johnson City v. Mann, praying the same relief as in his first or 94 Tenn. 17, 27 S. W. 1015, 27 L. R. A. 565: former bill, adding to the last bill one E. J. "The difference between the cash and the Register as a new party defendant. To this credit price on a sale of property may be last bill the defendants have interposed the put into the form of interest on a note given plea of res judicata. This plea was sustainfor the purchase price without violating the ed by the court below, and the complainant's usury law, although the per cent. agreed up- new bill was dismissed, and from this decree on is greater than the lawful rate of inter- the complainant appeals to this court assignest." Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 10 S. ing said decree as error. E. 375, 6 L. R. A. 427; Graeme v. Adams, 23 Grat. (Va.) 225, 14 Am. Rep. 130. Under the law as stated there was no usurious taint in the note herein sued upon, and the court below committed no error in the decree rendered, and the same is hereby affirmed, at the cost of the appellants. There was no error here. The new bill involves identically the same subject-matter and issues as did the former bill, and is between the same parties, with the exception of the new defendant, E. J. Register; and he is shown to be in privity with the two defendants in the former bill, being a purchaser of the property in controversy from them since the adjudication of the former case. Some additional facts are alleged in the last bill that were not contained in the former; but all such matters might have been alleged and litigated therein, and are not sufficient to overturn the propriety of the former disposition of the cause. The April plea of res judicata applies to every objec HOCKER and PARKHILL, JJ., concur. WHITFIELD, C. J., and SHACKLEFORD and COCKRELL, JJ., concur in the opinion. (59 Fla. 542) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. JUDGMENT (§ 713*)—RES JUDICATA-QUES TIONS DETERMINED. The plea of res judicata applies to every objection urged in a second suit, when the objection was open to the party within the legitimate scope of the pleadings of the former one, and might have been presented in it. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1241; Dec. Dig. § 713.*] 2. JUDGMENT (§ 713*)-RES JUDICATA-MATTERS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN LITIGATED. In an action upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies, not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1241; Dec. Dig. § 713.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, De Soto County; W. S. Bullock, Judge. Bill by John L. Jones against C. C. Morgan and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed. tion urged in a second suit, when the objec tion was open to the party within the legiti mate scope of the pleadings of the former one, and might have been presented in it. Herman's Law of Estoppel, p. 179. In an action upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies, not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit. 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 714. The decree of the court below in said cause is hereby affirmed, at the costs of the appellant. HOCKER and PARKHILL, JJ., concur. WHITFIELD, C. J., and SHACKLEFORD and COCKRELL, JJ., concur in the opinion. (59 Fla. 544) LA FAYETTE LAND CO. v. CASWELL et al. Treadwell & Treadwell, for appellant. J. (Supreme Court of Florida, Division B. April W. Burton and H. S. Hampton, for appellees. 2, 1910.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. EQUITY (8 233*)-DEMURRER TO BILL. A general demurrer to an entire bill for want of equity should be overruled, where the case made by the bill entitles the complainant to any substantial relief in a court of equity. TAYLOR, J. This is the second appearance of this litigation in this court. For a complete statement of the facts, see the case of Morgan v. Jones, 52 Fla. 543, 42 South. 242. Since the mandate of this court in the case was sent to the court below, that court, in obedience to said mandate, entered its decree of final dismissal of the complainant's bill. Since that time the same complainant in the former bill, John L. Jones, has again [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 509; Dec. Dig. § 233.*] 2. EVIDENCE (§ 452*)-CONVEYANCE TO FIRM PAROL EVIDENCE. A deed made to a firm by the firm name, instead of the individual members of the firm, is not for that reason void. It is a latent am- [ing either of their Christian names. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, This A deed made to a firm by the firm name, instead of the individual members of the firm, is not for that reason void. It is a latent ambiguity, that may be explained and supplied by parol. Murray, Ferris & Co. v. Blackledge, 71 N. C. 492; Walker v. Miller, 139 N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 157, 111 Am. St. Rep. 805; Morse v. Carpenter, 19 Vt. 613; 1 Jones on Law of Real Hendry & McKinnon, for appellant. Har- Property in Conveyancing, par. 244, and dee & Butler, for appellees. Bill by John E. Caswell and L. A. Knight against the La Fayette Land Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. TAYLOR, J. The appellees filed their bill in equity in the circuit court of Taylor county against the appellant for the removal of clouds upon their title to the standing timber growing upon divers lands in said county, and to enjoin the appellant from trespassing thereon and from harassing the complainants with divers alleged vexatious suits at law in which it is alleged the appellant has undertaken to seize the timber cut from said lands by the appellees. To the bill the defendant below interposed a demurrer on the following grounds: (1) There is no equity in the bill. (2) The bill shows that complainants have an adequate remedy at law. (3) The bill shows that the question of title to said property is being litigated in an action at law. (4) The bill states conclusions, and does not set out the facts showing that a reasonable time has expired. (5) The bill alleges facts that tend to vary and contradict the terms of a written instrument under seal. cases there cited. The order of the court below in said cause is hereby affirmed, at the cost of the appellant. HOCKER and PARKHILL, JJ., concur. WHITFIELD, C. J., and SHACKLEFORD and COCKRELL, JJ., concur in the opinion. (59 Fla. 510). GOLSON et al. v. BOYETT et al. (Supreme Court of Florida, Division B. April 2, 1910.) (Syllabus by the Court.) APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1135*)-REVIEW-AF FIRMANCE. Where a bill in equity for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land sets up a proper case for such specific performance, and the proofs sustain the allegations of the bill, a decree awarding such specific performance will be affirmed by the appellate court. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 1135.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Santa Rosa County; J. E. Wolfe, Judge. Bill by Margaret Annette Boyett and others, by their next friend, J. E. Boyett, against P. Golson, administrator, and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. (6) The bill sets up a contract in relation to said timber, made prior to and contempo-L. raneously with the said written instrument under seal, and in terms contrary thereto. This demurrer was overruled by the chancellor, and from this order the defendant below appeals to this court, assigning said order as error. There was no error in this ruling. T. F. West, for appellants. Daniel Campbell & Son, for appellees. TAYLOR, J. This is the second appeal in this case. See Maloy v. Boyett et al., 53 Fla. 956, 43 South. 243. On the former appeal various defects in the bill of complaint were pointed out, and the decree of the court below was reversed, with directions for leave to the complainants to amend their bill for the specific performance of a contract to convey realty. The complainants accordingly amended their said bill, and upon the testimony taken the court below rendered a decree It is well settled here that a general de murrer to an entire bill for want of equity should be overruled, where the case made by the bill entitles complainant to any substantial relief in a court of equity. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gibson, 43 Fla. 315, 31 South. 230. We think the bill sets up a good ground for equitable relief in its effort to remove clouds from the complainants' title, as well also as in its prayer for injunc- | in favor of the complainants, adjudging that tion. It is contended here that the convey- the alleged contract between the said parties ance under which the complainants claim should be specifically performed. This decree title is void because no grantees are named the defendants below bring here for review by therein. This contention is based upon the appeal. It is now contended that the amendfact that the deed under which the com- ed bill, upon which the cause was finally plainants claim, attached as exhibit to their heard and determined, is subject to the same bill, is made to Caswell and Knight, of Tay- criticisms as the bill stricken down on the forlor county, Fla., as grantees, without giv-mer appeal. This contention we cannot sus TION FOR PARENT'S LOSS-EVIDENCE. The financial condition of the child, but not the source of any estate it has, is a proper element of inquiry, as bearing on the loss likely to be entailed on the parent from the child's injury. tain. The amended bill now under considera-16. DAMAGES (§ 171*)-INJURY TO CHILD-ACtion we think entirely supplies the defects pointed out in the former appeal, and we think presents a sufficient case for specific performance. We think, too, that the proofs abundantly sustain the decree of the court below, and said decree is therefore hereby affirmed, at the cost of the appellants. HOCKER and PARKHILL, JJ., concur. WHITFIELD, C. J., and SHACKLEFORD and COCKRELL, JJ., concur in the opinion. (166 Ala. 645) Cent. Dig. § 498; Dec. Dig. § 171.*] 7. PARENT AND CHILD (§ 7*) — INJURY TO DENCE. employer for injury in his employment is not adEvidence as to recovery by a child of its missible, over the parent's objection, in an action by the parent against the employer for loss consequent to the injury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parent and REAVES V. ANNISTON KNITTING MILLS Child, Cent. Dig. § 97; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] CO. (Supreme Court of Alabama. Dec. 16, 1909. Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1910.) 1. PARENT AND CHILD (§ 7*) INJURY TO Where the injury to a minor employé was caused by the negligence of her employer in not warning and instructing her as to the dangers incident to her employment, the consent of her parent to her engaging in the dangerous employment was not contributory negligence, barring recovery by the parent for loss of her wages. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parent and Child, Cent. Dig. § 87; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 2. PLEADING ( 130*) — PLEAS - EFFECT OF GENERAL ISSUE. The plea, in an action based on injury to an employé through the master's negligence, that the injury resulted from dangers ordinarily incident to the service, is within the general issue pleaded, and so superfluous. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 284; Dec. Dig. § 136.*] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 226*)-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-DANGERS ORDINARILY INCIDENT TO SERVICE. Failure of the master to warn and instructed a young and inexperienced employé of the dangers incident to her employment is not a danger ordinarily incident to the service. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 664; Dec. Dig. § 226.*] 4. PARENT AND CHILD (§ 7*) INJURY TO CHILD-DANGEROUS EMPLOYMENT-CONSENT OF PARENT-PLEADING AND PROOF. One suing the employer of his infant child for loss of her wages through injury to her from the negligence of the master in not warning and instructing her as to the dangers incident to her employment, having, though unnecessarily, averred in the complaint nonconsent to the employ ment, must prove it as a condition of recovery; [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parent and Child, Cent. Dig. § 97; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] 5. PARENT AND CHILD (§ 7*) INJURY TO CHILD IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT-PLEADING. Consent of a parent to his infant child engaging in a dangerous employment, in fact not being negligence proximately contributory to the child's injury through the master's negligence in not warning and instructing her as to the dangers incident to her employment, is not rendered so by the complaint averring nonconsent to the employment. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Parent and Child, Cent. Dig. §§ 94, 97; Dec. Dig. § 7.*] Tate & Walker, for appellant. Willet & Willet, for appellee. MCCLELLAN, J. Counts 1, 2, and 7 as amended were those upon which the testimony was taken upon the trial. The first two rely upon the negligence of defendant (appellee) in omitting to warn and instruct plaintiff's (appellant) nine year old child, inexperienced and immature, in reference to the dangers incident to her employment in defendant's hosiery mill. The seventh count as amended ascribed the injury to the negligent failure of the defendant in respect of an uncovered, exposed shafting, rapidly revolving a short distance above and parallel with the floor of one of the rooms of the mill. This is the second appeal. Reaves v. Anniston Knitting Mills, 154 Ala. 565, 45 South. 702. view is among those decided adversely to The main question now presented for reappellee on the previous occasion. It is, under pleas H and I, whether the consent of a |