LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS. (26 & 27 Vic. c. 41.) THE common law declared that, as inns are for the public good, and the necessities and convenience of travellers, an innkeeper shall not be permitted to select his guests, and must receive into his inn every person against whose admission no tangible objection (such as intoxication or the like) can be made, and who is willing to deposit a reasonable sum in advance, as security for the expense of his entertainment. And should the innkeeper violate this, he is liable not only to an action at the suit of the injured party, but also to an indictment at the suit of the Crown. The wisdom of the law, in a commercial country especially, is too obvious to need comment. An imprudent attempt to limit its operation was, indeed, made in Rex v. Ivens (7 Car. & P. 213), where an innkeeper sought to justify his refusing to receive a guest on the ground that he was travelling at an hour of the night after the innkeeper's family had gone to bed; and, also, that he was travelling on a Sunday, and refused to tell his name and abode. These defences were all overruled by Coleridge, J., who tried the case, and, in answer to the first, said, "Why are inns established ? For the reception of travellers, who are often very far distant from their own homes. Now, at what time is it most essential that travellers should not be denied admission into the inns? I should say when they are benighted, and when, from any casualty, or from the badness of the roads, they arrive at an inn at a very late hour. Indeed, in former times, when the roads were much worse, and were much infested with robbers, a late hour of the night was the time, of all others, at which the traveller most required to be received into an inn." The law on the subject of innkeepers has not always been perfectly understood. A notion grew up, which seems to have been founded on a dictum of Eyre, J., in Newton v. Trigg (1 Show. 269), whence it found its way into several books, e.g., Bac. Ab. "Inns and Innkeepers," D., 9; Wentworth's Pleader, &c., that the innkeeper, who, undoubtedly, has a lien for his reckoning on the goods of his guest, has also a lien on his person. This opinion seems to have prevailed, among the vulgar, at least, until the case of Sunbolf v. Alford (3 M. and W. 248; 2 Jur., O.S., 110), decided 146 years after Newton v. Trigg. It would be difficult to answer the reasoning of the Court in the latter case. "If," says Lord Abinger, "an innkeeper has a right to detain the person of his guest for the non-payment of his bill, he has a right to detain him until the bill is paid, which may be for life; so that this defence supposes that, by the common law, a man who owes a small debt, for which he could not be imprisoned by legal process, may yet be detained by an innkeeper for life. The proposition is monstrous. Again, if he have any right to detain the person, surely he is a judge in his own cause; for he is then the party to determine whether the amount of his bill is reasonable, and he must detain him till the man brings an action against him for false im prisonment, and then, if it were determined that the charge was not reasonable, and it appeared that the party had made an offer of a reasonable sum, the detainer would be unlawful." It is, however, worthy of observation that the supposed right of an innkeeper to detain the person of his guest was not the actual point raised in Sunbolf v. Alford. That was an action against the defendant for assaulting and beating the plaintiff, stripping and pulling off his coat, and converting it to his own use; to which the defendant pleaded a justification that he was an innkeeper and the plaintiff his guest, and on the latter refusing to pay his reckoning, the defendant stripped off his coat, and detained it as a security or pledge for the same. The sufficiency of this answer was, therefore, the question; on which Parke, B., says, "There is, at all events, no power to do what this plea justifies-namely, to strip the guest of his clothes; for, if there be, then, if the innkeeper take the coat off his back, and that prove to be an insufficient pledge, he may go on and strip him naked; and that would apply either to a male or to a female. That is a consequence so utterly absurd that it cannot be entertained for a moment.' The observations of the Court in this case against the existence of a lien on the person are, therefore, to a certain extent, extra-judicial, although, we believe, no lawyer at the present day would question their soundness. An innkeeper is bound by law to take care of goods or money brought into his inn by a guest. Here the law is very strict against the innkeeper. If they are lost or injured he is prima facie liable, and it is no defence that they were stolen by his servants or others. The innkeeper may, however, exonerate himself by proof that the loss was occasioned by the misconduct or gross negligence of the guest, and perhaps, even by want of reasonable care on his part (see the note to Calye's Case, in 1 Smith's L. C. 106, 5th ed.). With the view of relieving innkeepers from a part of their liability in this respect, two bills were introduced into Parliament in the past session, one of which has ripened into an Act. It being one of considerable importance, and with which, therefore, the practitioner and the student should be alike acquainted, and being, moreover, concise, we give its provisions in extenso, premising that it is the 26 & 27 Vic, c. 41, and intituled "An Act to amend the Law respecting the Liability of Innkeepers, and to prevent certain Frauds upon them," and was passed on the 13th day of July, 1863. After reciting that "it is expedient to amend the law concerning the liability of innkeepers in respect of the goods of their guests in manner hereinafter mentioned," it proceeds to enact as follows: Sect. 1. Innkeeper not to be liable for loss, &c., beyond £30, except in certain cases.-No innkeeper shall, after the passing of this Act, be liable to make good to any guest of such innkeeper any loss of, or injury to, goods or property brought to his inn, not being a horse or other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage, to a greater amount than the sum of thirty pounds, except in the following cases (that is to say): (1.) Where such goods or property shall have been stolen, lost, or injured through the wilful act, default, or neglect of such innkeeper, or any servant in his employ. (2.) Where such goods or property shall have been deposited expressly for safe custody with such innkeeper. Provided always that, in the case of such deposit it shall be lawful for such innkeeper, if he think fit, to require, as a condition of his liability, that such goods or property shall be deposited in a box or other receptacle, fastened and sealed by the person depositing the same. Sect. 2. Obligation to receive property of guests for safe custody. -If any innkeeper shall refuse to receive for safe custody, as before mentioned, any goods or property of his guest, or if any such guest shall, through any default of such innkeeper, be unable to deposit such goods or property as aforesaid, such innkeeper shall not be entitled to the benefit of this Act in respect of such goods or property. Sect. 3. Notice of law, &c., to be conspicuously exhibited.— Every innkeeper shall cause, at least, one copy of the first section of this Act, printed in plain type, to be exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance to his inn, and he shall be entitled to the benefit of this Act in respect of such goods or property only as shall be brought to his inn while such copy shall be so exhibited. Sect. 4.-Interpretation of terms.-The words and expressions hereinafter contained, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall, in this Act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the Act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows, that is to say the word “inn" shall mean any hotel, inn, tavern, public house, or other place of refreshment, the keeper of which is now by law responsible for the goods and property of his guests; and the word "innkeeper" shall mean the keeper of any such place. Having thus given the provisions of the new statute we may remark that the bill met with some considerable opposition, especially as it proceeded on the ground that the common law, though probably a just one originally, required modification, in consequence of "the great facility given to travelling" in modern times; which facility, MORTGAGE TO TENANTS IN COMMON. it was contended by some persons, might be found a reason for holding the innkeeper even more tightly than before; at any rate, that an attack on the principle of the common law, which placed innkeepers under peculiar responsibilities, must be looked on as very mischievous and short-sighted, and use was made of the following passage:"Rigorous as this law may seem," (Sir. W. Jones, Bailments, 96-97), "and hard as it may actually be in one or two particular instances, it is founded on the great principle of public utility, to which all private considerations ought to yield; for travellers, who must be numerous in a rich and commercial country, are obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of innholders, whose education and morals are usually none of the best, and who might have frequent opportunities of associating with ruffians or pilferers, while the injured guest could seldom or never obtain legal proof of such combinations, or even of their negligence, if no actual fraud had been committed by them." MORTGAGE TO TENANTS IN COMMON. the A SUBSCRIBER asks us to mention the best way of making a mortgage to two or more persons as tenants in common; and as the answer may be useful to others, we give it insertion here. If money is to be lent on mortgage in two distinct sums, by two different mortgagees, or sets of mortgagees, who are to be paid pari passu, object may be effected by conveying the land to all the mortgagees, with a proviso for redemption on payment of the mortgage debts and interest to the several lenders, the mortgagor covenanting separately with the different mortgagees for payment of their respective debts and interest. This method is very common, and it has no other inconvenience than that of obliging each set of mortgagees to obtain the concurrence of the other before they can deal with the land. But this method is not very practicable where the different mortgagees are numerous, on account of the great length to which the mortgage deed would extend, and on account of the inconvenience which might ensue from vesting the land in a great number of persons. If, therefore, several persons are to contribute to a sum to be lent on mortgage, it is usual to make the mortgage to trustees for the entire sum, the interests of the several lenders being ascerIt tained either by a separate deed or on the face of the mortgage. is more convenient to the mortgagor that the mortgage deed should deal with the trustees alone, as lending a sum of money belonging to them on a joint account: but such a course cannot be deemed prudent for the lenders unless the trustees are persons in whom they may place perfect confidence. For, if the trustees have power to discharge the land, it is clear that the lenders have little else to look to than the personal security of the trustees. It appears to be settled that, when a mortgage of this kind is made, a person entitled to a portion of the mortgage money cannot sustain a suit for foreclosure without bringing the persons entitled to the remainder of the money before the Court (Lowe v. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. 368; Palmer v. Earl of Carlisle, 1 Sim. & Stu. 423.) The case of Montgomery v. Marquis of Bath, 3 Ves. 560, must be taken to be overruled. EXAMINATION STUDIES. Conveyancing (continued).—By the statement in No. VI. (p. 144), that easements are created, de novo, by grant, is to be understood that a deed is necessary, for easements being incorporeal, rights cannot have their origin except by grant, or what presupposes a grant, namely, prescription; though in the case of the easement termed a right of way it may arise by necessary implication, as where the purchaser of land has no lawful access to it but through other land of the grantor. The thoroughfare thus implied in the grant is called a way of necessity (Burt. Comp. pl. 1167, ante, p. 137). Mr. Burton (Comp. pl. 1165) says: "Rights of accommodation in another's land, as distinguished from those which are directly profitable, are properly called easements. These serve as excuses in an action of trespass brought by the owner of the land, and may also be actively asserted, in case of disturbance, by an action on the case." As to No. VII. (p. 145), Mr. Burton (Comp. pl. 120) has thus explained the principles upon which shifting uses originated: "The rules relating to uses or equitable estates were in many respects conformable to those of estates at law, but in some points they differ; in particular the use might be disposed of by will, though the laws then in existence did not allow of a testamentary disposition of land, and whether the use were so disposed of, or by an agreement inter vivos, there seems to have been no regular form prescribed according to which the interest should be modelled. The forms which modern settlements, grounded on the same principles, have assumed, are at least sufficient to prove that it might lawfully be stipulated that the transfer should not take effect until the happening of some event, or the expiration of some period, so that in the meanwhile the use might remain in its present proprietor, or belong to a third person. Thus, A. might make a feoffment to B. and his heirs, to the use of A. himself (or it may be supposed of B. or any |