wearing apparel of self and family. 3. Concealing, &c., goods to the value of £10 after adjudication, or within sixty days thereof. 4. Allowing a false debt to be proved. 5. Fraudulently omitting property from schedule. 6. Fradulently concealing any of books relating to property, dealings, or affairs. 7. Falsifying books or omitting entries from the same. 8. Fradulently mortgaging his property, or concealing any debt due to or from him. The above offences may be committed by trader or non-trader; the following by trader only, viz. :-9. Accounting for property by fictitious losses or expenses within three months of petition, or under the bankruptcy. 10 Fradulently obtaining goods under pretext of carrying on trade within that time; or, 11. Fradulently pledging or disposing of goods unpaid for. (See 2 Exam. Chron. pp. 54, 154, 296.)

(Trinity Term, 1863.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

I. Give the dates and titles of the Acts which now regulate the criminal law.

ANS.-The examiners must be supposed to mean the late Consolidation Acts, which were passed in the year 1861, and session of 24 & 25 Vic. cc. 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, and 100. Cap. 94 is entitled, "An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of England and Ireland relating to accessories to and abettors of indictable offences." Cap. 96 is "An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of England and Ireland relating to larceny and other similar offences." Cap. 97 is "An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of England and Ireland relating to malicious injuries to persons." Cap. 98 is "An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of England and Ireland relating to indictable offences by forgery." Cap. 99 is "An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of the United King dom against offences relating to the coin." Cap. 100 is " An Act to consolidate and amend the statute law of England and Ireland relating to offences against the person," comprising homicide, attempts to murder, letters threatening to murder, acts causing or tending to cause danger to life or bodily harm, assaults, rape, abduction and defilement of women, child stealing, bigamy, attempts to procure abortion, unnatural offences, making gunpowder to commit offences, searching for the same, and other miscellaneous

matters.

II. Define a crime in what manner does it differ from a civil injury?

ANS. A crime, strictly taken, is the violation of a right in which the community at large has an interest, though ordinarily it is

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

applied to indictable offences only. It differs from a civil injury in
that the latter is a wrong an individual considered merely as such.
(See Key, Crim. Law, 14, 15; Warren's Law Stud. 589, 2nd ed.;
4 Steph. Com. 80, 2nd ed.)

III. Can an accessory before the fact to any felony be punished
in all respects as if he were a principal? and does the law
differ with regard to an accessory after the fact?

ANS. By the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 94, s. 1, an accessory before the fact of a felony may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished, as if he were a principal felon (2 Exam. Chron. 297; as to the case of a misdemeanor, see s. 8, stated 2 Exam. Chron. 297). An accessory after the fact may be indicted and convicted as such, either with or or after the principal felon, or for a substantive felony (that is, of being an accessory after the fact), though the principal be not amenable to justice, and may be punished as such an accessory (24 & 25 Vic. c. 94, s. 3; 2 Exam. Chron. 40). It has been decided that an accessory after the fact to a felony cannot be convicted on an indictment charging the commission of the felony only, but should be indicted for the substantive felony of being an accessory after the fact; that being the substantive felony mentioned in the Act, and not the original offence (Reg. v. Fallon, 7 Law. Tim., N.S., 471).

IV. May separate receivers of stolen property be included in the same indictment in the absence of the principal?

ANS.-By 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 93, separate receivers at different times of stolen property may be included in the same indictment in the absence of the principal, and be charged with substantive felonies.

V. What are the different kinds of larceny, and is there any difference between grand and petty larceny ?

ANS.-Formerly larcenies were either grand or petty, a distinction abolished in 1827, and they became simple; that is, plain theft unaccompanied by any other atrocious circumstance; and mixed or compound where there has been the aggravation of taking from one's house or person. By the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96 (Larceny Consolidation Act), s. 2, all larcenies are to be of the same nature, and subject to the same incidents as grand larceny was before 1st June, 1827.

VI. Will a delivery of goods from the owner to the offender ground an indictment for larceny?

ANS.-Where the owner delivers goods to another, intending not only to part with the possession, but the right of property also, and the third party appropriates or converts them, it is not larceny; but it is larceny where the owner delivers the goods, but either he does not thereby divest himself of the legal possession, or the possession

was obtained by fraud, and in pursuance of a previous intent to steal them. (F. Bk. 319, 320; Archb. Crim. Pl. and Evid. 182, 8th ed.)

VII. Can a bailee be indicted for larceny in fraudulently con

verting goods to his own use?

ANS.-Yes; it is expressly provided by the 24 & 25 Vic. c 96 (Larceny Consolidation Act, 1861), s. 3, and that although the bailee does not break bulk, or otherwise determine the bailment.

VIII. If a man finds a chattel which has been lost by the

owner, and appropriates it, believing that the owner cannot be found, will such appropriation amount to larceny? ANS.-It will not amount to larceny: but if the party believed that the owner could be found it would be otherwise. (See F. Bk. 60. 198, 248, 319; Reg. v. West, 18 Jur. 1031).

IX. What offence does the destroying a valuable security

constitute?

ANS. By the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96 (Larceny Consolidation Act, 1861), s. 27, whosoever shall steal, or shall for any fraudulent purpose destroy, cancel, or obliterate the whole or any part of any valuable security, other than a document of title to lands, shall be guilty of felony, of the same nature and in the same degree and punishable in the same manner as if he had stolen any chattel of like value with the share, interest, or deposit to which the security so stolen may relate, or with the money due on the security so stolen, or secured thereby and remaining unsatisfied, or with the value of the goods or other valuable thing represented, mentioned, or referred to in or by the security.

X. What is forgery as defined by the common law?

ANS.-Forgery by the common law is "the fraudulent making or alteration of an instrument purporting to be valid to the prejudice of another man's right" (4 Bl. C. 247; F. Bk. 326.) It has been decided that the alteration by the drawer of a cheque of his own cheque after it had been paid by his banker and returned to him cancelled, so as to give his signature the appearance of a forgery, is merely a cheat and not a forgery (Brittain v. Bank of London, 8 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 382).

XI. Will the alteration of a genuine instrument amount to forgery, and, if so, under what circumstances?

ANS. The alteration of a genuine instrument in a material respect, and so as to be capable of deceiving and injuring other parties, is a forgery. (Key, Crim. L. 17, 48; Archb. Crim. Pl. and Ev. 358, 8th ed.) But not if the alteration does not work any prejudice to others, as by reducing the amount payable to the accused (Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 383; see further 8 Exam. Chron. 140—170; 2 Id. 133).

XII. What is the offence of forging a transfer of stock, or power for such transfer, and under what statute is it punishable? ANS.-Forging the transfer of certain stock and power of attorney relating thereto is, by the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 98 (Forgery Indictable Offences Consolidation Act, 1861), s. 2, the provision extends to "any stock, annuity, or other public fund which now is or hereafter may be transferable at the Bank of England as at the Bank of Ireland, or the capital stock of any body corporate, company, or society which now is or hereafter may be established by charter or by, under, or by virtue of, any Act of Parliament." The punishment is penal servitude for life, or for not less than three years, or imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement.

XIII. State the nature of the offence of pulling down fixtures to a dwelling-house by a tenant for years?

ANS.-If done unlawfully it is a misdemeanour by the Malicious Injuries to Property Consolidation Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 97) s. 13.

XIV. What is the punishment for setting fire to any furze, gorse, heath, or fern?

ANS.-By the Malicious Injuries to Property Consolidation Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 97), s. 17, any person convicted of setting fire (inter alia) to any furze, gorse, heath, or fern, shall be guilty of felony, and may be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven and not less than three years, or be imprisoned for not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement; and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping.

XV. Describe the nature of a writ of certiorari.

any term

ANS.-The writ of certiorari issues out of Chancery or a Common Law Court, directed to inferior courts and Judges, commanding them to return the record of a matter depending before them, in order that the applicant may have it disposed of in the superior court (see F. Bk. 342; Key, Crim. Law, 95-97; 15 Jur. 467). In criminal cases the writ issues for the removal of the indictments and the proceedings thereon, either for trial or very commonly for the purpose of quashing them (16 & 17 Vic. c. 30, ss. 4, 5). The writ is taken away in several cases by particular statutes.

EXAMINATION STUDIES.

(Easter Term, 1863.)

Common Law.-The Questions and Answers will be found ante, pp. 137-143.-No. I. (p. 137), suggests the utility of a knowledge of that part of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, relating to Pleading, and the Common Law Pleading Rules, with which it is to be feared few country clerks are acquainted. Read Pract. Com. Law, pp. 107-114, 124-139, which will be found sufficient to meet any future questions on pleadings. The answer No. II. (p. 138) should be well studied, as it is not unlikely to reappear. The short point is that in actions on contract for not more than £20, if the defendant suffers judgment by default, the plaintiff gets no costs unless by leave. Remark the utility of endorsing a notice on the writ of an application for the costs. From No. III. (p. 138) the reader gathers that privilege from arrest is either permanent or temporary. As to No. IV. (p. 139) some confusion exists as to the precise meaning of the words "Actio personalis." By some these words are taken to refer to actions in tort only, whilst others extend them to actions in respect of torts and of contracts-that is, actions ex delicto and ex contractu. The latter is the most usual, but obviously not the most appropriate, since the maxim is respecting personal actions dying with the persons; but, confessedly, actions on contract do not die with the person, whilst formerly actions for torts did universally die or become extinct with the persons who suffered the injury. Personal actions in tort may be brought for injuries to the person or to property, or arising out of the connection existing between two persons. Mr. Broom (Max. 702, 706, 2nd ed.) after stating the application of the maxim to actions ex contractu, proceeds :-" It is, however, to actions in form ex delicto that the rule actio personalis moritur cum persona is peculiarly applicable; indeed, it has been observed that this maxim is not applied in the old authorities to causes of action on contracts, but to those in tort which are founded on malfeasance or misfeasance to the person or property of another; which latter are annexed to the person, and die with the person, except where the remedy is given to the personal representative by the statute law; it being a general rule that an action founded in tort, and in form ex delicto, was considered an actio personalis and within the above maxim." No. V. (p. 139) shows how important it is, where there has been an irregu larity in an opponent's proceedings which it is intended to take advantage of, to be not only prompt, but to apply before taking any other step in the cause. As to No. VI. (p. 139) the student is supposed to know that the old rule that several causes of action, different in form, and where the judgment could not have been the