spiritual promotion, was held not to extend to bishops, although they have spiritual promotion (2 Rep. 46). In Rex v. Vice Chancellor of Cambridge (3 Burr. 1647), respecting the contest for the high-stewardship of the university, between Lord Hardwicke and Lord Sandwich, you will find the same principle applied in the construction of the university statutes—that the highsteward was not included under the words "aliorum officiariorum." In Copland v. Powel, (1 Bing. 373), the same principle was applied, to show that a statute, beginning one of its enactments with the mention of a collector of taxes, could not, under subsequent general words, include the sheriff.

There is a very curious circumstance attending the construction of our statute law, the expediency of which may perhaps admit of a question, as a matter of jurisprudence. It is that some statutes are to be construed liberally, or, as it is termed, "benignly," whilst others are to be construed strictly.

To show the absurdities into which the Courts may be sometimes led by the distinction between penal and remedial Acts, you may look at the Attorney-General v. Jeffrys (M'Clell. 296), where the Judges of the Exchequer are divided as to whether 21 G. III. c. 37, against exporting British machines, was to be construed strictly or liberally, a question determined according to the views of the Judges of the Exchequer upon a point of political economy.

Somewhat analogous to the strict and liberal interpretation of statutes is a manner of construing statutes of which we hear less in the present day, but of which our ancient law books are full-the construction of statutes by equity, Lord Tenterden, in Prandling v. Barrington, (6 B. & C. 475), says, "Speaking for myself alone, I cannot forbear observing that I think there is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of a statute, and that it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the legislature might possibly have provided for other cases, had their attention been directed to them." This, I apprehend, is very sound doctrine in the present time; but, in ancient days, when parliament met but seldom, and, after they had done the business of granting money, were hastily dissolved, it was absolutely necessary that some discretion should be exercised by the Judges in enlarging the confined language, or restraining the too general expressions, in the few and short Acts that were passed, in order to adapt them to the real mischief, the redress of which was necessary to the wellbeing of society. Accordingly, a large proportion of that part of our jurisprudence which is usually referred to the ancient statute law of the country, is nothing else but the opinions of the ancient Judges as to what the legislature intended, or ought to have intended, but what the legislature had not expressed. You will find a mul

titude of references in Lord Coke's writings upon the subject of the construction of statutes by equity. I will refer you to Co. Litt. 24 b.; 2 Inst. 382; Hensloe's case, 9 Co. But the most redoubtable champion for the construction of statutes by equity is old Plowden. Upon the subject of the equity of statutes, and on the previous subject, more heard of in the present day, but which sounds quite as oddly, "the benignity of statutes," you will find an old and very scarce book, Hatton on Statutes, worth consulting. It is generally supposed to have been written by Queen Elizabeth's lord keeper, Sir Christopher Hatton, at least as famous for his dancing as for his law.

MOOT POINTS.

No. 49.-Satisfied terms-8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, s. 2.-On a sale of freehold property which is subject to a mortgage for a term of years created before the above Act, the mortgagee is made a party to the purchaser's conveyance, and part of the purchasemoney is paid to the mortgagee in discharge of his mortgage debt. First, can the term be assigned to the purchaser, so as to become merged in the inheritance, or can it be assigned to a trustee in trust to attend the inheritance? Secondly, does the term on the mortgage debt being paid off become attendant on the inheritance by construction of law, or is it necessary to assign the term in the usual manner in order to render it attendant?-HENRY CADMAN, jun., Messrs. Flowers, 17 Gracechurch-street, E.C.

No. 50.-Appointment of new trustees under a will.-A testator's will, dated in 1843, contained the following power of appointment of new trustees :-" Provided always, and I hereby declare that, in case the trustees hereby appointed, or either of them, or any future trustees or trustee, shall cease to be a trustee by dying, going to reside beyond the seas, or desiring to be discharged from or becoming incapable to act in the trusts aforesaid, then, as often as the same shall happen, it shall be lawful for the surviving or continuing trustee, or the executors of the last surviving trustee (with the consent of my wife, if unmarried, and of A. B. if living) by any deed, &c., to appoint any other fit person or persons to supply the place of the trustee or trustees so ceasing as aforesaid.” And the said testator directed that the trust estate should be vested in such new trustee or trustees in the usual manner. died in 1844, leaving freehold and leasehold estates. proved by the widow, and the trustees took on

The testator The will was themselves the

trusteeship. One of the trustees is since dead, and the other trustee wishes to retire. It is wished that the succeeding trustees should be the widow and B. First, it is doubted whether the widow being the executrix, and one whose consent is required to the appointment of new trustees, is thereby rendered incompetent to be a trustee, and it is presumed that it will not be proper for the surviving trustee to appoint only one trustee on his retirement; secondly, whether a valid and unobjectionable appointment of the widow as a trustee can be made; and, thirdly, whether an appointment of one trustee only by the surviving trustee would be sufficient. THOS. JOHNSON MASON, 19, Bridge-street, Louth.

No. 51.-Construction of will.-A testator, by his will, gave the sum of £10,000 to trustees upon trust to invest and pay income to daughter E., the wife of W. M., for her sole and separate use during her life, and at her death to pay the same principal sum and the annual dividends, interest, and proceeds thereof unto and equally between such of the children of the said E. M. as should attain the age of twenty-one years; and if but one, then to such one child absolutely, and in case his said daughter should die without leaving any child or children her surviving, then upon trust as therein mentioned. The testator died some few years ago, and his daughter is since dead, leaving only one child surviving her. This child has recently died under the age of twenty-one years. From the terms of the said will, are not the child's representatives entitled to the £10,000; or, is the clause introducing the ultimate trust to be construed as meaning in case E. M. were to die without leaving any child her surviving, who should attain the age of twenty-one years? Your correspondents are requested to advise hereon.-J. T. SARGENT, 5, Ramsgate, Louth.

No. 52.-Barristers and solicitors.-If a solicitor who has duly obtained his certificate, and in practice wishes to become a barrister, his name must be taken off the rolls of the Courts before he can be admitted to the bar. As such barrister, he could not take a brief unless it were placed in his hands by a solicitor. If a barrister wishes to practise as a solicitor, must his name be taken off the list at the bar before his certificate as attorney be granted him, and could such a person, with certificates both as barrister and attorney, plead in the superior Courts? Would it be a breach of professional etiquette for such an attorney to take briefs from his clients as a solicitor and argue them himself, by virtue of his position as barrister? -JOEL EMANUEL, Southampton.-P.S. Many of your correspondents address their letters to "Joel Emanuel, solicitor, Southampton." That address is wrong, and there is a great difficulty before the letter is delivered to me; and, in one instance, a delay of three days took place before I received the letter. My direction is, "Joel Emanuel, Southampton."

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

(Michaelmas Term, 1862.)

COMMON LAW.

I. When a writ is issued under the Bills of Exchange Act, within what time and in what manner must the defendant appear

to it? (yol. 1, p. 121, No. II.)

ANS.-The defendant may appear within twelve days of service, but not as a matter of course, but only by leave of a Judge; for by sect. 2 of the Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, a Judge of any of the said Courts (and not the Court itself, 7 Law Tim. Rep. 285) shall, upon application within the period of twelve days from service, give leave to appear to such writ, and to defend the action, on the defendant paying into Court the sum indorsed on the writ, or upon affidavits satisfactory to the Judge which disclose a legal or equitable defence, or such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the Judge may deem sufficient to support the application, and on such terms as to security or otherwise as to the Judge may seem fit (1 Exam. Chron. pp. 121, 161; Com. Law Pract. 73). The Court may review the Judge's decision (3 Jur., N. S., 92; 7 Law Tim. Rep. 285).

II. When goods are sold to a woman who afterwards marries, against whom must an action for their price be brought? (vol. 1, p. 123).

ANS. Upon the principles stated in vol. 1, p. 123, on a similar question, the action for the goods supplied to the wife before her marriage must be brought against the husband and wife jointly: it could not, of course, be brought against the wife alone, as her coverture would be pleaded, nor (though this is not so evident as the other) can the action be sustained against the husband alone. In a similar case where the husband was sued alone, it was decided that the Judge had no power to amend the record at the trial under s. 222 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, by the insertion of the wife as a co-defendant (Garrard v. Guibelei, 10 Week. Rep. 213, 565; 5 Law Tim., N. S., 609; see sects. 34-40 of C. L. P. Act, 1852, in Com. Law Princ. pp. 9, 10).

III. What step must be taken by an attorney before he can bring an action to recover his bill of costs?

ANS.-The attorney must first deliver his bill of costs, for by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, no attorney or solicitor shall commence or maintain any action or suit for the recovery of any fees, charges, or

disbursements, for any business done by such attorney or solicitor, until the expiration of one (calendar) month after such attorney or solicitor shall have delivered unto the party to be charged therewith, or sent by the post to, or left for him at his counting-house, office of business, dwelling-house, or last known place of abode, a bill of such fees, charges, and disbursements, and which bill shall either be subscribed with the proper hand of such attorney or solicitor (or in the case of a partnership by any of the partners either with his own name or with the name or style of such partnership), or to be inclosed in or accompanied by a letter subscribed in like manner referring to such bill. In the case of a defendant about to go abroad leave may be obtained to sue earlier (see Com. Law Pract. 78-82, where the various cases are noticed).

IV. If a plaintiff, after issue joined, neglects to go on to trial, how may the defendant proceed?

ANS.-There are two courses open to the defendant; for, first, if the plaintiff neglect to bring on the cause for trial within certain periods after issue has been joined (periods which vary according as the cause is a town or a country one; see Com. Law Prac. 152; C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 101), the defendant may give the plaintiff twenty days' notice to bring on the cause for trial at the next sittings or assizes, as the case may be, after that notice. If the plaintiff after this neglects to give notice of trial for such sittings or assizes, or to proceed to trial in pursuance of the notice given by the defendant, the defendant may suggest on the record that the plaintiff has failed to proceed to trial, although duly required so to do (which suggestion is not traversable, but only subject to be set aside if untrue), and may sign judgment for his costs; but the Court or Judge may extend the time for proceeding to trial, with or without terms (see Com. Law Prac. 151-153). Secondly, in lieu of this, the defendant may make up the issue, and carry down the record for trial, giving the plaintiff the same notice of trial by proviso as the plaintiff ought to have given to him. If records are entered for trial by both plaintiff and defendant, the defendant's record will be treated as standing next in order after the plaintiff's record in the list of causes, and the trial of the cause will take place accordingly (C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 116; R. G. Hil. T. 1853, pl. 42; Com. Law Pract. 177).

V. What is the consequence of the non-joinder of persons, as plaintiffs? 1. Where the defendant gives a notice objecting to such non-joinder; 2. Where he does not give such a notice ?

ANS.-First: By s. 36 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, if the defendant gives, at or before the pleading, a notice objecting to such non-joinder, or pleads in abatement the non-joinder, the plaintiff