a part (Arch. Crim. Pl. & Ev., 275-279, 8th ed.; Key Crim. L., 44-45).

X.-At the trial for forgery of a bill of exchange or other instrument, is it sufficient to prove that any part thereof has been fraudulently altered, and if so, what part?

ANS.-Every fraudulent alteration in a document, whether by subtraction, addition, or substitution, is forgery. The making any material alteration in a bill of exchange with intent to defraud, as altering the amount, or date, &c., will constitute forgery (Arch. Cr. Pl. & Ev., 350, 10th ed.; see more fully Key Crim. L., 47).

XI.-Define the offence of perjury.

ANS.-Perjury is a crime committed where a lawful oath is administered, by any having authority, to any person in any judicial proceeding, who swears absolutely and falsely in a matter material to the issue or cause in question; but by the express provision of many modern statutes, a false oath taken in certain cases not of a judicial kind is deemed to amount to perjury, and visited with the same penalties (4 St. C., 307 et seq., 4th ed.; Key Crim. L., 49; F. Bk., 305).

XII. What is compounding felony, and are there any offences the compounding of which will not subject the party to an indictment?

ANS. The offence of compounding a felony is the taking of a reward for forbearing to prosecute an offence of that description; and one part of it is where a party robbed takes his goods again, or other amends, upon agreement not to prosecute. This was formerly held to make a man accessory, but is now punished only with fine and imprisonment. As to other offences, the compounding misdemeanours, without leave of one of the courts at Westminster, seems to be illegal. But it is not uncommon, when a person is convicted of a misdemeanour more immediately affecting an individual—as a battery, imprisonment, or the like-for the court to permit the defendant to speak with the prosecutor before any judgment is pronounced; and if the prosecutor declares himself satisfied, to inflict but a trivial punishment (4th St. C., 299–302, 4th ed.; Key Crim. L., 63-65; as to compounding informations, see F. Bk., 305; 9 C. & P., 368).

XIII.-Have justices of the peace any, and what, powers in petty sessions to adjudicate summarily, and on what conditions, against persons charged with any, and what, felonies and misdemeanours; and what are the rights of the accused in such cases with regard to his defence?

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

TRINITY TERM, 1861 (concluded).

ANS.-BY the Criminal Justice Act (18 & 19 Vic., c. 126), if the accused admit before the justices in petty sessions, or a stipendiary magistrate, that he is guilty of simple larceny of goods above the value of five shillings, or stealing from the person, or larceny as a clerk or servant, he may be summarily convicted, whatever the value of the property stolen. Where, however, the accused does not confess being guilty, the power to convict and commit is limited to cases of simple larceny of the value of five shillings, or of having attempted to commit larceny from the person, or simple larceny; and in any of these cases the prisoner is to be asked whether he consents to the charge being thus summarily determined, or whether he wishes the case to be sent for trial by jury at the sessions or assizes, as the case may be (F. Bk., 334; 4 St. C., 394-396, 4th ed.; as to juvenile offenders, see 10 & 11 Vic., c. 82, and 13 & 14 Vic., c. 37; F. Bk., 333).

XV.-Is the prosecutor entitled to be paid his costs in any, and what, cases?

ANS.-By 7 Geo. IV., c. 64, and 14 & 15 Vic., cc. 11, 19, and 55, the court is empowered in all cases of felony and upon indictments for certain misdemeanours, to allow out of the county rate the expenses of the prosecutor and his witnesses, with compensation for their trouble and loss of time. It is impossible to enumerate the cases of misdemeanour, but the reader is referred to 4 St. C., 500— 502. Many recent acts contain some provision for the expenses of the prosecutions thereunder (see Key Crim. L., 105).

THE questions in the division of Common Law (see ante, pp. 101105) are not very difficult, but Nos. 2, 11, 12, and 13 are possibly such as ought not to have been put to articled clerks, inasmuch as they involve doctrines more fit for counsel. No. II. raises the question of the liability of an English factor buying for a foreign merchant, and, as will be seen by our answer at p. 101, it is by no means an elementary matter. Those who wish for further information on this

point are referred to an article in 2 Jur., N.S., pt. I., pp. 513-515, whic his noticed in 3 Law Chron., 239, 240, and see 1 Id., 214-223, 394-396.-No. IX. is as to the proper party to sue on a note payable to husband and wife, the wife being the survivor. Being payable to husband and wife, it is to be assumed that she was the meritorious cause of action, that having been reduced into possession by the husband, the note became the wife's, and she alone could sue on it. As Mr. Walford says (2 Actions, 1021), "Obligations and contracts under seal, made either with the wife alone, or with the husband and wife jointly, survive not to the husband's representatives, but to the wife, who is consequently the proper party to enforce them, because a sealed instrument of itself imports a consideration. For the same reason negotiable instruments, made or indorsed during coverture, either to the wife alone or to the husband and wife jointly, pass to the wife, and, accordingly, may be enforced by her."No. XII. relates to the effect of joining two persons as plaintiffs, when one only should have sued, a state of things which formerly would have been fatal to the action, but is now provided for by a very recent act (ante, p. 104; 2 L. C., N.S., 181). Let it be remembered that it is a case of mis-joinder and not of non-joinder.— No. XIV. relates to a set-off where too many plaintiffs are joined, a case which is provided for by the act before referred to, the 23 & 24 Vic., c. 126, s. 20 (ante, p. 104; 2 L. C., N.S., 182). The other questions are more within the province of a young solicitor, such as No. 1 as to an agent for the execution of a deed being authorised by deed (p. 101); it being a rule that an attorney, appointed to execute a deed must be constituted by deed (Co. Litt., 52 a; Noy's Max., ch. 31; 1 Broom's Pract,, 229, citing, 7 T. R., 210; 2 East, 146). As stated by Mr. Walford (Actions, 770), "It may here be remarked that when a contract under seal is said to be authorised by the employer, this must be understood of an express authority under seal given by the principal to the agent to execute deeds for him, it being a rule of law that an agent cannot bind his principal under seal without being authorised by deed to do so."-No. III.-— What instruments require an attesting witness ? There are other cases than those mentioned at pp. 101, 102, such as agreements between the master of a ship and a merchant seaman, and by a defendant who has appeared by attorney to judge's orders to stay proceedings on payment of debt and costs (Pract. Com. L., 295; but see 10 Jur., 599).—No. IV. applies to the case of an unstamped or improperly stamped instrument being attempted to be put in evidence, and requires a knowledge of the provisions in the C. L. P. Act, 1854, by which, upon payment of the proper stamp, with the penalty, and an additional £1, to the officer of the court, the document may be received in evidence (ante, p. 102), and suggests that on a trial the

attorney should be prepared with the money or give his client notice that it may be required.-No. VI., pp. 102-103, requires a knowledge that rent, whether the demise be by parol or by deed, is esteemed of higher rank than a bill, which is but a simple contract, and is of as high a rank as a bond, so that it is not merged in either security (see Tudor's Real Prop., 180; Davis v. Gyde, 2nd Ad., and El., 263; Parrott v. Anderson, 7 Ex., R. 93; Selw. N. P., 679, 11th ed.).—No. VII. as to the facts to be sworn to on filing a bill of sale (p. 103), is a specimen of the kind of questions which ought to be put at the examinations, being respecting a matter peculiarly within the province of a solicitor. And perhaps the same may be said of No. VIII., relating to the requisites of a guarantee (p. 103). We venture, however, to think that No. IX., relative to the course to be pursued if a witness be arrested, is not of this character (p. 103); nor perhaps is No. X., as to old deeds and wills proving themselves (p. 103). No. XIV.-As to costs in actions ex delicto, where a sum less than £5 is recovered, depends upon a recent statute (ante, pp. 2, 3), which it is reasonable to require the examinant to know; but the reader must guard himself from supposing that, independently of that enactment, the right to costs is clear. The case of Hatch v. Lewis, to be argued in next term, will probably furnish an illustrative instance. The questions in Equity (pp. 105-109) are perhaps less difficult than on some other occasions, but still some of them are by no means easy. No. I., as to the difference between mistakes in matter of law and in matter of fact (p. 105); and No. II., as to the meaning of a conversion out and out, are rather questions for counsel than for articled clerks. Conversion is explained by Mr. Hayes (Convey., p. 48, 4th ed.)-"If land be directed to be sold, and the produce paid to A., or money be directed to be invested in the purchase of land to be conveyed to A., the land or the money, though really unconverted, assumes, in contemplation of Equity, that character which it is destined to assume in fact. The beneficial interest in the land to be sold becomes the personal estate of A.; the beneficial interest in the money to be invested becomes the real estate of A.-As to No. III., relating to contracts in restraint of trade, so that the limited distance be not unreasonable, the time may be unlimited. In other words, it is the extent of the limited area which is important (see Com. L. Princ., pp. 204-211). Contracts in total restraint are void, though there be a consideration, and there must be a consideration even for a limited or partial restraint. That a covenant extending to the whole life of the covenantor is valid where the space is limited, or where the restraint is only in a particular mode and not generally, See Elwes v. Croft, 14 Jur., 855; Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W., 273, stated Com. L. Princ., 209.No. IV., relative to maintenance, requires a knowledge of the provi

sion, in the Mortgagees and Trustees' Act, with respect to maintenance -a provision of some importance (see ante, pp. 78-106).-No. V., as to voluntary contracts in the nature of settlements, depends upon the principle applicable to all voluntary engagements, that is, if incomplete, Equity will not lend its assistance to the volunteers. There may be a valid declaration of trust by an instrument which purports, though ineffectually, to convey a legal estate (see Parnell v. Kingston, 28 Law Tim. Rep., 217, stated 3 L. C., 257). Where there is not a mere engagement to create a trust, but a perfect declaration of a trust, the transaction is not incomplete (Ibid, 3 Myl. & R., 36). There is an essential distinction between the case of a man who declares that he will hold property in trust for another, and that of one who only affects to give, but does nothing to complete his gift (Evans v. Jennings, 6 W. R., 616, stated 5 L. C., 57; and see there as to the exploded notion of the trustees acting or not making a difference).—No. VI., relating to Remedial Equity, which is a term lately adopted by text writers, includes some of the oldest heads of Equity, as accident, mistake, and fraud. The most scientific division of Equity jurisdiction is that given by Mr. Smith in his Manual, and which is stated in Key to Equity, 3, 4. Readers would do well to master it.-No. VII. relates to a fraud by a woman, who, appearing to be the owner of property, induces a man to marry her, having secretly settled or voluntarily conveyed away the property. It is not necessary that the husband should prove actual fraud or deception-for deception will be inferred-if, after the commencement of the treaty of marriage, the wife should have attempted to dispose of her property without the knowledge or concurrence of her intended husband (Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Ha., 608; 12 L. J., Ch. 73). The general doctrine is well laid down, fraud being the basis, in England v. Downs, 4 Jur., 526; see 13 Jur., 29; 14 Id., 1103.-No VIII. is a practical point, but one which no solicitor is likely to originate, except under the advice of counsel. It refers to the new orders respecting evidence in chief to be taken viva voce at the hearing of a cause readers would do well to make themselves master of the subject, as the question is one likely to be repeated.-By No. IX. the time for closing evidence not taken viva voce at the hearing is stated to be eight weeks after issue joined. The reader sees that this does not apply to the most ordinary mode of bringing a cause to a hearing, viz., by notice of motion for a decree. It assumes that the plaintiff has filed a replication, and that excludes a notice of motion for a decree. Readers should familiarise themselves with these distinctions. We have already explained what are the investments authorised by the Court of Chancery for cash under its control (pp. 27-46-77— 107-136), and an answer to No. X will readily be framed there