and the opinions of such persons in such cases form a pro

per basis of judicial action.

*

So it would not have been difficult for judicious men to determine from his conduct whether he continued in his wild, extravagant, dissipated habits. There can be little doubt that discreet and intelligent men in the community will generally form a correct opinion as to whether a young man who has lived among them until the age of twenty four is of wild, extravagant, and dissipated habits or not;" and referring to Tattersall v. Howell, 2 Merr. 26, he held the condition was valid.

It does appear to me that the cases of Re Fox, 8 O. R. 489; Pew v. Lafferty, 16 Grant 408; Tattersall v. Howell, 2 Merr. 26; Wynne v. Wynne, 2 M. & G. 8, and West v. Moore, 37 Mississ. 114, shew expressly the first condition is not too vague and indefinite a matter for trial or for adjudication by the Court.

It is of no consequence to consider the second condition, that Michael shall be kind and obedient to his mother. It is more difficult to be determined. By that condition he was not required to live and take care of his mother, although that is likely what the testator intended or desired, and thought would be the case, as he was to have the land after her death; and, therefore, I cannot say that his leaving her four years after his father's death and moving to Seaforth was an act of unkindness or an act of disobedience; and there is no evidence that she ever forbade his moving away. But during the four years he did live with her, there is evidence of neglect to see that she had proper provision made for her, which from the relative position of the parties was unkindness on his part, although it could not have been said to be so on the part of a stranger—not at any rate to the same degree. I give no opinion upon that condition.

As to the third condition, "that Michael be known. among his friends as an industrious man," which I read from the context of the will," for the period of ten years after the death of his mother," but, taking it in its most

restricted sense, during the lifetime of his mother, I hold it to be in either case a valid condition, and to be a condition precedent for the period of her lifetime, but a condition subsequent for the ten years after her death.

What is there unreasonable or impossible in deciding upon the fact whether he was an industrious man or not? or who can better determine it than his friends?

It is said who are the friends referred to? I should say those who knew him, or even his neighbours, and had no ill feeling to him; or those, at any rate, who had a kindly or friendly feeling to him, although they did not personally know him, or those who might be called, if required, as witnesses to speak favorably of his character from personal knowledge, or to express the general repute of his neighbourhood. The friends referred to might be a term which was purposely used to insure a favourable body for him, his well wishers, and to exclude his enemies, or those who were not well disposed to him, or who would harshly judge him. The term does no more than describe those who would have been or would be called upon to try the matter if no mention of friends had been made. In that case the question would be determined by those who had the knowledge of the man and of his character in that respect. But these are the very persons who are to try the question now, with this advantage to the man, that those who are to speak of his being industrious are not only to be those who have no ill-feeling against him, but his friends; that is, those who have a kindly or friendly feeling towards him.

It was argued that no advantage of these conditions could be taken after Michael's death. I know of no such rule or law.

It was also said, as Michael was one of the heirs-at-law, he took an estate as such independently of the will, and it was not shewn he had notice of the will or of these conditions. That rule does not apply in this case, for he had possession of the land for about five years from his mother's death till his own, and that was not in the character of an

heir-at-law, but as a devisee; and he had certainly knowledge of the will, and he has no claim to the land but as devisee under the will.

At the trial the only matter in question was, the validity of these conditions, and they are, in my opinion, valid. As respects their effect as conditions precedent, the title of the plaintiff has failed, because it was not disputed the conditions had not been observed; and so far as they are conditions subsequent, the title of Michael has been forfeited.

There is, upon consideration, no object in granting a new trial, for it is quite obvious from the proceedings at the last trial the only question was as to the validity and meaning of the conditions; and I am of opinion the motion must be absolute to set aside the judgment for the plaintiffs, and to enter it for the defendants, with costs.

ARMOUR, J., concurred.

O'CONNOR, J., adhered to the opinion already expressed by him.

Motion absolute to enter judgment

for defendants, with costs.

37-VOL XIII O.R.

[CHANCERY DIVISION.]

RE MOOREHOUSE AND LEAK.

Mechanics' lien-R. S. O. ch. 120-Jurisdiction of Master in Chambers to annul registration of lien-Time of filing lien as between material-man and owner.

The Master in Chambers has jurisdiction to entertain a motion under R. S. O. ch. 120 sec. 23 to annul the registry of a mechanic's lien when the amount in question is over $200. Re Cornish, 6 O. R. 259 followed. The question whether an issue as to a mechanic's lien should be summarily tried or not rests largely, if not entirely in the discretion of the judge.

When a contractor working for several owners has but a single contract for the supply of materials with the material-man, the time of filing a lien by the latter against an owner is not to be measured with reference to the duration of deliveries under the contract between the materialman and the contractor, but by the completion of the work by the contractor for the several owners.

THIS was an appeal from the judgment of Ferguson, J. It appeared that one Robert Crabb was building eight houses for Dr. Moorehouse under two separate and distinct contracts, one of which related to six of the houses and the other to the remaining two houses. William Leak had a contract with Crabb for the supply of a lot of bricks, under which he had delivered bricks to Crabb's teamsters at the brick kiln, in such lots and at such times as Crabb chose to send for them, and sufficient bricks to complete the six houses were hauled to those houses on or before September 1st, 1886. Leak registered a lien for $444 against these houses on October 5th 1886, against J. S. McMurray as owner, as he appeared as such in the Registry office.

A second lien was registered by Leak for $786 against all the eight houses on October 14th, 1886.

Dr. Moorehouse, the owner, moved before the Master in Chambers for an order to vacate the first lien, on the ground that it was not filed within the thirty days allowed by the Mechanics' Lien Act, R. S. O. ch. 120, and that the owner was misdescribed; and to vacate the second lien as

to the six houses, and also as to the two houses except as to the sum of $336, which he was willing to pay into Court as the amount claimed to be due, in order to get his property discharged from the lien, and the motion was argued on October 23rd, 1886.

F. E. Hodgins, for the lien-holder, objected to the Mas ter's jurisdiction under the section 23 of the Mechanics' Lien Act, R. S. O. ch. 120, which reads:

"Upon application to the County Court, or the Judge thereof, in claims under two hundred dollars, and to the Court of Chancery in other cases, such Judge or Court may receive security or payment into Court in lieu of the amount of such claim, and may thereupon vacate the registry of such lien, or may annul the said registry upon any other ground."

J. B. Clarke, for the land-owner, contra.

The following cases were referred to: Re Allen, 31 U. C. R, 458, 494; Smeeton v. Collier, 1 Ex. 457; Regina ex rel. Wilson v. Duncan, 11 P. R. 379; Morrison v. Taylor, 46 U. C. R. 492; Re Cornish, 6 O. R. 259.

November 5, 1886-THE MASTER IN CHAMBERS.-This alleged lien concerns eight houses on College street, divided into two groups, one (the westerly) containing six houses, the other being of two houses.

Mr. Leak who claims the lien, supplied bricks for the houses to the contractor Mr. Crabb, and it is for their price the lien is alleged. Dr. Moorehouse is the owner.

Two liens have been filed by the claimant, one on the westerly group of six houses, on the 5th October, 1886: the other on all the eight houses filed on the 14th of October, 1886.

This motion is by Dr. Moorehouse, to discharge these liens, except as to $336, which he desires to pay int› Court-acknowledging the lien to that extent on the two easterly houses.