Grimsly vs. Jernigan-Maynard vs. Flanders & Huguenin, etc.

GRIMSLY VS. JERNIGAN; MAYNARD vs. FLANDERS & HUGUENIN.

1. The verdict is supported by the evidence.

2. Newly discovered testimony which could not change the verdict is no ground for new trial.

NISBET, trustee, et al. vs. SAWYER, trustee, et al., COCH, next friend, vs. WHITSETT, ex'r, et al.; CARRAWAY vs. LOCKETT; THE AURARIA GOLD MINING Co. vs. WAHL.

The discretion of the chancellor exercised in the grant or refusal of an injunction will not be controlled unless abused, or unless some well recognized principle of law or equity be violated.

66 256 Case 3 e126 114

KNOX, administrator, vs. SUMMERS et al.

Where an attorney makes an affidavit as the foundation of a garnishment, it is not sufficient for him to state that the defendant is justly indebted to his client a specific sum, "and that he (the attorney at law) has reason to believe that the said Daniel N. Baker (his client,) will apprehend the loss of the same, or some part thereof, unless process of garnishment do issue." A garnishment founded on such an affidavit will be dismissed on motion.

CRAWFORD, Justice.

STORY et al. vs. COLLINS et al.; SAWYER, trustee, et al, vs. PLANT et al.; MORGAN vs. KEITH; WHITE vs. FULTON et al.

This court will not interfere with the discretion of the court below in granting a first new trial, unless that discretion has been abused.

Pulliam vs. Shelor, executrix-Lee vs. State, etc.

PULLIAM VS. SHELOR, executrix; LEE vs. State; DuMAS VS. STATE; IVEY vs. STATE; GUNN vs. GILES, ordinary; COUCH, administrator, vs. COUCH; JACKSON, administrator, vs. MARTIN; JONES vs. STATE; HUMPHREY VS. STATE.

There being being sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, this court will not interfere with the discretion of the court below in refusing a new trial.

HAYES US. PITTMAN, executrix.

Suit was brought by Hayes against Mrs. Pittman, executrix of J. G Pittman, on the following receipt: "Received, Thomasville, January 6th, 1871, of Joshua Smith, one hundred dollars for James H. Hayes, the same to be credited on note held by James H. Hayes against said Joshua Smith. [Signed] "J. G. PITTMAN." The only evidence introduced was the receipt itself, and the testimony of the plaintiff's son that Pittman had several claims belonging to his father for collection, but he knew nothing about this particular note :

Held, that a non-suit was properly awarded,

JACKSON, Justice.

1. Where a declaration in a suit against a railroad on account of a physical injury alleged that plaintiff was employed as a train-hand on the defendant's freight train, that by the negligence of other employes the accident occurred (describing it) by which his fingers and a portion of his hand were so mashed as to necessitate amputation, and that his capacity to labor and earn money was thereby permanently diminished one half, evidence as to plaintiff's age and capacity to labor was admissible without more specific allegations in regard to them.

2. After stating an injury done to the plaintiff, giving all the material
facts touching his physical condition, his previous capacity and pres-
ent incapacity for labor resulting therefrom, it was not error to allow
the witness to state how much less he could do after than before
the injury.

3. We cannot see that the charge of the court was such as to constrain
the verdict of the jury as to the amount of damages to be found.
(a). Suit being brought for a permanent injury resulting from a rail-
road accident, future pain and suffering may form an element in
estimating damages, provided the evidence renders it reasonably
certain that they will necessarily result from the injury.

The Atlanta and West Point Railroad vs. Johnson.

4. It is not improper to introduce in evidence standard life-tables to show the expectancy of life of a person of the age of the injured party, as a basis upon which to estimate the amount of damages he should recover, and such in effect was the charge of the court. (a). That the judge directed the jury to inquire into the plaintiff's capacity to labor instead of his ability to earn money is no ground of reversal. The capacity to labor was in fact the thing of which plaintiff claimed to have been deprived, and as a result thereof arose an inability to earn money.

5. In a suit by an employé against his employer for damages done by a co-employè, the question whether he himself was free from negligence, refers to negligence operating at the time of the injury. That he might have been negligent at some other time would not affect the issue.

6. The rule that positive is superior to negative testimony does not apply where, of two parties having equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thing, one swears that it occurred, the other that it did not. The preference the law gives positive over negative testimony is when one swears positively that a thing happened and another swears that he was present and did not see it or hear it (as the case may be), it being quite possible that it may nevertheless have happened.

7. We cannot say that the verdict in this case was unsupported by evidence.

Railroads. Damages. Negligence. Evidence. Charge of Court. Master and servant. New Trial. Before Judge CLARK. City Court of Atlanta. June Term, 1880.

Johnson sued the Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company for a personal injury. He alleged as follows: On the 18th of September, 1877, he was employed as a train-hand on the way-freight trains of said company, and while certain cars were being shifted from one track to another at LaGrange, Ga., the conductor, who had the power to do so, under the rules of the company, ordered him to couple a box car to a flat car loaded with lumber. In doing this his left hand was caught between the bumpers of the cars, without fault or negligence on his part, and his four fingers and a portion of his hand were thereby so mashed as to necessitate their amputation. The cause