Mr. Schurz, in his powerful address of protest to the governor, properly suggested that holding two examinations to ascertain "merit and fitness" is like requiring two examinations by physicians to find whether one is "hale and hearty," one as to whether he is "hale" and the other as to whether he is "hearty."

The act in question is the clumsy device of spoilsmen to nullify the constitution of the State. That a conspiracy so transparent and subversive of public order can succeed, is of course impossible. There is nothing in the history of the courts of New York to give any promise of success to an unlawful purpose so obvious. In the prevailing opinion in the Chittenden-Wurster case, written after the passage of this measure, the Court of Appeals significantly say: "It is said that each officer having appointments to make could himself examine the applicants for position, and in that way determine who should be the appointee by a competitive examination. Undoubtedly, but it will readily be seen that this system would practically nullify the civil service law and bring it into disrepute." (152 N. Y. Rep. P. 356.)

The submission of the "Black Bill" to the scrutiny. of the courts, which is soon to be made, can have but one result. The certain defeat of this transparent attempt to nullify the constitution ought to prepare the way for the legislation which it commands.

The change of administration in Chicago last April has subjected the Illinois statute to a crucial test. Unfortunately, the act did not go into effect until the July following its adoption at the city election of 1895. That election resulted in a change from democratic to republican control. The new mayor promptly turned out "the gang," as his followers not inappropriately called the democratic host, and installed "the boys" who were expected to control in his interest the republican machine, now enuphonetously known as "the organization." This clean sweep and substitution even extended to some six hundred members of the police force. Having thus strikingly illustrated the need, and prepared

the way, for reform, Mayor Swift appointed an excellent commission and thereafter cordially supported it. This seeming inconsistency on his part is perhaps traceable to a desire to mark the introduction of the merit system by a conversion as dramatic as that of St. Paul. Possibly he sought at the outset of his administration to put temptation behind him, or to create a sort of solitude in which the new commission might learn its duties and formulate the rules required by law. Whatever the truth, the mayor thereafter sustained the commission while it worked out a thorough classification of the service, prepared adequate rules, held many examinations and certified a few eligibles for appointment. Under such conditions came the change from republican to democratic rule in the election of Mayor Harrison last spring and a clean sweep of Mayor Swift's personal appointees.

The Illinois statute is based on the national, New York and Massachusetts acts. It differs from the earlier legislation in that it is more inclusive and stringent in its provisions. The excluded "head or heads of any department" of the New York act gives place to the "heads of any principal department" in the statute of Illinois. Unrestricted removals under all prior legislation give way in Illinois to removals only for cause, to be ascertained upon written charges after opportunity to the person charged to be heard. The Illinois act also provides that vacancies shall be filled by promotion where it is practicable, that promotions shall be "on the basis of merit and seniority of service and examination," and that "all examinations for promotion shall be competitive."

The commissions under the Illinois statute are continuous and independent bodies. Mayor Harrison, however, assumed the Chicago commissioners to be his subordinates, and that a majority of them should be in political and personal accord with himself. Upon the refusal of the majority of the old commission (the other member having been appointed comptroller) to accept his construction of the words, "heads of any principal

department," used in naming the excluded officials, to include some fifty heads of bureaus in the departments, inspectors and captains of police and various foremen and others, the mayor removed the two remaining members on frivolous charges afterwards trumped up to comply with a provision of the statute requiring him to file his reasons for such removals. The new commission promptly published an opinion construing the words, "heads of any principal department," so as to exclude from the classified service most of the desirable positions claimed by the mayor as spoils, thus giving him (to use their words) "the benefit of the doubt as to the positions which "should be taken out of the classified service." The mayor was thus enabled to fill the higher places in the service with avowed and active enemies of the merit system, an opportunity which he promptly improved. His appointees, with some honorable exceptions, in co-operation with the council, are doing what may be done to place the civil service law in a false light before the public, and-so far as practicable-to render it inoperative.

The statute excludes from the classified service "officers . . . . whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the city council." When the act was adopted but few officials, some of them of minor importance, were subject to such confirmation. Upon the accession of Mayor Harrison, it was feared by some of the best friends of the law that it is especially vulnerable at this point. Its enemies quickly sought to avail themselves of their apparent opportunity. The council promptly created a considerable number of new positions, making them all subject to confirmation by itself. The committee on civil service, on June 14, 1897, reported forms for four ordinances, recommending their passage. By these measures it was gravely proposed to designate as "heads of principal departments,' as said term is used in section eleven" of the civil service act, numerous "public officials" and "all employees of the City of Chicago, receiving $3 or less per day, as compensation for work;" to make "the head of each

and every department, bureau or division of work in the public service of Chicago," and certain experts, private secretaries, head assistants and others, subject to confirmation by the council; and to make "all transfers, appointments, discharges and promotions in the fire and police departments" subject to the order of the mayor and approval of the council. These extraordinary proposals were opposed by the administration which was not prepared to attempt the complete nullification of the statute. Two weeks later the council passed, as an administration measure, an ordinance which provides that a considerable list of "officials" named shall be designated as 'heads of principal departments,' as said term is used in section eleven" of the civil service act.

66

Some of the friends of the law, fearing these attacks were aimed at a vital point, deemed it wise to endeavor to save something by acquiescence. Others, and notably the Citizens' Association, held that the way to save the law was to defend it against all comers. The Citizens' Association retained special counsel and procured the Attorney-General to file petitions, on behalf of the people, in the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus, to obtain an authoritative and final interpretation of the law and of the power of the city council in respect to it. These cases were fully presented to the court in October last, and early decisions are expected. The new commission only contended for a liberal construction of the words, heads of any principal department." corporation counsel boldly attacked the constitutionality of the act, and defended the ordinance which seeks to make subordinate officials "heads of principal departments" merely by thus designating them. The writer's relation to these cases renders improper here any prophecy in regard to the result. It must suffice here to say, that we hope for a judgment by the court strongly sustaining the act, with a finding that the ordinance is void as unreasonable and in conflict with

*

the statute. The law is supported by public opinion. The penalties for its violation are severe. If fully sustained by the court, it will be at least reasonably enforced.

The President, by his executive order of July 27, 1897, directing that removals shall be made only for just cause, upon written charges and opportunity to be heard, has raised the question whether removals should be controlled by law. Civil service reformers have hesitated to place any legal restraint upon the power of removal by the appointing officer for any cause satisfactory to him. They have assumed that such officers will not be apt to remove efficient subordinates to make way for unknown successors to be taken from the eligible list. As early as 1881, in his address before The American Science Association, Mr. Curtis said :

"Removals for cause alone means, of course, removal for legitimate cause, such as dishonesty, negligence, or incapacity. But who shall decide that such cause exists? This must be determined either by the responsible superior officer or by some other authority. But if left to some other authority the right of counsel and the forms of a court would be invoked; the whole legal machinery of mandamuses, injunctions, certioreris, and the rules of evidence would be put in play to keep an incompetent clerk at his desk or a sleepy watchman on his beat. Cause for removal of a letter-carrier in the post office or of an accountant in the custom house would be presented with all the pomp of impeachment and establised like a high crime and misdemeanor." Orations and Addresses p. 190).

(II

Mr. Curtis, in his second annual address as President of the League in 1883, also said: "We do not plead for fixed permanency in public place, nor assert

*The Supreme Court of Illinois on December 22, 1897, handed down a strong opinion in these cases, holding the Statute to be constitutional and the ordinance in question void for unreasonableness. The court, in effect, holds that the Council has no power to add to the list of exclusions from the act. This decision places the Illinois act on a firm basis.