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cut off all the timber and all the brush (except where there was no timber) on all the land south of a certain field to a certain prairie by the first day of March, 1890, and the plaintiff, in consideration of the labor to be performed by him and the money to be expended by him in the payment of the taxes as aforesaid, was to have the right to cut, carry away and appropriate to his own use all of the timber upon said lands, which he alleges was of great value, to-wit: the sum of three hundred dollars over and above all costs of cutting and carrying away. And this plaintiff alleges that he paid all the taxes assessed against said lands for the year 1888, and endeavored in good faith to perform the labor he had agreed to do by cutting the brush and cutting down and removing the timber, which he here charges and alleges that he could and would have done, but for the wrongful, wilful and unlawful interference with his rights under said contract, by the said defendant as hereinafter set forth.

That on account of the large quantity of timber and brush upon said lands, and the short time plaintiff had in which to cut and remove the same, it was impossible for him to perform said labor or to appropriate said timber, without the assistance of a large number of hands. That, after plaintiff had employed hands to assist him as aforesaid. and was proceeding to the execution of said contract on his part, the defendant in this suit came to the plaintiff and informed him that he had purchased said lands from the said Mary B. Paddock and claimed and demanded the immediate possession thereof at a time soon after plaintiff had entered and long before his term had expired. That in 1888, and before said term had expired, defendant unlawfully, with force and arms, did enter upon said lands and, by threatening to cause plaintiff's employees to be arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned, did frighten, intimidate and drive away said employees from plaintiff's service as aforesaid, and did thereby wrongfully, forcibly and unlawfully deprive, delay and prevent the plaintiff from appropriating timber aforesaid to his own use, as by said contract he, the said plaintiff, had a right to do. And plaintiff alleges that, before the said defendant purchased said lands from the said Mary B. Paddock, if he did so purchase, he was fully advised and informed of all of plaintiff's rights in the premises, and that he purchased the same subject to all of plaintiff's rights as aforesaid. Plaintiff further alleges that by reason of the aforesaid wrongs and injuries inflicted by said defendant he was damaged in the sum of three hundred dollars. Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment for said sum of three hundred dollars for his damages and for all other proper relief.

[(Signature and verification as in Form No. 5909.)]1

(2) FOR ENTICING OR HARBORING SERVANT.2

1. The matter to be supplied within [] will not be found in the reported

case.

For

2. Requisites of Complaint, etc. the formal parts of a complaint, petition or declaration in a particular juris

diction consult the titles COMPLAINTS, vol. 4, p. 1019; DECLARATIONS, vol. 6, P. 244.

For statutes relating to civil liability of third person for enticing servant from master's employ see as follows, to wit:

Form No. 13571.1

(Title of court and cause as in Form No. 6942.)

And the plaintiff says that on the first day of June, 1899, one Joseph Hunt was the servant of said plaintiff, and as such servant then lived and resided with said plaintiff, his master, yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises aforesaid, wrongfully and without the license and consent and against the will of said plaintiff, persuaded, procured and enticed the said Joseph Hunt, then being the servant of said plaintiff, to absent himself and depart from the service of said plaintiff, on pretext and by means of which said persuasion, procuration and enticement, he the said Joseph Hunt, the servant of said plaintiff, on the day and date late aforesaid, without the license and against the will and consent of said plaintiff, wrongfully absented himself and departed from said service and still continues so to do. Jeremiah Mason, Attorney for Plaintiff.

(3) FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO SERVANT.2

Form No. 13572.3

(Commencing as in Form No. 6934.) For that whereas, before and at the time hereinafter mentioned, one John Goss was, and from thence hitherto has continued and still is the servant and traveler of the plaintiffs, and that said John Goss, on the first day of May, 1840, was possessed of a certain phaeton and a certain horse then drawing the same, and in which phaeton the said John Goss was driving along the highway, and the said defendant was also then possessed of a gig and horse then under his care and management, proceeding along the said highway, and that said defendant was carelessly, negligently, and improperly driving his said gig and horse, and that by the carelessness, negligence and improper driving of the said defendant, the said gig then ran and struck with great violence against the said phaeton, and thereby said John Goss was thrown with great violence out of his said phaeton upon the ground, and by means of the premises, the said John Goss was then and there greatly bruised, and became and was sick, disabled, and unfit to attend to the necessary business of the plaintiffs, about which he was employed at the time, and so remained from thence hitherto, and during all of which time, by reason of the premises, the said plaintiffs lost the services of the said John Goss and all advantage which otherwise would have

North Carolina. Code (1883), § 3119. vant after such notice.
Tennessee. Code (1896), §§ 4337,

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4338.
Knowledge of Relation. — In an action
for enticing, employing or harboring
the servant of another, it is a material
and necessary allegation that the de-
fendant knew, at the time of enticing,
harboring or employing, that the party
enticed away, harbored or employed
was the servant of the plaintiff, or that
he afterward had notice thereof, and
continued to employ or harbor the ser-

Ferguson v. Tucker, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 182; Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 249.

1. See, generally, supra, note 2, 4. 2. See Mills' Anno. Stat. Colo. (1891), § 1513; 2 Ga. Code (1895), § 3816.

3. This form is in substance the declaration in Martinez v. Gerber, 3 M. & G. 88, 42 E. C. L. 55, in which case it was held that the declaration was sufficient without stating that the servant was hired or that he was to receive a salary.

accrued to them from such services; and also by reason thereof, the said plaintiffs were obliged to employ, and did necessarily employ, one Charles Gassiot during the period aforesaid as their traveler and servant instead of the said John Goss, and became liable to pay, and did afterward, to wit, on the first day of December, 1840, necessarily pay to said Charles Gassiot a large sum of money, to wit, £200, for the expenses and wages of the said Charles Gassiot as such traveler and servant during the period aforesaid, to the damage (concluding as in Form No. 6934).

2. By Servant.

a. Against Master.

(1) FOR FAILURE TO EMPLOY.
Form No. 13573.

(Conn. Prac. Act, p. 121, No. 196.)

(Commencing as in Form No. 5912.)

1. On April 1st, 1878, the plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff should serve the defendant as an accountant, and that the defendant should employ the plaintiff as such, for one year and pay him for his services $120 a month.

2. On April 2d, 1878, the plaintiff offered to enter upon the service of the defendant, and has ever since been ready and willing so to do. 3. The defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to enter upon such service, or to pay him anything under said contract. The plaintiff claims $1,000 damages. (Concluding as in Form No. 5912.)

Form No. 13574.

(Precedent in Noble v. Ames Mfg. Co., 112 Mass. 492.)1 [(Title of court and cause as in Form No. 6942.)]2

And the plaintiff says that he is a machinist of great skill and long experience; that he was employed in business at Wailuku in the Sandwich Islands; that the defendant engaged him to abandon his said business and leave Wailuku and come to said Chicopee to take the position of a foreman in the employment and in the manufacturing establishment of the defendant as soon as he, said plaintiff, should reach Chicopee; that he, the plaintiff, in consequence of such engagement and by agreement with the defendant for such position as foreman at a good salary, did abandon his said business and come to Chicopee, and offered himself to the defendant ready to take the position as agreed upon, but the defendant utterly refused to employ him and would not receive him but turned him away, whereby the plaintiff lost much valuable time, was put to great expense and lost his business, which was of great value and profit to him. [(Signature as in Form No. 6942.)]2

1. In this case the court instructed the jury that plaintiff could recover as items of damage his expenses in coming from the Sandwich Islands and compensation for the time consumed in his

journey. The supreme court held that this instruction was erroneous and sustained defendant's exceptions.

2. The matter to be supplied within [] will not be found in the reported case.

(2) FOR PERSONAL INJURIES.

(a) Notice to Employer.

Form No. 13575.

(Precedent in Dolan v. Alley, 153 Mass. 381.)1

[To Messrs. John S. Alley & Co. ]2

Please take notice that Charles Dolan, of Ayer, Mass., while at work in your employ was injured on the twelfth day of March, a. D. 1888, in the leach-room of your tannery at Ayer, Mass., by reason of the falling in of the roof thereof and the falling of the steam-pipes therein, said roof and said steam-pipes both falling upon said Dolan. Corcoran and Parker, Attorneys for Charles Dolan.3

[Dated the twenty-eighth day of March, 1888.]2

(b) Complaint, Declaration or Petition.

1. Massachusetts.-Stat. (1887), c. 270, §3, as amended Stat. (1892), c. 260.

Objection was made to this notice on the ground that it was not signed by plaintiff, but the court held that it purported to be signed "in behalf" of plaintiff, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, sufficiently shows that it was signed by those having authority.

Precedent.-In Donahoe v. Old Colony R. Co., 153 Mass. 356, the notice was held sufficient. It was in the following words and figures, to wit:

"The Old Colony Railroad Company is hereby notified that on the fifteenth day of October, 1888, when within one hundred yards northerly from the railroad station at Readville, Mass., on that part of the said Old Colony Railroad Company formerly known as the Boston and Providence Railroad Company, I was injured by my right leg being caught between a dump car and tender of an engine, I, at the time, standing on the dump car, which was the first car of a train of cars to which said tender of said engine was attached. Said injury was caused by reason of a broken draw-bar on the dump car, which allowed the dollyvarden on the tender of the engine to run up against the end of the dump car, and which caught and injured my leg. This notice is given under the provisions of chapter 270 of the Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts of the year 1887, and of chapter 155 of said Acts of the year 1888."

2. The matter enclosed by [] will not be found in the reported case.

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Indiana. Horner's Stat. (1896), § 5206s.

It

Iowa. - Code (1897), § 2071. Massachusetts. Stat. (1887), c. 270, as amended Stat. (1888), c. 155, Stat. (1892), c. 260, Stat. (1893), c. 359, Stat. (1894), c. 499, Stat. (1897), c. 491. Minnesota. - Stat. (1894), § 2701. Relation of Master and Servant. must be alleged that the relation of master and servant existed. Whalan v. Whipple, (R. I. 1887) 13 Atl. Rep. 107; Di Marcho v. Builders Iron Foundry, 18 R. I. 514. And this is not sufficiently shown by alleging that plaintiff was employed by defendant's agents and servants. Whalan v. Whipple, (R. I. 1887) 13 Atl. Rep. 107. But an averment that defendant was a railroad company engaged in operating a railroad and that plaintiff was then in its service as a switchman, and while in the actual discharge of his duties, etc.,

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aa. IN GENERAL.

is sufficient. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240.

Negligence of Defendant- Generally. -The complaint must show by necessary inference or direct allegation that the injuries were the result of the defendant's negligence. Peerless Stone Co. v. Wray, 10 Ind. App. 324; Torongo v. Salliotte, 99 Mich. 41; Cox v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R. I. 199. And negligence in reference to the particular matter causing the injury must be alleged. Walsh v. Western R. Co., 34 Fla. 1; Helfrich v. Williams, 84 Ind. 553; Knahlta v. Oregon Short Line, etc., R. Co., 21 Oregon 136. Thus, where plaintiff seeks to make the negligence of the master in not selecting competent servants the basis of his liability, the negligence must be distinctly set forth in the complaint or declaration. Slattery v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 23 Ind. 81; Dow v.,Kansas Pac. R. Co., 8 Kan. 642; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Milliken, 8 Kan. 647; Blake v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 70 Me. 60; Lawler v. Androscoggin R. Co., 62 Me. 463. And a mere allegation that the defendant allowed an employee to neglect his duties, without alleging facts showing how or wherein, is insufficient to charge defendant. Moss v. Pacific R. Co., 49 Mo. 167. And where the complaint alleges that the injuries were caused by defective appliances, it must allege that the defects arose from the negligence of defendant or some person entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the machinery was in proper condition, and an averment that defendant knew of the defect or might have known it by the exercise of reasonable diligence is insufficient. Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson, 94 Ala. 143.

A general allegation of negligence in the performance of or in failing to perform a duty which the law casts upon the defendant, resulting in injury to the plaintiff without his fault, is sufficient to withstand a demurrer. Hammond v. Schweitzer, 112 Ind. 246. And is sufficient unless the facts specially pleaded show the contrary. Pennsylvania Co. v. Witte, 15 Ind. App. 583. But a mere averment that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence does not show actionable negligence on the defendant's part. Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Young, 117 Ind. 520.

Names of Defendant's Agents.

Where a petition alleges negligence of a corporation, it need not name the agents who are negligent. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. George, 85 Tex. 150; Cramer v. Union Pac. R. Co., 3 Utah 504. So where the complaint alleges that the defect might have been discovered but for the negligence of defendants or some person in their service entrusted therein with the duty of supervising the machinery, it need not state the name of the person so entrusted. McNamara v. Logan, 100 Ala. 187. And the plaintiff need not state in his complaint the names of the officers or officer of the defendant corporation through whom he expects to bring notice to the defendant of the negligent habits of the engineer in charge of the train upon which plaintiff was injured. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Stupak, 123 Ind. 210.

Immaterial Error. - An allegation that "the said defendant, wholly disregarding its duty to this defendant in that behalf did furnish," etc., is good after verdict, it being apparent that the second use of the word "defendant was a clerical mistake. Johnson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 96 Mo. 340.

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Negativing Contributory Negligence. — In some states it is not necessary to negative contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. George, 94 Ala. 199; Magee v. North Pac. Coast R. Co., 78 Cal. 430; Young v. Shickle, etc., Iron Co., 103 Mo. 324; Williams v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 109 Mo. 475; Johnston v. Oregon Short Line, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 94; Richmond Granite Co. v. Bailey, 92 Va. 554. While in others plaintiff must negative contributory negligence. Torongo v. Salliotte, 99 Mich. 41; Mad River, etc., R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541. But a general allegation of want of contributory negligence is sufficient unless facts specially pleaded show to the contrary. Pennsylvania Co. v. Witte, 15 Ind. App. 583; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Darling, 130 Ind. 376; Spencer v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 130 Ind. 181.

An allegation that plaintiff was "in the prudent and careful discharge of the duties of his employment is a sufficient allegation that plaintiff was without fault. Henry v. Fitchburg R. Co., 65 Vt. 436.

Incompetent Coemployees

Master's

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