CRS-32 a "family" account or "private", individual account. The mere granting of this option might not, however, be sufficient to prevent one of the greatest difficulties which has yet arisen concerning the ability of a separated, divorced or widowed women in obtaining credit, i.e., she has never taken credit out in her own name. It might be argued that a better statute would be one which required that a credit account be based solely on the basis of the income of the individual applying, such that, upon filling out a certain form, auxiliary or supplementary cards can be issued to anyone. If, however, neither spouse's income taken separately would qualify them for credit, the ability of the creditor to "consider the financial status of a married couple" does not prevent him (or her) from considering only a portion of the wife's income or from taking other sex-discrimination factors into consideration such as whether the wife is of childbearing age. Strictly speaking, this will not be a denial of credit solely on the basis of the prohibited criteria but rather the "family unit" will be discriminated against by not giving the same credence to the joint income of two married people as it would if a business partnership of two people were to apply for a card. Thus, it could be argued that the fact the female spouse's income is not given its full weight is not discrimination against "a person" on the sole basis of sex or marital status, within the terms of the statute, because (1) the account is not for a "person" but for a "family" and (2) a "family" income of two spouses cannot be treated the same as a business income of a two-person partnership because the purpose of the latter is to make money which will increase its creditworthiness whereas a unique by-product of the former is reproduction of the species, a process which does not enhance its credit CRS-33 worthiness but rather operates to diminish it as its liabilities increase. These arguments are, of course, mere extrapolations of possible developments; the exact application and scope that will be given to this law depends, as has been said before, on the interpretation given to them by creditors, on active litigation by complainants and on the court's ultimate construction of their provisions. Maryland Maryland's statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex reads as follows: Sec. 128(e). No seller may discriminate against any installment buyer because of the sex or marital status of the buyer. Sec. 153(b)(1). A retail credit account Sec. 153C(2). Any application, question- Md. Ann. Code art. 83, §§128(e), 153(b)(1),(Supp. 1973). Several deficiencies are readily apparent. The law applies to only retail credit accounts, a victim of credit discrimination might possibly persuade a court to give the provision prohibiting discrimination a broader interpretation by liberally construing the meaning of a "retail credit account;" yet, given the general CRS-34 wording of the statute and its explicit application to retail credit accounts, it is not very likely such an argument would succeed. It is quite interesting, though, to note that subsection (2) in no way, form, or fashion prevents an investigation into the "sex or marital status" of an individual though pursuit of information regarding one's race, creed, color, or national origin is strictly forbidden. The fact that the statute protects persons "wishing to establish a retail credit account" would not appear to readily prevent a seller or financial institution from terminating, for example, a woman's account upon marriage. As for enforcement of the Maryland law, the statute provides as follows in Art. 83, §153F: (a) Whenever a seller or holder shall violate (b) The Commissioner of Small Loans shall (c) If, after a hearing held in accordance with CRS-35 Hence, the Maryland law--unlike most of the other state statutes--provides in the above section and those referred to therein an elaborate system of enforcement though a commission. Under $163 Any person who violates or participates in the violation of any provision of this subtitle ... shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not more than six (6) months or both, in the discretion of the court. This provision, then, only makes discrimination a criminal offense and does not provide for a private cause of action nor for court costs and attorney fees. The effectiveness of this system in regards to credit discrimination perhaps needs to prove itself empirically in so far as the general tenor of the enforcement provision is perhaps unsuited for the type of injury incurred by a refusal to grant credit or a loan on grounds of sex or marital status. The possible awkwardness of a commission handling these complaints without a complainant being able to resort to private action, plus the limited scope of the statute all lead one to think of it as a weak law of marginal potential. Massachusetts Like most of the other States with statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in the granting of credit, Massachuetts passed a law just this past year proscribing this business practice. The essence of the Massa chusetts statute is to amend the law prohibiting discrimination against race, color, religious creed, national origin or ancestry such that it includes an additional subsection which provides as follows: It shall be an unlawful practice: *** 14. For any person furnishing credit or services CRS-36 to deny or terminate such credit or services or CCH Massachusetts Regular Session, 1973, New Laws, p. 137 (Chapter 168, approved April 11, 1973). This statute largely contains attributes previously discussed in the context of other state laws. It is interesting, however, to note that the law includes a prohibition on terminating or adversely affecting one's credit. Though it is questionable whether these words are not redundant in so far as the termination of one's account is arguably a denial of credit in the ordinary use of the terms, it is quite possible that these provisions were pointed at the problem confronted by newly married women. Upon informing the store of their new names and addresses, their accounts have been known to be terminated. This was what happened, at least, to Sonia Pressman Fuentes, a practicing attorney for over 15 years. Upon informing various stores that she had changed her name, she received two categories of responses: first, one group issued her a new card in the name of her husband Roberto Fuentes, while the second group refused to issue her a new card until she submitteda new application with information regarding her husband's income as well as his signature. (S. P. Fuentes, Unpublished Statement before the National Commission on Consumer Finance, House Banking and Currency Committee, May 22, 1972). Since Ms. Fuentes continued to work and receive the same salary as before--the only thing being different was the fact of her marriage and her encumbent name change--there is certainly a strong agrument that this type of discrimination would readily come within the wording of a statute like that of the State of Massachusetts. Another starte like that of Massachusetts may prevent is problein which a |