at the rate of 50 per cent. ad valorem thereon as "manufactures of * * * rock crystal * not specially provided for," under the provisions of paragraph 115 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, (chapter 11, § 1, Schedule B, 30 Stat. 159 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1636]). The importers protested, insiting that the intaglios were dutiable at 10 per cent. ad valorem as "precious stones, advanced in condition or value from their natural state by cutting or other process, and not set," under the provisions of paragraph 435, Schedule N, 30 Stat. 192 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1676]. * It appears from the testimony and the return of the assistant appraiser that while the natural rock crystal itself is not particularly expensive, these completed intaglios unset cost as high as $13 to $15 each, and that this cost is due to the fact that the ornamentation is done with an engraving tool in an expensive manner. They are used for jewelry purposes only. That rock crystals are commercially known as precious stones appears from the decision of this court in Hahn v. United States, 100 Fed. 635, 40 C. C. A. 622. The fact that these unset precious stones have been advanced in value by "being cut and ornamented with various designs in an expensive manner" brings them specifically within the provisions of paragraph 435, regardless of the subsequent advancement in value by painting. They, therefore, were not dutiable as manufactures of rock crystal not specifically proIvided for under the act. The decision of the court below is affirmed. SCOTT et al. v. FISHER KNITTING MACH. CO. et al. SAME v. REGAL et al. SAME v. SEAL BACK UNDERWEAR CO. et al. Nos. 163-166. PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT-KNITTING MACHINES. The Bellis patent, No. 561,559, for a knitting machine capable of producing loops on a ribbed fabric adapted to be fleeced, is one of primary character, covering a meritorious invention, and entitled to a broad construction, and is infringed by the machine of the Fisher patent, No. 656,535. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New York. This cause comes here upon appeal from a decree dismissing bill charging infringement of claims 1, 3, 6, and 7 of complainants' patent No. 561,559, granted to David C. Bellis June 9, 1896, for a knitting machine. For opinion below, see 139 Fed. 137. Hubert Howson and Charles Howson, for appellants. Charles Neave and Alfred Wilkinson, for appellees. Before LACOMBE, TOWNSEND, and COXE. Circuit Judges. TOWNSEND, Circuit Judge. The art discussed herein relates to knitted fabrics and the machines by which they are produced. The patent in suit covers a machine for producing a heavy knit material, capable of use in making winter undergarments. Its construction is fully explained in the opinion of the court below. 139 Fed. 137. The claims in suit are as follows: "(1) A knitting machine having two sets of needles and cams therefor for producing ribbed fabrics, jacks or loopers, cams and a bed therefor, operated by the driving mechanism of said machine to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles, substantially as and for the purposes set forth. * "(3) A circular knitting machine having two sets of needles, needle-cylinder, cam-cylinder, needle-dial, and cam-dial, together with jacks or loopers operatively mounted in grooves of a jack-bed, fastened to the needle-dial, and cams adapted to operate the said jacks or loopers in conjunction with the said needles, to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles, substantially as and for the purposes set forth. "(6) A circular knitting machine having two sets of needles and means for operating the same, a system of loopers or jacks operated by cams to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles, and means for supplying the said loopers with yarn, substantially as and for the purposes set forth. "(7) In a circular rib knitting machine the combination of two sets of needles, a cylinder, and a dial therefor, a system of loopers or jacks, guided in slots of the said dial, a bed for said loopers or jacks, and means for operating the said needles and loopers, substantially as and for the purposes set forth." Bellis was the first to produce "a fleecing ribber" and the new fabric known as "fleece rib." Machines for producing a fleecy inner face on plain knit fabrics had been known for some 13 years prior to the invention of the patent in suit. Ribbed goods had been fleeced by carding the body threads. But plain knit fabrics were inelastic, and carding the body threads weakened the garment. The demand for a fabric which would obviate these objections is indicated by the commercial success of complainants' and defendants' manufactures. That the construction of a machine capable of producing such a fabric was not obvious appears from the 31 prior patents introduced by defendants, no one of which showed a solution of the problem, and from the inability of defendants' experts to construct from the prior art any practical fleecing ribber, or to satisfactorily indicate how the prior structures could be so adapted as to produce a fleece rib, without radical and substantial modifications, involving the exercise of invention. and by the further very significant facts that the Scott patents, Nos. 517,788 and 577,789, for rib knitting machines, applied for prior to the issue of the Bellis patent, proceeded upon a theory, and were constructed upon a plan, radically different from the suggestions furnished by the prior art as testified to by defendants' experts, and that, after the Bellis disclosures, Scott abandoned his former construction, followed Bellis, and finally secured a half interest in the Bellis patent. The only prior limiting machine material to this discussion is that of the Cooper & Ford, British Patent No. 172, of 1887. But this was a plain nonribbing knitter, provided with loopers, and if the second • set of needles be added thereto in order to make a ribbed fabric, it would not operate as a looper at all. The solution of the problem is not accomplished by the introduction of another set of knitting needles into said Cooper & Ford or the prior Sturgess & Hearth machines, because in each of them, as is admitted by defendants' expert: "The stretches of supplemental thread which would be exposed on the unribbed fabric would be imbedded and inwrapped within the fabric when made ribbed by the addition of a second set of needles." Nor is the solution of the problem furthered by the ribbed fabric. machines of the prior art. The closest of them (that of Lecaisne, of 1892), which laid an extra thread in the fabric, need not be discussed, because it was not enumerated by defendants' expert in his list of 10 specially pertinent patents, because it is not a looper, and furnishes no suggestion of means for making loops, and because Cooper & Ford in the second patent, chiefly relied on by defendants, abandoned Lecaisne in order to produce a looper. This, therefore, is a case where, so far as concerns machines for making the new fabric, there is no prior art, and, so far as concerns machines for making the old fabrics, they apparently, at most, failed to furnish any suggestion of adaptation to the new purpose, but, as complainants claim, and there is some evidence to support the claim, their construction would tend to lead the inventor away from, rather than toward, the right path for the attainment of the object sought. The arguments directed to a limitation of the scope of the patent in suit consist, first, in the following criticisms of its language, in connection with that of Bellis' fabric patent, No. 561,559. His object was to construct "a machine which is capable of producing a ribbed knit fabric with backing," described in his patent there for, consisting of "a two-ply rib knit webbing," or provided with "a backing on the ribbed knit fabric, which may be of a different material from that of which the body of the fabric is composed," to be introduced "while the latter is being produced." The result, the production of a "ribbed knit fabric with backing," was accomplished by means of "jacks or loopers operated to act in conjunction with the needles to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes composing the body of the ribbed fabric." "But to produce a backing on such fabric while the latter is being produced devices must be provided which bring the backing or supplemental thread from the inside of the machine over the needles at certain and predetermined intervals, so that it may be interlaced with the meshes of the fabric as will be hereinafter more fully described," and the jacks must rise to push the thread "over a needle, to be interlaced with a mesh formed by such needle." There is no statement in the patent that its object was to construct a machine capable of producing loops to be fleeced. It is admitted that the machine of the patent in suit makes a fabric described in the Bellis fabric patent as one which can be finished in one operation, and that when so finished it is a completed article, with a substantial backing before it is fleeced, while defendants' fabric has only floating loops for its backing, and is not a completed article until it has been fleeced. It is further admitted that there are substantial differences in the construction and operation of the two machines, and that the construction of defendants' machine follows in certain details the machines of the prior art. In the light of these facts we are brought to a consideration of the status and scope of the patent in suit and of the single issue in the case that of infringement. The criticisms upon the language of the patent itself will first be considered. * * It is objected that there is no reference in the specification to the fact that the object of the invention was to produce a fabric capable of being fleeced. But it is well settled that the patentee is not obliged to state all the objects of his invention, and that he is protected in all the beneficial uses thereof within its scope; and here no statement as to fleecing was necessary, because the patent in suit concerned only a new "improved ribbed knit fabric, produced and finished in one operation" (patent No. 561,558) on the patented machine. Whether it should thereafter be used as thus finished, or subjected to a new operation for fleecing, was immaterial. Furthermore, such a construction for fleecing was old in plain knit goods. There is no evidence that the fabric was ever practically used for any other purpose, and the uncontradicted testimony is that this was the sole purpose to which the invention related. The references to making the backing of different material are criticised by defendants as referring merely to a double-faced material. But such references might equally well suggest a fabric adapted for fleecing, such as a cotton body with a fleece lining of wool. It is contended that while the stated object of the invention in suit was such that the "extra thread is tightly interlaced with the loops," etc., ..* * * whereas Fisher's [defendants'] extra thread is not interlaced, is not secured to the main fabric at all," etc. But the Fisher patent specifically describes means "to engage with an extra thread and secure it on one surface of the fabric, forming floating loops," and explains how said loops are "caught on the inside of the fabric by the loops of the main thread." Whether the defendants' thread is not in fact interlaced will be discussed later. Much stress is laid on the language quoted above which indicates that the supplemental thread must be brought "from the inside of the machine over the needles," etc. But a reference to the specification shows that this statement was made in the course of a description by the patentee of the specific machine illustrated in the drawings, and that such limitation is nowhere else found, except in claim 5, not here in suit, but which covers this specific construction. But it is argued that, as Bellis insists that however his machine be modified it must be "provided with jacks or similar devices to bring a thread over a needle to be interlaced with a mesh formed by such needle" and as defendants do not thus manipulate their thread, and do not interlace the loop in the body of the fabric, they do not infringe. The differences in the operation of the two machines and in the construction of the loop are fairly shown by the following diagrams and citations from complainants' brief: |