report to each other violations of such rule, and not to employ any person thus reported. But an employee was held to have a right of action for a wrongful report.

As to liability for libeling former employee, also as to sufficiency of statement of cause of action for preventing him from obtaining employment or retaining it when secured, see Wabash R. R. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102; 69 N. E. 1003; 4 L. R. A. N. S. 1091 (1904). See also, as to liability for libeling former employee, Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Ely, 83 Miss. 519; 35 So. 873 (1904); Sheftall v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 589; 51 S. E. 646 (1905).

In Bacon v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 66 Mich. 166; 33 N. W. 181 (1887), a communication from a subordinate to a superior official of a railroad corporation, to the effect that an employee had been discharged for stealing, was held privileged, but held also that the question of good faith in making such communication should have been left

to the jury. So in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 73 Tex. 568; 11 S. W. 555; 4 L. R. A. 280; 15 Am. St. Rep. 794 (1889), was held privileged the publication, for its own use, by a railroad corporation having many thousand employees, of a "discharge list" containing statements of the causes of the discharge of employees, such alleged cause in the case under consideration being carelessness. To similar effect, Hunt v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 Q. B. (1891) 189.

In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107; 21

S. W. 384 (1893), the situation was similar to that involved in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Richmond, but here there was held to be evidence of malice sufficient to create a liability for the publication.

In Willner v. Silverman, 71 Atl. 962 (Ct. App. Md., 1909), an employer was held liable to a discharged employee for writing a letter to an association of such employers, one of the rules of which was that an employee discharged by one member should be refused employment by all the others. Such letter contained a request that he be "refused employment in all association houses in which he may ap ply for a position." Such letter, which was circulated among the members of the association, was said by the court not to state the facts of the case with entire accuracy, and to furnish some evidence of malice on the part of the writer.

See, on the general subject, article in 42 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 802 (1903) by R. S. Holland.

As to injunction against blacklisting, see § 105.

The following are instances of statutes imposing civil or criminal liability (in some instances both) for blacklisting: Ala. Crim. Code (1907), §§ 6398-9; Ark. L., 1905, c. 214; Colo. R. S. (1908), §§ 396, 397, 401, 402; Conn. G. S. (1902), § 1298; Fla. R. S. (1906), § 2854; Ga. Penal Code (1895), §§ 128-134; Civil Code (1895), §§ 1873-8; Ill. R. S. (Starr & Curtis' Ed., 1896), c. 38, § 96; Ind. Stat. (Burns' Ed., 1908), §§ 8007-8 (and see § 8009); Iowa Code (1897), §§ 5027-8; Kan.

G. S. (Dassler's Ed., 1905), §§ 40269); Minn. R. L. (1905), § 5097; Miss. L. 1908, c. 93 (applicable to telegraphers); Mo. R. S. (1906), § 2166; Mont. Rev. Codes (1907), §§ 1755-7 (see also § 8467); Nev. L. 1905, c. 150; N. D. Rev. Codes (1905), § 8773 (see also Const., § 212); Okla. Stat. (1903), §§ 26589); Oreg. L. 1903, p. 137; Tex. L. 1901, c. 99; L. 1907, c. 67; Utah Comp. Laws (1907), §§ 1340, 1341 (see Const., art. 12, § 19; art. 16, § 4); Va. Code (1904), § 3657c; Wash. L. 1899, c. 23; Wis. Stat. (1898), § 4466b; act of Congress of June 1, 1898 (30 Stat. L. 428, § 10, relating to carriers engaged in interstate commerce).

By Minn. R. L. (1905), § 1822, it is unlawful to "contrive or conspire to prevent any person from obtaining or holding any employment, or discharge, or procure or attempt to procure the discharge of, any person from employment, by reason of his having engaged in a strike."

By Colo. R. S. (1908), § 401, is excepted the case of a former employer or employee "imparting a fair and unbiased opinion of a workman's or employer's qualifications when solicited so to do, by a later or prospective employer of such workman, or employee." So by Nev. L. 1905, c. 150, supra, is excepted giving in writing on application from a discharged employee, or one desiring to employ him, a truthful statement of the reason for discharge, such statement not to be used as the cause of an action for libel.

In Wabash R. R. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102; 69 N. E. 1003; 4 L. R. A. N. S. 1091 (1904) Ind. Stat. (Burns' Ed., 1908), § 8008, supra, was on constitutional grounds held inapplicable to an employee voluntarily leaving his employment.

By Tex. L. 1901, c. 99, § 4, supra, "he is guilty of blacklisting who places or causes to be placed, the name of any discharged employee, or any employee who has voluntarily left the service of any individual, firm, company or corporation on any book or list, or publishes it in any newspaper, periodical, letter or circular, with the intent to prevent said employees from securing employment of any kind with any other person, firm, corporation or company, either in a public or private capacity." See also § 7, for prohibitions against interference with employment.

In State ex rel. v. Justus, 85 Minn. 279; 88 N. W. 759; 56 L. R. A. 757; 89 Am. St. Rep. 550 (1902) Minn. L. 1895, C. 174 (now § 5097, supra), was sustained against the objection that the subject was not expressed in the title; that the act was class legislation; that the natural rights of employees were violated, the court saying: "It is the purpose of this law to protect employees in the enjoyment of those natural rights and privileges guaranteed them by the constitution, viz., the right to sell their labor and acquire property thereby."

18 Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411; 34 S.

E. 216 (1899), where, though the act in question was called "blacklisting," it seems rather referable to the class of cases considered in § 21, involving the action of a body of tradesmen in protecting themselves against delinquent debtors.

19 Thus, in Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420, 430; 28 Atl. 190, 193; 23 L. R. A. 135, 138; 39 Am. St. Rep. 686 (1894), an action by a dealer in building materials was held not to lie against an association of persons engaged in the business of contracting and building, for inducing dealers in building materials not to sell to the plaintiff. The ground of this action of the association was that the plaintiff had conceded the demands of workmen engaged in a general strike in the building trades. The court, considering it necessary to show the legality of the relation, after drawing a distinction between the rate of wages as fixed by the law of supply and demand in the absence of combination, and the rate as fixed by a combination of workmen, justified the defendants' acts on the ground thus stated: "The combination of the employers was not to interfere with the price of labor as deter

mined by the common-law theory, but to defend themselves against a demand made altogether regardless of the price as regulated by the supply." To similar effect is Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. St. 433; 28 Atl. 195 (1894).

On the other hand, in Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 88 Fed. 873 (C. C. Nev., 1898), it was held actionable to induce the defendants' employees to refuse to deal with the plaintiff, by means of a published notice stating that the plaintiff "entertained feelings of animosity" for the defendants, that "his actions had tended to interfere with their business," that "his expressed intentions were to hinder and embarrass them still further," that "his interests are so antagonistic to ours-his purpose is so manifestly hostile that those who favor him cannot complain if we consider them as equally unfriendly to us." Otherwise what was the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant does not appear. Further decision to the same effect in 96 Fed. 681 (C. C. Nev., 1899). Affirmed as Hanchett V. Chiatovich, 101 Fed. 742; 41 C. C. A. 648 (9th C., 1900).

1

1 L. D. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 100, 125; 85 N. E. 897, 904 (1908). As to distinction between "the general relation of employer and employee," and such relation pending a strike or lockout, see Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., infra.

2 This seems, however, to have been clearly understood by Holmes, J., who, in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107; 44 N. E. 1077, 1081; 35 L. R. A. 722, 727; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896), said: "I have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between employers and employ. ed is not competition. But I venture to assume that none of my brethren would rely on that suggestion. If the policy on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term 'free competition,' we may substitute 'free struggle for life. Certainly the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the same class competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal interests." So in Allen v. Flood, App. Cas. (1898), 1, where the court, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the doctrine is confined to mere "acts which are done in furtherance of trade competition," applied it to inducing the discharge of fellow-employees, saying (p. 141): 'Why is not the present case within it? What was

the object of the defendant and the workmen he represented but to assist themselves in their competition with the shipwrights? A man is entitled to take steps to compete to the best advantage in the employment of his labor, and to shut out, if he can, what he regards as unfair competition, just as much as if he was carrying on the business of a shipowner." So it was said by Lord Shand (p. 164): "The case was one of competition in labor, which in my opinion is in all essentials analogous to competition in trade, and to which the same principles must apply." See also p. 167; Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 611; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 189 (1904); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 583; 78 N. E. 753, 758; 6 L. R. A. N. S. 1067, 1078; 116 Am. St. Rep. 272 (1906); Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 98 Pac. 1027, 1038 (Supm. Ct. Cal., 1908); Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908); dissenting opinion of Caldwell, J., in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912, 396; 28 C. C. A. 99, 123 (8th C., 1897).

Rich in suggestion is the article in 19 Law Quart. Rev. 37, 182 (1903) by D. R. Chalmers Hunt. See also articles in 16 Harv. Law Rev. 236 (1902-3) by E. F. McClennen; 20