§ 222a. New Hampshire.33

Neb., 1897), where it was held unconstitutional as interfering with liberty of contract, U. S. v. TransMissouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290; 17 Supm. 540; 41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897), being distinguished as a case of a statute upheld under the commerce clause of the Federal constitution. As to constitutionality of provision of act of 1897 as to attorneys' fee, see Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, supra. As to effect of exemption as to "assemblies or associations of laboring men," see Cleland v. Anderson, supra, where the act was sustained against the objection that it was unconstitutional because of such exemption, but see to the contrary, Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, supra. See § 181; also under Ill. (§ 209); La. (§ 214); Mich. (§ 217); Mont. (§ 221); N. C. (§ 225); Wis. (§ 235).

By L. 1905, c. 162, § 1, "every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this State is hereby declared to be illegal" (under a penalty of a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both). By § 2 "every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce, within this State, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor" (under the same penalty

33 See Const., art. 82, for grant of power to legislature to enact

as under § 1). In State v. Adams Lumber Co., 116 N. W. 302 (Supm. Ct. Neb., 1908), following U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290; 17 Supm. 540; 41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897), this act was held applicable to reasonable as well as unreasonable contracts in restraint of trade, in this case, to a combination among retail dealers in lumber to prevent competition of wholesale dealers in selling directly to consumers. To similar effect under former act, Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252; 92 N. W. 306; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 136 (1902). See Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; 36 N. E. 345; 23 L. R. A. 588 (1894; see § 34), where similar conditions were under consideration.

In Mollyneaux v. Wittenberg, 39 Neb. 547; 58 N. W. 205 (1894), the prohibition of the former act of 1889 against "pools" and "trusts” was held not to apply to an agreement in a deed that the vendee should not use the property described for "hotel purposes for two years."

In Downing v. Lewis, 56 Neb. 386; 76 N. W. 900 (1898); see subsequent decision in 59 Neb. 38; 80 N. W. 261 (1899), the act of 1889 was held inapplicable to the ordinary contract of a vendor not to engage in business of the character of that sold. See under Tex. (§ 232).

By § 3 of the act of 1905 “any property owned under any contract

laws to prevent restrictions upon competition.

or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in the foregoing sections of this act, shall be forfeited to the State." By § 4 an annual statement is required from certain corporations, including a statement of stock owned by such a corporation in other corporations, etc., and of its own stock held by other corporations, etc. By § 5 may be required from a corporation by the attorney-general "any statement he may think fit, in regard to the conduct of its business"; also "a list of all contracts or transactions ... in which it has sold any article of (or?) product or carried any article or product within this State at a rate less than the ordinary market price, of (if?) such article or product had been sold or carried by any other person than the party to such transaction." By § 6 it is a misdemeanor to enter into any contract, combination or conspiracy "for the purpose of drawing (driving?) out of business any other person engaged therein"; so to "for such purpose in the course of such business, sell any article or product at less than its fair market value, or at a less price than it is accustomed to demand or receive therefor in any other place under like conditions; or sell any article upon a condition, contract or understanding that it shall not be sold again by the purchaser, or restrain such sale by the purchaser" (under the same penalty as under § 1). By § 7 "no corporation, joint stock com

pany or other association, shall engage in business within this State, a majority of whose stock is owned by or controlled or held in trust for any manufacturing or other corporation which in the course of its manufacture or production conducts its business or any part thereof, in a manner which would be prohibited by this act, if it were so conducted in the course of such business within this State." By § 8 provision is made for inspection of corporate books, etc. See § 9 as to application of act to officers of corporation; § 11 for prohibition of corporation, etc., twice adjudged to have violated the act, and thereafter violating it, to engage in business. By § 12 the penalty for violation of the act is, in addition to penalty for contempt, the same as under § 1. See § 13 as to personal liability of officers for corporate debts; §§ 14, 15 for prohibition of rebates in transportation by carriers. And by § 15 if any corporation, etc., "shall offer, grant or give any special prices, inducements or advantages for the sale of articles produced, manufactured, owned or controlled by it, to purchasers in any particular locality, in order to restrict or destroy competition in that locality in the sale of such articles, it shall be unlawful thereafter to transport within this State any article owned or controlled by it, or produced or manufactured by it, by whomsoever the same may be owned or controlled." See §§ 16, 17 as to procedure in courts of equity. By § 18 threefold damages

37 L. 1899, c. 690, § 1 (Birdseye's R. S., 3d ed., p. 2405). See article in 4 Columbia Law Rev. 83 (1904) by T. D. Kenneson.

In Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89, 100; 61 N. E. 118, 120; 56 L. R. A. 855, 859 (1901), the act was held to be a substantial continuation of the act of 1897 herein repealed, as to effect of which see Brooklyn Distilling Co. V. Standard Distilling, etc., Co., 120 App. D. 237; 105 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (1907). It was also held in Matter of Davies to apply to combinations already formed, but still maintained and in process of consummation. It was said of the act with reference to its object, that it is "little more than a codification of the common law upon the subject and its validity to this extent is not and cannot be successfully questioned." As to civil liability thereunder, see Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 75 App. D. 145; 77 N. Y. Suppl. 373 (1902).

By L. 1892, c. 688, § 7 (Birdseye's R. S., 3d ed., p. 3410) "no domestic stock corporation and no foreign corporation doing business in this State shall combine with any other corporation or person for the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of competition in any necessary of life." Compare under Ga. (§ 207); Miss. (§ 219); Okla. (§ 228); Tex. (§ 232); Wis. (§ 235); Wyom. (§ 236).

In Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 165 Fed. 945, 958 (C. C. N. Y., 1908), § 7 was applied in holding illegal a combination "in the exclusive control of the business of constructing, repairing, managing, and operating railroads and transporting passengers by railroad between the Bronx and the Battery and intermediate points in the city of New York so as to absolutely exclude competition in that business in that place or territory." Such combination, effected by transfer of stock of competing corporations to a "holding corporation" was held not legalized by § 40 of the Stock Corporation Law conferring upon a corporation general power to hold stock in another. To like effect, Burrows v. Interborough Metropolitan Co., 156 Fed. 389 (C. C. N. Y., 1897). To the contrary, Attorney-General V. Consolidated Gas Co., 124 App. D. 401; 108 N. Y. Suppl. 823 (1908); affirming Re Consolidated Gas Co., 56 Misc. 49; 106 N. Y. Suppl. 407 (1907); Matter of Attorney-General, 125 App. D. 804; 110 N. Y. Suppl. 186 (1908), where, in view of § 40, the combination was held not within the prohibition of § 7. See under Mich. (§ 217); article in 40 Am. Law Rev. 558 (1906) by E. L. Andrews. See also, as to § 7, Alexandria Bay Steamboat Co. v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co., 18 App. D. 527; 45 N. Y. Suppl. 1091 (1897); National Har