for exclusive trade, though legal, considered by itself, may yet Ct., Sp. T., 1899); Blauner v. Williams Co., 36 Misc. 173; 73 N. Y. Suppl. 165 (Supm. Ct., App. T., 1901); Bald Eagle Valley R. R. Co. v. Nittany Valley R. R. Co., 171 Pa. St. 284; 33 Atl. 239; 29 L. R. A. 423; 50 Am. St. Rep. 807 (1895); George v. East Tennessee Coal Co., 15 Lea (Tenn.), 455; 54 Am. Rep. 425 (1885); Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 (1864). See Heimbuecher v. Goff, 119 Ill. App. 373 (1905); Over v. Byram Foundry Co. 37 Ind. App. 452; 77 N. E. 302; 117 Am. St. Rep. 327 (1906); Giles v. Dunbar, 181 Mass. 22; 62 N. E. 985 (1902). See under Tex. (§ 232). As to effect of S. C. Civil Code (1902), § 2845, see Packard v. Byrd, 73 S. C. 1; 51 S. E. 678; 6 L. R. A. N. S. 547 (1905); Walter A. Wood Mowing, etc., Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co., 75 S. C. 378; 55 S. E. 973; 9 L. R. A. N. S. 501 (1905). Agreements for exclusive employment were sustained in Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657 (1846); Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247 (1847); Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544; 46 N. E. 117; 35 L. R. A. 512; 57 Am. St. Rep. 488 (1897); Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 116 Fed. 304; 53 C. C. A. 484; 58 L. R. A. 915 (7th C., 1902). See Kessler v. Chappelle, 73 App. D. 447; 77 N. Y. Suppl. 285 (1902). Compare Morris v. Colman, 18 Vesey, 437 (1812; sustaining agreement with theater proprietors not to write dramatic pieces for any other theater). So even of an agreement to serve for life. Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 273 (1837). By Mass. R. L. (1902), c. 56, § 1; so by Kan. L. 1907, c. 139, it is prohibited under a penalty to "make it a condition of the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, that the purchaser shall not sell or deal in the goods, wares or merchandise of any other person," etc. But this does "not prohibit the appointment of agents or sole agents for the sale of, nor the making of contracts for the exclusive sale of goods, wares or merchandise." In Commonwealth v. Strauss, 188 Mass. 229; 74 N. E. 308 (1905), such prohibition was held not to include offering inducement by way of discount from regular price, to sell seller's goods exclusively. See subsequent decision in 191 Mass. 545; 78 N. E. 136; 11 L. R. A. N. S. 968 (1906), as to what is "exclusive sale." The statute was here sustained against various constitutional objections; and see as to its effect in preventing creation of monopoly. See also L. 1907, c. 469. In Central N. Y. Telephone, etc., Co. v. Averill, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 378 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1907), was held invalid a provision in a contract for telephone service in a hotel, that the corporation furnishing such service should have the exclusive right to place telephones in the hotel. This conclusion was based on a distinction between business of a private and that of a public character. See § 132. Such application of the distinction seems to us of doubtful validity, the restriction not being upon the one engaged in the business of a public character, but upon ne other party to the contract. Relief against such provision was denied in subsequent decision in 129 App. D. 752; 114 N. Y. Suppl. 99 (1909). be illegal as a part of a scheme illegal as in restriction upon competition.95 § 141. Grant by carrier of exclusive privilege.-Owing, it would seem, to a failure to distinguish between the duty of a carrier to the general public, and the right of the carrier to select the instrumentalities to be employed in serving the public, such right of selection has in certain cases been denied.96 But the exercise of such right of selection is a mere incident of the general power of transportation, and is no more open to objection as a monopoly than is the lease or grant of specific property, as the exercise of a power incident to the ownership of such property. Thus it has been said: "There is hardly more objection on the ground of public policy to such a restriction upon a railway company in cases like these, than there would be to a restriction upon a lessor not to allow the subject-matter of the lease to be enjoyed by any one but the lessee during the lease. The privilege, when granted, is hardly capable of other than exclusive enjoyment." 97 95 See Cummings v. Union Blue Stone Co., 164 N. Y. 401; 58 N. E. 525; 52 L. R. A. 262; 79 Am. St. Rep. 655 (1900); Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 App. D. 443; 106 N. Y. Suppl. 115 (1907). This principle seems to have been overlooked in the cases involving the legality of the methods of the "Distilling & Cattle Feeding Company"; see on this point, § 199. Compare under Federal act (see § 194), Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454; 60 C C. A. 290; 64 L. R. A. 689 (8th C., 1903); see also under Ohio (§ 227). For prohibition against arrangements for dealing in particular article, etc., without dealing in "any competing article," see under Mo. (§ 220). 96 See following sections. 97 U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 287; 29 C. C. A. 141, 157; 46 L. R. A. 122, 134 (6th C., 1898); affirmed in 175 U. S. 211; 20 Supm. 96; 44 L. Ed. 136 (1899). In Kates v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636, 646; 34 S. E. 372, 376; 46 L. R. A. 431, 435 (1899), was clearly stated "the distinction which exists between the duty which a railroad company owes to the public and the private right to regulate and control its property." See also Fluker v. Georgia R. R. & Banking Co., 81 Ga. 461; 8 S. E. 529; 2 L. R. A. 843; 12 Am. St. Rep. 328 (1888); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 120 Fed. 215; 57 C. C. A. 362; 61 L. R. A. 140 (7th C., 1903); see subsequent decision in 199 U. S. 279; 26 Supm. 91; 50 L. Ed. 192 (1905). See, on the general subject, article in 20 Harv. Law Rev. 253, 345, 428 (1907) by Jeremiah Smith. § 142. Grant of exclusive privilege of soliciting patronage of passengers. The failure to distinguish between the duty of a carrier to the general public and the right of the carrier to select the instrumentalities to be employed in serving the public, has been conspicuously illustrated in decisions denying the right to grant to a hack proprietor, for instance, the exclusive privilege of soliciting patronage of passengers on the grounds of the carrier, particularly at a railroad station. Such decisions seem, however, clearly against the weight of authority.98 And it has 98 The grant of such a privilege was held void in Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10; 53 N. E. 937; 45 L. R. A. 427; 74 Am. St. Rep. 274 (1899); McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465; 18 S. W. 15 (1892); Palmer Transfer Co. v. Anderson, 115 S. W. 182 (Ct. App. Ky., 1909); Kalamazoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194; 47 N. W. 667; 10 L. R. A. 819; 22 Am. St. Rep. 693 (1890); Montana Union Ry. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419; 24 Pac. 209; 8 L. R. A. 753; 18 Am. St. Rep. 745 (1890). So in Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247; 14 S. W. 106 (1890), under constitutional prohibition against "discrimination in charges or facilities in transportation ... between transportation companies and individuals, or in favor of either." See also Hedding v. Gallagher, infra. As to injunction as remedy against discrimination by carrier against hackman, see Cooper v. De Vall, 81 Ark. 314; 98 S. W. 976; 8 L. R. A. N. S. 1027 (1906). But such a grant was sustained in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 120 Fed. 215; 57 C. C. A. 362; 61 L. R. A. 140 (7th C., 1903); 199 U. S. 279; 26 Supm. 91; 50 L. Ed. 192 (1905); Union Depot & Ry. Co. v. Meeking, 42 Colo. 89; 94 Pac. 16 (1908); N. Y., New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136; 41 Atl. 246; 42 L. R. A. 157; 71 Am. St. Rep. 159 (1898); Kates v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636; 34 S. E. 372; 46 L. R. A. 431 (1899); Hart v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 754; 58 S. E. 452 (1907); Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35; 17 N. E. 89; 9 Am. St. Rep. 661 (1888); Boston & Albany R. R. Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65; 58 N. E. 189; 52 L. R. A. 418 (1900); Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230; 58 N. E. 689; 83 Am. St. Rep. 275 (1900); Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377; 57 Atl. 225; 64 L. R. A. 811 (1903); overruling, it seems, previous decision in 69 N. H. 650; 45 Atl. 96; 76 Am. St. Rep. 204 (1899); Brown v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Hun, 355; 27 N. Y. Suppl. 69 (1894); N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Warren, 31 Misc. 571; 64 N. Y. Suppl. 781 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1900); State ex rel. v. Union Depot Co., 71 Ohio St. 379; 73 N. E. 633; 68 L. R. A. 792 (1905); Snyder v. Union Depot Co., 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 368 (Franklin C. C., 1899); Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Davidson, 33 Utah, 370; 94 Pac. 10; 16 L. R. A. N. S. 777 (1908). So been said: 99 "We find that the courts have gone no further than to prevent discrimination in granting privileges at the point where the contractual relations between the company and the passengers cease; that is, at the station yard or platform where passengers enter and leave the premises. No case has been brought to our attention where an attempt has been made to apply the rule within a depot, where the general business is transacted between a common carrier and its patrons." § 143. Grant of exclusive privilege to connecting carrier.— The failure to distinguish, just alluded to, is also illustrated in decisions denying the right of a carrier to select the means of transportation as between connecting carriers.1 in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Old Dominion Baggage Co., 99 Va. 111; 37 S. E. 784; 50 L. R. A. 722 (1901), notwithstanding prohibition taken from English statute against carrier giving "undue preference." See English decisions to the same effect here cited. And so of grant of privilege of soliciting transfer business on train. Lewis v. Weatherford, etc., Ry. Co., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 48; 81 S. W. 111 (1904; so held notwithstanding prohibition of anti-trust act; see § 232). As to N. Y. statute (L. 1890, c. 565) forbidding preferences by railroad company as between carriers transacting business on its premises, see N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Flynn, 74 Hun, 124; 26 N. Y. Suppl. 859 (1893); N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sheeley, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 185 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1893); N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Warren, supra. Municipal ordinances prohibiting the soliciting of the patronage of passengers on railroad premises were sustained in City of Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424; 97 Pac. 454 (1908); Moerder v. City of Fre mont, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 394 (1899). See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 122 Mass. 60 (1877); City of St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364; 38 Am. Rep. 296 (1880). Compare as to validity of ordinance providing for establishment of hack stands in proximity to railroad premises, Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chicago, 181 Ill. 289; 54 N. E. 825; 53 L. R. A. 223 (1899). In N. Y., N. H., etc., R. R. Co. v. Bork, 23 R. I. 218; 49 Atl. 965 (1901), where an action of trespass for remaining and soliciting traffic as a hackman at a railroad station was held to lie, the validity of the grant to another of the exclusive right to solicit traffic at such station was held not involved. 99 Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188; 81 N. W. 835; 47 L. R. A. 532 (1900), where a grant of the exclusive privilege of soliciting the patronage of passengers within a depot building and train sheds attached, was sustained. See, on the general subject, article in 20 Harv. Law Rev. 253, 345, 428 (1907) by Jeremiah Smith. 1 Thus of privilege to connecting steamboat company. Indian River § 144. Grant by carrier of exclusive privilege of transportation.-Closely analogous to the decisions just considered are those denying the right of a carrier to select an agency for the purpose of exclusive transportation over its own line; thus an express company for the purpose of exclusively transporting express matter.2 Such decisions seem, however, against the weight of authority. Steamboat Co. v. East Coast Transp. Co., 28 Fla. 387; 10 So. 480; 29 Am. St. Rep. 258 (1891). See also as to discrimination between connecting railroads, Prescott & Arizona Central R. R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co., 73 Fed. 438 (C. C. N. Y., 1896); Post v. Railroad, 103 Tenn. 184; 52 S. W. 301; 55 L. R. A. 481 (1899). See under Federal act, § 182. In Alexandria Bay Steamboat Co. v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co., 18 App. D. 527; 45 N. Y. Suppl. 1091 (1897), an arrangement by a railroad company with one of two competing steamboat companies connecting with it at its terminus, by which one of such companies was given the advantage over the other in transportation, was sustained as legal, notwithstanding the prohibition of L. 1890, c. 564; L. 1892, c. 688, against combinations of corporations to prevent competition. So in Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 73 Mo. 389, 410; 39 Am. Rep. 519, 523 (1881), was sustained an agreement by a railroad company to employ but one ferry at a given point. See as to agreement giving elevator exclusive right to handle grain transported over railroad, Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 191, 201 (1868). 2 Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24 Pa. St. 378; 64 Am. Dec. 667 (1855); New England Express Co. v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 57 Me. 188, 196 (1869). 3 In the Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1; 6 Supm. 542; 29 L. Ed. 791 (1886), where railroad companies were held not bound to furnish independent express companies with equal facilities for doing an express business on their passenger trains, the court said (117 U. S. 24; 6 Supm. 554): "The public require the carriage, but the company may choose its own appropriate means of carriage." The doctrine of the Express Cases on this point was applied in Blank v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 80 Ill. App. 475, 483 (1899); Louisville, New Albany, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, N. E. 796, 798; 38 L. R. A. 93, 94; 58 Am. St. Rep. 348 (1896); Dulaney v. United Rys. & Electric Co., 104 Md. 423; 65 Atl. 45 (1906). As to application of Texas anti-trust act, see § 232. 26; 44 As to agreements with stock yard companies, see Covington StockYards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; 11 Supm. 461; 35 L. Ed. 73 (1891); Butchers & Drovers' Stock-yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 67 Fed. 35; 14 C. C. A. 290 (6th C., 1895); with sleeping-car companies, Chicago, St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 139 U. S. 79; 11 Supm. 490; 35 L. Ed. 97 (1891); Fort Worth & Denver |