§ 101. Injunction against preventing from securing or continuing in employment.23 § 102. Injunction against interference with receiver.-In some instances the allowance of an injunction has been based on the power to prevent interference with a receiver; thus where the decision was based on the general "power of a court of equity, having custody by receivers of the railroad and other property of a corporation, to enjoin combinations, conspiracies or acts upon the part of the receivers' employees and their associates in labor organizations, which, if not restrained, would do irreparable mischief to such property, and prevent the receivers from discharging the duties imposed by law upon the corporation." " 24 § 103. Injunction against unlawful acts of striking employees or those in sympathy with them.-In numerous instances injunctions have been granted against acts of striking employees, or, in some instances, of those in sympathy with them, thus, where it was said: "The threatened acts are such that their frequent occurrence might be expected, and to obtain legal redress therefor the annoyance of a multiplicity of suits would follow; also it is alleged that defendants are insolvent-both of thereby causing them personal annoyance with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment." 23 Injunctions against acts or the use of methods tending to prevent from securing employment or continuing in employment were allowed in, for instance, Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492; 57 N. E. 1011; 51 L. R. A. 339; 79 Am. St. Rep. 330 (1900; see form of decree); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; 78 N. E. 753; 6 L. R. A. N. S. 1067; 116 Am. St. Rep. 272 (1906); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79; 56 Atl. 327; 63 L. R. A. 534; 99 Am. St. Rep. 783 (1903). See also decisions cited in c. IX. 24 Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 312; 11 C. C. A. 209, 211; 25 L. R. A. 414, 419 (7th C., 1894). So acts producing fear of violence upon the minds of employees of a railroad in the hands of a receiver, were held an unlawful interference with the management of the road and a contempt of court, in Re Wabash R. Co., 24 Fed. 217 (C. C. Mo., 1885); U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748 (C. C. Colo., 1885). See also Re Doolittle, 23 Fed. 544 (C. C. Mo., 1885). See, as to mining property in the hands of a receiver, U. S. v. Weber, 114 Fed. 950 (C. C. W. Va., 1902). which are among the prime reasons that appeal to a court of equity for its preventive relief." 25 25 Cœur D'Alene Consolidated, etc., Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. 260, 265; 19 L. R. A. 382, 385 (C. C. Idaho, 1892). Other instances of injunctions granted under such conditions are Lake Erie & Western Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 61 Fed. 494 (C. C. Ind., 1893); U. S. v. Sweeney, 95 Fed. 434, 439, 446 (C. C. Ark., 1899); Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49 (C. C. Tenn., 1901); Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264 (C. C. Ill., 1901); Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed. 658 (C. C. W. Va., 1902); Carroll v. Chesapeake & O. Coal Agency Co., 124 Fed. 305; 61 C. C. A. 49 (4th C., 1903); Gulf Bag Co. v. Suttner, 124 Fed. 467 (C. C. Cal., 1903); Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard, etc., Co., 110 Ill. App. 61 (1903); Christensen v. People, 114 Ill. App. 40 (1904); affirmed as O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354; 75 N. E. 108; 108 Am. St. Rep. 219 (1905); Bruschke v. Furniture Makers' Union, 18 Chicago Legal News, 306 (Super. Ct. Cook Co., 1886?); Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640; 78 S. W. 482; 111 Am. St. Rep. 262 (1904); Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers' Assoc., 64 N. J. Eq. 640; 54 Atl. 565 (1903); Beattie v. Callanan, 67 App. D. 14; 73 N. Y. Suppl. 518 (1901); Herzog v. Fitzgerald, 74 App. D. 110; 77 N. Y. Suppl. 366 (1902); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903); N. Y., Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Weekly L. Bull. 306 (Cuyahoga Co., Ohio, Com. Pl., 1887); Perkins v. Rogg, 28 Id. 32 (Cin. Super. Ct., 1892); Temple Iron Co. v. Carmanoskie, 10 Kulp (Pa.), 37 (1900). See Steicher v. Grogan, 43 App. D. 213; 59 N. Y. Suppl. 1065 (1899). In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759; 53 Atl. 230 (1902), the injunction was against "entering the premises of complainant against its will, with intent to interfere with its business; violence, threats of violence, insults, indecent talk, abusive epithets, practiced upon any persons without their consent, with intent to coerce them to refrain from entering the employment of complainant or to leave its employment." See also decisions cited in c. X. For forms of orders enjoining such acts, see American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions, 90 Fed. 608 (C. C. Ohio, 1898); U. S. v. Sweeney, supra; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, supra; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 129 (C. C. Neb., 1902); Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903). For form of temporary injunc tion in Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563 (C. C. Mo., 1903), see with comments, editorial note in 37 Am. Law Rev. 285 (1903). In Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 598; 15 Supm. 900, 911; 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1895); affirming 64 Fed. 724, 765 (C. C. Ill., 1894) (see supra), the injunction was sustained on the ground of the right of the government to enjoin interference with interstate commerce. See § 8. § 104. Injunction against picketing or acts incident thereto. -In several instances injunctions have been allowed against picketing 26 or acts incident thereto.27 26 Thus, even in the absence of proof of violence, in Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 520; 77 N. W. 13, 22; 42 L. R. A. 407, 416; 74 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1898); Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, 110 Fed. 698 (C. C. Ohio, 1901). See also Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. Iowa, 1905); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; 44 N. E. 1077; 35 L. R. A. 722; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896). See also § 85. But mere picketing, in the absence of coercion, was regarded as insufficient ground for an injunction in Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1891); so, for a preliminary injunction, in Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 609; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904); Butterick Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1; 100 N. Y. Suppl. 292 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1906); Krebs v. Rosenstein, 31 Misc. 661; 66 N. Y. Suppl. 42 (1900); affirmed in Kerbs v. Rosenstein, 56 App. D. 619; 67 N. Y. Suppl. 385 (1900); see Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 101 (1900); affirmed in 55 App. D. 618; 67 N. Y. Suppl. 630 (1900); also Winslow v. Building Trades Council (Case & Comment, Aug., 1899), cited in Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., supra. See also § 85. As to allowing permanent injunction "after the troubles which called it out in its interlocutory form, and which are the substance of the allegations of the bill on which it issued, are wholly over," see Piano & Organ Workers' Union v. Piano and Organ Supply Co., 124 Ill. App. 353 (1906). In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759; 53 Atl. 230 (1902), an injunction was allowed against "loitering or picketing in the streets near the premises of complainant, with intent to procure the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant, and with a view to cause persons so employed to quit their employment, or persons willing to be employed by complainant to refrain from such employment." As to requisites of complaint, see Badger Brass Manuf. Co. v. Daly, 119 N. W. 328 (Supm. Ct. Wis., 1909). 27 Thus acts producing fear of injury, in American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions, 90 Fed. 608 (C. C. Ohio, 1898); Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49 (C. C. Tenn., 1901); Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264 (C. C. Ill., 1901); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906); Butterick Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1; 100 N. Y. Suppl. 292 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1906); Beaton v. Tarrant, 102 Ill. App. 124 (1902); Christensen v. Kellogg § 105. Injunction against blacklisting.28 Switchboard, etc., Co., 110 Ill. App. 61 (1903); Christensen v. People, 114 Ill. App. 40, 61 (1904); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903). See also Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union, 5 Ont. Law Rep. 463 (1903). See also § 86. In Goldberg v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429; 86 Pac. 806; 8 L. R. A. N. S. 460; 117 Am. St. Rep. 145 (1906), the injunction allowed was against "causing any agent or agents, representative or representatives, or any picket or pickets, or any person or persons to be stationed in front of or in the immediate vicinity of said (plaintiff's) places of business, with a placard or transparency having on it the words and figures ("Unfair firm; reduced wages of employees 50c per day. Please don't patronize") or any placard or transparency (having words or figures) of similar import, and from, at said places of business, or in front thereof, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, by means of pickets or transparencies, or otherwise, threatening or intimidating any person or persons transacting or desiring to transact business with said plaintiff, or being employed at said place or places by the plaintiff." 28 In Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421; 32 N. E. 744; 20 L. R. A. 342; 34 Am. St. Rep. 294 (1892), an injunction against the blacklisting of employees was refused; but see explanation of the decision in 20 L. R. A. 342, note. See, generally, as to blacklisting, § 43. PART II. COMBINATIONS PRODUCING PUBLIC INJURY CHAPTER XII THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY § 106. The doctrine of public policy. 107. Application of doctrine to restrictions upon competition. § 106. The doctrine of public policy.-The wrongs hitherto considered have been wrongs that the law regards as committed merely against an individual. But we pass now to a consideration of wrongs that the law regards as far more extensive in their operation, namely, as committed not merely against an individual, but against a large number of individuals, constituting that vague combination known as "the public," that is to say, the inhabitants of a given town, city, State or country, as the case may be, or even of a region not limited by mere political boundaries. The needs and capacities of different individuals are so infinite in their variety that a wrong measured by the needs and capacities of a large number must, of necessity, be somewhat indeterminate in its character, to say nothing of the indefiniteness of the number affected. Hence, it is not surprising that so indeterminate a test of liability has at times encountered strong disapproval.1 Nevertheless it is a 1 Such disapproval is manifested in the frequent quotation of the remark of Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bingham, 229, 252 (1824), that "public policy is a very unruly horse." See, for instance, Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 157, 164 (1839). For criticisms of the doctrine, see remarks of Campbell, C. J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, 64 (1855); also Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney (Wis.), 123, 136; 56 Am. Dec. 164, 168 (1851). In Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 231; 55 N. W. 1119, |