picketing is inherently illegal has been thus expressed: "The very fact of establishing a picket line is evidence of an intention to annoy, embarrass and intimidate, whether physical violence is resorted to or not. Any picket line must result in annoyance, both to the employer and the workmen, no matter what is said or done, and to say that the court is to determine by the degree of annoyance whether it shall be stopped or not would furnish no guide, but leave the question to the individual notions or bias of the particular judge.' 29 "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." 30 § 86. Picketing accompanied with acts of violence or producing fear of violence.-Although, in the view already taken, there is nothing illegal in mere picketing, those engaged in picketing have frequently as incident thereto committed undoubtedly unlawful acts of violence or producing fear of violence. As to acts of violence little need be said. The question of principal difficulty is when the acts of those engaged in picketing are unlawful as producing a fear of violence. The act of picketing is commonly not that of a mere solitary indi It and public streets must be free to punishing for contempt for violation of injunction. As to sufficiency of cause of action for picketing, see Crescent Feather Co. v. United Upholsterers' Union, 153 Cal. 433; 95 Pac. 871 (1908). 29 Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424; 83 N. E. 940; 14 L. R. A. N. S. 1018 (1908). Here picketing was held illegal even in absence of violence or threats of violence. 30 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. Č. Iowa, 1905). This language was approved and applied in George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 66 Atl. 953 (Ct. Ch. N. J., 1907). vidual, but of, it may be, fifty, or a hundred, or hundreds of striking employees. And, not to speak of open threats, when the words and tones and gestures of those picketing evince an inclination toward acts of violence, there seems to be a reasonable basis for the doctrine that accords with the weight of authority, namely, that picketing under such conditions is unlawful, or, perhaps to speak more accurately, the acts incident to the act of picketing are under such conditions unlawful. It is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp line of distinction between such incident acts as are, and such as are not, unlawful. Thus it has been said: "The decision of the question, I think, must depend upon the circumstances surrounding each case. There must be taken into account the size of the guard, the extent of their occupation of the street, and what they say and do. Taking every circumstance into account, if it appears that the purpose of the picketing is to interfere with those passing into or out of the works, or those wishing to pass into the works, by other than persuasive means, it is illegal. If the design of the picketing is to see who can be the subject of persuasive inducements such picketing is legal." 31 31 Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899). An injunction was here allowed under conditions thus described: "The crowds spoken of as 'guards,' judged by their size and acts, were designed for coercive, as well as persuasive, purposes. Conceding that a number of strikers could remain in the vicinity of the factory yard to see what was going on, yet when the number became a crowd, and when the acts of the crowd expanded into occasional attacks upon property and abusive language towards employees, and interference with those seeking to enter the yard, the 'guard' became a coercive instrument. A permanent guard in a public street in front of citizens' houses or fac tories is in itself a nuisance." See Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C. C. 592, 602 (1867); Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Id. 325 (1869); Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Id. 82 (1875); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 609; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904). For instances of injunctions allowed under similar conditions, see American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers', etc., Unions, 90 Fed. 608 (C. C. Ohio, 1898); Otis Steel Co. v.. Local Union, 110 Fed. 698 (C. C. Ohio, 1901); Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49 (C. C. Tenn., 1901); Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264 (C. C. Ill., 1901); Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (C. C. Ohio, 1906); Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' § 87. Picketing accompanied with inducing to refuse to enter or continue in employment.—As already seen, it is, according to the prevailing doctrine, unlawful to induce an employee Union, 159 Fed. 500 (C. C. Nev., 1908); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 62 S. E. 236; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 848 (Supm. Ct. Ga., 1908); Beaton v. Tarrant, 102 Ill. App. 124 (1902); Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard, etc., Co., 110 Ill. App. 61 (1903); Christensen v. People, 114 Ill. App. 40, 61 (1904); Piano & Organ Workers' Union v. Piano & Organ Supply Co., 124 Ill. App. 353 (1906); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903); Butterick Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1; 100 N. Y. Suppl. 292 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1906); N. Y. Central Iron Works Co. v. Brennan, 105 N. Y. Suppl. 865 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1907). As to evidence of violation of injunction in such case, see Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355; 77 N. E. 176; 4 L. R. A. N. S. 1001; 110 Am. St. Rep. 248 (1906); affirming 121 Ill. App. 647 (1905); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 173, 179 (C. C. Wis., 1906). In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union; Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, supra; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102, 117 (C. C. Neb., 1902), intimidation was held evidenced by the circumstance of those taking the places of the striking employees submitting to continued confinement within the works where they were employed. In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, it was said: "Persuasion too emphatic or too long and persistently continued may itself become a nuisance, and its use a form of unlawful coercion." To the same effect, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, supra. See also Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582; 140 Fed. 153 (C. C. Iowa, 1905); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 181 (C. C. Wis., 1906); Christensen v. People, supra; Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. D. 605, 609; 91 N. Y. Suppl. 185, 187 (1904); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers' Assoc., 64 N. J. Eq. 640; 54 Atl. 565 (1903). In Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, it was said: "Picketing in proximity to the shops or elsewhere on the streets of the city, if in fact it annoys or intimidates the new employees, is not allowable. The streets are for public use, and the new employee has the same right, neither more nor less, to go back and forth, freely and without molestation, and without being harassed by so-called arguments and without being picketed, as has a defendant or other person." An injunction was here allowed because of the employment of methods "attended with assaults and violence and intimidations and terrorizing." By 7 of the English Conspiracy & Protection of Property Act (1875), it is made unlawful for any person "with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and to quit his employment,32 and, it may be, to induce one to refuse to enter the employment of another.33 Such acts of inducement are frequently incident to the act of picketing, that is to say, those engaged in picketing frequently induce or seek to without legal authority," to "watch or beset the house or other place where such other person resides, or works or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place." By 2 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, "it shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working." See Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Comm'rs, 2 Irish Rep. (1908) 214; article in 42 Am. Law Rev. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling. For decisions under the act of 1875, see § 87; also Farmer v. Wilson, 69 L. J. Q. B. 496 (1900); Ward v. Operative Printers' Assistants' Soc., 22 Times L. R. 327 (1906). In State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227; 58 Atl. 769; 107 Am. St. Rep. 28 (1904), under G. S. (1902), § 1296, making it a criminal offense to "threaten or use any means to intimidate any person to compel such person against his will to do or abstain from doing any act which such person has a legal right to do or injure or threaten to injure his property with intent to intimidate him," was sus tained a conviction for the employment of certain methods in attempting to induce an employer to execute an agreement with members of a labor union. One of the methods employed being picketing, the legality of picketing under certain conditions was recognized, but it was held properly charged that "the placing of pickets to induce one to leave his employer's service by threats and intimidation was unlawful." In Goldberg v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429; 86 Pac. 806; 8 L. R. A. N. S. 460; 117 Am. St. Rep. 145 (1906), was held maintainable an action based on allegations that "with intent to threaten and intimidate employees and patrons and customers of plaintiff," the defendants kept "immediately in front of plaintiff's place of business and threatened so to keep there, representatives and pickets bearing placards and transparencies" bearing the words and figures: "Unfair firm; reduced wages of employees 50c per day. Please don't patronize," and that "by said means they had intimidated patrons and customers of plaintiff from entering said place of business." The acts in question were said to be mostly connected with a boycott of the plaintiff's business. For form of injunetion allowed, see § 104. See generally, as to liability for acts of violence or producing fear of violence, §§ 3, 4. 32 See § 65. 33 See § 66. induce persons to quit the employment of the person against whom the strike is directed, or to refuse to enter such employment. It seems obvious, however, that the legality of such acts, being determined by the doctrine above stated, in no way depends on the circumstance of their being incident to the act of picketing. 34 34 In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97; 44 N. E. 1077; 35 L. R. A. 722, 723; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896), the maintenance of a patrol in front of the plaintiff's place of business, for the purpose of inducing persons to leave or refrain from entering his employment, was enjoined under the conditions thus stated: "Following upon a strike of the plaintiff's workmen, the defendants conspired to prevent him from getting workmen, and thereby to prevent him from carrying on his business, unless and until he should adopt a certain schedule of prices. The means adopted were persuasion and social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm conveyed to persons employed or seeking employment, and a patrol of two men in front of the plaintiff's factory, maintained from 6:30 A. M. until 5:30 P. M., on one of the busiest streets of Boston. The number of men was greater at times, and at times showed some little disposition to stop the plaintiff's door. The patrol proper at times went further than simple advice, not obtruded beyond the point where the other person was willing to listen, and it was found that the patrol would probably be continued if not enjoined. There was also some evidence of persuasion to break existing contracts." There were dissenting opinions by Field and Holmes, JJ., the latter of which is especially instructive. See as to reference to Massachusetts and other statutes making it "a criminal offense for one by intimidation or force to prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of a person or corporation." So far as the acts here in question constituted an enticement to leave employment, the decision that they were illegal might be sustained on the ground indicated in the text. See Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903); Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903); Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox C. C. 82 (1875); State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227; 58 Atl. 769; 107 Am. St. Rep. 28 (1904); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 172 (C. C. Wis., 1906). As to injunction against "unlawful persuasion," see Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62; 80 N. E. 60 (1907); affirming 127 Ill. App. 526 (1906); Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 386; 77 N. E. 176, 187; 4 L. R. A. N. S. 1001, 1017; 110 Am. St. Rep. 248 (1906); affirming 121 Ill. App. 647 (1905). Under the prohibition of the Eng. lish Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875 (see § 86), an injunction was allowed in Lyons v. Wilkins, 1 Ch. (1896) 811, against "watching and besetting" the works of employers, for the purpose of ་ |