act of inducing was a natural incident or outgrowth of some lawful relation, particularly that of employee. 66 § 69. Combination to induce to quit employment.-If the act of inducing to quit employment be unlawful, it would seem lawful for a labor union or its members to attempt to induce apprentices under contract to leave their service). In Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128; 48 Atl. 894; 54 L. R. A. 640; 85 Am. St. Rep. 779 (1901), it was held actionable to induce employees to violate their agreement with their employer not to belong to a labor union. 66 Thus, in Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 264 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1891), it was held lawful for striking workmen to induce others to leave their employment by "persuasion and entreaty," the court saying that their action was "for an advantage in their business, which they had the right to seek by all lawful means." So in Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908), in denying relief against mere persuasion to quit or decline employment, while the employer was said to have "the right to a free access to the labor market, and the further right to the continuing services of those who accepted employment at will until such services were terminated by the free act of one or the other party to the employment," the employees were said to have the right "to an equally free access to the labor market." "The right of the one to persuade (but not coerce) the unemployed to accept certain terms, is limited and conditioned by the right of the other to dissuade (but not restrain) them from accepting." See previous decision in Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 172, 179 (C. C. Wis., 1906). To the contrary, however, seems Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636 (C. C. Minn., 1903). So in Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., supra, the employer having sent material on which the strikers had been working, to other employers for completion, relief was denied against the action of such strikers in inducing the employees of such other employers to refuse to work on such material, they notifying such employers that they would have to cancel their contracts for the performance of such work, or they would quit work. The court said: "To whatever extent employers may lawfully combine and co-operate to control the supply and the conditions of work to be done, to the same extent should be recognized the right of workmen to combine and co-operate to control the supply and the conditions of the labor that is necessary to the doing of the work." As to whether action of employee in inducing to quit employment may be regarded as that of a competitor with the employer, see § 45. In Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294; 84 N. E. 457; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 162 (1908), it was said to be "settled in this Commonwealth, at least, that competition and similar defenses are not justification for inducing an employee or other person to commit a breach of a contract, immaterial whether done in pursuance of a combination to do such act. In this view proof of the combination is superfluous so far as the mere question of civil liability is concerned.67 and thereby interfering with the business of the employer." In South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., App. Cas. (1905) 239; affirming Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, 2 K. B. (1903) 545, which reversed 1 K. B. (1903) 118, in holding a labor union liable for inducing the breach by employees of their contract of service, it was held no defense that such action was dictated by an honest desire to forward the interest of both employers and employees, and not prompted by a wish to injure the employers, between whom and the employees there was no quarrel or ill-will. In Coons v. Chrystie, 24 Misc. 296; 53 N. Y. Suppl. 668 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1898), an organization of master plumbers and its officers were enjoined from calling out the plaintiff's employees on the ground that he was not a member of the organization. It was so held against the contention that "the workmen had agreed with the defendant society that they should not accept employment from unaffiliated persons, such as the plaintiff," and that "by causing them to cease work the defendants merely caused the workmen to keep their promise," the court saying: "It may be that such an agreement would be valid as between the society and its members." Compare Reform Club of Masons, etc., v. Laborers' Union Protective Soc., 29 Misc. 247; 60 N. Y. Suppl. 388 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1899). In Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329; 84 N. Y. Suppl. 837 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1903), while conceding the possibility that it may now be legal to induce another to quit his employment as a means of advancing or maintaining the rate of one's own wages, it was denied to be thus legal merely for the purpose of obtaining the exclusive employment of members of labor unions. As to relation of employer as justifying inducing to quit employment, see § 36. Compare as to inducing to discharge from employment, § 72. In Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 185; 97 N. W. 663, 668; 63 L. R. A. 753, 760; 103 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1903), where an injunction was allowed to employers against a boycott instituted by an association composed of delegates from different labor unions, for the purpose of compelling the employment of union labor only (see § 63), it was held improper to also enjoin from going upon premises where the plaintiffs were employed, "for the purpose of ordering, directing or notifying men belonging to the various allied unions to desist from work upon the premises by reason of the fact that plaintiffs were employed thereon." See AllisChalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155, 172 (C. C. Wis., 1906). 67 In Webber v. Barry, 66 Mich. 127; 33 N. W. 289; 11 Am. St. Rep. 466 (1887), it was held a trespass to enter with a body of § 70. Criminal liability for combination to induce to quit employment.—Though mere inducing to quit employment seems of itself to create no criminal liability,68 yet, in accordance with the general doctrine of conspiracy to do a merely unlawful act not criminal,69 conspiracies to induce employees to quit their employment have been held to create a criminal liability.70 71. Inducing discharge from employment.-The doctrine that it is illegal to induce to quit employment has been conversely applied, so as to create a liability for inducing an employer to refuse to continue to deal with an employee; in other words, to discharge him from employment." Here, too, the 70 Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox. C. C. 404 (1851); State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; 9 Atl. 559; 59 Am. Rep. 710 (1887); State v. Dalton, 114 S. W. 1132 (Ct. App. Mo., 1908; for facts, see § 14). 71 Thus in Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414; 65 Atl. 129; 118 Am. St. Rep. 152 (1906), where there was an accompaniment of threats, it being held unnecessary "to prove any other malice than that which the law might imply from the unlawful act proved." So in Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa, 488; 75 N. W. 355; 67 Am. St. Rep. 306 (1898); 114 Iowa, 358; 86 N. W. 377 (1901), where, however, the discharge was induced by a libelous statement. The libel, rather than the inducing, seems to have been the gist of the action. So in Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly, 77 Md. 396; 26 Atl. 505; 19 L. R. A. 408; 39 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1893), of the notification to an employer by a labor union that in case of his retention in his employ of the plaintiff, a "customs cutter," all labor organizations in the city would be notified that his house was a non-union house. So in Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485; 59 N. E. 125; 52 L. R. A. 115; 83 Am. St. Rep. 289 (1901), where the inducement was "with intent to injure" the employee, it being regarded as immaterial whether the result was accomplished "by malevolent advice" or "by falsehood or putting in fear." See May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11; 51 N. E. 191 (1898). Contrary to the authorities generally on this point, seems Bonsall v. Reagan, 7 Del. (Pa.) Co. Rep. 545 (1900). That it is not necessary, for the purpose of creating liability for inducing such discharge, that a combination exist for that purpose, see remarks of Romer, J., in Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, 2 K. B. D. (1903) 600. In Hines v. Whitehead, 124 Iowa, 262; 99 N. W. 1064 (1904), however, it was regarded as necessary under the pleadings to prove a conspiracy to induce such discharge. See also as to liability doctrine applies even in the absence of any contract to serve for a fixed period.72 And here, too, there is, perhaps, a tendency, at least, to make the legality of inducing discharge from employment depend on whether the act of inducing was a natural incident or outgrowth of some lawful relation, particularly that of employee.73 for procuring discharge from employment, Suarez v. McFall, 87 S. W. 744 (Tex. Civ. App., 1905). In an action for causing discharge from employment, recovery was allowed for the amount of wages that the plaintiff would have earned during the period that he was deprived of employment, and he was held not obliged to seek employment elsewhere. Connell v. Stalker, 20 Misc. 423; 45 N. Y. Suppl. 1048 (N. Y. City Ct., 1897); affirmed in 21 Misc. 609; 48 N. Y. Suppl. 77 (1897). By Fla. R. S. (1906), § 3515, it is a crime to conspire to prevent the employment or cause the discharge of a person; or to threaten injury to "life, property or business" for such purpose. In JettonDekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969; 43 So. 590 (1907), it was said that such provision should be read in the light of Chipley v. Atkinson, infra. 72 Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; 1 So. 934; 11 Am. St. Rep. 367 (1887); Gibson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 232 Ill. 49; 83 N. E. 539 (1907); Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly, supra; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 360; 74 N. E. 603, 606; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 899, 904; 108 Am. St. Rep. 499 (1905); Carter v. Oster, 112 S. W. 995 (Ct. App. Mo., 1908); Dannerberg v. Ashley, 10 Ohio C. Ct. 558 (1894). So in London Guar antee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493; 69 N. E. 526; 99 Am. St. Rep. 185 (1904), as to a contract characterized as one "terminable at will, but under which the employIment would have continued indefinitely in accordance with the desire of the employer, except for such interference." So in Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166; 38 Atl. 96; 60 Am. St. Rep. 252 (1897), where there was an accompaniment of threats, etc., as to which, see § 6. So in Connell v. Stalker, supra, where it does not appear that there was such a contract. To the contrary, however, see Holder v. Manuf. Co., 138 N. C. 308; 50 S. E. 681 (1905), with which compare previous decisions in 135 N. C. 392; 47 S. E. 481 (1904). See Chipley v. Atkinson; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly, supra, to the effect that if the plaintiff alleges employment for a fixed period he must prove the allegation. As to necessity of alleging and proving defendants' knowledge of contract, see McGurk v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457; 85 N. E. 576 (1908). 73 Compare as to inducing to quit employment, § 68. Such relation need not necessarily be that of employee, as to which see § 72. Thus the relation of party to a contract seems to have been held sufficient in Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219; § 72. Relation of employee as justifying inducing discharge from employment.-There is observable a tendency to regard the act of inducing discharge from employment as lawful if merely incident to obtaining employment for one's self,74 or it may be for others in "solidarity of interest." 75 But there is likewise observable a tendency to regard such act as unlawful if merely incident to an end only remotely connected with obtaining employment for one's self, or like advantage. The question has been specially discussed in the common case of procuring the discharge of the employee merely because of his refusal to become a member of a labor union. The decided weight of authority is to the effect that under these conditions the act is unlawful, as without sufficient justification.76 Closely akin to the question whether the act of inducing is thus justified, is 35 Atl. 53; 33 L. R. A. 225; 54 Am. St. Rep. 882 (1896), holding that no action would lie for causing the discharge of an employee, by threatening the employer to terminate a contract that the defendant had the right to terminate at any time. In Lancaster v. Hamburger, 70 Ohio St. 156; 71 N. E. 289; 65 L. R. A. 856 (1904), a street railway conductor, discharged as the result of a report of his misconduct made to the company by a patron, was held to have no cause of action against the latter, irrespective of his motive in making such report. 74 Thus in Berry v. Donovan, infra (188 Mass. 357; 74 N. E. 605; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 903), it was conceded that a person seeking employment for himself would be justified "in making an offer to serve on such terms as would result, and as he knew would result in the discharge of the plaintiff by his employer, to make a place for the newcomer. Such an offer for such a purpose would be unobjectionable. It would be merely the exercise of a personal right, equal in importance to the plaintiff's right.” was. 75 See § 46. In Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; 1 So. 934; 11 Am. St. Rep. 367 (1887), it does not clearly appear what the relation of the defendant to the matter This is distinguishable from Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly, 77 Md. 396; 26 Atl. 505; 19 L. R. A. 408; 39 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1893), (which followed Chipley v. Atkinson), where the defendants were a labor union composed of persons engaged in the same line of occupation as the plaintiff. The question might have been raised whether, assuming the absence of coercion, the similarity or solidarity of interest did not furnish a sufficient basis for the legality of the action. 76 So held in Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353; 74 N. E. 603; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 899; 108 Am. St. Rep. 499 (1905), where was sustained an action against a representative and member of a national organization of shoe workers for procuring the |