allowing this doctrine to stand has already been seen in its extension from the mere relation of employer and employee to the relations of life generally.56 § 66. Inducing to refuse to enter or re-enter employment.The doctrine that it is unlawful to induce to quit employment seems to have been extended, though it may be with qualification, to the case of inducing to refuse to enter or re-enter employment. What is elsewhere said,57 as to who it is to whom the wrongdoer is liable for preventing a person from carrying out his intention to deal with another person applies here. Assuming him to be liable under any conditions to the person induced to refuse to enter the employment,58 is he liable to the intended employer? It seems to have been generally as Cumberland Glass Manuf. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assoc., 59 N. J. Eq. 49; 46 Atl. 208 (1899), it was said of the New Jersey act: "The words would seem to intend a legalization of a combination to induce others to join in a strike and are perhaps broad enough to legalize a combination to persuade individual workmen to quit or refuse to enter the service of any person or persons or corporation." In Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; 52 Atl. 152 (1902), the act was held to "simply render innocent as against the public, an act which previous to its passage, was a misdemeanor, and punishable by indictment," but not to "take away or in anywise affect any private rights which may arise out of acts which are legalized by that legislation." See also, as to such act, Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assoc., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 531; 20 Atl. 492, 496 (1890); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 119; 30 Atl. 881, 887 (1894); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Fed. 803, 815; 25 L. R. A. 414, 423 (C. C. Wis., 1894). So by Tex. L. 1899, c. 153, § 2, it is not unlawful "to induce or attempt to induce by peaceable and lawful means, any person to accept any particular employment or quit or relinquish any particular employment in which such person may then be engaged, or to enter any pursuit, or refuse to enter any pursuit or quit or relinquish any pur suit in which such person may then be engaged; provided that such member or members shall not have the right to invade or trespass upon the premises of another without the consent of the owner thereof." 56 See § 27. 57 See § 74. See, on the general subject, article in 16 Harv. Law Rev. 237 (1902-3) by E. F. McClennen. 58 In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, infra (63 N. J. Eq. 764; 53 Atl. 233), it was suggested that "the molested workman, seeking employment and unreasonably interfered with in this effort by a combination" has a remedy by action for damages or by injunction. sumed that he is,50 but without reference to the theoretical objection to sustaining a liability in favor of one person merely because another has failed to carry out his intention to deal with him. Such liability has been sought to be based on what has been termed a "probable expectancy," that is, a "right to enjoy a certain free and natural condition of the labor market." 60 But merely inducing to refuse to enter or re-enter the 59 See Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562 (1871); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; 44 N. E. 1077; 35 L. R. A. 722; 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896). In State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 291; 9 Atl. 559, 569; 59 Am. Rep. 710, 717 (1887), though a criminal proceeding, it was held not necessary to aver that the employer desired or intended to employ a person induced not to enter his employment; an allegation that such employer was in fact prevented from employing him being held, ex vi termini, to imply a purpose to employ him, which had been met and thwarted; there being also an allegation that the defendants conspired to hinder and prevent such employment. In People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649; 31 N. E. 240 (1892); adopting opinion of Daniels, J., in 61 Hun, 571, 581; 16 N. Y. Suppl. 436, 441 (1891), it was held a "threat to do an unlawful injury to property," to "threaten" to prevent persons who had been on strike from returning to their employment. What the defendant actually told the employer was that he would have to pay him a certain sum "to have his people back again to work"; that if he did not pay it "he could not have his people back again to work." This was a decision by four judges against three, reversing a decision made by two judges against one. The dissenting opinion of Gray, J., reported in 45 N. Y. State Reporter, 248, furnishes the better reason. People v. Barondess was followed under like conditions in People v. Weinseimer, 117 App. D. 603; 102 N. Y. Suppl. 579 (1907); affirmed in 190 N. Y. 537; 83 N. E. 1129 (1907). See also State v. Dalton, 114 S. W. 1132 (Ct. App. Mo., 1908; for facts, see § 14). As to liability under English statute for "watching or besetting," for purpose of inducing to refuse to enter employment, see §§ 86, 87. 60 Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 765; 53 Atl. 230, 233 (1902), where it was said: "The peculiar element of this perhaps newly recognized right, is that it is an interest which one man has in the freedom of another. It will probably be found in the end that the natural expectancy of employers in relation to the labor market and the natural expectancy of merchants in respect to the merchandise market must be recognized to the same extent by courts of law and courts of equity, and protected by substantially the same rules." This language was approvingly quoted in L. D. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 117; 85 N. E. 897, 900 (1908), where was asserted "the common law right to a reasonably free labor market." It was further said in employment of a person seems regarded as producing no liability in his favor. While it is said that "the flow of labor to the employer cannot be obstructed by intimidation or coercion produced by means of injury to person or property, or by threats of such injury," 1 it is also said: "The right of an employer to free labor is subject to the right of the laborer to hamper him by many expedients short of fraud or intimidation amounting to injury to the person or property of those who desire to enter his employ, or threats of such injury. For instance, persuasion not amounting to such intimidation is lawful, and perhaps the same may be said of social pressure, even when carried to the extent of social ostracism, not including, however, any threat in a business point of view." 62 The law on this subject must, however, be regarded as still somewhat unsettled.63 § 67. Inducing to quit employment in violation of contract Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, supra: "What is the measure or test by which the conduct of a combination of persons must be judged in order to determine whether or not it is an unlawful interference with freedom of employment in the labor market and as such injurious to an employer of labor in respect of his 'probable expectancies' has not as yet been clearly defined. Perhaps no better definition could be suggested than that which may be framed by conveniently using that important legal fictitious person who has taken such a large part in the development of our law during the last fifty years-the reasonably prudent, reasonably courageous and not unreasonably sensitive man." The liability arises in case of interference with the enjoyment of such expectancy "by means of such molestation or personal annoyance as would be liable to coerce the person upon whom it was inflicted, assuming that he is reasonably courageous and not unreasonably sensitive to refrain from employing or being employed." It was here regarded as unnecessary to determine how far the element of combination is a necessary condition of liability. See also § 74. 61 L. D. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, supra (200 Mass. 120; 85 N. E. 902). The principle was here applied to "the coercion and intimidation exerted by labor unions upon their members by fines or threats of fines" (200 Mass. 126; 85 N. E. 904). For facts, see § 6. As to picketing, see § 86. 62 Id. (200 Mass. 119; 85 N. E. 901). As to picketing, see § 87. 63 Being "still in the nebulous but clearing stage," Id. (200 Mass. 116; 85 N. E. 900). See discussion in Iron Molders' Union v. AllisChalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A., 7th C., 1908; see § 68). to serve. As already noted, the doctrine that it is unlawful to induce to quit employment applies even in the absence of any contract to serve for any fixed period.64 A fortiori does it apply to inducing to quit employment in violation of a contract to serve for a fixed period.65 64 See § 65; Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; 52 Atl. 152 (1902); Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 168, 172 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T., 1880). Liability for so inducing was sustained in Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; 53 S. E. 161; 5 L. R. A. N. S. 1091 (1906), sustaining on demurrer, declaration alleging intent to injure, and that the acts complained of were done "maliciously, without justifiable cause." as to effect of Code (1906), § 413. See also Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811, 828 (C. C. Ohio, 1897); Quinn v. Leathem, App. Cas. (1901) 495. See 65 In South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., App. Cas. (1905) 239; affirming Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, 2 K. B. (1903) 545, which reversed 1 K. B. (1903) 118, it was inducing employees "to break their contracts of service" that was held illegal. For facts, see § 68. In Smithies v. National Assoc. of Operative Plasterers, 1 K. B. D. (1909) 310, an agreement having been made between a union and a federation of employers for the reference of disputes to arbitration, and a dispute having arisen between a member of the federation and his employees, it was held no justification for such union inducing breach by such employees of their contracts of employment, that there was a bona fide belief on the part of the union that the employers were intending to evade a settlement of the dispute in accordance with the agreement, or even that such was actually their intent. By § 3 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, "an act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment." See article in 42 Am. Law Rev. 200 (1908) by C. R. Darling. In Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567 (1871), a cause of action was held stated in a declaration setting forth contracts of the plaintiffs with their workmen for the performance of certain work in the manufacture of boots and shoes; and alleging that the defendant, "well knowing thereof, with the unlawful purpose of hindering and preventing the plaintiffs from carrying on their business, induced said persons to refuse and neglect to perform their contracts, whereby the plaintiffs suffered great damage in their business." In Barnes v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (C. C. Ohio, 1907), an injunction was allowed against officers of a labor union inducing members to strike for the purpose of violating their contract with their employers by demanding a modification thereof by way of recognition of the "closed shop." Barnes v. Berry was distinguished in Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. § 68. Relation of employee as justifying inducing to quit employment. There is, perhaps, a tendency at least to make the legality of inducing to quit employment depend on whether the Switchmen's Union, 158 Fed. 541 (C. C. N. Y., 1907), where, in an action against a labor union and a subordinate lodge thereof (also their presidents) there was refused an injunction against inducing breach of a contract of service. The members of the union in the employ of the complainant had voted in favor of a strike, but, under the rules thereof, the sanction of the president was required to effectuate the strike. "The consent of the president in connection with the asserted direction by him to take the poll" was held not to be "such an incitement or inducement to strike as to justify a continuance of the injunction," it being said that he "acting under the constitution and by-laws of the union, could, at the request of the members, advise the employees as to their proper and lawful action." See Denaby & Cadeby Main Collieries v. Yorkshire Miners' Assoc., App. Cas. (1906) 384; Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563, 564, 565 (C. C. Mo., 1903); Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509; 50 S. E. 353; 69 L. R. A. 90; 106 Am. St. Rep. 137 (1905); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 763; 53 Atl. 230, 232 (1902); Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union, 5 Ont. Law Rep. 463 (1903). In several instances a civil or criminal liability, or both, has been declared by statute, for, as it has frequently been expressed, "enticing away a servant under contract." See Ala. Crim. Code (1907), § 6850; Streater v. State, 137 Ala. 93; 34 So. 395 (1903); Ark. Dig. (1904), § 5030, amended by L. 1905, c. 298; Sunnyside Co. v. Read, 71 Ark. 59; 70 S. W. 462 (1902); Sturdivant v. Tollette, 84 Ark. 412; 105 S. W. 1037 (1907); Tucker v. State, 111 S. W. 275 (Supm. Ct. Ark., 1908); Cal. Penal Code, § 646; Fla. R. S. (1906), § 3232; Ga. Penal Code (1895), § 121; L. 1901, p. 63; L. 1903, p. 91; Caldwell v. O'Neal, 117 Ga. 775; 45 S. E. 41 (1903); Chambless v. Melton, 127 Ga. 414; 56 S. E. 414 (1907); McBride v. O'Neal, 128 Ga. 473; 57 S. E. 789 (1907); Bright v. State, 61 S. E. 289 (Ct. App. Ga., 1908); Ky. Stat. (1903), § 1349; Bourlier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135; 15 S. W. 60; 11 L. R. A. 550; 34 Am. St. Rep. 171 (1891); La. R. S. (Wolff's Ed., 1904), p. 993; Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 242; 33 So. 211 (1902); Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388; 37 So. 2; 67 L. R. A. 65 (1904); Miss. Code (1906), § 1146; Triplett v. State, 80 Miss. 379; 31 So. 743 (1902); State v. Richardson, 86 Miss. 439; 38 So. 497 (1905); Gregory v. State, 42 So. 168 (Supm. Ct. Miss., 1906); Alford v. Pegues, 46 So. 76 (Supm. Ct. Miss., 1908); Mont. Rev. Codes (1907), § 8827; N. C. Revisal (1905), § 3374; S. C. Crim. Code (1902), § 359; State v. Aye, 63 S. C. 458; 41 S. E. 519 (1902); State v. Rhody, 67 S. C. 287; 45 S. E. 205 (1903); Tenn. Code (1896), §§ 4337, 4338; Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed. 49, 55 (C. C. Tenn., 1901; held un |