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tor of Internal Revenue of the United States for the Sixth District of Kentucky or allow an inspection of his records for the purpose of obtaining such information for use as evidence in said action of The Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Block et al., in said county court," etc.

Having been taken into custody by the Sheriff under this order, the Collector sued out a writ of habeas corpus and was discharged from custody by the order of the United States District Court for the Kentucky District.

1. In the brief of the Assistant Attorney General some doubt is expressed whether we can take cognizance of this case upon appeal from the District Court. Prior to the passage of the act of March 3, 1891, establishing the Circuit Court of Appeals, an appeal from the final judgment of a District Court on an application for a writ of habeas corpus by or on behalf of one alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution or any law of the United States went first to the Circuit Court. Rev. Stat. §763. But by the above act of 1891 it was provided that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the District Courts or from the Circuit Courts direct to this court in certain cases, among others, "in any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States." 26 Stat. 826, 828, c. 517, §5. The present case belongs to that class. The appellee, who was discharged upon habeas corpus, invoked the protection of the Constitution against his being restrained of his liberty by the appellant acting under an order of commitment issued by an inferior state court; and the judgment of the District Court proceeded upon the ground that the proceedings against him were inconsistent with the laws of the United States and with the regulations of the Treasury Department legally prescribed under those laws. Throughout, the contention of the appellant has been that the Constitution forbade the giving of the force of law to those regulations adopted by merely executive officers. We think the case is properly here on appeal as one involving the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States.

2. Of the power of the District Court to discharge the appelVOL. CLXXVII-30

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lee if he was held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States, no doubt can be entertained. It is true that in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251, it was said that although a court of the United States had power to discharge one held in custody by state authorities in violation of the Constitution of the United States, it was not bound to interpose immediately upon application being made for the writ, but should exercise the discretion with which it was invested "in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." Hence, the general rule that the courts of the United States should not interfere by habeas corpus with the custody by state authorities of one claiming to be held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, until after final action by the state courts in the case in which such custody exists. Ex parte Royall, above cited; New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89, and authorities there cited; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, and authorities there cited. But to this general rule there are exceptions which are thus indicated in Ex parte Royall: "When the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state authority."

The present case was one of urgency, in that the appellee was

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an officer in the revenue service of the United States whose presence at his post of duty was important to the public interests, and whose detention in prison by the state authorities might have interfered with the regular and orderly course of the business of the Department to which he belonged. The District Court therefore did not err in determining the question of constitutional law raised by the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and rendering final judgment.

3. We come then to inquire whether the imprisonment of the appellee was in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. This question was fully examined in the elaborate and able opinion of Judge Evans of the District Court. 96 Fed. Rep. 552.

The commitment of the appellee was because of a refusal to file with his deposition copies of certain reports made to him by Block & Sons, distillers, of liquors manufactured by them and deposited in the bonded warehouses on the distillery premises during a specified period. Manifestly, he could not have filed the copies called for without violating regulations formally promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. If these regulations were such as the Secretary could legally prescribe, then, it must be conceded, the state authorities were without jurisdiction to compel the Collector to violate them.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an officer in the Department of the Treasury. Rev. Stat. § 319. And the Secretary of the Treasury, as the head of an Executive Department of the Government, was authorized "to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining to it." Rev. Stat. § 161.

Now, the reports or copies of reports in the possession of the Collector-for not producing copies of which he was adjudged to be imprisoned-were records and papers appertaining to the business of the Treasury Department and belonging to the United States. The Secretary was authorized by statute to

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make regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the custody, use and preservation of such records, papers and property. The Constitution gives Congress power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by that instrument in the Government of the United States or in any Department or officer thereof. Const. Art. 1, § 8. That power was exerted by Congress when it authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to provide by regulations not inconsistent with law for the government of his Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining to it. The regulations in question may not have been absolutely or indispensably necessary to accomplish the objects indicated by the statute. But that is not the test to be applied when we are determining whether an act of Congress transcends the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. Congress has a large discretion as to the means to be employed in the execution of a power conferred upon it, and is not restricted to "those alone without which the power would be nugatory;" for, "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted" to the end authorized to be attained, " which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." "Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the Government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on legislative ground." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 421, 423. In the more recent case of Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 283, 293, this court, referring to the above constitutional provision, said that "in the exercise of this general power of legislation, Congress may use any means, appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution." Again: "Every right created by, arising under or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States may be protected and enforced by Congress by such means and in such manner as Congress, in

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the exercise of the correlative duty of protection, or of the legislative powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted to attain the object."

Can it be said that to invest the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law for the conduct of the business of his Department, and to provide for the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining to it, was not a means appropriate and plainly adapted to the successful administration of the affairs of that Department? Manifestly not. The bare statement of the proposition suggests this conclusion, and extended argument to support it is unnecessary.

This brings us to the question whether it was inconsistent with law for the Secretary to adopt a regulation declaring that all records in the offices of collectors of internal revenue, or any of their deputies, are in their custody and control" for purposes relating to the collection of the revenues of the United States only," and that collectors "have no control of them, and no discretion with regard to permitting the use of them for any other purpose."

There is certainly no statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbade the adoption of such a regulation. This being the case, we do not perceive upon what ground the regulation in question can be regarded as inconsistent with law, unless it be that the records and papers in the office of a collector of internal revenue are at all times open of right to inspection and examination by the public, despite the wishes of the Department. That cannot be admitted. The papers in question, copies of which were sought from the appellee, were the property of the United States, and were in his official custody under a regulation forbidding him to permit their use except for purposes relating to the collection of the revenues of the United States. Reasons of public policy may well have suggested the necessity, in the interest of the Government, of not allowing access to the records in the offices of collectors of internal revenue, except as might be directed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The interests of persons compelled, under the revenue