four hours, as required by this ordinance, the ice which had formed on the sidewalk in front of its premises, and the plaintiff sustained a severe injury by slipping and falling thereon.

It is said on behalf of the plaintiff that the obligation to keep the sidewalks free from snow and ice is imposed as a duty to all persons who may have occasion to use the walks in passing and repassing, and that the neglect to do so, in consequence of which any one lawfully using the walk is injured, is a neglect of duty to him, and entitles him on well-recognized principles to maintain an action. (Crouch v. Steele, 3 Ex. R. 402; Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 214.)

To maintain this proposition it is necessary to make it appear that the duty imposed was a duty to individuals rather than a duty to the whole public of the city; for if it was only a public duty it cannot be pretended that a private action can be maintained for a breach thereof. A breach of public duty must be punished in some form of public prosecution, and not by way of individual recovery of damages. Nevertheless the burden that individuals are required to bear for the public protection or benefit may in part be imposed for the protection or benefit of some particular individual or class of individuals also, and then there may be an individual right of action as well as a public prosecution if a breach of the duty causes individual injury. (Atkinson v. Water Works Co., 6 Exch. 404.)

The nature of the duty and the benefits to be accomplished. through its performance must generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part or exclusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a duty imposed wholly or in part for their especial benefit. In this case the duty was to keep the sidewalks free from obstructions. It will not be claimed

that this was not a duty to the whole public of the city, and the disputed question is whether it is also a duty to each individual making use of the walks. An obstruction by snow or ice may make the use of a walk dangerous, or may wholly preclude its use for the purpose for which walks are constructed. If the duty to keep the walk free from obstructions is a duty to individual travellers desiring to use it, it is as much broken. when the walk is wholly obstructed as when it is capable of

use but is dangerous, and an action will as much lie by one who is compelled to go around an obstruction, as by one who slips. and falls in a dangerous place. Moreover, as the lot owner is required to keep the walk free from all nuisances, an individual traveller who can maintain the proposition that this is a duty to him must be entitled to bring suit wherever the existence of a nuisance diminishes either the comfort or the safety of the use of the walk by him. This view of the obligation of the lot owner would add greatly to his common-law liabilities, and it is not easy to draw the lines which should definitely limit and confine his liabilities.

But if we look a little further into the statute under which the city is incorporated, we shall see that all its provisions respecting sidewalks, so far as they impose duties upon the owners of adjoining or abutting lots, have one common object, to provide suitable and safe passage-ways for foot passengers by the side of the public streets, and to keep these in condition for safe use. The expense of such ways is imposed on the owners of adjacent lots, and these owners must keep them free from encroachments. Will it be claimed that if the city council shall require a lot owner to construct a sidewalk in front of his premises, and he should fail to obey the requirement, every person who should come upon the street desiring to pass on foot where the walk should be, and who shall be precluded from doing so by the walk not being constructed, may bring suit against the lot owner for the neglect to build it as a neglect of duty to the traveller himself? He is damnified in that case as clearly as when he falls upon a dangerous walk and is hurt; though the damage may perhaps be insignificant.

But it is clear, we think, that the duty to build the walk is only a public duty, and the duty to keep it in condition for use is also a public duty. Exactly what force is to be given to the provision of statute that the lot owner shall be liable to the city for all damages which the city may be compelled to pay for his default, we need not consider in this suit. It is enough to say here that an action grounded on that particular provision of the statute could only arise after the city had been rendered liable in a suit against it. If the statute contemplated public duties only, the city ordinance could not go further and give

individual rights of action. But neither, we think, has it attempted to do.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must stand affirmed with

TORT, against the owners and occupants of a building in Boston, for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff therein. Trial, in this court, without a jury, before Field, J., who found for the defendants, and reported the case for the consideration of the full court. The facts appear in the opinion.

F. Peabody, Jr. (C. A. Prince with him), for the plaintiff. A. T. Sinclair for one of the defendants.

A. Russ (G. A. A. Pevey and H. H. Sprague with him) for the other defendants.

DEVENS, J. The plaintiff was a police officer of the city of Boston, acting under a rule regularly passed by the police commissioners, which made it his duty to examine in the nighttime the doors and windows of dwellings and stores, to see that they were properly secured, and to give notice to the inmates, or, if such buildings were unoccupied, to make fast the doors and windows found open. He crossed the threshold of the elevator entrance of the building, of which the defendants were owners or occupants, the doors of which were open, for the purpose of making an examination, thinking it was the entrance to the upper stories, in order that he might be in from the air and there light his candle, and was precipitated down the well of the elevator, which was unguarded, receiv

ing injury thereby. It is found by the report that he entered with the honest belief" that there might be something wrong being done in the building, and with the honest purpose of arresting offenders, if he found any, or of securing the doors. for the safety of the property of the occupants."

"It is a very ancient rule of the common law," says Chief Justice Gray, "that an entry upon land to save goods which are in jeopardy of being lost or destroyed by water, fire or other like danger, is not a trespass." (Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376.) As individuals may thus enter upon the land of another, firemen may do so for the protection of property, officers of the law for similar purposes, and, under proper circumstances, for the arrest of offenders or the execution of criminal process. The right to do this may be in limitation. of the more general right of property which the owner has, but it is for his protection and that of the public. (Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Railroad, 109 Mass. 277, 280; Hyde Park v. Gay, 120 Mass. 589, 593; Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190; Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.)

When doors are left open in the night-time under such circumstances that property is unprotected, it is a reasonable police regulation which permits an officer to enter in order to warn the inmates of the house, or to close and fasten the doors, and a license so to do is fairly implied, which, at least, should shield him from being treated as a trespasser.

'But, if the plaintiff was a licensee, it is contended that he was no more than this; that, if lawfully upon the premises, he was there at his own risk; and that none of the defendants were under any obligations toward him to keep this entrance of the building in a safe condition. It is certainly well settled that by the common law, no duty is imposed on the owner or occupant of premises to keep them in a suitable condition for those who come upon them solely for their own convenience or pleasure, and who have not been either expressly invited to enter, or induced to come by the purpose for which the premises are appropriated, or by some preparation or adaptation of the place for use by customers or passengers, which might naturally and reasonably lead them to suppose that they

might safely and properly enter thereon. Where no such preparation is made, or express or implied invitation extended, and the entry of the licensee is permissive only, there can ordinarily be no recovery for a neglect properly to guard the premises by which such person may be injured. (Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport Railroad, 10 Allen, 368, 373; Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306.)

If this be conceded, it is still to be determined in the case at bar whether, when there is evidence which tends to show that the injury proceeded from the neglect of an obligation imposed upon the defendants by statute, the protection intended to be afforded by means of such a statute is not for the benefit of all those who are upon the premises in the performance of lawful duties, even if they are but licensees, as well as for the benefit of those who are there by inducement or invitation, express or implied, and thus whether such neglect may not be made the foundation of an action.

The St. of 1872, c. 260, is entitled "An act in addition to an act to provide for the regulation and inspection of buildings, the more effectual prevention of fire, and the better preservation of life and property in Boston." Section 5 is as follows: "In any store or building in Boston, in which there shall exist or be placed any hoistway, elevator or well-hole, the openings thereof through and upon each floor of the said building shall be provided with and protected by a good and substantial railing, and such good and sufficient trap-doors with which to close the same, as may be directed and approved by the inspector of buildings; and such trap-doors shall be kept closed at all times except when in actual use by the occupant or occupants of the building having the use and control of the same. For any neglect or violation of the provisions of this section, a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars for each and every offence may be imposed upon the owner, lessee or occupant of said building.”

The owner or occupant of land or a building is not liable, at common law, for obstructions, pitfalls or other dangers there existing, as, in the absence of any inducement or invitation to others to enter, he may use his property as he pleases. But he holds his property "subject to such reasonable control and