DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 376 U.S. that might have been excused coming from the lips of a sick man, had announced his decision when the witness asked to be excused. He then said that the witness was a malingerer; and he refused to call a doctor. This aspect of the case emphasizes a second reason why a different judge should have tried the contempt charge. The judge who accused the witness of malingering was not a medical expert and his conclusion that the witness was faking, though admissible as evidence, would not be conclusive. This crucial fact was one that the judge should not be left to decide on the basis that he saw the witness and therefore could be depended upon to determine that he was not ill, as, contrariwise, he could have been depended upon to know that the accused had openly resisted a marshal, as in Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289. A man going on trial before that judge is denied a basic constitutional right-the right to examine and crossexamine. As we said in In re Murchison, supra, if the emotionally involved trial judge tries the contempt "the result would be either that the defendant must be deprived of examining or cross-examining him or else there would be the spectacle of the trial judge presenting testimony upon which he must finally pass in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In either event the State would have the benefit of the judge's personal knowledge while the accused would be denied an effective opportunity to cross-examine. The right of a defendant to examine and cross-examine witnesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that right jeopardized in such way." 349 U. S., at 139. An impartial judge, not caught up in the cross-currents of emotions enveloping the contempt charge, is the only one who can protect all rights and determine whether a contempt was committed or whether the case is either one of judicial nerves on edge or of judicial tyranny. 575 GOLDBERG, J., dissenting. MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. I agree with my Brother DoUGLAS that due process of law requires that this contempt be tried before a different judge. This Court has recognized that the power of a judge to impose punishment for criminal contempt without notice or hearing is: "capable of grave abuses, and for that reason [the Court has never given any] encouragement to its expansion beyond the suppression and punishment of the court-disrupting misconduct which alone justified its exercise." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 274. The Court has also "marked the limits of contempt authority in general as being 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'" Ibid., quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231. I would hold, therefore, that the Constitution forbids a judge to impose punishment for such contempt without notice or hearing, except when (1) the contempt creates such "an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court .... [that if] not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's authority will follow,'" In re Oliver, supra, at 275, quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 536, and when (2) “no explanation could mitigate [contemner's] offence or disprove the fact that he had committed such contempt of [the court's] authority and dignity as deserved instant punishment." Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 310. The power to punish in so summary a fashion is, as the New York Court of Appeals recognized, fraught with danger, particularly when the alleged contempt consists of a charge of wrongdoing against the very person sitting in judgment of the contempt. GOLDBERG, J., dissenting. 376 U.S. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS has convincingly demonstrated that the contempt charged here was not such an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court as to necessitate instant punishment, that an explanation or the introduction of evidence could have mitigated or disproved the offense, and that it consisted essentially of a charge of wrongdoing against the very person sitting in judgment of the contempt. I conclude, therefore, that this contempt could not constitutionally have been tried summarily,* and that it should have been tried before a different judge. *There may well be instances of disruption where the trial judge correctly feels that some immediate action is necessary to restore order but that a full, immediate civil or criminal contempt proceeding might cause undue prejudice against the defendant in the main trial. In attempting to accommodate these conflicting demands, the trial judge should have some latitude, limited, of course, by the overriding principle of the law of contempts that the power exercised be "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231; In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 274. Opinion of the Court. RABINOWITZ ET AL. v. KENNEDY, ATTORNEY GENERAL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 287. Argued March 2, 1964.-Decided March 30, 1964. 1. An attorney who performs legal services, including the handling of litigation, for a foreign government must register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. The work of a lawyer in litigating for a foreign government cannot, within the meaning of the exemption section of the Act, be characterized as only "financial or mercantile" activity, for those terms are used in the Act to describe conduct of an ordinary private commercial character. Furthermore, since the interest of a foreign government in litigation, even if relating to financial or mercantile matters, cannot be deemed only "private and nonpolitical," an attorney engaged in such litigation cannot under any construction of the Act qualify within the exemption section. Pp. 609-610. 2. Where petitioners have made no attempt to determine which questions on the government registration form must be answered and where the Government admits that some of the questions are wholly or partially inapplicable, the issue as to the extent of the disclosure to be required of attorneys under the Foreign Agents Registration Act is not ripe for adjudication. Pp. 601-611. 115 U. S. App. D. C. 210, 318 F. 2d 181, affirmed on other grounds. David Rein argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Stephen J. Pollak argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, George B. Searls and Doris H. Spangenburg. MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, attorneys engaged in the general practice of law, instituted this declaratory judgment action, 28 Opinion of the Court. 376 U.S. U. S. C. § 2201, against respondent, the Attorney General of the United States, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint alleged that petitioners had been: "retained by the Government of the Republic of Cuba to represent in the United States the Republic of Cuba and its governmental agencies in legal matters, including litigation, involving the mercantile and financial interests of the Republic of Cuba. . . . The retainer does not cover advice or representation involving public relations, propaganda, lobbying, or political or other non-legal matters, nor have the plaintiffs advised, represented, or acted on behalf of the Republic of Cuba in any such matters." The complaint alleged further that respondent had "demanded that [petitioners] ... register with the Attorney General under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended." The relief sought by petitioners included a "judgment declaring that their activities as legal representatives for the Republic of Cuba do not subject them to the requirements of registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended . . . . 52 Stat. 631, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 611. That Act requires the registration of "any person who acts or agrees to act . . . as . a public-relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee, servant, agent, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal... "Foreign principal" includes "a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party," as well as "a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of individuals organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business in, a foreign country The Act exempts from registration any "person engaging or agreeing to engage only |