WILLIAM IRVING WOODFORD, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES
[138 C. Cls. 228; 355 U. S. 861]
Pay and allowances; retired Army pay. Petition dismissed.
Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court October 28, 1957.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.
See Suit for Salary I, II, III, IV, VIII. AGENCY.
See Jurisdiction II.
APPRENTICE TRAINING.
See Contracts I, II, III. ARBITRARY ACTION.
See Pay and Allowances VII.
BUSINESS EXPENSES.
See Taxes IV, V, VI.
CAREER COMPENSATION ACT.
See Pay and Allowances VIII, IX, X, XI.
CHANGED CONDITIONS.
See Contracts XXIII, XXIV, XXV.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
See Suit for Salary I, II, III, IV, VIII, X,
CLAIM RECITAL.
See Patents III.
CONSIDERATION.
See Contracts XII.
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH.
See Taxes XXVIII, XXIX, XXX. CONTINUITY OF INTEREST. See Taxes XVI.
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.
See Contracts X, XI; Statute of Limitations I, II, III, IV, V. CONTRACTS.
I. Plaintiffs are employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing who, in 1951 and 1952, entered into an apprentice training program instituted by the Bureau and which provided that upon completion of a four- year course successful applicants could qualify as journeymen plate printers. The program was dis- continued in 1953. Plaintiffs allege that their par- ticipation in the program was on a contractual basis and that they suffered damages by its discontinuance in that they had accepted demotions from their former positions and had lost grade increases and rights to other training under the Servicemen's Re- adjustment Act. It is held that the institution of the program was not a contract or an offer to contract and that consequently there could be no breach thereof.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the petitions are dismissed. Barnes, et al., 76. United States 36
II. Prior to entering into the training program plaintiffs signed waivers of higher grades and salaries applicable to them. It is held that this was a voluntary act on the part of plaintiffs and done solely for the purpose of dispensing with reduction-in-grade procedures otherwise required under the statutes and regula- tions. Officers
III. Plaintiffs' employment as apprentices was the same as any other civil service employment. They were free to drop out of the course at any time and the Govern- ment could dispense with their services when desired, provided only that procedural requirements as to dismissal were complied with. Id.
IV. Plaintiffs, on behalf of their subcontractor, seek to recover for extra work required to repair steel towers damaged by flood waters in the Central Valley of California. It is held that while the contracting officer could have treated the repairs as extra work resulting from damage which was not the fault of the contractor or subcontractor he was not obligated to do so. In the instant case he recognized no liability on the part of the Government and did not order the repairs in writing as could have been done under the contract. There was no breach of the contract by the defendant and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. The petition is dismissed. Donovan Construction Co., 97. United States 70 (28)
V. Repairs made necessary by floods are not generally recognized as extra work for which the Government would be responsible and there was no provision in the contract which required the defendant to assume such responsibility. Id.
VI. Where a contract is silent as to the liability of the prime contractor to the subcontractor recovery may be allowed the contractor on behalf of the subcontractor, but when it expressly negates such liability there can be no recovery. Id.
VII. Plaintiff sues as trustee in bankruptcy on certain termination claims arising out of the bankrupt's con- tract with the United States Maritime Commission. The Government alleges that some of the bank- rupt's claims were fraudulent and invokes the general forfeiture statute, 28 U. S. C. 2514. It also asserts counterclaims under 41 U. S. C. 119, which is section 19 of the Contract Settlement Act. Plaintiff defends against the counterclaims on the ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations. It is held, under the authority of Erie Basin Metal Products v. United States, ante, p. 67, that the counterclaims are civil penalties and subject to the limitation of 28 U. S. C. 2462. The filing of the counterclaims within the specified time is a condition precedent to the right to assert them. The statute is never tolled by the filing of plaintiff's suit, even though the counterclaims arise out of the same transaction. The opinion and dissenting opinion of May 1, 1956, are vacated and this opinion substituted in their place. Goggin, Trustee, 279.
Limitation of Actions 35 (1), 129
VIII. Plaintiff's motion for rehearing is denied to the extent that it requests the striking of defendant's affirmative defense of forfeiture under the general forfeiture statute. Subject to the qualification that the Government may have waived its rights to the extent that it took over raw materials and work in progress without payment therefor, with knowledge that the plaintiff's claim was liable to forfeiture, the statute is applicable if fraud is proved. Id.
IX. The general forfeiture statute may be invoked against a trustee in bankruptcy the same as against a receiver in a state court. A trustee in bankruptcy is not a purchaser for value. His rights are derivative, and are not superior to those of the bankrupt. Id. United States 120
X. Plaintiff sues for reimbursement of certain unemploy- ment taxes which it was compelled to pay to the State of Illinois as a result of its operations under a Govern- ment contract. It alleges that its contract was terminated and the suit is brought under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, which would permit recovery of interest at 21⁄2 percent per annum on the amount
found to be due. The Government contends that the contract was completed and not terminated and that plaintiff in any event executed a binding release to the Government. It is held that the Contract Settlement Act is applicable and plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $420,212.46, together with interest to run from the date of payment by plaintiff of the individual payments which went to make up the total. Houdaille Industries, Inc., 301.
XI. The Government's contention that the contract was simply modified under the Changes article is not sustained. Under the Joint Terminal Regulations issued pursuant to the Contract Settlement Act a reduction in the amount of material called for by a contract was a method of termination specifically provided for. Id.
XII. It is held that the release executed by plaintiff is not valid due to a complete lack of consideration. Docu- ments executed in connection with the release which plaintiff had not negotiated or bargained for do not constitute consideration. Nor does the fact that the release was executed under corporate seal import consideration. Under the statute in Michigan, where plaintiff was domiciled, a seal constitutes only a rebuttable presumption of consideration, and in the instant case plaintiff had adequately rebutted the presumption. Id.
XIII. Plaintiff's expenses were of a kind specifically provided for in the contract and the right to reimbursement is not affected by the fact that claim for reimbursement was not made until after the contract had expired. It is sufficient that the expenses arose on account of plaintiff's operation under the contract. Id. United States 74 (16)
XIV. Plaintiffs were found guilty of violations of the Walsh- Healey Public Contracts Act and were ineligible for a period of three years to receive Government con- tracts. Operating under a different name they obtained two additional contracts which were fully performed and for which they were paid $181,580.46.
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