ABDUCTION.

Connivance of Child-Indictment-24 & 25
Vict. c. 100, s. 56.-An indictment under
sect. 56 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, for
unlawfully, by force or fraud, taking away,
enticing away, or detaining a child under
the age of fourteen, with intent to deprive
the parent or guardian of the possession
of such child, is not supported by evidence
of force or fraud exercised upon the guar-
dian of the child, or any other person than
the child so taken or detained; the force
or fraud must have been practised upon
the child himself in order to bring it within
the statute. (Reg. v. Barrett. April, 1885.
Smith, J.) 659.

Evidence-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 56.-The
prisoner, being indicted under the 24 & 25
Vict. c. 100, s. 56, for that she did feloni-
ously and unlawfully, by fraud, detain a
child, under the age of fourteen, with in-
tent to deprive the mother of the posses-
sion of her-the evidence being that the
child had been in the service of the pri
soner, and was missing and could not be
discovered; and that she gave different
accounts of what had become of the child,
but implying that the prisoner had given
her up to some third persons; and there
being no evidence that the child was still
in her actual custody, nor, indeed, any
evidence where she was: Held, that, upon
the principle of Jones v. Dowle (9 M. &
W. 19), the prisoner was rightly convicted;
because, whether her stories were all utterly
false, and the child was secreted by her-
self, or whether they were so far true, and
the child was in the actual custody of some
third parties, to whom she had wrongfully
delivered her, it was equally true that she
unlawfully detained the child by fraud.
(Reg. v. Annie Johnson. 1884. Č. C. R.)

481.

ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS.
(See Conspiracy to Defraud.)

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.
(See Felonious Receiving.)

ADMISSIONS.

(See Evidence.)

ADULTERATION OF FOOD.
Notice of intention to submit to analysis-
Contract to supply milk-Corporation
aggregate-Purchaser-Sale of Food and
Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63),
s. 14. The notice of intention to have an
article analysed, and the other procedure
which is prescribed by sect. 14 of the Sale
of Food and Drugs Act 1875, only applies
to proceedings taken under that Act by the
persons mentioned in sect. 13 of the Act,
and to proceedings by persons who at the
time of making a purchase intend to sub-
mit the article purchased to analysis. Upon
the supply of articles, in pursuance of a
general contract to supply, there cannot
be an intention on the part of the person
to whom the articles are supplied, to sub-
mit those articles to analysis within sect.
14. And the fact that an article, for the
sale of which a person is prosecuted under
the Act, was supplied in pursuance of a
contract, is immaterial. Corporations ag-
gregate are purchasers within the
meaning of the Sale of Food and Drugs
Acts. Parsons v. The Birmingham Dairy
Company (9 Q. B. Div. 172) not followed.
(Guardians of Enniskillen Union v.
Hilliard. April, 1884. Exch. Div. Ir.)
643.

66

Skim-milk-Deficiency of butter fat-38 &
39 Vict. c. 63, s. 6.-In answer to a request
for milk, the respondent sold to the appel-
lant skim-milk, which was proved by the
analyst to be 60 per cent. butter-fat defi-
cient, and not a normal whole milk. Held,
upon a case stated, that a magistrate was
justified in finding this was no offence
within the 6th section of the Sale of Food

and Drugs Act 1875. (Lane (app.) v. Collins (resp.). Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 677.

AIDING AND ABETTING. (See Prize Fight.)

AMENDMENT OF SENTENCE. (See False Pretences.)

APPEAL.

REFUSAL OF APPLICATION FOR BAILJURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL. (See Practice.)

REFUSAL OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUSJURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL. (See Extradition.)

REFUSAL TO COMMIT.

(See Debtors' Act.)

ARSON.

Setting fire to a picture frame in a house, and so setting fire to the floor of the houseIntent-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7.-The prisoner was indicted under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, for wilfully and maliciously setting fire to a picture frame in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to would amount to a felony. The jury found that the prisoner did not set fire to the house apart from the frame; that he did set fire to the frame; that the probable result would be setting fire to the floor of the house; that he did not intend to set fire to the house; that he was not aware that what he did would probably set the house on fire, and so injure the owner; and that he was not reckless or indifferent whether the house was set on fire or not. Upon these findings a verdict of Not guilty was directed by the judge. (Reg. v. Harris and Atkins. March, 1882. Hawkins, J.) 75.

Setting fire to things in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to, the offence would amount to felony-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s.7. -A servant girl entered on her service on the 2nd day of January, and on the 10th received notice to leave at the end of one month. On the 15th a sheet was discovered burning on a chair in front of, but four feet from, the kitchen fire. The girl was in the kitchen, and either could not or would not give any account of the occurrence. Later in the same day the prisoner's apron was on fire, although it was hanging on the kitchen wall, ten feet away from the fire. At 5 p.m. on the same day there was a

third fire, and at 7 p.m. the bed and bedding in the nursery were on fire, the girl being there at the time. No part of the house was actually burnt. Held, that, upon the above facts, the girl could not be indicted for the felony under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, for setting fire to things in a building under such circumstances that if the building were thereby set fire to would amount to felony. If a person maliciously, with intent to injure another by merely burning his goods, sets fire to such goods in his house, that does not amount to a felony under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 7, even although the house catches fire, unless the circumstances are such as to show that the person setting fire to the goods knew that by so doing he would probably cause the house also to take fire, and was reckless whether it did so or not; in which case there would be abundant evidence that he intended to bring about the probable consequence of his act, viz., the burning of the house. (Reg. v. Maggie_Nattrass. March, 1882. Hawkins, J.) 73.

ASSAULT.

Elementary Education Acts 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75) and 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 79)— Power to impose home lessons-Detention of child at school after school hours.-The master of a board school established under the Elementary Education Acts 1870 and 1876 is not authorised by those Acts in setting lessons to be prepared at home by children attending such school, and the detention of a child at school after school hours for not doing home lessons amounts to a criminal assault. (Hunter v. Johnson. June, 1884. Q. B. Div.) 600.

ATTEMPT TO MURDER.
(See Murder.)

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF. (See Practice.)

BAIL, APPEAL FROM REFUSAL of. (See Practice.)

BANKRUPTCY.

Convicted felon-Liability to be made bankrupt-Felony Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), . 88.7 and 8-Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 6, sub-sect. 6.—A convicted felon may be adjudicated a bankrupt on an act of bankruptcy committed either before or after his conviction. If a debtor's summons be served on a convicted felon

during his imprisonment, his neglect
to pay, secure, or compound for the debt
will be an act of bankruptcy. (Ex parte
Graves; Re Harris. Nov., 1881. Ct. of
App.) 118.

NOTICES IN THE "LONDON GAZETTE."

(See Evidence.)

Proof-Felony-Forged acceptances-De-
posit to secure overdraft at bank-Right
to prove for overdraft-Compounding
felony. The bankrupt had obtained an
overdraft from his bankers on depositing
certain bills of exchange as security. It
was afterwards discovered that the accept-
ances to the bills were forgeries. The bills
were subsequently delivered up to the
bankrupt in exchange for joint and several
promissory notes of himself and his father.
It was alleged that part of the arrangement
was that the bankers would not prosecute
the bankrupt for forgery. The notes were
not paid at maturity. Held, that, assuming
the alleged corrupt agreement had been
made, the bankers could prove for the
amount of the overdraft without first pro-
secuting the bankrupt. (Ex parte Leslie;
Re Guerrier. Feb., 1882. Ct. of App.)
125.

BASTARDY.

.

Voluntary witness-Refusal to answer ques-
tions-Power of justices to commit to
prison-7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 70-35 & 36
Vict. c. 65, s. 4.-By sect. 70 of the 7 & 8
Vict. c. 101, justices in petty or special
sessions may, upon the request of any party
to any bastardy proceedings before them,
summon any person to appear as a witness
in such proceedings; and if any person so
summoned neglect or refuse to appear to
give evidence at the time and place ap-
pointed in such summons
it
shall be lawful for such justices by war-
rant .
to require such person to
be brought before them; and if any person
coming or brought before any such jus-
tices in any such proceedings refuse to give
evidence therein, it shall be lawful for such
justices to commit any person to any
house
of correction within their jurisdiction, &c.
On the hearing of a bastardy summons,
the alleged putative father went into the
witness-box and denied the statement of
the mother. In cross-examination he de-
clined to answer a question (considered by
the justices to be material), and offered to
withdraw from the case and consent to an
order being made against him. The jus-
tices committed him to prison for refusing
to answer the question. Held, by Grove

and Hawkins, JJ. (dissentiente Smith, J.)
that the justices had jurisdiction to commit,
for that the words "if any person coming
or brought before such justices," in the
above section, were not limited to persons
who had been summoned to appear and
give evidence. (Reg. v. Flavell and
another. Dec., 1884. Q. B. Div.) 660.

BETTING.

Place kept or used for betting-Moving about
in inclosed field-Betting Houses Act (16
& 17 Vict. c. 119).-An inclosed field was
let to a committee for the purpose of hold-
ing certain dog races, to which the public
were admitted on payment of an entrance
fee. The appellant attended the meeting,
and moved about in the field and made bets
with various persons present. Held, that
the appellant could not be convicted under
the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119, sects. 1 and 3, of
having "used a place for the purpose of
betting with persons resorting thereto."
(Snow (app.) v. Hill (resp.). March, 1885.
Q. B. Div.) 737.

BIGAMY.

Cohabitation-Continuance of cohabitation
doubtful-Presumption of law. It was
proved that the prisoner and his wife were
married in 1865, and that they lived
together after marriage, but how long did
not appear. There was no evidence of
separation or when they last saw each
other. In 1882 the prisoner married a
second time, and was indicted for and con-
victed of bigamy. Held, that there was
no evidence to displace the presumption
arising on this state of facts that the first
wife was living at the date of the second
marriage. (Reg. v. Thomas Jones. June,
1883. C. C. R.) 284.

Evidence.-On a trial for bigamy two certi-
ficates were produced, one purporting to be
the certificate of the marriage in 1843, of
the first wife to A. B., prior to the mar-
riage with the prisoner in 1875; the other
purporting to be a certificate of the death
of A. B. in 1880, subsequent to the mar-
riage with the prisoner. Held (after con-
sultation with the Recorder of London),
that as prima facie the marriage with the
prisoner was illegal, the so-called first wife
could give evidence on the trial of the
accused. (Reg. v. David Ayley. Nov.,
1881. Deputy Recorder of London.) 328.
Evidence-Proof of first marriage.-Where
the proof of marriage is supported by a
copy of the certificate and evidence that

Irishmen must shun him as their deadly
enemy." The indictment alleged that the
notice tended (1) to excite an unlawful
confederacy; (2) to excite a riot; (3) to
induce persons to shun George Thompson
against the form of the statute. The judge
at the trial, upon the requisition of the
counsel for the Crown, ruled that the
notice on the face of it was an unlawful
notice within the meaning of the statute,
but reserved for the court the point
whether he should have so ruled or should
have left the question to the jury. The
jury, in answer to the only question sub-
mitted to them, found that the prisoner had
in fact posted the notice, and the prisoner
was accordingly convicted. Held, that the
notice was capable of bearing the meaning
alleged in the indictment; but that the
question whether it did in fact bear such
meaning should not have been withdrawn
from the jury. (Reg. v. Coady. Feb.,
1882. C. C. R. Ir.) 89.

BREACH OF THE PEACE.
AUTHORITY ΤΟ DISPERSE

ASSEMBLY.

UNLAWFUL

(See Justice of the Peace.)

BREAD, SALE OF.

Baker not provided with scales and weights
-Delivery of bread from a cart at a cus-
tomer's house in pursuance of a previous
order-6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 7.-By 6 & 7
Will. 4, c. 37, s. 7, "Every baker or seller
of bread

who shall convey or
carry out bread for sale in and from any
cart or other carriage shall be provided
with and shall constantly carry in such cart
or other carriage a correct beam and scales

with proper weights
. and in
case any such baker or seller of bread
shall at any time carry out or de-
liver any bread without being provided with
such beam and scales, with proper weights
then, and in every such case,
every such baker or seller of bread shall
for every such offence forfeit and pay any
sum not exceeding five pounds." Held,
that this section applies to cases where
bread is delivered in pursuance of a pre-
vious order, and not merely to cases where
the baker sends out bread for sale in a cart.
(Ridgway (app.) v. Ward (resp.). Dec.,
1884. Q. B. Div.) 603.

Baker-Sale and delivery-Loaves sold and
weighed at shop in customer's presence-
Delivered at customer's house by baker's
cart at customer's request-Cart not pro-
vided with beam and scales, &c.-6 & 7
Will. 4, c. 37-Sect. 7-Bread" carried out
and delivered for sale."-Bread, bought
by a customer at a baker's shop, and then
and there weighed in the customer's pre-
sence, was afterwards, at the customer's
request and to oblige her, sent by the baker
in his cart, with other goods purchased by
the customer, to her house three miles off,
where it was delivered by the baker's man,
the cart not being provided with beam and
scales with proper weights as directed by
sect. 7 of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37. The
justices having convicted the baker of an
offence under sect. 7, in carrying out and
delivering bread from a cart not provided
with beam and scales, &c.: Held, that the
bread was not "carried out and delivered"
by the appellant as a baker "for sale," but
for the convenience and at the request of
the customer, the sale and weighing having
taken place at the shop, and that therefore
no offence had been committed under
sect. 7. Robinson v. Cliffe (1 Ex. Div.
295; 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 689) and Ridgway
v. Ward (15 Cox C. C. 603; 14 Q. B. Div.
110; 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 704) distinguished.
(Daniel v. Whitefield. June, 1885. Q. B.
Div.) 762.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.
Superior Court Mandamus-4 & 5 Will. 4,
c. 36.-A mandamus from the High Court
of Justice will not lie to the Central
Criminal Court, that being a Superior and
not an inferior court. The Recorder of
London, one of the justices of the Central
Criminal Court, by the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36,
having refused to make an order for the
restitution of stolen property under sect.
100 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, this court has