to this case, and supports the conviction. The theft in this case was committed on board a vessel sailing under the British flag, and being at the time floating in a tidal river where ships used for commerce go, and therefore it is submitted the Admiral had jurisdiction over the offence. REG. υ. WILSON. 1882. Sir H. Giffard and E. Clarke were heard in reply.-The case Admiralty— of Reg v. Leslie (Bell C. C. 220; 8 Cox C. C. 269) was referred Jurisdiction. to. The COLERIDGE C.J.-This case has been argued at some length, and the question raised by it is no doubt of considerable importance. The facts are these. The bonds which the prisoners have been convicted of feloniously receiving were on board an English ship, in the river Maas, off Rotterdam, in front of a dolphin," and was moored by ropes to the land of Holland. The tide ebbs and flows in the river, and at the place where she was lying in front of the "dolphin" there is always enough water to float ships of her class. There was no actual proof when, or by whom, the bonds were stolen. The case states, "There was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that the theft occurred after the voyage began; the evidence rather pointed to its having occurred before she sailed." Whether the bonds were carried off the ship on to the shore, and sent by some conveyance to the prisoners in England, or whether they were brought by the prisoners to England, does not appear. prisoners were acquitted of stealing the bonds and found guilty of receiving them with guilty knowledge that they had been stolen. It is obvious that the prisoners could not be convicted of feloniously receiving the bonds unless they were stolen within the same jurisdiction where the receiving took place, and therefore it becomes material to inquire whether the jurisdiction of the Admiralty attached so that the prisoners could be tried at the Old Bailey. It is admitted that the exact point raised in this case has never arisen for decision in our Courts before. There appear but two points for us to decide. 1. Was the ship within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty so as to make offences com. mitted upon it triable according to the English law? 2. If that point is answered in the affirmative, were the prisoners, according to the decisions, liable to be tried in the English courts? First, as to the place. The place appears to me to come within the old definition of the Admiralty jurisdiction. The ship was at a part of the river which is never dry, and where it would not touch the ground at low water, and the tide ebbs and flows in the river, and great ships do lie and hover there. That is sufficient to bring this ship within the Admiralty jurisdiction. Without saying that the reports of the case of Rex v. Jemot and Rex v. Allen (ubi sup.) are as full as could be desired, it seems very difficult to draw any tangible distinction between them and the present case. This case also falls within the decision of Reg. v. Anderson (ubi sup.), where the ship was half-way up the river Garonne, in France, and at the time of the offence REG. v. CARR AND 1882. about 300 yards from the nearest shore, and this Court held, the prisoner having been convicted of manslaughter, that the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and that the Central Criminal Court had jurisdiction to try the prisoner. I am unable to distinguish this case from that, but if Admiralty anything Reg. v. Anderson seems an à fortiori case. Then, as to Jurisdiction. the second point, whether there is anything in the personality of the prisoners which would make them not liable by the law of England. It is true that some of the Judges in Reg. v. Anderson (ubi sup.) place reliance upon the fact that the prisoners formed part of the crew of the vessel, but Bovill, C.J. in his judgment points out that England has always insisted on her right to legislate for persons on board her vessels in foreign ports. None of the Judges suggested that their judgments would have been in any way altered if the prisoners had not in those cases formed part of the crew. I think it makes no difference whether a person is a British subject or not who comes on board a British ship where the British law reigns, and places himself under the protection which that flag confers; if he is entitled to the privileges and protection of the British ship he is liable to the disabilities which it creates for him. I am unable, therefore, to make a distinction between a passenger or stranger on board a ship and one of the crew, and it makes no difference in my mind whether the person is on board voluntarily or involuntarily; if while on board he is entitled to the protection of its flag, he is also bound by the obligations imposed by the law governing that ship. The utmost that can be said as regards the theft in this case is that the bonds may have been stolen by someone who came on board casually; it may be a foreigner who took them off the vessel at Rotterdam. Suppose the thief had not been able to get off the ship, and had been captured and brought here, could he have been tried here? In my opinion he could, for if while he was on board the ship he was entitled to the protection of the British flag, he was at the same time equally liable to the disabilities of the criminal law of this country. It appears to me that the evidence shows that the bonds were stolen within the jurisdiction of the English law, and I am of opinion that the prisoners therefore were triable at the Central Criminal Court for receiving them well knowing them to have been stolen. think that the conviction should be affirmed. I POLLOCK, B.-I am of opinion that the conviction should be affirmed. The prisoners were convicted of the offence of feloniously receiving stolen goods, and the question is, were the prisoners within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court for all purposes? The general rule of law is that a person on board an English ship is to be treated as within the dominion of the English Crown; and it is admitted that if the ship had been on the high seas, or had been moored in the middle of the river, this rule would have applied to the case. Then what distinction can there be because the ship was tethered by ropes to the shore? I think there is no distinction. She was a large ship carrying passengers and goods from Harwich to Rotterdam, and was in a tidal river at Rotterdam at a spot where great ships go. She was there for the purpose of unloading, and when unloaded would return to Harwich. I think, therefore, the conviction was right. REG. V. CARR AND 1882. Admiralty LOPES, J.-I think, also, that the conviction should be affirmed. Jurisdiction As to the question of the thief not being one of the crew of the vessel, I do not think that that matters. The thief was on board an English ship at the time the bonds were stolen, and therefore came within the English law. STEPHEN, J.-Since the time of Richard II. the jurisdiction of the Admiralty has been extended to waters where great ships go. There are many statutes which gave jurisdiction to particular courts in particular cases. But the jurisdiction of the Admiralty itself has never been defined in any other way than as laid down in the reported cases. The case of Rex v. Jemot bears on the question of local jurisdiction, and decided that the Admiralty had jurisdiction over a theft on board an English vessel in a Spanish port, and shows that the jurisdiction of the Admiral was not confined to the waters outside creeks, ports, harbours, &c. Rex v. Allen (ubi sup.) is to the same effect. Reg. v. Anderson (ubi sup.) goes further, and affects both the questions of place and person, the place being in a foreign river, and the person being an American subject, who had committed manslaughter on board an English ship. No doubt the prisoner was one of the crew of that ship, but it seems to me that we cannot lay down the rule in narrower terms than that the jurisdiction of the Admiral extends to all tidal waters where great ships go, and to all persons on board of them whether foreigners or not. There is no reason which should induce us to lay down restrictions to the extent which has been contended by the prisoners' counsel, that the Admiralty jurisdiction extends only when the British flag is flying, and not when it is lowered. It seems to me that the protection of the British flag and the English jurisdiction are co-extensive, and that protection and obedience must co-exist. I think, therefore, that the thief in this case, if he had been captured, might have been tried at the Old Bailey. WILLIAMS, J.-I concur. Conviction affirmed. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Tuesday, June 13, 1882. (Before FIELD and CAVE, JJ.) BEATTY AND OTHERS (apps.) v. GILLBANKS (resp.). (a) APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURT. Unlawful assembly -The "Salvation Army" - Assembly of persons for lawful purpose-Knowledge by them that such assembly would cause others to commit a breach of the peaceLiability for such breach-Sureties to keep the peace. The appellants, with a considerable number of other persons, forming a body called the " Salvation Army," assembled together in the streets of a town for a lawful object, and with no intention of carrying out their object unlawfully, or by the use of physical force, but knowing that their assembly would be opposed and resisted by other persons in such a way as would in all probability tend to the committing of a breach of the peace on the part of such opposing persons. A disturbance of the peace having been created by the forcible opposition of a number of persons to the assembly and procession through the streets of the appellants and the Salvation Army, who themselves used no force or violence, it was Held, by Field and Cave, JJ. (reversing the decision of the Justices), that the appellants had not been guilty of "unlawfully and tumultuously assembling," &c., and could not therefore be convicted of that offence, nor be bound over to keep the peace. Held also, that knowledge by persons peaceably assembling for a lawful object that their assembly will be forcibly opposed by other persons, under circumstances likely to lead to a breach of the peace on the part of such other persons, does not render such assembly unlawful. CASE ASE stated by Justices pursuant to the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, and the 20 & 21 Vict., c. 43. At a petty session for the division of Axbridge, in the county of Somerset, held at Weston-super-Mare, in the said division, on the 29th day of March, 1882, the three appellants Beatty, Mullins, and Bowden were charged on the complaint of the respondent Gillbanks, the superintendent of constabulary within the said division, for that the appellants had unlawfully and tumultuously assembled, with divers other persons, to the number of 100 or (a) Reported by HENRY LEIGH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. OTHERS v. GILLBANKS. 1882. more, in public thoroughfares, called Walliscote-road, Regent- BEATTY AND street, and other places within the said parish of Weston-superMare, on the 26th day of March inst., to the disturbance of the public peace and against the peace of our Lady the Queen. And upon the hearing of such complaint, the Justices found that the allegations therein contained had been proved, and did order the appellants to be severally bound in their recognisances respectively, with two sureties, to keep the peace for the term of twelve calendar months, and in default to be imprisoned for three calendar months, or until they did severally sooner comply with the aforesaid order. The appellants being dissatisfied with that decision, the Justices, on their application, stated and signed the following case, setting forth the facts and grounds of their aforesaid determination, for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, as follows: CASE. At the hearing of the before-mentioned complaint, the following facts were proved : (a) The Salvation Army is an organised body of persons who are and have for some time been in the habit of forming themselves into processions of more than 100 persons, and in such processions parading the principal streets and public places of the town. (b) These processions are formed at the Hall of the Salvation Army, and, after their formation, proceed, headed by a musical band and flags and banners, through the streets, collecting, and for the purpose of collecting, as they go, a mob of persons with whom, attended by much shouting and singing, uproar and noise, they eventually return to the Hall, where a meeting is then held. (c) The appellant Beatty is captain and a leader of the Salvation Army, and organises and directs these processions and meetings. (d) The other appellants Mullins and Bowden are also leaders of the Salvation Army, and assist in organising and directing the processions and meetings. (e) There is another organised band of persons at Westonsuper-Mare, called the Skeleton Army, which also parades the streets and is antagonistic to the Salvation Army and its processions. (f) There are numbers of other persons at Weston-super-Mare who, as soon as the Salvation Army has formed for the purpose of thus parading the streets as aforesaid, are in the habit of assembling in a mob of great numbers about and around and in front of the procession of the Salvation Army. Some of these, together with the Skeleton Army, assemble to dispute the passage of the Salvation Army through the said streets and places, some to encourage such passage, with shouting, singing, Unlawful assembly. |